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ABSTRACT

“The Gifts of Enemies”: The Acteal Massacre, Sociedad Civil
Las Abejas and Mexico’s Ejército Zapatista de Liberación
Nacional and Humanitarian and Development Aid during The
Low-Intensity War, 1997-1999
by
Maria Ramona Hart

Advisor: Patricia Tovar

This dissertation is about a faction of the Sociedad Civil Las Abejas who, as Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs), were housed at the INI IDP camp in San Cristóbal de Las Casas,
Chiapas, Mexico, in 1997-99 after the Acteal massacre on December 22, 1997. This faction is of
interest because they protested the remaining members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (Civil
Society The Bees) social movement at Acteal and the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación
Nacional, often better-known as the Zapatistas), because the movement required them to reject
governmental humanitarian aid and development programs or lose their membership in the social
movement. Challenging David Graeber’s (2011) conception of debt as something accumulated
among social equals, I show that the aid, which I contend was not in any sense a “free gift” as it
demanded reciprocity (as part of a gift economy), was most often accepted—specifically that
IDP recipients who accepted this aid drop out of the Zapatista movement and embrace the PRI,
or Party of the Institutional Revolution, to whom they would acquire a debt of loyalty in a
clientelistic mechanism.
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The study analyzes the ways that poverty obstructs projects of indigenous and “original
peoples’” resistance against states, such as Spanish colonial, Mexico or Guatemala (Chiapas was
a department of Guatemala until 1841), that have dominated them for centuries. Repression,
preventable death, enslavement, illiteracy, illness, corruption, underdevelopment, racism,
domination, displacement, deterritorialization, extractavism, dispossession and accumulation by
dispossession in Chiapas have kept poverty indicators among the highest of Mexican states and
comparable to much poorer countries elsewhere in the world. I argue that under these extreme
conditions, resistance to the state is harder to sustain, causing many to reject the idea of
resistance—and to drop out of resistance movements, a factor that has been under-theorized in
the social movements literature.
And, more critical to this study, I argue that much humanitarian aid, especially from
federal government and international sources, is “assistentialist” in that it is fundamentally
“charity,” treating the symptoms rather than the structural causes of poverty, and not changing
the fundamentals of people’s lives. I contend that the IDPs at the INI camp were more likely to
be critical of aid that was a “free gift” and assistentialist than non-assistentialist aid—because
this aid simply placed a band-aid on their absolute poverty. Drawing on my fieldwork in the
camps in 1997, 1998 and 1999, as well as a return visit with 14 of the families that were housed
there, I show how the INI camp illustrated Fassin’s (2012) critique that humanitarian efforts are
fraught with difficulties, from critical and uncompliant refugees and IDPs, who are never
grateful nor docile, to the declaration of a state of exception within Mexico in September, 1998,
to a host of other problems and issues. In short, I ask why did some people embrace (government
sourced) humanitarianism in a context in which it was rejected politically by powerful local
actors, such as the EZLN? I showed how the Mexican government’s
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Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera cash transfer program was structured to counter “the
problem” of Zapatismo, along the lines of the Maussian dualism between prestation and war, and
how it aligned with a Marxian reading of “history from below.” I showed how the Chiapas
conflict had become a civil war by 1997 with paramilitaries carrying out the massacre at
Acteal—and the mild reaction that Las Abejas had toward the paramilitary wandering freely in
Acteal during 1999, and the paramilitaries’ light sentencing for the massacre. I also offered a
clear illustration of how the IDPs were social agents with “a feel for the game” (Bourdieu 2005),
causing many of them to make individual choices which embraced but then rejected the PRI,
whom they saw principally as among their “enemies” bearing “gifts.” The study also illustrates
the power of representatives of the Mexican government to divide the neo-Zapatista social
movement—that is, the modern Zapatista movement, including all the movements allied with the
EZLN—particularly when abject poverty and hardship were involved.
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CUMBIA DE SOCIEDAD CIVIL LAS
ABEJAS

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION LAS
ABEJAS’ CUMBIA

Señores, voy a cantar una cumbia,
De la organización Las Abejitas
La reina está juntamente con su pueblo,
que es el reino de Dios poderoso

Señores, I’m going to sing you a cumbia
about the organization of little Bees, Las Abejas,
Our queen is together with her people
under the reign of all powerful God

Vamos todos a luchar
en la sociedad civil
para un México mejor
y un pueblo con justicia
Los hombres organizados en su pueblo
cansados de violaciones e injusticias
también sus representantes perseguidos
por organizar a su pueblo oprimido.
Que vivan los derechos humanos
que viva la CONAI compañeros
que viva nuestro patrón de Chenalhó
también la sociedad civil San Pedrano
Vamos todos a luchar
en la sociedad civil
para un México mejor
y un pueblo con justicia

Let’s all go and fight
in civil society
for a better Mexico
and a people with justice
The men organized their people
tired of violations and injustice
and their representatives persecuted
for organizing their oppressed people
Long live human rights
long live CONAI, comrades,
long live our patron of Chenalhó
and San Pedro civil society
Let’s all go and fight
in the civil society
for a better Mexico
and a people with justice
(Translation, Maria Ramona Hart)

--© 1998
CORO “LA VOZ DE LOS DESPLAZADOS”
Comunidad de X’Oyep, Mplo. de Chenalhó, Chiapas
En memoria de los mártires de Acteal
Recorded and edited by Sangeet Grabaciones
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HIMNO ZAPATISTA

ZAPATISTA HYMN

Ya se mira el horizonte
Combatiente zapatista
El camino marcará
A los que vienen atrás

Now we can see the horizon
Zapatista combatant
The path will be shown to
Those that come after us

Vamos, vamos, vamos, vamos adelante
Para que salgamos en la lucha avante
Porque nuestra Patria grita y necesita
De todo el esfuerzo de los zapatistas

Let's go, let's go, let's go, let's go forward!
To take part in the struggle ahead
Because our Fatherland cries out for and
needs
All of the effort of the Zapatistas

Hombres, niños y mujeres
El esfuerzo siempre haremos
Campesinos y obreros
siempre unidos con el pueblo

Men, children and women
We will always make the effort
Peasants and workers
All together with the people.

Nuestro pueblo exige ya
acabar la explotación
nuestra historia dice ya
lucha de liberación
Ejemplares hay que ser
Y seguir nuestra consigna
Que vivamos por la patria
O morir por la libertad

Our people demand now
an end to exploitation
Our history demands now
struggle for liberation
A model we must be
And keep our slogan
That we shall live for the Fatherland
Or die for freedom
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“CUANDO TENGA LA TIERRA” (Written by Daniel Toro and Ariel Petrocelli 1972)
Cuando tenga la tierra sembraré las palabras
que mi padre Martín Fierro puso al viento,
cuando tenga la tierra la tendrán los que
luchan
los maestros, los hacheros, los obreros.
Cuando tenga la tierra
te lo juro semilla que la vida
será un dulce racimo y en el mar de las uvas
nuestro vino, cantaré, cantaré.
Cuando tenga la tierra le daré a las estrellas
astronautas de trigales, luna nueva,
cuando tenga la tierra formaré con los grillos
una orquesta donde canten los que piensan.
Cuando tenga la tierra
te lo juro semilla que la vida
será un dulce racimo y en el mar de las uvas
nuestro vino, cantaré, cantaré.

HABLADO:
'Campesino, cuando tenga la tierra
sucederá en el mundo el corazón de mi
mundo
desde atrás de todo el olvido secaré con mis
lágrimas
todo el horror de la lástima y por fin te veré,
campesino, campesino, campesino,
campesino,
dueño de mirar la noche en que nos
acostamos para hacer los hijos,
campesino, cuando tenga la tierra
le pondré la luna en el bolsillo y saldré a
pasear
con los árboles y el silencio
y los hombres y las mujeres conmigo'.
Cantaré, cantaré, cantaré, cantaré.

When I have the land I will
plant the words
That my father Martín Fierro put to the wind,
When I have the land
Those who fight will have
The teachers, the axemen, the workers
When I have the earth
I swear to you seed, that life
will be a sweet cluster and in the sea of grapes
Our wine, I will sing, I will sing
When I have the earth
I will give the stars
Astronauts of wheat, new moon,
When I have the earth I will
form with the crickets
An orchestra where those who think will sing
When I have the earth
I swear to you seed that life
Will be a sweet cluster and in the sea of grapes
Our wine, I will sing, I will sing
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Peasant, when I have the earth
The heart of my world will happen in the world
From behind all the forgetfulness I will dry with my tears
All ...
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internally-displaced persons
ISSTE, Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (Institute of
Security and Social Services of State Workers), the state-sponsored supermarket
JAP, Junta de Asistencia Privada (Private Assistance Group)
Maya Vinik, Maya Men (in Tzotzil), a fair-trade coffee-producing cooperative which sells
shade-grown coffee locally and on the international market
MELEL XOJOBAL, Melel Xojobal, Truel Light (in Tzotzil), a Dominican humanitarian group
(21,75)
Mesa Directiva, leadership body of Sociedad civil Las Abejas
National Coordinating Committee “Plan de Ayala,” peasant coordinating body that derived from
CNPA and CNPI
NAFTA, North American Free Trade Agreement
OCEZ, Organización Campesino Emiliano Zapata, (Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization)
OMIECH, Organización de Médicos Indígenas del Estado de Chiapas (Organization of
Indigenous Doctors of the State of Chiapas)
ORPODEC, Organización Popular para la Defensa de Las Cultura (Popular Organization for
the Defense of Cultures)
OSIACH, Organización de Salud Indígena de Los Altos de Chiapas (Organization of
Indigenous Health of the Highlands of Chiapas)
Desarrollo, Paz y Justicia, (Peace and Justice), a paramilitary group that attempted
assassinations of Ruiz and others prior to Acteal
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PGR, Procudaría General de la Republica, (Attorney General’s Office)
PROCAMPO, Programa de Apoyo Directo al Campo (Direct Rural Support Program)
PROGRESA, Programa de Educación, Salud, y Alimentación (Program for Education, Health
and Nutrition)
PRONASOL, Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National Solidarity Program)
RAP, Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas (Pluriethnic Autonomous Regions)
SAGAR, Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería y Desarrollo Rural (Secretary of Agriculture,
Livestock and Rural Development)
San Andrés Accords were signed on February 16, 1996 between representatives of the EZLN
and the federal government
SEDESOL, Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Secretary of Social Development)
SIPAZ, Servicio Internacional para la Paz (International Service for Peace)
SOCAMA, Solidaridad Campesino-Magisterial (Solidarity Peasant-Teacher)
SOCIEDAD CIVIL LAS ABEJAS, The Bees Civil Society organization
SSA, Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia (Secretary of Health and Assistance)
UMR, Unidades Médico Rurales (Rural Medical Units)
UNORCA, Unión Nacional de Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas Autónomas (National
Union of Regional Autonomous Campesino Organizations), peasant coordinating body that
derived from CNPA and CNPI.
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Map: Regions of Chiapas
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Timeline
A timeline for the neo-Zapatista movement is as follows:
● In 1983 the FLN’s (Frente de Liberación Nacional) vanguard came to Chiapas from
Mexico City to organize Tzeltal-speaking Maya who had settled the Selva Lacandona in
the 1970s and 1980s; by late 1993, the organization had taken on Maya goals and culture,
becoming the EZLN. It operated by consensus in open voting and created the CCRI-CG,
the leadership. The movement decided to attack the Mexican government in order to be
heard.
● In 1974 the National Indigenous Congress, convened by the diocese of San Cristóbal and
Tuxtla Gutiérrez under Bishop Samuel Ruiz, was an “awakening” to all indigenous
groups in the region.
● In 1992, Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (Las Abejas) is founded in Chenalhó. It is a pacifist,
religious organization formed under the aegis of Catholic catequists associated with the
dioceses of San Cristóbal de Las Casas. Sociedad Civil Las Abejas is based at Acteal,
where the Mesa Directiva sits and where it directs operations for all other members of
Las Abejas who live elsewhere. In 1997 the majority of the membership of Sociedad
Civil Las Abejas was displaced, most to highland camps such as Pohló and X’Oyep, but
about a quarter made their way to San Cristóbal de Las Casas, to INI, Nueva Primavera
and Don Bosco. This research takes place at INI and at Acteal.
● 1992 was also the year of the Columbus quincentennial. The statue of Diego de
Mazariegos was toppled in San Cristóbal de Las Casas by indigenous protesters.
● In 1994, the Zapatista uprising occurs in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Comitan, Ocosingo,
Rancho Nuevo and Altamirano on New Year’s Day, the day that NAFTA is due to go
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into effect. The EZLN takes control of these localities. Three hundred Zapatistas die and
after 12 days of fighting, the EZLN puts down its arms. Lands are “recuperated” by the
EZLN from private ranches. The first parallel government and experiment in autonomy is
set up by Amado Avendaño and his mostly indigenous supporters after he “loses” the
election for governor to Julio César Ruiz Ferro.
● In 1995, because of the ceasefire signed by the EZLN and the Mexican federal
government in January 1994, the government turns to low-intensity war, using
paramilitary to attack Zapatistas and BAEZLN (Bases de apoyo de EZLN, or support
bases) in the northern zone.
● On February 16, 1996, the San Andrés Accords are signed by the Mexican government
and the EZLN on indigenous rights and culture, brokered by Bishop Samuel Ruiz García
and CONAI (Comisión Nacional de Intermediación), the National Intermediation
Commission and COCOPA, Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación para Chiapas (The
Commission for Peace and Reconciliation). The Accords are never implemented.
Indigenous autonomy is the primary goal. A watered-down version is signed into law in
2001 instead. The EZLN rejected this version of rights and culture, arguing that it does
not write indigenous autonomy into the law.
● Also in 1996, the EZLN rejected all aid which comes from the government and begins to
build an autonomous society, building its own schools and health clinics, and its own jails
and writing its own laws.
● In 1997, paramilitarization began in the highlands, especially in the municipality of
Chenalhó. There were threats enacted against persons and robbing and burning of houses,
culminating in the massacre of Acteal on December 22. There were approximately 250
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paramilitary in the region, and 45 Tzotzil Maya were assassinated by highly trained
paramilitary using the methods of the Guatemalan Kaibiles. Twenty thousand indigenous
Tzotziles, Tzeltales and Tojolobales were now displaced,1 living in Internally Displaced
Persons camps in the highlands and San Cristóbal. Seventy thousand Mexican troops
were now stationed in Chiapas; that is, one-third of the Mexican army.
● In 1998, there was a humanitarian crisis in the highland IDP camps and in the San
Cristóbal camps (INI, Don Bosco and Nueva Primavera), as food, blankets, cooking pots
and utensils, as well as clothing, needed to be donated for the displaced, who have lost
everything. Paramilitary have taken over their lands and houses.
● In February, 1999, humanitarian aid was offered to Las Abejas families at INI by Emilio
Rabasa, a member of COCOPA, a government committee formed to draw up the San
Andrés Accords. The Mesa Directiva at Acteal demanded the immediate return of the 110
persons at INI. On February 8, 1999, more than half the INI camp left to return to Acteal,
site of the massacre fourteen months earlier rather than accept “unacceptable” aid.
● The other half left Las Abejas and accepted this government aid.
● In 2000, PANista president Vicente Fox was elected. The PRI lost its first election in its
70 year history. Fox promised to end the Chiapas conflict “in fifteen minutes.” Fox
ordered the demilitarization of the conflict zone and closed one base, the Amador
Hernandez base in the Lacandon rainforest, at the heart of Zapatista territory. The EZLN
called for 7 more bases to be closed.

1

The paramilitary are desensisitized by the military to killing due to systematic viewings of violent US films such
as Rambo, showed by commanders. The military commanders trained at Fort Benning, Georgia in the United States
and overseen by the CIA teach the paramilitary, most of whom are indigenous men from the same families as the
IDPs in camps. The conflict has become a civil war.
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● In 2003, the EZLN created five Zapatista “caracoles” or snail shells and continued
building schools and health clinics in Zapatista territory. Contemporaneously, nonZapatistas utilized EZLN autonomous schools and health clinics, and Zapatistas and Las
Abejas began to leave their movements in favor of government aid.
● In 2008, Sociedad Civil Las Abejas split into two groups. Las Abejas, Asociación Civil
leaves Acteal and formed a new community on lands Sociedad Civil Las Abejas bought,
calling it Nuevo Yibeljoj. In 2012, Las Abejas split again, into the Unión de Pueblos
Indígenas Las Abejas de los Altos de Chiapas, Las Abejas, Asociación Civil, and
Sociedad Civil Las Abejas de Acteal. My research participants are members of the former
movement. I will find two leaders in Chenalhó in 2014, now evangelical ministers with
the World Council of Churches who have spent considerable time in the United States.
● In 2011, one of the two ministers brought a lawsuit against the intellectual author of the
crime of Acteal, with nine other “survivors” against ex-president Ernesto Zedillo, who
was at the time a Yale University professor. In September, 2013, the case was dismissed
by a judge on the grounds that former heads of state are granted immunity.
● By 2014, a whole generation of Zapatista children have grown up in the EZLN
autonomous municipalities. Many others have begun to leave, either to Playa del Carmen,
where they are required by the Zapatista CCRI-CG to share their earnings in construction
or in hotels with the “compas” they have left behind in Chiapas. Others leave to go to the
United States. Yet others began to reap the benefits of Zapatista autonomy in relative
peace, although the low-intensity war is not officially over and there are reports of
paramilitary arming themselves once more.
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● On November 7, 2018, nearly 2,000 BAEZLN are displaced by paramilitary from the
community of Chavajebal, but most return to their communities in December, but 1,000
more are displaced in January 2019. Paramilitary—including Máscara Roja—are still
active in the Chenalhó region.
● On August 20, 2019, the EZLN creates seven new caracoles and four new autonomous
municipalities in Zapatista territory.
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Prologue
Ever since the Zapatista uprising, on January 1st, 1994, I was drawn to Chiapas, a
fishbowl where anthropologists had worked for nearly five decades. But because of the uprising, I
knew that I wanted to go to Mexico more than anything, and in June of 1997, I finally received
the go ahead in the form of the first of three National Science Foundation training grants from
CUNY Graduate Center and City College professor June Nash. I had anticipated this moment for
three years. Once in Chiapas, I went to every Zapatista march, rally and protest event that was
held over the two years I stayed there, from June 1997 through August 1999. And I returned many
times over the course of the next two decades, even returning to live in Chiapas with my family in
tow in 2009-10. Somewhat of an activist at home, Chiapas transformed me into an activist par
excellence. But there was one event, in particular, that set me on a trajectory that led to this
dissertation. I took one special photo that spurred me to study the low-intensity war in the
watershed year of 1997.
It was September 13th in Mexico City, and I had just exited the founding congress of the
FZLN, the Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, the brand new civil arm of the Zapatista
movement founded by Javier Elorriaga, a Mexico City journalist, held in the federal district, as
Mexico City is known within Mexico. The congress was packed, filled to the rafters with activists
and observers, and it was both revolutionary and patriotic, melding together the values of the
Zapatistas with the universalist and harmonious ideology of the Mexican Revolution, evidenced
by the many Mexican flags in hanging side by side with the EZLN black flag with red lettering
and one red star. In San Cristóbal de Las Casas, at the kickoff of the march of 1,111 Zapatistas to
Mexico City for the founding congress, the Zapatista comandantes spoke about the significance of
their flag, stating:
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This is our banner of struggle and rebellion, the flag with a black background, a red fivepointed star, and the letters 'EZLN'. The flag of black and red, which are the symbols of
the pain and rebel dignity against a bad government which tried to forget us for so many
years. The flag with a five-pointed star, which symbolizes the struggle for humanity is the
flag of the Zapatistas. In it, are the blood and the death of our people. But also in it is the
struggle, and the hope for justice, liberty, and democracy, which all Mexicans deserve
(The EZLN March and the FZLN Congress 1997).

The speakers, all Zapatistas—and Elorriaga—were greeted by thunderous applause. They spoke
of civil values rather than bellicose ones, and of a radical new form of democracy which they
called autonomy. When it ended, many people in attendance had tears in their eyes.
That day, the Zapatistas left the white building, today known as the “Cafeteria
Comandante Ramona” in the Zacatecas neighborhood where the congress was held. They were,
by all accounts, without the comandancia, or CCRI-CG, who remained in Chiapas while the rank
and file took a caravan of buses through Juchitan, Oaxaca City, Oaxaca, Oaxaca, and Tepotzlan,
Morelos to Mexico City, where they arrived the day before the march, on September 12th. A
festive marcha, or march began in the streets, with ropes separating the Zapatistas, marching with
banners, flags and pageantry, from the many Mexican and international activists. I was among the
activists. I ran to a nearby farmacia and purchased a US$ 20 camera, the cheapest one they had,
as I was living on a graduate student budget, and I had broken mine on a long bus ride a few
weeks back. As I walked back to the marcha, I noticed a few Mexican journalists entering the
street where the EZLN was chaotically but proudly marching. I followed them, ignoring the
prohibitions against entering—it was just too heady a moment to listen to the authorities, the
police, who were not guarding the EZLN. Loading my film in the chaos, I began taking rapid fire
photos in all directions as the journalists were taking their time framing iconic shots.
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Unbeknownst to me, I took the most important photo of my professional life after I loaded my
second roll of film. It was Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, wearing a purple ribbon on his
battered slightly darker purple shirt plastered with sweat stains—likely his everyday garb—and,
against all odds, hiding in plain sight, right in the open. His famed cap, army khaki bearing three
red stars, was tucked under his ski mask and he had no pipe, no horse and no words for the crowd.
He was simply standing in front of me, less than three feet away, surrounded by other Zapatistas.
His charismatic eyes, crinkled at the edges and recognizable everywhere, looked down and to the
right, slyly observing me photographing him. Used to having his picture taken, he didn’t turn
away, but this photograph was something different. It was the only candid shot taken with no
prior permission from the Sup. No other activist or observer knew he was there. Even CNN
reported that the CCRI-CG would be remaining behind in Chiapas. But he was there. And so were
many members of the CCRI-CG.2 Although all were unarmed at the time, the Sup’s presence is
proof that the EZLN was well aware that an attack may come at any moment, as his popularity
would likely foil an attack. Yet, the attack would come to the unarmed Sociedad Civil Las Abejas
at Acteal instead a mere three months later.
As the by-now infamous Chase Bank internal memo of January 1995 by Emerging
Markets advisor Riordan Roett read:
While Chiapas, in our opinion, does not pose a fundamental threat to Mexican political
stability, it is perceived to be so by many in the investment community. The government
will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the national
territory and of security policy (Parsons 1995).
And the following communiqué from June of 2005, after a “Red Alert” had been issued just the
day before read as follows:
2

In my photographs, other comandantes are likewise wearing purple ribbons.
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“We have the necessary conditions in place to survive an attack or enemy action that would do
away with our current leadership or which would attempt to annihilate us completely.” The
chains of command and the succession of responsibilities have been clearly established, as well
as those actions and measures to be taken in the event of being attacked by government forces
and their paramilitaries [Emphasis added] (CCRI-CG June 20, 2005).
The CCRI-CG of the EZLN in 2005 publicized the fact that measures were taken to
continue the Zapatista lucha (struggle) even if all or some of its publicly known leadership is
removed via jail, disappearance, or death. Clearly, the low-intensity war continued well into the
2000s, and beyond. As a parade of military and paramilitary, in 2009 in San Cristóbal de Las
Casas which I witnessed indicated, the war against the EZLN—and the Zapatistas’s “war against
oblivion”—continued well into the 2000s and beyond in Chiapas. At the parade, the infamous
almost Anglo-looking soldier pushed back by his rifle straps by a young Las Abejas girl in
January 1998 and reproduced around the world in a photo by Pedro Valtierra, was riding in an
open backed truck with the rest of the military. He is recognizable around the world because of
the photograph. Even though Subcomandante Moisès is now the spokesperson for the EZLN, its
mouthpiece and figurehead, known to the outside world, the struggle continues today, unabated.
These events, and the day-to-day reminder of my photograph of Marcos, were the direct impetus
for me to finish this dissertation, for which fieldwork was completed in 1999. It has been a long,
yet fruitful, road.
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Introduction: “For a Better Mexico”
On January 1st of 1994, the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, Zapatista
Army of National Liberation), a Mayan guerrilla army from the Selva Lacandona, took Mexico
by stealth, storming nine towns and villages throughout Chiapas, the same day NAFTA, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (TLC in Spanish), went into effect. The nearly 3,000
armed, uniformed and masked EZLN milicianos and milicianas (solidiers) had several allies in
the Chiapas region. One was Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (Civil Society The Bees) located at
Acteal, in the municipality of Chenalhó, a pacifist Catholic civil society organization, wearing
traditional traje,3 traditional huipils,4 skirts and red and white shawls used as head coverings
during mass for women, and rebozos5 and beribboned hats for men, and following Word of God
catequists. On December 22, 1997 the Acteal massacre, carried out by paramilitaries, left 45
Totzil people dead—all members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas. This led to a large displacement
of indigenous Maya to San Cristóbal, to the former grounds of INI (Instituto Nacional
Indigenísta, National Indian Institute), and to Nueva Primavera and Don Bosco, all located in
San Cristóbal de Las Casas, as well as to highland camps such as Polhó and X’Oyep. This
dissertation examines the aftershocks of the Acteal Massacre and it follows the internally
displaced persons (IDPs) at the INI camp including the 14 families who returned to Acteal in
1999. Of particular importance will be struggles around the acceptance and refusal of
governmental humanitarian aid,6 centering on a 1996 EZLN policy that rejected all government
aid, and a Las Abejas contingent at INI who considered this too onerous given their structural—

3

Literally “suits.”
Blouses.
5
Tunics.
6
In the dissertation governmental humanitarian aid will be understood as food aid, health provisioning, education,
CONASUPO stores, monetary aid and government development projects, as well as
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera, a federal cash transfer program.
4
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and absolute—poverty. Since the government used its immense power to offer aid to people if
they left the neo-Zapatista movement and supported the PRI (Partido Revolucionario
Institucional), who had been in power for nearly 70 years at the time, this created tension and put
the displaced people in the middle of the conflict between the government and the Zapatistas.
This dissertation, then, is about protesting the resistance, and, specifically, the EZLN’s
rule on “la Resistencia” which demanded the rejection of government aid and development
programs, with those who did not comply forced to end their membership in the social
movement. That governmental humanitarian aid was not in any sense a “pure gift” as it
demanded a similar kind of reciprocity (Parry, 1986)—specifically, that recipients drop out of
the Zapatista movement and embrace the PRI. The study highlights the power of representatives
of the Mexican government to divide the neo-Zapatista social movement—that is, the modern
Zapatista movement, including all the movements allied with the EZLN. It analyzes the ways
that poverty obstructs indigenous and “original peoples’” resistance against states, such as
Spanish colonial, Mexico or Guatemala (Chiapas was a department of Guatemala until 1841),
which have dominated them for centuries. Repression, preventable death, enslavement, illiteracy,
illness, corruption, underdevelopment, racism, domination, displacement, deterritorialization,
extractavism, dispossession and accumulation by dispossession in Chiapas have kept poverty
indicators among the highest of Mexican states and comparable to much poorer countries
elsewhere in the world. I argue that under these extreme conditions, resistance to the state is
harder to sustain, causing many to reject the idea of resistance—and to drop out of resistance
movements, a factor that has been under-theorized in the social movements literature.
And, more critical to this study, I argue that they turn to the PRI and international sources
of aid even though they are “assistentialist,” that is, fundamentally “charity,” treating the
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symptoms rather than the structural causes of poverty, and not changing anything at base. I
contend that the IDPs at the INI camp were more likely to be critical of aid that was
assistentialist than non-assistentialist aid—because this aid simply placed a band-aid on their
absolute poverty. In the EZLN’s development of their autonomy and in the consolidation of their
base, the EZLN continues to resist the Mexican state.
As a social movement, the neo-Zapatista movement has highlighted the leading role of
the “mártires” of Acteal—those assassinated during the massacre, and the harsh, lived
experiences that my research participants experienced in the context of civil war, with members
of their own families on both sides of the conflict, some in the paramilitary forces and some
among the Internally Displaced Persons. In addition to showing the nefarious effects of the
indigenous displacement and their protest against their own social movement, this study
describes how the federal government’s low-intensity war engendered a humanitarian emergency
which put the survival of more than 20,000 internally-displaced persons in jeopardy, as
infections, parasites, malnutrition and disease were constant threats within the camps. I
demonstrate how the IDPs at INI were perceived as pawns by the PRI government, and how one
of its agents, with their offer of government aid in 1999, caused the first of several splinter
groups among Las Abejas, which still struggles with factionalism today—yet, how this faction
successfully resisted this passive moniker and fought back. In part, my work is done through
tracing how these humanitarian crises reshaped childhood in IDP camps.
One theoretical contribution of the dissertation is its use of different forms of proffered
aid in the region as the basis for distinguishing between different forms gift structures may take.
I propose that governmental humanitarian aid is akin to a gift economy with its attendant implied
reciprocity, as Malinowski argued in 1922 and David Graeber (2011; 2014a) reiterates in his

3

discussion on debt (the basis of which I challenge). Humanitarianism, on the other hand, is a
“pure gift,” with no reciprocation or expectation of a return envisaged. Humanitarianism exists in
societies with market systems, an advanced division of labor and an important commercial
sector, all preconditions of “pure gifts” according to Parry (1986, 467). Indeed, as Fassin (2012,
233) states in his influential critique of humanitarian reason, for aid recipients “the gift can have
no counter gift, since it is assumed that they can only receive; they are the beholden of the world.
For (aid recipients) the gift may even be the gift of the self—at least in theory.” Humanitarianism
(and the “pure gift”) is to be distinguished from a gift economy in which reciprocal trading
relationships establish a debt between trading partners (e.g., Gregory 1982).
Gift economies have been studied in modern day China (Yan 2002), among Cambodian
professional “girlfriends” who are not officially classified as prostitutes (Hoefinger 2010), and
among employees in a firm (Netzer and Schmutzer 2013), among many other settings. What
many of these studies have in common is that they conform to Cheal’s (1988, 2016) use of the
term “gift economy” in which women are the primary gift givers and in which gift-giving is
primarily situated within the locus of the family unit. This study takes gender neutral and
generalized humanitarian aid as the point of departure. Specifically, I posit that only
“unacceptable” government-sourced humanitarian aid in 1990s Chiapas was constitutive of a gift
economy, with its implicit reciprocity,7 as it had strings attached and was in no way indicative of
a “pure gift.” And what conditions they were: foremost among the implied return obligations of
government and development aid and federal cash transfers was the recipients’ rejection of
Zapatismo—a social control mechanism instituted by the EZLN, and seized on by the

7

Malinowski had contended that gift givers expect a return of equal or greater value (Parry 1986).
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government in a move that was meant to quell protest. And the government required a debt of
loyalty to the PRI.
Central to the exchange relationship is the idea of debt, although David Graeber (2011;
2014a) argues that only exchanges between formal social equals create debt, and that other
transactions do not necessarily do so. A debt is an incomplete or uncompleted exchange “when
some balance has not yet been restored” (Graeber 2014a, 91). Graeber interprets exchange as a
process which includes buying, selling and all forms of gifting or prestation in which reciprocity
is implicit or unstated. Pure gifts do not create debt, while debts exist within exchange networks.
Money is an accounting tool for reckoning debt. It arose spontaneously, and is likely as old as
human history. Graeber tells us that credit was the earliest form of money, in contradistinction to
the field of economics, modeled on Adam Smith, which typically puts money first. Here,
Graeber makes clear that the dichotomy between states and markets is false: each depends on the
other for their very existence (2014a, 71). However, I argue that the existence of a gift economy
consisting of governmental humanitarian aid between impoverished IDPs and a powerful
Mexican government suggests that debts can exist between actors who are not social equals,
challenging Graeber’s fundamental point.
If one is to accept such a gift, following Amartya Sen (1983) and James Ferguson (2010;
2015), monetary aid rather than food aid would better serve displaced and refugee populations.
As such, this study is relevant for humanitarian efforts that still distribute assistentialist food aid,
with little regard for structural changes in society—best dealt with by money. Today in Chiapas,
there is an internal displacement of 7,000 people from Chalchihuitán, Chiapas over a land
dispute with neighboring Chenalhó, due to paramilitarization—the same paramilitaries that
perpetrated the massacre at Acteal, leading to serious concerns that another massacre may be

5

imminent. There are 41.3 million IDPs in the world today, more than ever before, and the
analyses posed here are directly relevant to the present situation.

Land and Freedom
Las Abejas’ nonviolent resistance to the Mexican state and the local PRI organizations
has by now been well-studied (SIPAZ 1998a, 1998b; Centro de Derechos Humanos
CDHFBC1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Eber 1998, 2003; Hernández Castillo 1998, 2005; 2012; Hirales
1998; Álvarez Fabela 2000; Tavanti 2001, 2003, 2005; Moksenes 2004, 2005, 2012; Toledo
Tello and Garza Caligaris 2006). However, previous accounts of Las Abejas zero in on the birth
of a social movement and its cultural and religious identity (Tavanti 2005), the development of a
human rights perspective (Moksenes 2005; 2012), or on the ways in which Las Abejas, as a
Catholic social movement, uses its Catholicism to resist the Mexican state (Kovic 2003). Their
adherence to EZLN goals places them squarely in the neo-Zapatista camp (Leyva Solano 2001),
or bases of support, the insurgents and civil society of the EZLN who fight using some
combination of what has been characterized as a “netwar” by a Rand Corporation-funded study
(Ronfeldt et al. 1998), civil society, and NGO support. However, Las Abejas’ religious and
pacifist ideology separates them from the EZLN; pacifism is at the center of their quest for
survival and religious identity. So, although this study deals more with the struggle to survive
than with the role of religion, it will be worth remembering that faith informs this community of
believers and in some cases, is its reason for being, something that was certainly true of the
victims of the Acteal massacre.
In what follows, I demonstrate the ways in which Las Abejas operated as an arm of the
neo-Zapatista movement rather than as a completely autonomous body and how this ambiguous
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position allowed for resistance to both the EZLN and the Mexican state, causing internal strife
and miscommunication, which in the late 1990s was inevitable given the many displaced
persons’ camps in which IDPs who belonged to Las Abejas were living. The structural and
absolute poverty in the camps would be the litmus test for the organization’s ultimate relevance
and very survival, as it caused the splintering of membership. Although many would leave, the
circle would tighten around Las Abejas—and the EZLN—allowing for stronger survival
mechanisms for the rank and file as well as the leadership.
And, I argue, as do Rus and Tinker (2014), that the political opening provided by
Zapatismo would inspire other indigenous movements in the Latin American left to seize power,
albeit state power, something shunned by the EZLN8 and the Movimento Sem Terra (Landless
Movement) in Brazil (Vergara-Camus 2014).
For if they have struggled to maintain their way of life against the ravages of social
progress, it is not because they wish to return to a mythical and hazy past. It is because,
as Marx said of 19th Century France, they wish to strike out beyond the conditions of
their own existence, to transform the old order through their own energies—in
conjunction with other men and women, to be sure, but also as indígenas.
-Robert Wasserstrom (1976, 291)

This is reflected in the above quote, in which Robert Wasserstrom cut to the heart of
indigenous rebellions in Chiapas nearly 20 years before the 1994 Zapatista uprising. The EZLN
staged its rebellion not to topple the government or to seize state power, as planned in the
Lacandon jungle as early as 1983, when a Marxist-Leninist vanguard travelled to the selva and
Cañadas of Chiapas from Mexico City to “convert” the indigenous agrarian proletariat and
8

Until 2017 when the EZLN announced the candidacy of an indigenous woman, Marichuy, María de Jesús Patricio
Martínez from Tuxpan, Jalisco, for President in 2018. In March, 2018, the EZLN announced that she did not have
the requisite signatures for candidacy (EZLN 2018).
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campesinos.9 Instead the EZLN leadership sought to develop a new society within the Mexican
state—and to inspire other indigenous groups throughout the Americas to do the same. The
Zapatista uprising has been an ethnic movement whose supporters have fought heart and soul for
the right to create a new society (e.g., Stephen and Collier 1997), but the road to autonomy has
been a rocky one.
The concept of autonomy,10 is a cornerstone of resistance deployed by “testimonial
peoples” (Ribeiro 1971, quoted in Nash 2005) against an encroaching neoliberalism and the onset,
since the early 1990s of a globalization from which no state, region, or community is immune. It
is an important concept for understanding the context of Chiapas at the time of the Acteal
massacre. In this case indigenous campesinos, peasants or semi-subsistence farmers, were
uprooted by paramilitary11 violence and marked by what Philippe Bourgois terms structural
violence, that is, “political-economic forces, international terms of trade, and unequal access to
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The EZLN sent the world a powerful message when it took on the Mexican military machine with a combination
of semi-automatic—and wooden—weapons. On January 1st, 1994, the EZLN issued the First Declaration of the
Lacandon Jungle listing their demands: “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom,
democracy, justice and peace.” These are basic human rights, not limited to indigenous communities, but lacking in
many parts of the world. These are the same conditions that drove Thomas Paine to write The Rights of Man in 1791
in defense of the French Revolution.
10
Jan Douwe Van der Ploeg, a key researcher on peasant autonomy, tells us that autonomy and
repeasantization go hand in hand. Repeasantization “is, in essence, a modern expression of the fight for autonomy and
survival in a context of deprivation and dependency” (2009, 7, italics in original). Although two of the case studies
Van der Ploeg examines are in Europe (The Netherlands and Italy), and one in Peru, these studies have relevance for
peasant studies and autonomy because repeasantization is “massive and widespread” (2009, 178) and it offers “a
politically and economically appropriate way out of underdevelopment for many developing world countries” (2009,
54). Repeasantization is a process which both the EZLN and Sociedad Civil Las Abejas have undergone since the
1994. This was the period when both organizations would offer a way out of the seasonal dependency on the large
ls.s, or landed estates. As Mariana Mora notes, “by the beginning of the revolution in 1910, thirty-seven estates
existed in the broader Tzaconejá Valley, many of which continued to exist to some degree until the Zapatistas took
over land in 1994, such as the estates Jobero, Gran Poder, Porvenir, Yaxolob, San José la Union, Buenavista,
Mendoza, Tzaconejá, and El Amolar. Though the revolution enacted land reform through the establishment of ejidos,
estate economies continued well into the latter half of the twentieth century” (Mora 2017, 83). Repeasantization was
the result in EZLN and Las Abejas communities. To put things into historical perspective, in 1889 there were 950
fincas in the hands of San Cristóbal landlords who took them over by inading the lands of Tzotzils and Tzeltzals
(Garza Caligaris et al. 1998, 43).
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Unlike the “non-state actors” of the Middle East wars of the 1990s and 2000s, paramilitaries operate under the
aegis of the government.
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resources, services, rights, and security that limit life chances” (2009, 19). In Chiapas, the
indigenous EZLN rose up to overturn the structural violence that was the basis of neoliberalism
and the destitution that arose from it. Autonomy was to be the answer to this structural violence.
Importantly, in 1996, the EZLN carried out its own project of autonomy, replacing the
services of the state with the EZLN’s own government, including schooling, healthcare, laws,
courts, and taxes. And, most critical to this study, the EZLN rejected all government aid beginning
in 1996, aid from the federal, state and local governments. NGOs and international organizations
such as the ICRC had to be cleared by the EZLN’s hierarchy—from below, first (“mandar
obedeciendo,” or “lead by obeying” is the EZLN’s leadership strategy; more simply, it is
democracy from the roots, or democratic populism). The members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas
followed suit.
Through the San Andrés Accords, signed in 1996, the EZLN sought to obtain true
autonomy—the ability to govern themselves, to build their own schools and health clinics, to
obey their own laws, and most of all, to recuperate lands which the owners of the fincas had
stolen from the original peoples of the Americas first with the Spanish Conquest and its
devastating aftermath, and second, with 19th century liberalism during the Porfiriato.12 With the
reform of article 27 of the 1917 constitution, ejidos, which are communal agrarian reform lands,
were allowed to be sold or rented out. This was one impetus for the 1994 Zapatista uprising.
Zapatistas used the same rallying cry that the 1910 revolutionaries had used during the Mexican
revolution: land and freedom. This version of autonomy was the EZLN’s own. NGOs saw
autonomy in more limited terms, merely as freedom from the state, but not from its laws. To the
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EZLN, autonomy meant freedom. This quest for indigenous autonomy is, as of this writing, 23
years old and still unfulfilled, de facto, rather than de jure.

Findings and Contributions of this Study
In theoretical terms, this study contributes to the literature by documenting the ways that
people within social movements reject resistance projects and chafe at them, at times quite
openly. As such, I begin by explicating the ways in which Las Abejas operated as a unit of the
neo-Zapatista movement rather than as a wholly autonomous body; this ambiguous position
allowed for protest against both the EZLN and the Mexican state. Typical of their resistance to
the state—albeit a nonviolent one, as they were members of Las Abejas—is an incident at a
human rights workshop held at Acteal in 1999 by the human rights center, Centro de Derechos
Humanos Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (Frayba), when the attendees, victims of the massacre,
succeeded in jeering, hissing and booing at two members of the paramilitary, Máscara Roja, who
were strolling by—people responsible for their relatives’ deaths. In this, they were applying
classic social sanctions to those whose intentions were violent, illustrating the “weapons of the
weak” (Scott 1976). Yet most instances of protest were directed to the EZLN and Las Abejas. To
take but one example, one rainy afternoon soon after the IDPs’ arrival, when Roberto, an
employee at INI, the Instituto Nacional Indigenísta, or National Indian Institute, the grounds of
which had been taken over by RAP, the Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas, with the Zapatista
uprising and subsequent candidacy of Amado Avendaño for governor in 1995, grinningly
supplied the IDPs at the INI camp with electrical cables and light bulbs because their interior
lights in the run-down barrack-type rooms where they slept on the concrete floor were in nonworking order, the IDPs were going behind the Mesa Directiva’s (Table of Directors) of Las
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Abejas at Acteal and the EZLN’s CCRI-CG’s (comandancia’s) back by accepting government
aid, yet they did so anyway; they were in defiance of both their social movement and the EZLN.
This was a gift of governmental humanitarian aid that came from an unacceptable source, yet
was accepted by the group of IDPs living in abject poverty at the camp.
I examine the idea of gifts of assistentialist humanitarian aid and its alternatives.
Assistentialist aid, which treats the symptoms rather than the root causes of poverty, was a
principal source of assistance in the region (Dietz 1996), and I show how IDPs were largely
critical of this aid, while being forced to accept much of it. However, even when it was urgently
needed, many IDPs rejected at least some of it. For instance, in 1999, some IDPs at INI accepted
the “gift” of supplies for an atole-making project from Desarrollo Integral de La Familia (DIF),
a government agency, although it was forbidden by the EZLN, but after taking the ingredients
most women refused to make atole for their children, rendering the aid project a failure—and
illustrating the critique of humanitarian reason, an approach to humanitarianism that examines
agency among both aid provisioners and among aid recipients (Fassin 2012). A second form of
assistentialist aid, which was accepted but griped about, were the “gifts” of many medical
consultations occurring during 1998 at the INI camp. The nurse and doctors from the IMSS
hospital Clínica de Campo, a government source, repeatedly told the IDPs to bathe and to fix
themselves up, when bathing was impossible at INI. There were neither tubs nor showers, and no
way to bathe except in the polluted stream that ran past the camp—which they utilized. The
teams13 from CCESC also angered the INI population by their emphasis on hygiene, when
“good” hygiene was likewise impossible at INI. The bathroom was constantly flooded and, thus,
in virtually unworking condition. There was not enough potable water. As a result, such talks
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merely placed a band-aid on the IDPs’ extreme poverty without changing the underlying
causes—and there were no funds to fix these structural conditions, about which the IDPs
complained incessantly, once again illustrating Fassin’s (2012) critique. In addition, the “gifts”
of food aid from the ICRC were inadequate—and criticized. Yet the IDPs were forced to accept
this assistentialist aid or starve. Because much humanitarian aid is still assistentialist, years after
Freire (1973) and others critiqued this practice, this study adds significant nuance to the literature
on asistencialismo, and, more to the point, to the critique of humanitarian reason, by showing the
full range of IDPs’ agency with respect to aid shipments and providers, with ramifications for
displaced populations and donors. By so doing, I advance the theory on humanitarianism and the
critique of humanitarian reason.
I also present a successful non-assistentialist development project, midway between gift
and commodity exchange, as it was a loan, a rare success story in the literature, as Edelman and
Haugerud (2005) tell us efficacious projects are few, instituted by CCESC (Centro de
Capacitación en Ecología y Salud para Campesinos, the Center for Training in Ecology and
Health for Peasants, a local NGO that is part of the UNICEF network) and FONAES (the social
development arm of INI, a government source): making breastfeeding dolls for sale. The project
was undertaken by those who left Sociedad Civil Las Abejas in 1999, and thus, were free to do
as they chose. The project is still in operation after twenty years, and in a normative break with
social relations in highland Chiapas, it has made women the “breadwinners” in their families.
One of my key arguments is that resistance to the state is harder to sustain for those who
experience structural poverty and immiseration, dispossession and deterritorialization, as those
who have a history of racism and accumulation by dispossession. And that these factors cause
many such individuals to drop out of resistance movements, a connection that has been under-
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theorized in the social movements literature. Indeed, it is due to such miserable conditions that
all of my research participants have left Sociedad Civil Las Abejas since 2008 because they
chose to accept government supports—although some of my interlocutors have done a surprising
turnaround, as the epilogue shows. In particular, one program,
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera may be one of the most important results of the Zapatista
rebellion—it put structural poverty on the table nationally, since it aided one quarter of Mexican
families—until June of 2019. It also forced subsequent presidents to address the roots of
rebellion and armed insurgency in a structural, non-assistentialist manner. It is akin to the
Maussian dualism between prestation, of which spitting out ginger root is the prelude, and war:
In the Trobriand Islands the people of Kiriwina told Malinowski: ‘The men from Dobu
are not good like us; they are cruel, they are cannibals. When we come to Dobu, we are
afraid of them. They might kill us. But then I spit out ginger root, and their attitude
changes. They lay down their spears and receive us well.’ Nothing better interprets this
unstable state between festival and war (Mauss 1990, 105).
Ferguson (2015, xii) calls cash transfers “a new politics of distribution” and argues that
distribution “opens up new political possibilities and sheds new light on a host of analytical
issues ranging from labor and livelihoods to markets and money to dependence and personhood.”
I will explore cash transfers further in Chapter One.
However, I also show how the IDPs who left Las Abejas in favor of a symbolic cash
settlement from the Mexican government (which they would receive only in 2008), and further
cash transfers from the state were dissatisfied with this insufficient and problematic aid. Some
left Mexico and even sued former President Zedillo, whom many called the “intellectual author”
of the Acteal massacre, in 2011, proving that a gift from the enemy does not friends—or
compatriots—make.
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I establish humanitarianism as a “pure gift” and governmental humanitarian aid as part of
a gift economy, with, by definition, implied reciprocity—in this case, a debt of loyalty and
allegiance to the PRI. I challenge David Graeber’s conception of debt as existing solely among
social equals (2014a, 120), arguing that the existence of debt between a powerful neoliberal
PRIista Mexican state and impoverished IDPs disproves his contention that exchange—and
debt—can only occur among equals. In this, I echo Didier Fassin’s (2012) critique of
humanitarian reason, when he says of the poor:
in return for the gift of fragments of their life, they receive the counter gift of a means of
survival. This is the structure of the exchange organized by the management of the poor.
In this transaction of symbolic and material goods, the mediators are the administrative
officers, social workers, health professionals, and staff of charitable organizations (Fassin
2012, 81).

Fassin might have been talking about the INI camp, so similar—and unequal—was the exchange
system. At INI, human rights workers and anthropologists collected the gift of “fragments of
their life,” while humanitarian aid providers (from NGOs and INGOs) gave the “gift” of aid. I
show how much of this aid was contested.

This Research
December 24, 1997. At Christmas-time it is still raining in Chiapas, as it has been for
months. Standing in the street, I see wood smoke curl in the damp air—the aroma of tortillas
toasting on hot comals, made by machine, sold by the kilo. Because it is Christmas, pine needles
blanket church floors emptied of pews for syncretic rituals, part Catholic, part Maya in a sixteenth
century synthesis. Candles are everywhere in single file. And there are clouds on the
mountaintops instead of snow. But it is the human tableau, the face of indigenous southern
14

Mexico in Chiapas that is most absorbing. Pasamontañas—ski masks—and paliacates or
bandanas worn over nose and mouths, make the movement recognizable worldwide, as what must
be thousands take to the streets to protest the massacre that has just taken place in Acteal.
Before the massacre, I interned at the San Cristóbal Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray
Bartolomé de Las Casas in August, 1997 and conducted work at several university libraries in San
Cristóbal, particularly at UNACH, Universidad Autónoma de Chiapas (Autonomous University
of Chiapas) and the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social,
CIESAS (Center of Investigations and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology), where I
established a research affiliation. Yet, it wasn’t until Christmas Eve, 1997 that my fieldwork
formally began. Sitting in the Cybercafe window, where I was working that morning, 24 armored
tanks and Humvees rolled down Real de Guadalupe, San Cristóbal’s main thoroughfare, in a
silent show of force.14 The war had come to San Cristóbal, once again.15
That night, two days after the massacre at Acteal, I began fieldwork with displaced
members of Las Abejas who fled Acteal to a camp set up on the grounds of INI, the Instituto
Nacional Indigenista, on the edge of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, which RAP, the Regiones
Autónomas Pluriétnicas, or Autonomous Pluriethnic Regions, had taken over in 1994. My
fieldwork began when I helped friends bring food—tamales, frijoles, arroz con leche, and
pozol—to the displaced taking refuge on the INI grounds, one of three camps in the city. This was
the beginning of a concerted relief effort that would begin in San Cristóbal, Mexico City, and
elsewhere in the nation. In the one photo of that evening I am surrounded by women and children
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Much of Real de Guadalupe has since been made into an “andador turistico,” or pedestrian thoroughfare closed to
traffic.
15
In an interesting parallel, the EZLN also uses silent marches in a show of non-violent force, for example, in
September, 2014 in Ayotzinapa, the site of an extrajudicial execution of 43 “normalistas,” teachers’ college students,
carried out by narcotraficantes, and apparently ordered by the government, 20,000 Zapatistas marched silently in
Iguala, the town where the killings occurred.
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shivering in the winter damp, most barefoot and wearing only shawls over their bare arms. I was
back in camp the next day and immediately began working with the displaced, joining an
informal group orchestrating play and drawing workshops in the afternoons for the first five
months, and working for ten months with CCESC, the Centro de Capacitación en Ecología y
Salud para Campesinos, the Center for Training in Ecology and Health for Peasants, referred to
me by Alianza Cívica, Civic Alliance. Alianza Cívica is a citizen watchdog NGO whose role is to
monitor local, state, and federal elections; it formed in 1994 to monitor the August elections of
that year. In 1997-1998, Alianza Cívica emphasized civic education and citizen participation and
connected NGOs with those in need. CCESC is a health and education NGO that monitored the
health of the displaced.
I collected data through participant observation in 1998 and 1999 while conducting
trauma and art workshops and while working as a member of a health team with CCESC for ten
months. With CCESC, I helped deliver (unwanted) hygiene advice, I took measurements of
children, weighed babies, delivered nutrition information to a camp whose members were ill and
losing weight, and I accompanied families on medical visits. Independent of this work with
CCESC and over the course of a year, I conducted formal interviews through three Tzotzil
translators with 33 adults and 23 teens in the 110-person camp.16 Then, in the summer of 1999, I
followed the members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas to Acteal, where I conducted interviews with
the Mesa Directiva (Board of Directors) and with individuals and families housed there. During
the summer of 1999, I spent a total of four weeks in the highland Acteal camp as a human rights
observer, living among the same 17 families I had known at INI, as well as keeping in contact
with those who remained in San Cristóbal. I collected rich ethnographic data while living at the
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Acteal IDP camp, data that had been more difficult to collect at INI, as I was not living on site. I
observed a human rights workshop facilitated by Frayba, a skin disease workshop facilitated by
Medicos del Mundo, vaccinations administered by indigenous promotores de salud, the fiesta of
San Pedro de Chenalhó (renamed San Pedro Desplazado by the IDPs), as well as masses, and I
had the opportunity to accompany the children to the autonomous school at Acteal Las Abejas
and Acteal Bases de Apoyo (Support Bases or BAEZLN) school, as well as many opportunities to
visit with the families from the INI camp. In 1997, I had received the first of three National
Science Foundation Training Grants under the tutelage of Professor June Nash, and this allowed
me to stay in Chiapas for two years, from June 1997 through August 1999. I returned to New
York in late August 1999, where I received a University Writing Fellowship from The City
University of New York Graduate Center.
This research was beset by problems of access. Because of restrictions on foreign
researchers in the conflict zone and the deportations of foreigners in 1998, I decided to work at
INI in San Cristóbal rather than risk expulsion from an EZLN autonomous municipality or camp.
In some ways, my work at the INI camp was condoned by the authorities. As a “renegade” branch
of Las Abejas that accepted more government aid than any other camp, the INI contingent of Las
Abejas was regarded by the authorities as almost PRIista—although of course, they opposed the
PRI and there were Zapatistas among them—they were seen as not as radical or “dangerous” as
inhabitants of Polhó. And although the displaced at INI lived under the watchful eyes of RAP, the
Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas, Autonomous Pluriethnic Regions, they defied RAP in
numerous ways—and this, too, was well-known, causing consternation among the NGO
community which was supporting the IDPs; this defiance of RAP openly pleased the conservative
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PRIista local government, and allowed me free access to the camp, although I was followed on
more than one occasion by an immigration officer with a walkie-talkie.
Even though I remained within the city limits, in order to interview the IDPs at INI I had
to be cleared by Alianza Cívica, and, more importantly, I had to be approved by the responsables,
elected officials responsible for leading the community. Julia of Alianza Cívica met with the two
responsables at the INI camp, Gerardo and Enciso, because the IDPs were tired of people taking
data and leaving. Julia (of AC) explained my position. They will be meeting with the responsables
two more times this mid-May (1998). She will ask them if it is alright for me to begin
interviewing. All this because the IDPs themselves have asked that foreigners not be given free
access to them. Las Abejas are the ones making these decisions via the elaborate hierarchy that
they have created.

Chapter Overview
This study analyzes seven pieces of the story of survival in Chiapas amidst displacement
and its causes: (1) war and paramilitarization, (2) poverty, (3) law, (4) humanitarian aid, (5)
public health in Internally Displaced Persons camps, (6) social reproduction, including education,
and (7) a microdevelopment project making breastfeeding dolls for sale. Knitted together, they
portray survival amidst civil war and the worsening conditions in the IDP camps in 1998 and
1999.17 These conditions made resistance to the state harder to sustain and sparked defiance to the
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But many lay observers, such as the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), or SIPAZ and other NGOs who were on
the scene early on have described the conditions, yet not in a diachronic way, as this study does. Scholars have had
limited access to the camps during the years 1996-2003.
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EZLN policy of aid rejection and eventually lead to demobilization of both Las Abejas and the
EZLN18 in the late 1990s.
Chapter One, Finding México Profundo in Southeastern Mexico, gives the local,
national and international background of Chiapas at the time of the massacre. It also profiles the
birth of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas (in 1992) and the emergence of the EZLN in 1994. I discuss in
some detail the EZLN’s 1996 policy of governmental aid rejection and its adoption by Las Abejas
and the genesis of that policy. Given that after the EZLN CCRI-CG decided to reject all aid that
came from the government, economic upheaval ensued for its adherents, the chapter includes an
assessment of whether IDPs—who have lost everything—can afford to reject government aid, and
an evaluation of how successful this EZLN policy was among the displaced living at INI, given
the poverty in the camp. As background, I discuss the multiple dimensions of indigenous poverty.
Aid rejection was to be a bitter pill for most, and a measure of political commitment. Not all
would be able to reject the government and its aid and development programs. I also discuss the
development of the EZLN’s turn toward autonomy in 1996. Autonomy has roots in ANIPA, RAP
and other indigenous organizations in the early 1990s, and the moves toward autonomy in these
organizations lead to Zapatista autonomy, in which the EZLN would replace the PRI
government’s laws, schools, health clinics, courts, jails and roads with their own autonomous
infrastructure in its MAREZ in a radical move toward replacing the services of the state with their
own services.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Debates Critical to this Study: The Gift and Gift
Economy, Critique of Humanitarian Reason, Clientelism, and Hegemony shows how gifts
which were acceptable or unacceptable in the physical, affective-cognitive, psychological and
18

See Barmeyer (2009) for an account of partisans of the EZLN leaving the social movement because of a lack of
resources. Those who remained became more commited. See Mora (2017) for a recent account of EZLN caracoles.
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community sense were based on social reproduction needs at the INI camp and how they were
nevertheless contested. As I show throughout this study, the free gift of humanitarian aid had
strings attached—it carried unwanted talks on hygiene from the teams at CCESC, unwanted NGO
meddling in the form of community meetings, and interference with Las Abejas’ and the EZLN’s
project of autonomy on matters of health as IDPs came under the allopathic health umbrella and
mistrust as even the aid itself came to be suspect, with family heads clustered around Gerardo as
he checked off the rations from the Mexican Red Cross, and later the ICRC, to be given out every
two weeks. This chapter shows how the “gift” of aid was challenged at the INI camp, and how the
“free gift,” which was “charity” or “assistentialism,” was the most contested of all the gifts the
IDPs received. It also shows how governmental aid was part of a gift economy, as it required
loyalty to the PRI in a clientelistic mechanism. The gift, likewise, was a way for the state to
become hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense.
Chapter Three, Paramilitarization and Civil War: Becoming IDPs, examines the
paramilitarization of Chenalhó by the organization Máscara Roja (Red Mask). It is based on
interviews with research participants at the INI camp in 1998 and at Acteal in 1999. Las Abejas
and BAEZLN left their communities often with no possessions and late at night because they
could not afford to pay the cooperación to buy arms required by the ruling party (PRIistas) that
governed the municipality of Chenalhó. They received death threats and fled into the mountains,
first to IDP camps in the highlands and then to INI in San Cristóbal. Once they had left, PRIistas
and landless paramilitaries took over their homes and their lands. Most did not return.
Chapter Four, Aftermath of a Massacre, examines the light sentencing of the
paramilitary and the government’s absolving itself of responsibility. The Mexican military
remained in the vicinity while the paramilitaries carried out this crime. I profile a law workshop
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held by the human rights center, Frayba, at Acteal in July 1999. There were “irregularities” in the
case, most especially the failure to treat the Acteal site as a crime scene (SIPAZ 1998b). Of 88
paramilitary operatives sentenced for the crime of Acteal, only five remained imprisoned in 2011,
and all had been released by 2014. I examine the aftermath of the massacre at Acteal; although the
federal government was complicit in planning the atrocity, the “intellectual authors” of the
massacre have not been brought to justice.
Chapter Five, The Struggle for Autonomy in the Context of a Humanitarian Crisis
and the Return to Acteal, shows how humanitarian and development aid became a crisis by the
summer of 1998, as aid for displaced Las Abejas and BAEZLN was reduced to less than the basic
essentials—children were losing weight in the INI camp and were severely malnourished. Because
of Hurricane Mitch’s landfall in September, food aid became critical, as there was very little work
and very little left in the coffers for the IDPs. The Mexican Red Cross had to turn to the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in September. The ICRC was funded by the
European Union. This was a political statement in Chiapas in 1998, when foreigners were being
deported seemingly daily. I show how the IDPs resisted this assistentialist aid, while being forced
to accept it.
Chapter Six, Autonomy in the Context of Displacement and Public Health, examines
how structural violence and structural poverty were implicit in the delivery of health services at
the INI camp and at Acteal and the way that this population was brought under the public health
umbrella for the first time in many peoples’ lifetimes. I show how IDPs were infantilized and
racialized by the NGOs as they were exhorted to improve their hygiene and overall state of
cleanliness when “good” hygiene was impossible in IDP camps. I argue that such NGO attention,
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whether medical or hygienic, detracts from Las Abejas’—and the Zapatistas’—project of
autonomy.19
Chapter Seven, Development Aid: The Doll Project at INI, examines a microcredit
development project for women who knew how to sew and embroider making breastfeeding dolls
for sale. The project was the brainchild of Dr. Marcos Arana of CCESC, and funded by FONAES,
the social development arm of INI, the National Indian Institute. Funds were finally obtained in the
summer of 1999, and so, the project was undertaken by twenty-two women who had broken with
Sociedad Civil Las Abejas over acceptance of government aid in February 1999. These were the
families who had remained behind at INI; called “INIti” by their former campmates, they openly
accepted Mexican government aid against the wishes of the EZLN CCRI-CG (comandancia) and
the Mesa Directiva (Table of Directors) of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas at Acteal; they were dropped
from Las Abejas because of their acceptance of this forbidden government aid. The project was not
assistentialist and allowed the women to support their families in displacement, something which
proved impossible before. The project is still in operation as of this writing and is the rare success
story in the development studies literature.
Chapter Eight, Childhood in Displacement, asks how had low-intensity war and aid
rejection affected the Las Abejas and BAEZLN children at INI and at Acteal. In the cases at INI
where aid was accepted, how had aid acceptance been a factor in children’s overall well-being?
What were the children learning, when they were unable to attend school? How did schooling
change their outlooks? What effect did trauma (play and drawing) workshops have on the children
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Chiapas. The care was inconsistent, and there was (and is) a high degree of turnover among providers, very few of
whom stay on in Chiapas where the conditions of medical intervention are largely inadequate but where need is
therefore greatest.
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at INI and Acteal? In short, how had social reproduction, the production and socialization of
human populations, been affected by a childhood spent in displacement?
Chapter One introduces the structural—and absolute—poverty of indigenous
Chiapanecos, among the most disenfranchised of persons in Mexico. I discuss Guillermo Bonfil
Batalla’s idea of “deep Mexico” and give statistics for this poverty, illustrating how extreme
poverty caused the Chiapas rebellion—and how it caused my research participants to be unable to
sustain their resistance to the Mexican state.
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Chapter One:
Finding México Profundo in Southeastern Mexico
Absolute poverty is a chief predictor of child and adult malnutrition. Unlike in the United
States, where poverty is relative, in Chiapas, poverty is absolute, leading to high mortality rates,
especially for children under five, rather than relative. For Chiapas is “a rich land” with “a poor
people” (Benjamin 1996) where poverty is widespread among the indigenous population. This is
borne out in Chenalhó, the municipality from which my research participants originated. Most
women do not have shoes (or wear plastic ones), many, many families still have a deficient diet,
eating only tortillas and beans, or worse, tortillas with a pinch of salt and chili or broth with
cabbage, as I still observed in 2019; many children leave school early to help the family
economy, and end up selling chicle on the street. Poverty is structural, and includes a lack of
jobs, macroeconomic factors, ethnic discrimination and racism, and affects health, diet, nutrition
and, as children often drop out of school to help the family out, causes high rates of illiteracy.
The federal government used absolute poverty as part of its counterinsurgency strategy
against the EZLN, including credits (PROCAMPO monies), land, and education—and after 1997,
Progresa funds (renamed Oportunidades in 2002 under then-President Vicente Fox, and renamed
again in 2014 as Prospera funds) as well as Social Development Ministry funds and even
CONASUPO stores, up until 1999. Without these subsidies, the result would be increasing
immiseration among the poorest 6.9 million families in the nation who were recipients of such
funds.20 Indeed, without civil society supports, neither the EZLN or Las Abejas would continue to
be viable. The EZLN struck back by proposing indigenous autonomy in its caracoles. While in
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Mora (2017, 11-12) argues that under President Fox, Oportunidades had racialized effects, as it was targeted at
indigenous groups, giving cash for school attendance, medical checkups and household hygiene, all of which
“marked alterations in cultural habits.”
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August, 2019, the EZLN would add seven new caracoles and four new autonomous municipalities
(MAREZ), bringing the total to 43 CRAREZ (Centros de Resistència Autònoma y Rebeldìa
Zapatista, a newly-introduced name for both caracoles and autonomous municipalities), following
a trend of growth noted in 2016 when Subcomandante Moisès announced that the EZLN was
beginning to do better than its PRIista neighbors. However, in the late 1990s, structural and
absolute poverty was endemic among the displaced population, who could not hang on until
conditions improved. I explore that structural, absolute poverty here and conclude that for many
families, it was a reason for their refusal of the EZLN policy of governmental aid rejection—and
for eventually leaving Sociedad Civil Las Abejas in favor of government subsidies and cash
transfers, although some families would do a surprising turnaround in 2011, by suing ex-President
Zedillo in a U.S. civil court, thereby rejecting “the gifts of enemies.”
Additionally, in this chapter, I follow the ways that the Mexican government, in 1998 and
1999, turned against the large international presence in Chiapas, with deportations and expulsions
from the state and the country. Together, they help to explain the situation in Chiapas in the late1990s, and the myriad forms taken by the low-intensity war, which also targeted foreigners,
blamed for fomenting the Chiapas rebellion.

Inside Deep Mexico
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla (1987) dissects the roots of poverty in what he called “deep”
Mexico, that is, its poorest, largely-indigenous regions, stretching from Chiapas to the Sierra
Norte de Puebla to Hidalgo and Guerrero—Chiapas being Mexico’s poorest state, followed by
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Oaxaca and Guerrero.21 It comes as no surprise that indigenous Mexicans are the poorest of the
poor, the most marginalized and the most vulnerable. Although Mexico claims that it is a
mestizo nation, the ruling stratum boasts almost “pure” European blood and the ideology of
mestizaje at the heart of Mexican nationalism is generally true only for those in the middle and
popular classes, with the exception of indigenous peoples, who largely reject mestizaje. But, in
contradistinction to the mestizocratic ideal, the Mesoamerican cultural heritage of the Indian is
presumed to be “dead,” a fitting subject for museums and monuments. Indigenous place names,
however, show the resilience of indigenous culture, as does the indígenista ideology of the
Mexican Revolution, epitomized by the presence of Cuahtémoc and other Indian leaders on
Mexican currency. To this day, such names predominate in Mexican geography and topography
(for example, Iztaccíhuatl and Popocatépetl, the two volcanoes cradling Mexico City, are named
for Aztec deities). Indigenous place names were eradicated by the Spaniards but saw a
resurgence, although regions differ, as indigenous nomenclature was restored by the popular
classes after the Conquest and after the Mexican Revolution. Yet the middle classes openly reject
identification with the oppressed Indian, instead embracing the European archetype at the top of
the pyramid. Mestizaje, or race mixing, continued, while being vilified in some places, especially
in backwaters like San Cristóbal de Las Casas, with its “auténticos coletos,” or Spanishdescended elites, who shunned mestizaje. As they have done since the Conquest, indigenous
communities turned inward upon themselves for protection.
The structural poverty in the south of Mexico, especially among its indigenous people,
results from the same uneven development that has caused large portions of the global south to
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“The next two poorest states, Oaxaca and Guerrero, are 25% and 30% above Chiapas,” according to Growth Lab
of Harvard (growthlab.cid.harvard.edu). According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía de México
(INEGI, National Institute of Statistics and Geography), Chiapas is also the state with the highest poverty rate
(74.7%) as well as extreme poverty (46.7%).
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stagnate under corrupt governments and unequal access to resources, both natural and
manufactured. In Mexico’s south—especially in Chiapas22—one immediately becomes aware of
the fact that many indigenous people have been crushed under the weight of a poverty so
profound that in 2004 infant mortality in Chiapas still resulted in 21.6 deaths per 1,000 live
births, with many more children dying before the age of five from highly preventable illnesses
such as parasites and dysentery (knoema.com 2013). As noted above, many women cannot
afford even plastic sandals and go barefoot, most people are malnourished, with a significant
percentage in the countryside eating only tortillas with a little salt and chili. People are constantly
dying of hunger and neglect. As a UN report notes:
The indigenous population in Mexico is estimated to be 12.6% of the wider population
and 80.6% of the indigenous population are considered to be extremely poor. Maternal
mortality rates in the states of Guerrero, Chiapas and Oaxaca are 103.2, 82.7 and 80.6 per
100,000, respectively. In the rural areas of these three states the probability of death due
to preventable diseases is 181% higher than the probability in the urban centers of the
same states (United Nations 2015, 87).
These conditions were immediately apparent at the INI camp in 1998 and 1999, and at Acteal in
1999. There was insufficient food and a lack of other necessities (which are typically provided
by humanitarian organizations); adult men and male children wore cast-off clothing from the
United States; women habitually washed their clothes—and their hair—in polluted streams,
causing an infection-malnutrition cycle; and, most seriously, people died of preventable diseases,
such as parasitic infections and amoebic dysentery.23
22

In Chenalhó, one indicator of structural poverty is that 64.36 percent of residences have earthen floors
(CONEVAL 2005). See Table 1.
23
Six people died at X’Oyep in 1998, which at the time was a Las Abejas displaced persons’ camp in the highlands.
These were all of preventable causes. In 2015, my once-neighbor in San Cristóbal, an indigenous woman and
mother of eight originally from Chamula, died of septicemia because of a surgical sponge left in her abdomen after
an operation five years earlier. All of her organs failed, and she was put on dialysis just days before her death.
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Inequality in Indigenous Chiapas

Municipio

NACIONAL

%
% With Houses

Total

Malnutrition % Illiteracy % 6-14 Years % Incomplete

No

Population

(%)

Health Earthen Without
Services Floors toilets

over age
15

not
attending

basic
education

school

over age 15

% Houses

% Houses

without
piped

Without
electricity

Water

103,263,388.0

18.2

8.35

5.29

45.98

49.78

9.93

9.9

11.05

6.12

4,293,459.0

47

21.33

9.65

64.65

76.37

29.04

12.99

27.22

9.17

Chenalhó

31,788.0

77

38.76

18.92

92.25

55.88

64.36

27.68

32.22

22.62

San
Cristóbal

166,460.0

36.8

15.47

9.94

51.17

63.74

20.91

10.75

14.32

9.46

31,061.0

74.8

82

93.3

51.19

29.62

94.27

94.85

97.45

27.58

Chiapas

de Las Casas

Zinacantán

Table 1.1 Source: Adapted from the National Council for Evaluation of Social Development Policy, (CONEVAL)
2011.

“Somos pobres,” “we are poor,” many Zapatistas and members of Las Abejas told me
over and over, not only in 1997 but up to, and until, 2019. As the table presented above (Table
1.1)24 shows, as many as eleven years after the Chiapas rebellion in the municipality of Chenalhó,
as many as 77% of families were malnourished; illiteracy over the age of 15 was 36.76%; 18.92%
of children aged 6-14 years of age did not attend school; 92.25% of people over the age of 15

24

Culled from 2005 data, the closest range available to my study years of 1997-99.
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possessed an incomplete basic education; and 55.88% had no health services. 64% of houses in
Chenalhó had earthen floors. By comparison, only 24.8% of houses in which indigenous people
lived in Chiapas had dirt floors during the same years. An earthen floor in the home increases the
probability that its occupants will contract respiratory or gastrointestinal illnesses (INEGHI 2010,
108). 27.68% did not have a toilet, yet home toilets are an essential service with important
implications for sanitary conditions and for the health of occupants. Toilets reduce the possibility
that occupants will contract gastrointestinal illnesses and their presence can even prevent
epidemics (INEGHI 2010, 112). 32.22% possessed no piped water although piped water
decreases the probability that inhabitants will contract gastrointentinal illnesses (INEGHI 2010,
110). 22.62% did not have electricity. 27.9% of indigenous people in Chiapas had more than three
occupants per room—the majority of these houses were one-room domiciles (INEGHI 2010,
109). In 2019, Chiapas was still the poorest state in Mexico, twenty five years after the Chiapas
rebellion, with 29.7% of its inhabitants living in extreme poverty, while Guerrero had 26.8%
living in extreme poverty, and Oaxaca had 23.3%, according to 2018 data (CONEVAL 2018).
Such poverty would prove to be a key factor in individual families’ decisions to leave both social
movements.

Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera
Beginning in 1997, the Mexican government implemented a series of anti-poverty
measures to fight the EZLN by fighting poverty. To an extent it has worked.
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera is a federal government cash transfer program begun under the
Progresa name and revamped in 2002 under then-President Vicente Fox as Oportunidades. It is
now called Prospera (World Bank 2014). The iconic program, until its discontinuation in early
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2019, after 21 years, by PRD president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (Development Pathways
06/02/2019), granted mothers living in extreme poverty conditional cash transfers of between 500
to 2500 pesos (U.S.$45.00 to U.S.$200) a month for each child who attended school regularly,
had up-to-date vaccination cards, proper nutrition and regular medical checkups. In addition, the
program included mandatory hygiene and family planning workshops and home visits. 6.9 million
families in Mexico were recipients of Prospera funds and the program has been adopted in many
other countries throughout the world. Consequently, it has been considered a success story. It has
been copied in Brazil25, where a decade ago it was the largest cash transfer program in the world
(World Bank 2007), Peru, Honduras, Jamaica and Bulgaria, as well as in New York City (World
Bank 2014). One critic of the program, a (civil society) research participant, maintained that at
times fathers take the money to buy alcohol, but this person also conceded that at least the
children had to stay in school and receive periodical check-ups, making the program a “success,”
even given this downside (Interview with Bárbara, December 20, 2014). Other cash transfer
programs have also been undertaken in the Chiapas countryside: PROCAMPO pays 200 pesos or
$20 U.S. dollars per month to each campesino family of PRI affiliation and during the height of
the Chiapas conflict in the 1990s, monies from the Social Development Ministry’s micro-regional
councils in the Cañadas region of Chiapas were utilized by peasant campesino farmers who were
unaffiliated with Zapatismo, as they were provided by the PRI; this was a conscious federal
government strategy to counter “the problem” of Zapatismo (Fox 2000, 233). Yet, residents of
many indigenous communities, such as those in Chenalhó township, that do not possess basic
health services are ineligible for participation in Prospera; thus they were excluded from the one
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The first conditional cash transfer program in Latin America originated in Brazil in 1995. This was Bolsa Escolar
(Harrington 2011). However, this was solely focused on school attendance and not medical checkups, vaccinations,
health and hygiene or family planning, as in Mexico. These aspects of the program were copied in Brazil from the
Mexican case.
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successful program the government had instituted to raise the poor out of absolute poverty (Heath
2016). Sometimes impoverished families of PRI affiliation utilize the EZLN caracoles’ health and
education services (Nash 2005). At other times, membership in the EZLN, especially among the
BAEZLN, has been inconsistent in these years and harder to sustain, while the civil society26
inputs which have cushioned the rebellion have declined over time.
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera was not assistentialist. Molyneux (2006, 430) described
the roots of Oportunidades and other social programs in Latin America, this way:
As states moved towards targeted assistance programmes, attention focused on how the
poor could be encouraged to ‘help themselves.’ This idea informed a range of policies,
from giving economic assistance (as in the case of micro-credit), to providing basic
education in nutrition and health care. These latter strategies were designed, as in the
earlier ‘social hygiene’ movements of the 1920s and 1930s, to ‘modernize and civilize’ the
poor, but also to equip them with the attitudinal wherewithal to manage their own
destinies, ‘free’ of state dependency but subordinated to the discipline of the market (2006,
430).

As Mariana Mora (2017, 11-12) tells us, Oportunidades was structured to have racialized
effects, even if it merely listed indigenous and Afro-Mexican communities under the category of
“vulnerable groups” and did not go into greater detail. Even today, 80 percent of indigenous
people in Mexico live under the federal poverty line, and so, were eligible to receive these funds.
Mora (2017, 171-177) discusses the scope of the program:
“Over the course of my fieldwork, (Opportunidades)… received the largest budgetary
allocation ever seen by a federal program of its kind: 25 billion pesos (250 million US
dollars) in 2004, 33 billion (330 million US dollars) in 2005, and 36 billion (360 million
26

Civil society organizations are those not affiliated with the state. International protest forced President Salinas de
Gotari to acquiesce to a ceasefire on January 13, 1994 after 12 days of fighting in Ocosingo, Las Margaritas,
Altamirano, Rancho Nuevo (a Mexican army base), Oxchuc, Huixtán and Chanal, as well as San Cristóbal de Las
Casas.

31

US dollars) in 2007…. At the time, Chiapas was home to almost half a million recipients,
and together with Oaxaca and Veracruz was one of the three states with the largest
number of beneficiaries….” (2017, 173).

Implicit in the program was co-responsibility on the part of mothers for health, education
and hygiene that attempted to break the generational cycle of poverty and allowed families to
“increase their social capital, emerge from conditions of extreme poverty, and effectively
participate in the economic opportunities provided by the market” (Mora 2017, 173). In a 2006
interview with Mora, Sandra Dávalos, regional director of Oportunidades, described the most
significant features of the program, in her opinion:
The change in habits and attitudes among the women who take part are most important. I
have seen how the women who receive their check every two months take their roles more
seriously. They have to share responsibilities for the program to work. This sense of
responsibility improves self-esteem among indigenous women. If they fail to attend the
health workshops or fail to send their kids to school, they are unsubscribed from the
program…. I observe that they acquire a level of [civic] maturity because they are able to
take decisions about their lives. Oportunidades teaches them they have the power to
choose. This is part of building democracy [in Mexico]. (Quoted in Mora 2017, 174).

Oportunidades was a social development program grounded in “neoliberal logics of
efficiency and risk management among poverty-stricken populations” whose overriding aims
were to reeducate women to be “active and rational subjects that are responsible for their own
well-being” (Mora 2017, 173-74). This contrasts with populist programs that create passivity and
dependence, and are thus, assistentialist.27
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Some such assistentialist programs in Mexico during the 1990s were PRI party programs that created loyalty in
their beneficiaries: CONASUPO stores, BANRURAL credits and development monies, discussed later in this
chapter (Dietz 1996, 72).
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Early studies of Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera have been encouraging, although many
researchers admit that it may be too early to assess long-term results. Rodriguez (2007) reported a
35% increase in visits to rural health clinics and a significant 22% decrease in morbidity for
children aged 0-2. In rural areas, malnutrition decreased with a greater variety of foods consumed,
especially vegetables and meats, accompanied by a corresponding increase in height and weight
among participating children (Lomelí 2008). Among children, anemia decreased from 61% to
35.8% in children under two years of age living in rural areas. The reduction in anemia is
significant because insufficient iron intake in young children is linked to poor cognitive
development (SEDESOL 2010). School attendance has likewise spiked; in Progresa’s first year
alone, school attendance went up 26% (SEDESOL 2010).
“The biggest ‘development’ story of the last twenty years is, in fact, not microcredit but
(as a recent policy review put it) ‘the rise and rise of social protection’ (Roelen and Devereux
2013, 1). And the central mechanism of the new anti-poverty programs is not credit,
securitization, or any sort of neoliberal predation but the startlingly simple device of handing out
small amounts of money to people deemed to need it,” James Ferguson writes in Give A Man a
Fish: Reflections on the New Politics of Distribution (2015, 2). Such cash transfer programs are
now a cornerstone of southern welfare state policy in South Africa and Namibia and to a lesser
extent in Botswana (2015, 5) making it a surprising new development in macroeconomic policy
and practice. Cash transfers are now received by more than 30% of South Africa’s population; a
non-contributory benefit today that delivers 3.4 percent of the country’s GDP directly to the
poor—under a neoliberal regime.28 Ferguson tells us that cash transfers aren’t a joke—as they
were in development circles—any longer. He argues that welfare states in the Global South
28

Contrast this with a recent book ironically entitled Just Give Money to the Poor (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme
2010).
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developed because of an awareness in the circles of power of the potential for social protest
among the desperately poor, for whom there simply isn’t enough work. Elaborating on the
aphorism that makes up the title of the book, Ferguson states that the ethos of development work
is “transformation,” but there are already far too many fishermen in South Africa (who already
know how to fish), very few of whom can even work—few have boats and nets, motors and
access rights to waterways—let alone being able to sell their fish in an oversupplied market
primarily because of competition from Asia, a leader in the aquaculture market, which produces
89 percent of fish and possesses 97 percent of fishing jobs. Today, coastal South Africa “swarms”
with unemployed fishermen (Ferguson 2015, 35-7). Neoliberalism has created social exclusion,
and cash transfers are a tacit admission of this fact. This directly mirrors the situation in Mexico,
especially in Chiapas; because of the Zapatista rebellion, and the taking up of arms against the
government—and because of the fallout of NAFTA, which caused many campesino farmers to be
unable to compete with U.S. grown, subsidized and imported corn, the Mexican government
proposed the idea of cash transfers to quiet unrest among the most disenfranchised—indigenous
campesino farmers, whose ejidos were now effectively privatized with the “reform” of Article 27
of the Constitution. Although it has been particularly successful in luring impoverished
campesinos to the PRI, the program has been something of a Trojan horse, as Mora (2017) shows
us, demanding medical checkups, nutritional workshops—and, most controversially, family
planning workshops. Many of the women to whom Mora (2017) spoke voiced a criticism that the
Oportunidades program “enslaved” them, as it told them to limit the number of children that they
would have—while their husbands insisted on having more. This placed them in a bind and
caused some to state that “the government… want(s) to control us” (quoted in Mora 2017, 172).
The program, “a classic programme of the neoliberal right,” has been charged with “controlling
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and subjugating indigenous groups” and has been cited with corruption, such as compelling
participants to vote for the ruling party and forcing them to pay bribes to have their attendance
sheets signed at medical checkups where they were not actually seen by a doctor (Development
Pathways 06/02/2019). At least in Mexico, although successful, conditional cash transfers would
prove to be the proverbial “gift horse” one is told not to look “in the mouth”; the moment one
looks, the gift goes from satisfactory to disagreeable.

Poverty in Chiapas, NAFTA, and the Globalization of Neoliberal Policies
The problem of indigenous poverty is not new. Authors such as Bonfil Batalla (1987),
Freyermuth Enciso (2003), Jenkins (1981), Benjamin (1996), Eber (1994), Nash (2001), GuterasHolmes (1961), and Harvey (1998) point to the ways in which chronic undernourishment
circumscribes life in indigenous communities. Chiapas is a rich land populated by a poor people.
Problems of poor school performance, stunted growth, alcoholism, domestic violence and
maternal mortality are all in one way or another symptomatic of poverty, a structural poverty that
keeps those living in poverty from improving their lives due to structural conditions such as
discrimination, social marginalization and social inequality. Chiapas ranks first in the nation in
illiteracy, at 17 percent (Noticias de Noticias, 2011). The Chiapas conflict was caused, in large
part, by extreme poverty (Harvey 1998; Benjamin 1996). And, as the conflict stretched on, year
after year, and, as concurrent neoliberal policies were put into place under NAFTA (after 1994),
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such as increased tariffs on corn, hunger increased in indigenous communities—and especially in
communities in resistance—and, after 1997, in the highland camps.29
In Polanyi’s ([1944], 2001) term, the peasants from Chenalhó, who began to join Las
Abejas as early as 1992—predating the EZLN by two years—had come from communities where
the economic system was “embedded” into the fabric of their communities, but now those
campesinos who had struggled to be at least semi-self-sufficient subsistence farmers had
overnight come face-to-face with modernity30 and the Santa Ana winds of globalization,31 marked
most viscerally by the 1992 signing of NAFTA by U.S. President George H.W. Bush, Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. Its imposition
on January 1, 1994, was an impetus—one among many—for the EZLN uprising in Chiapas on
that day.32 NAFTA’s lowered tariffs on corn making it economically unfeasible for campesinos
all over Mexico to sell corn at all. From the moment NAFTA was implemented, campesinos’ corn
prices would be undercut by cheap American yellow varieties of corn,33 subsidized by the U.S.
government, Zapatista rebellion or no. Perhaps even more critical was Salinas’s reform of Article
27 of the Constitution, which stipulated that ejidos could be sold or rented out. The EZLN staged
its rebellion as a foil for neoliberalism, which I define as a set of policies promoting universal free
markets, deregulation of financial markets, restructuring, trade liberalization, floating currencies,
29

By 2016, these numbers had begun to slacken, as reflected in Subcomandante Moisès’s statement that the EZLN
caracoles were better off than their PRIista neighbors. The struggle was beginning to bear fruit after all of these
years.
30
I reject the term “post-modern” in the context of Chiapas, although many researchers have appropriated this term
from literature—and the social sciences of the 1990s. See Nugent (1995) and Edelman (1999) for arguments against
“postmodernism” and “postmodern” development, respectively.
31
Morton (2013) discusses Hobsbawm’s (1994:289-91) contention that the peasantry is declining and is a minority
everywhere except China—although this may no longer be the case in China with rapid proletarianization in the
2000s. According to Hobsbawm, in Mexico, the number of peasants halved between 1960 and 1980, a result of
global processes which had begun to transform the countryside (ibid).
32
See N. Harvey (1998); Muñoz Ramirez (2008) for a detailed account; also Ross (1994, 2002, 2006).
33
In the late 1990s, the importation of genetically-modified corn from the United States began. At the same time,
genetically-modified seed crops were banned from cultivation in Mexican soil. In October 2013, a Mexican court
would uphold the ban on genetically-modified seed crops planted in Mexico.

36

weakened sovereignty, the removal of worker protections in labor markets, privatization of
government services and resources, expansion of offshore financial centers and government
retrenchment.34 Among its most prominent promoters were U.S. President Ronald Reagan and
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The earliest efforts to implement the paradigm were—
surprisingly—in third world dictatorships, notably Suharto’s Indonesia and Pinochet’s Chile
(Edelman and Borras 2016). Another feature of the so-called Washington Consensus of the 1980s,
developed in reaction to the stagflation that marked the sluggish U.S. economy, was—and is—
IMF and World Bank austerity measures (Williamson 1989). These involved cutting social
programs such as health, education and social services, especially in Latin America, where these
measures were felt most strongly, reminiscent of the “lost decade” concurrent with the 1982 debt
crisis when country after country defaulted on their IMF and World Bank loans. In these cases,
governments turned to the IMF and the World Bank for help in the form of additional loans. Often
as a trade-off for these loans, austerity measures such as the cutting of health care and educational
programs began in the 1990s in Mexico, among other countries (Edelman 1999). Williamson’s
ten points, ranging from such ideas as privatization, trade liberalization (the lowering of tariffs),
cutting of health and education services and infrastructure, low government borrowing,
deregulation and competitive exchange rates, were originally derived from Latin American
leaders and were still extant in the 2000s (The Economist 2010; Williamson 2002).
Scholars of the EZLN such as Ivan LeBot, Neil Harvey, and June Nash have noted that the
EZLN’s real enemy has been globalization. Nash tells us that it was the Spanish conquest which
shrank the Maya world to the boundaries of their individual communities. Given that the Maya
world once embraced much of Mesoamerica, the EZLN’s global reach and outlook is merely a
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See Edelman and Haugerud (2005) for discussions of the origins of neoliberalism and globalization.
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return to the past, when “the Mayan vision of their universe... embraced the world” (Nash 2001,
30). The common, collective good, rather than the capitalist Protestant ethic’s individual good,
shaped that world, as semi-subsistence cultivators knitted together a communal livelihood based
on the ejido, or common usufruct lands (written into the 1917 Mexican constitution); this was
based on “the moral logic of indigenous people rather than the rational logic of free market
globalization” (2001, 25). The Chiapas rebellion was engineered to strike back against the
government that was hell bent on devastating traditional economies and survival stratagems. By
attacking local municipalities, the EZLN struck at the heart of neoliberalism, the hegemonic
structures that stood in their way.

The Birth of Las Abejas
While the EZLN was founding itself in the eighties and early nineties in order to attack
local municipalities—and the federal government—Las Abejas was forming over a land dispute.
Events that inspire collective action typically arise out of everyday circumstances. By themselves
they are often pedestrian, but in the case of the founding of Las Abejas, a family dispute over land
and gender drew a community into what outside observers would normally consider a private
legal matter. A November 1992 dispute between Catarina and María Hernández López and their
brother Agustín over the inheritance of 120 hectares of land led to the founding of Sociedad Civil
Las Abejas. Because they were women, Agustín didn’t want to recognize his siblings’ right to
inherit the land. As was customary, the community adjudicated the dispute and decided to
distribute the land in three equal parts.35 The dispute, however, didn’t end there. Because 60
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In Mexico, indigenous communities often have parallel local legal systems under the recognition of “usos y
costumbres” and/or ejidal or community lands. This dates to the colonial system of the Republica de los Indios, on
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hectares weren’t registered with a legal instrument of ownership, in this case the Certificate of
Agrarian Rights, the community decided to allocate the remaining land to the sisters. Agustín
rejected the decision and turned over the land to some inhabitants of Yibeljoj, Las Delicias, and
Yabteclum. Two groups formed—one supporting Agustín and another supporting his sisters.
When Agustín and his supporters kidnapped the two women and their children, forcing
them to sign a document forfeiting their rights to the land, representatives from 22 communities
formed the organization Sociedad Civil Las Abejas to support the sisters. Agustín’s group, calling
itself “El Tabasco,” insisted on their rights to the land and in an assault seriously injured three
from the newly formed group and killed Tzajalchen’s municipal agent. The new group, Las
Abejas, radioed the PRIista municipal president for aid in transporting the injured to the hospital
in San Cristóbal, but five of those who aided the injured were arrested and held in the San
Cristóbal jail. Las Abejas immediately organized a march to protest the unjust jailings (CIACH
1997, 3; Hidalgo 1998, 54-8). The Mesa Directiva, the elected governing body at Acteal,
explained how the group chose its name:
In 1992 five of our brothers in Tzaljachen were incarcerated. All were innocent. They
were catequists and Presbyterians and Pentecostals. We are a group of Catholics. We
organized rapidly. We arrived at an accord that we were going to do a march and an
oración (prayer). We began the march on the 10th of December in 1992. It was raining...
cold. We began with a prayer. We marched in Chenalhó. We passed the road to San
Andrés Larrainzar—there was a lot of press, journalists — “híjole!” we said. They asked
us where we were going and why we were marching. They asked what organization we
came from. We said that we are an organization of Catholics, of believers. Ah bueno, we
still didn’t have a name. We kept on walking. [At Chamula they took some food at the
side of the road.] Then one of the catequists said, because again there was a lot of press,
what name does our organization have? Then we began to talk. There were a lot of
the one hand and the Republica de los Españoles on the other. In 1542, New Laws were enacted allowing a limited
degree of autonomy (Rabasa 2010, 104).
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people. Then one answered that he had worked with honey, with the beehive, and he had
seen that they have their queen and that all are workers. I also worked with honey. It’s
the same with us, we are workers in the community. We are doing this work in order to
liberate our brothers. We were in accord. We said to the press, we said crying out
“¡Vivan Las Abejas!” The press said, ‘where are you going?’ We said, ‘we are going to
liberate our brothers.’ The press said, ‘what is your name?’ ‘Las Abejas of Chenalhó,’
we said, yelling (Interview, July 1, 1999).

The new organization was to be successful in securing the release of their incarcerated brothers
and would go on to fight against oppression with the support of CDHFBLC and diocese
catequists, who are important to its pathway. Las Abejas focused on two central issues: 1)
“liberation, broadly defined as the eradication of oppression and domination,” and 2)
“reconciliation, working to restore their own dignity while rejecting violence, vengeance and
hatred” (Kovic 2003, 58-9). These issues are closely allied and address the “violent peace” that
has characterized Chiapas since 1994 (and even more so since 1997) (Rojas 1995; Kovic 2003,
58-9). Las Abejas, like the bees its name indicates, work collectively under a queen, the Virgin of
Guadalupe, the indigenous patrona of Mexico. As the Mesa Directiva explained their pacifist
message, bees sting but do not kill. Las Abejas were an obvious target of paramilitary violence:
unwilling to fight back, they presented no threat. The Seguridad Pública’s response was to turn a
blind eye, from a few meters away. Yet, Las Abejas never gave up its nonviolent stance. Besides
the crime of Acteal, it experienced other persecutions and assassinations. In this, their roots go
back to the Catholic catequists who have been organizing in Chiapas since the 1970s under the
tutelage of Bishop Samuel Ruiz (Kovic 2003; Tavanti 2003:5). Las Abejas shared its conditions
of poverty with the EZLN, yet chose to fight back nonviolently. As one of Marco Tavanti’s
interlocutors explained, “ While we do not use weapons in our resistance, we agree with the
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propuestas of the EZLN because we are oppressed in the same way. We are coffee producers but
we do not get any money from our work. We don’t have roads, clinics, or houses with
electricity…. The struggle of the Zapatistas is necessary because thousands of indigenous people
are poor and our conditions are getting worse” (Interview 25, quoted in Tavanti 2003, 146).

Making Another World Possible
The EZLN, a rebel army bred from Chiapas’s indigenous campesinos, or peasantry, took
the world by storm when it attacked San Cristóbal, Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano and an
army base, Nuevo Rancho to protest the reform of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, which
allowed ejido lands36 to be bought, sold, and rented out, which they saw as a betrayal, and to
protest NAFTA, which went into effect on that day. Ejidos were communal lands granted
communities by the 1917 Constitution, and their “reform” meant that indigenous communities
would be dispossessed of these lands upon which their livelihoods depended. NAFTA, the North
American Free Trade Agreement, signed by the governments of the United States, Canada and
Mexico in 1992, meant that tariffs would be lowered on corn and that indigenous campesinos
would be unable to sell their corn for a profit. The United States is the largest corn producer in
the world, and in 1994, it flooded the Mexican market with its cheap yellow corn. The
Zapatistas, as they called themselves, rose up in arms to say “Ya Basta!” (“Enough is Enough!”),
and to proclaim their right to “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence,
freedom, democracy, justice and peace.” These eleven demands formed the basis of the First
Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle in December 1993. The Chiapas uprising took place soon
thereafter.

36

And comunidades agrarias, communal lands held by each indigenous community, since the Conquest.
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The EZLN staged its rebellion not to topple the government or to seize state power, as
planned as early as 1983 in the Lacandon jungle by the Marxist-Leninist vanguard that travelled
to the selva and Cañadas of Chiapas from Mexico City in that year to “convert” the indigenous
agrarian proletariat and campesinos. Instead it sought to develop a new society within the
Mexican state—and to inspire other indigenous groups throughout the Americas to do the same.
The Zapatista uprising has been an ethnic movement whose supporters have fought heart and
soul for the right to create a new society, but the road to autonomy has been a rocky one.
By 1994, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos and the rest of the “vanguard” had turned
against the idea of revolution, rejecting the Marxism-Leninism that brought them to the
Lacandon Jungle in the first place, and instead embraced Maya notions of consensus and
democracy, which they recreated in a unique phrase melding the ideals of proletarian revolution
with democracy: mandar obediciendo, or “lead by obeying.” It was the EZLN’s rank and file, the
bases de apoyo, or “support bases,” which was to determine the EZLN’s course of action.

The San Andrés Accords and Indigenous Autonomy
Two years after the EZLN’s uprising pressure mounted for a settlement. On February 16,
1996, in an attempt to end the conflict, the EZLN and the federal government, with the aid of the
national legislature’s COCOPA, signed the San Andrés Accords. The Accords called for the
recognition of the indigenous peoples of Mexico in the Constitution and their right to selfdetermination, the right to govern themselves through their own social institutions, economy,
culture and politics, that is, the right to autonomy. But the San Andrés Accords were never
implemented. Most observers agree that this was by design (Nash 2001; Speed 2008; Womack
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1999; Aubry 2003). Conflicts in indigenous communities continued, although many communities
were able to effectively exercise autonomy.
Still today, autonomy has become a proving ground, as Zapatista communities and their
bases of support, including Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, do for themselves what the Mexican
federal government could not. After five hundred years of oppression at the hands of mestizos and
coletos—the local term for descendants of the Spaniards—autonomy has come to mean freedom
to indigenous Mexicans.
It is instructive to examine how the EZLN came to an understanding of the importance of
autonomy. In the Cañadas and the Selva Lacandona (the ravines and the Lacandón jungle), areas of
post-1940s settlement by landless highland campesinos, autonomy was a given because state
resources and oversight were absent in the largely uninhabited and inhospitable Selva. These were
the areas that first harbored the EZLN and from which its earliest leadership and membership
arose.37 In 1996, The Zapatistas instituted a formal rejection of aid because they believed from
their experience in the Selva and the Cañadas that it would lead to greater autonomy. Although the
de facto autonomy of the EZLN regions dates only to 1996, it was preceded by experiments in
autonomy by the National Plural Indigenous Assembly for Autonomy (ANIPA, or Asamblea
Nacional Indígena Plural por la Autonomía,) and Autonomous Pluriethnic Regions, (RAP, or
Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas), and before that to the period of organizing in the Cañadas and
Selva, that is, during the 1980s.38 The Mexican state attempted to gain a foothold in these areas
through the PRONASOL programs, or National Solidarity Program (Programa Nacional de
Solidaridad), one component of the neoliberal reforms Salinas introduced, which included
37

See Morquecho (2011) for a full account of the founding of the EZLN, a “child” of the Fuerzas de Liberacion
Nacional, or FLN by its leaders, Germán, Rodrigo and Elisa and three Chol-speaking insurgents, Javier, Jorge and
Frank in 1983. Harvey (1998) also provides excellent background material on the EZLN.
38
Leyva Solano (2001, 33) shows us how indigenous settler communities in the Cañadas were pluralistic yet
“ideologically polarized” before 1994 as unions and religious entities opposed one another.
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privatization, trade liberalization and government restructuring (Harvey 1998, 170). What
happened during that period prior to the uprising was crucial to the development of the strategic
understanding that autonomy represented a novel way forward and that neoliberalism represented a
threat to all indigenous groups. At the time, many indigenous groups in Latin America had
received de jure territorial autonomy from their national governments.39 In Mexico, Zapatista and
indigenous autonomy was de facto rather than de jure; the watered-down version of the San
Andrés Accords that was signed into law in 2001, made clear that lawmakers had rejected the
claim of indigenous autonomy under the law. Although “usos y costumbres,” the provisioning of
local indigenous autonomy in Mexico, dates to the Conquest, and specifically to the New Laws of
1542 (Rabasa 2010, 104), this limited local autonomy of 2001 differs in scale and scope from
Zapatista autonomy.

Forms of Autonomy
In post-2003, with the creation of caracoles (“snail shells”), or de facto Zapatista
autonomy, the struggle is slow, “hard, tenacious,” as it was in 1848 in France (Engels, 1964, 16).
As Rebecca Solnit put it, in “Revolution of the Snails:”
The United States and Mexico both have eagles as their emblems, predators which attack
from above. The Zapatistas have chosen a snail in a spiral shell, a small creature, easy to
overlook. It speaks of modesty, humility, closeness to the earth, and of the recognition
that a revolution may start like lightning but is realized slowly, patiently, steadily. The
old idea of revolution was that we would trade one government for another and somehow
this new government would set us free and change everything. More and more of us now
understand that change is a discipline lived every day, as those women and men standing
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Among the states to recognize these rights are Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Venezuela and Brazil
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before us testified; that revolution only secures the territory in which life can change.
Launching a revolution is not easy, as the decade of planning before the 1994 Zapatista
uprising demonstrated, and living one is hard too, a faith and discipline that must not
falter until the threats and old habits are gone—if then. True revolution is slow (Solnit
2008).

In this slow pursuit of autonomy, Zapatismo would become a model for other Latin
American social movements. As Arturo Escobar wrote in 2016, the Zapatistas “reconstitute the
communal as a pillar of autonomy.” Peer autonomous movements, he notes, embrace autonomy,
community and territoriality for people of the color of the earth who seek an alternative model of
life, economy and society (2016). In Land and Freedom, Leandro Vergara-Camus outlines the
similarities and differences between Zapatismo and the Movimiento Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil
on the question of state power, making clear that not every movement’s path is the same. The
alternate reality embraced by the EZLN regarding its alterity to the state forms the nexus of its
resistance to that state. While this is also true of the MST, that movement seeks legitimacy within
the confines of the nation state while challenging its power (Vergara-Camus 2014, 219). Both
movements employ mass mobilization and nonviolent confrontations with the state in opposition
to “major political actors” who “have, for the moment chosen political integration and negotiation
instead of opposition or autonomy” (2014, 295). With the MST, especially, Vergara-Camus
characterizes their tactics as revolutionary as they oppose the state apparatus most recently by
means of a September, 2007 petition to reverse the “highly irregular” privatization of Vale de Rio
Doce, the largest state-owned mining company in the world, and a 2009 campaign with 1.3
million signatures submitted to the Brazilian Congress, representing “an opportunity to
recompose a broad coalition of forces against neoliberalism” (2014, 239). For both the EZLN and
the MST, Vergara-Camus (2014, 298) follows on the heels of Holloway’s (2002) argument that
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replication is made difficult by the movements’ inability to scale up, an argument I make for the
EZLN. However, he also recognizes the importance of the movements’ need to change the
relationship between “the ruled and the rulers” (quoted in Vergara-Camus 2014, 298). At base, he
argues that social movements will “bear fruit if and only if they are able to transform the subaltern
classes from objects to subjects of their own history, by allowing them to gain control of the
means of production and creating a structure of popular power alternative to (or alongside) the
state…” (emphasis in original, 2014, 299).
Among the characteristics of autonomous movements, Escobar writes, is that many have
rejected capitalistic, environmentally-destructive modernity (2016). Subcomandante Insurgente
Moisès, the EZLN’s post-2014 spokesperson, has poignantly spoken about the Zapatistas’
rejection of “the capitalist hydra” in a book by that name and through seminars given throughout
Mexico in 2015-16; the capitalist system has sown only destruction, privatized ejidos and
instituted projects on lands worked by indigenous campesinos, thereby dislocating families and
communities. The answer, according to the EZLN, is autonomy.
The struggle for autonomy is inherently complex, as has been the concomitant quest for
constitutional reform by the EZLN, which began actively seeking de jure status for their MAREZ,
or autonomous municipalities in 2003 (Burguete Cal y Mayor 2003, 191). Burguete Cal y Mayor
reports that:

New actors, who are competing for political power and fighting for rights, not only from
the state and the mestizo-creole regional power groups, but also from the traditional
Indian elite, have emerged within the indigenous political scene. These new actors
frequently resort to an autonomous discourse, but they often mean different things by
autonomy (2003, 192).
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Both the EZLN (including its bases of support), and Las Abejas were identified by Burguete Cal y
Mayor (2003) as new actors.

As noted above, autonomy has had a mixed history in the region. Indigenous
communities in Chiapas have been governed by their own representatives, mostly indigenous
caciques, or leaders, who were members of the PRI (Collier and Quaratiello 1994; Rus 1994).
Even in 1940, Collier and Quaratiello (1994, 36) report, “special effort was made by Mexico to
integrate indigenous communities into the state;” however, most of these efforts focused on the
agricultural sector, or on community development issues such as road building, sanitation, and
curriculum in the local schools (1994, 36). Its effect, however, was to channel development
monies through municipal seats, limiting the monies’ access to remote communities, and thus
reinforcing the isolation of these outlying communities. Distributing funds to indigenous
communities reinforced their identity as indigenous rather than “as part of the class of poor rural
workers and peasants” (1994, 36). This divide between class and ethnicity would arise among
indigenous groups’ dealings with the state throughout the Americas (Brysk 1996). Because
federal and state funds for campesinos and the poor were apportioned through the local
organizations in Chiapas, most individuals’ contact with government agencies has been on a
limited scale. Many peoples’ most sustained contact with the government was the long wait at
PRI offices in San Cristóbal for free food and other offerings, provisions exchanged for their
votes during the 1940s through the 1990s (Collier and Quaratiello 1994). True decision-making,
however, came from the government, which, although it provided little in the form of help or
resources for the impoverished population, expected them to turn out come election day.
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But the history of autonomy in the area goes much further back (Collier and Quaratiello
1999, 161). Indigenous people experienced a degree of de facto autonomy during the colonial era
because it was easier for the colonial government to allow communities to govern their own
affairs. There was an elaborate system of law that separated the “República de Españoles”40 from
the “República de los Indios” in Spanish America. Because the Crown’s objective was “to curb
the ambitions of the conquistadores and their descendants and to save Indian communities from
destruction” (Semo 1993, xi), some of the features of the calpulli, or Aztec tributary system of
communities, were preserved, allowing for a limited degree of autonomy. Because only a small
subset of salaried officials was necessary to rule the Indigenous people, Spain was able to keep its
vast empire in check by largely relying on indigenous caciques to enforce the crown’s laws (Patch
2002, 12). This emphasis on local autonomy meant that even with the reducción system of forced
resettlement of Indigenous people into more populated areas, Maya social stratification was
preserved. With tribute (in labor, kind or money) paid by the Indian communities to the
encomenderos, the royal bureaucracy and the clergy, the Spanish maintained their control. Given
the decrees of local autonomy—despite the crushing weight of the tributary system—Indian
communities were able to survive the Conquest and subsequent colonial system.
The Spanish imposed a Nahua-Aztec model on non-Nahua areas, such as the Chiapaneco,
Yucatec, and other Maya groups. In this model, the Aztec calpulli was equivalent to the Nahua
altepetl.41 The parcialidades (partisan group), barrios (neighborhoods) and other organizational
structures in these areas were also equivalent to the structures that made up the Aztec calpulli
(Patch 2002, 13). Although generations of scholars42 emphasized the calpulli because it appeared
40

This was composed of the encomenderos, or recipients of an encomienda, a crown grant of Indian tribute labor,
the royal bureaucracy, and the ecclesiastical hierarchy (Semo 1993, xv).
41
Ethnically-based political entity, or city-state.
42
Including Eric Wolf and James Lockhart.
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to be “the basic landowning, suprafamilial institution,” more recent research shows that in central
Mexico, many calpullis held no lands. As Robert Patch explains, because the Spanish crown
could not afford to pay appointed officials to rule over the many thousands of Indian communities
in the Americas, essential functions of government such as tax collection and law enforcement
were entrusted to the Indian populace who had carried out these duties for thousands of years. The
Spanish system overlay the existing Aztec, Maya, Nahuatl, Mixtec and other existing
governmental systems. In essence, it was largely the names that were changed. This amounted to
a “colonial pact” between Spanish and Indian societies (2002, 11).

Peasant Unions: Civil Society Steps in
“The autonomous process that emerged in Chiapas after 1994 did not come out of thin
air,” Burguete Cal y Mayor (2003, 195) writes. The notion of autonomy under the law as a right
in Mexico was first elaborated in the zona norte of the state by AEDPCH, the Democratic State
Assembly of the Chiapanecan People (Asamblea Estatal Democrática del Pueblo Chiapaneco),
and CEOIC, the State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations (Consejo Estatal de
Organizaciones Indígenas y Campesinas), which together drew up the Proposal for the Creation
of Autonomous Pluriethnic Regions in 1992 (Nash 2001, 5-45; Díaz-Polanco 1998). This would
be the blueprint for the Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas, or RAPs—and for other regional
efforts for autonomy, such as one in the Soconusco, a coffee-growing region,43 and another in
Ocosingo. Fittingly, this document was unveiled on “el día de la raza,” in the cathedral plaza in
San Cristóbal de Las Casas in 1994 (Burguete Cal y Mayor 2003, 198-99).
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Soconusco is best-known for its profitable coffee cultivation, largely by 450 German settler families under
Bismark. Earlier crops include cacao and rubber.
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One important vector in the development of autonomy has been peasant unions’
opposition to the Guardias Blancas hired by ranchers to protect their lands, similar in many
respects to 19th-century southern Italian landholders employing “mafia entrepreneurs” for
the same reason (Schneider and Schneider 1976; Hobsbawm 1959; Higgins 2004). The
rapid, exponential growth of these peasant unions was critical to the awakening of civil
society in San Cristóbal de Las Casas, and in Chiapas more generally. Many came on the
scene after an uprising from within the ranks of the PRI itself, with the creation of the
National Council for Indigenous Peoples (CNPI) and the National “Plan de Ayala”
Coalition (CNPA), in 1979 (Díaz-Polanco 1998; Mattiace 1997). From these new groups,
important umbrella organizations, including the National Union of Regional Autonomous
Campesino Organizations (UNORCA) and the National Coordinating Committee “Plan de
Ayala,” arose. Events surrounding the creation of the unions OCEZ (formed in Venustiana
Carranza) and ARIC (formed in 1982 in Las Margaritas; later separating to form two
unions, ARIC Independiente and ARIC Unión de Uniones (Harvey 1998, 108), CIOAC,
the Independent Center of Agricultural Workers and Campesinos and other organizations
helped to bring large numbers of indigenous campesinos into civil society and strengthened
the opposition to the hegemony of the PRI (Nash 2001).
During 1995, these peasant and umbrella organizations as well as similar groups gained
in strength—especially in the Selva Lacandona (Leyva Solano 2001)—and began to participate in
non-violent protest tactics in opposition to the PRI and in support of the Zapatista movement. In a
key example of an attention-getting strategy, CIOAC members began to walk hundreds of
kilometers to Tuxtla Gutiérrez when bringing land claims; the PRI, in contrast, had long trucked
in supporters to beef up its numbers during election times (Nash 2001, 5-22).
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The first actual experiment in indigenous autonomy in Chiapas in the 20th century was
the parallel government instituted by the PRD candidate, Amado Avendaño, in the run-up to the
1995 gubernatorial elections in Chiapas. This experiment occurred in the midst of intense civil
resistance. Rosa Rojas (1994) reports on the parallel government:
“Civil resistance grew in the first week of November until it started to look like a “civil
insurrection” in the middle of new land occupations by the member organizations of the
CEOIC [State Council for Indigenous and Peasant Organizations,44 a state entity],
Ranchers’ offensives to take back their occupied lands led to violent confrontations in the
zone of Playas de Catazajá. As a result, council members of Soyaló, Simojovel and
Huitiupán were forced to resign. Popular mobilization demanded new councils. They
were instated and the resistance quelled.” (Rojas 1994, 84).
Zapatista autonomy was not far off. Although a November 1998 Zapatista communiqué
declared the Municipios Autónomas Rebeldes Zapatistas (MAREZ), or Autonomous Zapatista
Rebel Municipalities to be a “manifestation” of resistance (Barmeyer 2009, 60), it was the 2003
renaming of the EZLN autonomous municipalities as caracoles, or snails and their attendant
community-based laws that are the strongest exercise in autonomy yet. The caracoles are a
tangible symbol of autonomy. Caracoles are
the civilian government, health, educational, sports, political, and gathering places for the
Zapatista movement. There are five caracoles in Chiapas; one caracol for each of the five
geographic zones of… Chiapas…. One of the distinctive features of the snail shell is that
it swirls about and is a living entity where the outside meets the inside. This is a fitting
symbol of the Zapatista Civilian Centers… a place where the outside (national and
international bases of support) can come to meet and experience the inside (the Zapatista
bases of support) (Schools for Chiapas, 2011).

44

Created in January 1994. This organization helped to promote campesino land takeovers throughout the state at a
time when the vast majority of pending land claims went unaddressed by the state government.
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Their existence has spurred debate because they seem to threaten the authority of the Mexican
state, operating a parallel and “illegal” government in part due to the remoteness of Chiapas, and
especially the autonomous municipalities, and later caracoles. Meanwhile, the government has
largely ignored, and in fact condoned, their existence, allowing a de facto if not de jure
completion of the San Andrés Accords.
Burguete Cal y Mayor (2003, 200) offers an alternative formulation of autonomy within
the context of the conflict, of which there were two very different forms. The first, RAPs,
Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas, which the author terms Indianist, sprang from global ideas of
Indian autonomy and represented indigenous ideas for exercising local power. The second
autonomy ideal, which is of greater concern for the purposes of this study, is the Zapatista
experience of autonomy, which proclaimed itself in open rebellion and rejected governmental
authority. The latter’s actions took the form of open, “urban civil disobedience” as thousands
refused to pay taxes, utility, water and electricity bills, agrarian loans, and as the EZLN set up its
own town councils and confronted government employees. The MAREZ were born out of these
actions, and in 2003, so were the caracoles. The caracoles have antecedents in Article 15 of the
Constitution, which grants rights to indigenous peoples to live according to their customs, and in
the International Labor Organization’s convention 169, which Mexico ratified.45 Such efforts
have also been “part of a long-term effort to end the de jure state of illegality of what has become
a way of life for tens of thousands of indigenous people living en Resistencia” (Burguete Cal y
Mayor 2003, 200-201; Barmeyer 2009, 60).
From 1994 to 2003, there were five autonomous zonas in Chiapas, called Aguascalientes:
Los Altos, Norte, Altamirano, Selva Tzeltal, and Selva Tojolabal. These became the five
45

The ILO’s convention 169 is a legally binding international instrument which deals with the rights of indigenous
and tribal peoples. In 2015, it had been ratified by 22 countries, including Mexico.
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caracoles of Oventic, Roberto Barrios, Morelia, La Realidad, and La Garrucha. Organizationally,
they are “cultural spaces, gathering schools, assembly rooms, sport and rest zones, health centres,
and cooperatives” (Dinerstein 2009, 6; El Kilombo Intergaláctico 2010). The Clandestine
Indigenous Revolutionary Committee, (CCRI, or Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena)
headed operations in Aguascalientes before the EZLN switched tactics in 2003. The Zapatistas
turned ever more intently towards civil society because while President Fox did not end the
Chiapas conflict in 15 minutes, as promised in his electoral address, he achieved a significant
demilitarization of the conflict zone. The number of rebel municipalities, which in 2002 had
dropped to 23, increased to 29 by the following year with the installation of the Good
Government Councils (Barmeyer 2009, 60-61). Each Good Government Council administers
justice, hands out identity cards, mediates conflicts between autonomous councils and local
government councils, provides for general welfare provisions, most especially health and
schooling, promotes and administers cooperatives, crafts and building projects and denounces
human rights violations (Dinerstein 2007, 7-8). Each level is highly organized and reports to the
comandancia of the EZLN, in imitation of traditional autonomous structures in each Maya
community in the state, the Nahua parcialidades and atlepetl structures in place well before the
Conquest (Patch 2002, 13).
In Chiapas today, animal personalities are assigned to groups that wish to symbolize their
autonomy in tangible ways. Animals—like bees (Las Abejas) and ants (Xi’Nich)—have meaning
in Mayan cosmology, going back to the Popul Vuh, the Mayan Book of the Dawn of Life, and the
sacred book of the Maya (Tedlock 1996). Mayan cosmology from Guatemala to Mexico assigns
human personalities to animals.
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Along with the use of animal identities and part of the quest for autonomy in resistance
movements in Chiapas is the use of non-violent protest tactics which have played a vital role in
the protest to the Mexican state; these include peace belts (the linking of arms by participants in a
large circle along the perimeter of a displaced persons camp or community in a gesture of nonviolent resistance46), marches, fasting, the non-payment of utility bills and aid rejection. Both the
EZLN and Las Abejas engaged in a strategy of procuring as many resources for their movement
as they could from acceptable, or non-governmental sources—and utilized innovative strategies
including re-Indianization (Higgins 2004; Vergara-Camus 2014; Nash 1995), which in the case of
Las Abejas meant a return to traditional dress and revitalization of traditional music as well as
traditional political forums (interview with the Mesa Directiva, July 1, 1999).47

Chiapas in 1998 and 1999
The EZLN and Las Abejas campaigns for autonomy were more than symbolic acts of
defiance against state authority. They represented a fundamental effort to clear the repressive
aspects of the state from their communities. In 1998 and 1999, fear of violence remained foremost
in the minds of nearly all of the displaced. One-third of the Mexican army was stationed in
Chiapas between 1997-2000, although it failed to challenge the paramilitary attacks at Acteal.48
Many observers suspected that the military carried out maneuvers under cover of nightfall. The
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Peace belts were used at the highland camp, X’Oyep in January 1998 to keep the Mexican army out. In this case,
women literally pushed back the soldiers with their bare arms until they retreated.
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One very interesting traditional art form is music. This is epitomized by the prominent group, Sak Tzevul,
founded by three brothers (Damián, Enrique and Francisco [Paco] Mártinez Mártinez) from Zinacantan in 1996.
Their name means “Lightning.” They sing in both Tzotzil and Tzeltal. Such groups marry traditional music to
alternative rock. This group’s crossover hit was a rock rendering of the traditional Tzotzil song, Bolomchon. This
song can be found on YouTube. Sak Tzevul has performed over the past several years (2014-18) in Washington,
D.C., Madrid, Moscow, Paris, Mexico City and many other locations. This particular group has become even more
syncretic as two Japanese women have joined the band over the past several years (2009-2014), playing the violin
and trombone. Both the men and women wear traje, but the men’s is borrowed from women’s huipiles, or blouses.
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That retired Brigadier General Julio César Díaz was positioned at the entrance to the Acteal camp on the
afternoon of the massacre only increased popular distrust.

54

military created problems throughout the region: prostitution, rape, harassment, and a climate of
fear (CDHFBC 1998a; SIPAZ 1998a; Hirales 1998; Nash 2001; Álvarez Fabela 2000; Aubry
1996; Marín 1998; Kovic and Eber 2003; Eber 2003; Olivera Bustamante 1998). Although
indigenous communities in Chiapas had never been “closed corporate communities” (Wolf 1957;
Wasserstrom 1983)—they were closed in terms of membership with its attendant rights to land
and resources, but never sealed off from the outside—and they had never been penetrated to this
degree by those who would interfere with daily life.
During 1998 and 1999, NGOs in Chiapas operated in a climate of fear. Office wiretaps
and outright threats were common, as the government kept an eye on the NGOs. Common, too,
were deportations. Government officials threatened high-profile EZLN supporters such as Ofelia
Medina, a well-known Mexican soap opera actress, with expulsion from Chiapas, which served as
a warning to her and to others because the charge was later revoked. Less able to mobilize
political support, 108 of 134 Italian peace observers, whom the government described as
“revolutionary tourists,” were deported in 1998. Father Michel Chanteau, a French priest who had
worked with the indigenous laity of San Cristóbal for over thirty years similarly found himself
deported from Mexico (see CONPAZ 1995; Hellman 2000; Nash 1997, 2001; Harvey 1998,
SIPAZ 1998f; CDHFBC 1999).49
There were many Mexicans living in Chiapas from the federal district, as Mexico City is
known within Mexico, and many foreigners, a healthy share of whom worked at the 900 or so
NGOs in San Cristóbal in 1998 and 1999, and because of wiretapping was so prevalent, a
majority of residents, both foreign and from D.F., did not possess home phones. For the same
reason, the day-to-day business of the NGOs was usually conducted face-to-face. For much of
49

The American Thomas Hansen was also expelled in 1998, although he later won the right to return to Chiapas in a
Mexican court. He currently runs the NGO, Mexican Solidarity Network, based in Chicago.
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1998, a truck bearing a satellite dish was parked on the church plaza of the Our Lady of
Guadalupe Church, at the top of the Real de Guadalupe, to facilitate satellite transmissions both
into and out of San Cristóbal. Similarly, as noted earlier, in 1998, I was followed several times
by a man with a walkie-talkie who could only have been a migration officer. La migra kept thick
files on all foreigners, like myself, who remained in Chiapas for an extended period, whether or
not they were there legally or not. And the real business of the Cybercafe where I worked in the
summer of 1998 was conducted on the floor above the public computers; there a staff of three
monitored the incoming and outgoing emails of the many peace campers and other tourists
passing through the city—as a fellow staff member admitted to me in 1998.
Volunteers were (and still are) critical to the Zapatista project of autonomy. CDHFBC has
a long history of training volunteers to keep track of the notable army presence, and in 1997,
1998 and 1999, this presence was sizable indeed. Peace campers take note of the number of
times per day that an army truck or convoy passes through the community where they are sent—
and peace campers are only sent to sensitive zones where conflict between the community and
the army or paramilitary is occurring at the time of the assignment. In early 2019, peace campers
critically noted army incursions into La Realidad, Caracol One and renewed militarization of the
selva zone (SIPAZ 2019 LibertadLatina.org August 28, 2009). When I was a peace camper at
Acteal, I stayed for four weeks, and this is a typical timeframe, although some volunteers may
stay for only two weeks. I met teachers and professors from various parts of the United States,
and religious sisters from Spain, and many students, largely from Europe. We had come from
various parts of the globe, and we all converged on the hamlet of Acteal, which in the summer of
1999 was still rife with paramilitary activity, causing fear among the IDPs of Sociedad Civil Las
Abejas living there.
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International Civil Society
The dramatic violence at Acteal and the appearance of IDPs renewed international
attention to Chiapas. By 1999, the displaced found themselves to be key players at the center of
the struggle between the Mexican government, international humanitarian organizations, and the
United Nations. Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited several
displaced persons camps in 1998 and lambasted the Mexican government for not implementing
the San Andrés Accords. Citing a poor record on human rights and the government’s use of
paramilitary action in its most militarized state, she increased pressure on the Mexican
government to resolve the conflict. Because of these steps, the displaced started to get even more
press attention.
International organizations drawn to Chiapas after the Acteal massacre have had greater
funding and viability, largely due to their first world affiliations and fund-raising abilities, than
the local, Mexican NGOs and organizations that were on the scene early on. Yet, some observers
point to the lower number of NGOs in Chiapas after 1994, as a result of the uprising (Tavanti
2005). As these new groups and organizations, such as the Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT),
CARITAS, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), began to build houses, feed
people and bring in resources on an unprecedented scale after the Acteal massacre, they fostered
dependency among the recipients of aid, and membership in Sociedad Civil Las Abejas swelled.
Not surprisingly, a few people in Acteal admitted to joining the organization just as aid began to
pour in, so when the amount of aid reduced to a trickle, only the more committed remained part of
Las Abejas. At this point, it became clear that aid dependency (Buchannan 1977) had been
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broken, as Las Abejas came to “manage” civil society organizations and humanitarian aid
agencies alike, and Las Abejas’ acceptance of particular forms of aid conferred a kind of status
upon NGOs and aid providers themselves—these organizations henceforth acquired a kind of a
local and even international cachet, as they were officially associated with Las Abejas, the victims
of the attack on Acteal, and less directly, with the EZLN. These NGOs and agencies received
symbolic capital from their association with Las Abejas. Yet, the proliferation of NGOs in San
Cristóbal that worked with Las Abejas and the EZLN ultimately meant that some organizations
were “supported” by “Zapatismo,” the Zapatista cause. By this I mean that a proportion of the aid
meant for the EZLN (and Las Abejas) never made it to its intended target, as monies went for
personal expenditures, cars and housing for the NGO staffs.
If the Acteal massacre and the EZLN provided the push for NGO formation and activism,
Zapatista-inspired social experiments in autonomy pulled international actors into the fray (Nash
2001). In 1997, there were upwards of 900 NGOs in San Cristóbal alone. Like the EZLN, Las
Abejas had contact with a growing number of them, as they struggled for the same goals as the
Zapatistas: work, land, shelter, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy,
justice, and peace (EZLN 1994). Aid organizations entering Chiapas in 1998 helped provide a
new organizational framework which overlaid the indigenous organization of Las Abejas: they
sent “gifts”—building houses and sending computer equipment, monetary help, furniture,
cameras, bibles, blankets, food, shoes, clothing and other material to Acteal, resources which even
the EZLN had failed to secure.
In the wake of the 1994 Zapatista uprising, hailed as “the first post-modern revolution”
(Collier and Quaratello 1994), “Zapatourists,” students and international travelers, academics and
voyeurs, were drawn to Chiapas as the Zapatistas emerged from the Lacandon rain forest. The
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EZLN claimed an ideological lineage with Zapata’s peasant army that nearly a century earlier had
emerged from Morelos to challenge the legitimacy of the Mexican state’s oppression of peasants
and indigenous people. The tragedy of Acteal cast a somber pall over the Zapatista movement,
which, as Le Bot (1997) notes, had already begun to exhibit carnival-like traces with its
“Aguascalientes” in the jungle, large international gatherings drawing supporters from all over the
world, Caravanas por la Paz (peace caravans, largely from UNAM in Mexico City) and
boisterous international support networks. With the massacre, the conflict once again turned
serious; Tavanti (2005) and Kovic (2003) both point out that the attack on Acteal was actually an
attack on the San Cristóbal diocese and on the Zapatistas. The EZLN’s capacity for violence and
its unpredictability made it a more difficult target. After all, the 1994 uprising had begun as a
violent conflagration in San Cristóbal and Ocosingo. One thing the Acteal massacre accomplished
above all else, however, was the drawing of lines. If before it had been possible to state that Las
Abejas were EZLN sympathizers yet somewhere outside of the fray, now it was impossible to do
so—they had been drawn into the center of it, irretrievably.

Aid Rejection
The Acteal Massacre took place in a time of war following years of abject poverty and
government neglect. In the wake of the 1994 Zapatista uprising the Mexican state used
development and humanitarian aid as well as emergency assistance to undermine a revolt of
indigenous Chiapanecos. Two years later the Zapatista movement struck back and forbade its
supporters from accepting government aid. EZLN spokesperson Marcos offered a rationale for
aid rejection:
We have not accepted any government alms (for this is what they are). We have not
accepted them in the past and neither will we in the future, because, as the living
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conditions of the Indígenas who have accepted them show, problems are not solved and
living standards do not improve one bit. Above all, we do not accept them because we
have not made our insurrection to receive schools, credits, or CONASUPO 50 stores. We
have risen up for a better country where, among other things, our rights as indigenous
peoples are recognized, where we are respected, and where we are treated as citizens
and not as beggars (Carta a Guadelupe Loaeza. La Reforma. January 12, 1999, quoted in
Barmeyer 2009, 110-111).

The EZLN’s decision was not only to reject humanitarian aid, development aid and services from
the Mexican government [all of which were assistentialist (Dietz 1996)] but also embark on a
project of autonomy in which it would replace the services of the state with its own schools,
teachers, stores, and hospitals (Barmeyer 2009). The Zapatistas saw their autonomy project as an
act of non-violent resistance to the Mexican state and neoliberalism. It was a logical extension of
their peace marches around San Cristóbal in 1995 and 1996 and the deployment of peace belts in
San Andrés Larráinzar (San Andrés Sakam’chen de los Pobres) in 1995 during the signing of the
San Andrés Accords.51 Although the mandate to reject state-sponsored humanitarian aid came
from the EZLN, Las Abejas took this policy seriously, and decisions by the Mesa Directiva, the
governing body at Acteal, were made only after they were debated in public forums in the
individual camps. The political process at all levels was transparent, as both men and women
publicly discussed the ways such decisions would affect them.

50

CONASUPO, or Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (Peoples’ National Subsistence Stores) was a
federally-subsidized store for needy Mexicans, both urban and rural, created in 1962. A victim of neoliberalism, it
was dismantled in 1999.
51
Peace belts involved gathering a mass of people to surround a physical area so as to offer support and witness as
well as deter violence. In most cases, the participants were women and children, and they held hands in a human
chain, or “belt,” providing early warnings and a barrier against military incursions. At Pohló, community members
held hands in a peace belt 24 hours a day, in three-hour shifts, from January through August, 1998 (Christian
Peacemaker Teams 1998).
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Barmeyer (2009, 111) argues that the genesis of the Zapatista aid rejection in 1996 was a
reaction to the government’s strategy of dividing rebel communities by the offer of government
development programs. Prior to the conflict, Zapatista campesinos had been given PROCAMPO
funds of about two hundred pesos per family per month (around fifteen U.S. dollars), a
government payment for campesinos to get through the long agricultural cycle, local teachers paid
by the government, and CONASUPO stores located in rebel areas selling subsidized merchandise.
The CCRI-CG ended these subsidies for all Zapatistas and base supporters, as well as for Las
Abejas.
Meanwhile, the PRI government distributed “gifts”—subsidies—exclusively to PRI
supporters, government transfers of $55 pesos per hectare for coffee and corn and $1,125 pesos
per family in PROCAMPO funds (Stahler-Sholk 1998). SIPAZ (2002) reported that these
subsidies were causing people to abandon the struggle, as need forced them to abandon the
resistance. Las Abejas at Acteal disseminated a communiqué on October 1, 2000 in which it
denounced this tactic:
[PRI committees of Chenalhó] are forcing people to affiliate with the PRI, … so that our
municipality of Chenalhó will continue being governed by that party in upcoming
elections. The persons who make up the committees are deceiving and manipulating the
people through PROGRESA and PROCAMPO programs, and they are delivering
benefits, saying that the PRI is the party which helps the people. (www.jaguarsun.com/chiapas/chiapas55. Accessed July 7, 2003).
Alongside this story of aid rejection and protest of aid rejection among Las Abejas, Niels
Barmeyer (2009) shows a similar tension within the EZLN, illustrating how families of EZLN
affiliation in community after community dropped their membership in the organization when it
became economically impossible to remain. He writes that some of the people among whom he
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worked in Las Cañadas, the Zapatista heartland, felt abandoned by the EZLN which they had
spent a decade building when it mandated giving up PROCAMPO money, BANRURAL loans
and CONASUPO, Peoples’ National Basic Foods Company (La Compañía Nacional de
Subsistencias Populares), stores, all government “gifts,” but could provide nothing in their place.
Those who left the guerrilla movement blamed “economic hardship.” Barmeyer tells us that aid
rejection had “disastrous effects.” Hardships increased and exacerbated existing communal
tensions as families had to suspend schooling, give up state subsidies for basic goods, and forego
monthly cash allowances from PROCAMPO, one of the few national supports for Mexico’s
beleaguered peasantry. To add salt to the wound, neighboring villages that had rejected Zapatismo
received government support for new clinics and schools, and teachers to staff them (Barmeyer
2009, 112-3).
The EZLN command addressed the consequences of aid rejection with silence, fearing
that acknowledging the problems would only perpetuate them. EZLN communiqués of the period
are taciturn on the issue, except when their hand was forced by the PRI. Barmeyer tells us that, as
news agencies such as CNN publicized EZLN desertions, such as one that “Chiapas governor
Albores had presided over a ceremony during which sixteen rebels marched out of the jungle and
handed their guns over to him. That the EZLN regarded such events as potentially damaging
becomes apparent in a communiqué that was issued several days later. In it, the guerrilla
movement denounces the desertions as a hoax involving paramilitaries who had lent themselves
to the government’s propaganda stunt in exchange for cattle (EZLN 1999). Although La Jornada
seconds the EZLN’s allegations, the paper also acknowledges that some former Zapatista families
had left the guerrilla movement to take out government loans (Bellinghausen 1999).” This
contrasted sharply with the situation in the highlands. There the EZLN was supported only after
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the beginning of the conflict, with the landless highland population squatting on uninhabited
property independent of the uprising (Barmeyer 2009, 113), with massive desertions such as those
of Las Cañadas remaining relatively rare in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Before the rebellion, the national Bank of Rural Development, or BANRURAL, made
loans which the guerrillas repurposed to buy arms.52 At the time of the uprising, the state
government ended these subsidies in rebel territory; yet soon after, it reversed this policy,
intending development programs to foster division as recipients were forced to abandon their
participation in the struggle. The Zapatista response, known locally as “la Resistencia,” was to
reject all of these government programs (2009, 111-12). Barmeyer pinpoints the exact moment of
the policy change:
The Zapatistas’ decision of taking a tough line on the acceptance of ‘government alms’
came about in 1996. An indication for this policy change (albeit tucked away in a packet
of issues) can be found in a communiqué by the CCRI-CG [the EZLN comandancia]
dating from August 29, 1996. In it, the guerrilla command mentions agreements, made in
consultas by “tens of thousands of indigenous men and women” in the base communities,
on how to proceed after the failure to find a tenable compromise in the negotiations of
the second mesa (panel) of the San Andrés dialogues on Democracy and Justice.
According to the communiqué, the Zapatista base affirmed their willingness to “fight to
the ultimate consequences for democracy, freedom and justice” and asked their
commanders to suspend the dialogue rather than to “sell out” (EZLN 1996, quoted in
Barmeyer 2009, 111-112).
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Barmeyer (2009,74) tells us that in Las Cañadas, “In the context of a government program for the promotion of
cattle farming in Chiapas in the 1980s, entire villages engaged in a concerted effort to take out loans from the
national Bank of Rural Development (BANRURAL). In San Emiliano, the clandestinely organized Zapatistas,
hitherto inexperienced in cattle raising, used the money to buy two hundred calves. After six years, the first credit
was paid back through the sale of the bulls. With the sale of the remaining hundred cows, the base community
financed arms, ammunition, and equipment for EZLN recruits. A second BANRURAL credit bought another two
hundred calves, which were kept for a few years and then paid back for the preparation of the 1994 uprising; that
money was never paid back as the rebellion revealed the real objectives behind the cattle raising activities, thereby
ruling out the chance of further credits.”
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Yet, even then, this was a controversial position, not taken by all, as Barmeyer (2009,
112) shows. La Jornada (September 25, 1996) stated that “the order by the Zapatista command to
reject government aid is not well received in the indigenous communities of Las Cañadas”
(quoted in Barmeyer 2009, 112). He concludes that it is difficult to determine whether the policy
of la Resistencia was decided by democratic consensus or not. However, given the “political
divisions” following the decision, the most likely scenario was that more than half agreed to
comply with the appeal by the EZLN command “on grounds of faith rather than resolve”
(Barmeyer 2009, 112).
We may never know the true impetus for the rejection of development programs and
federal aid by the CCRI-CG, the Zapatista comandancia. History since 1996 shows that
Subcomandante Marcos made a critical error in judgement, however, losing many core
supporters, dropped from the EZLN for accepting government aid, as a consequence retaining
only the most committed. Yet chroniclers of the movement, such as Barmeyer, accept this
decision uncritically. If we take the very long view, it was only in 2016 that EZLN members
begin to do better than their PRIista neighbors. In this study, I show how this decision impacted
the IDPs from the low-intensity war on the ground. They resisted the strategy, while ostensibly
going along with it. They were not alone in griping over the apparent inability to reject state aid,
although the siting of their camp at INI, formerly a federal institution, but now operated by RAP,
the Regiones Autónomas Pluriétnicas, or Pluriethnic Autonomous Regions, an organization
sympathetic to their biting poverty, allowed the IDPs to get away with it. They accepted
government aid that they should have rejected, according to Marcos, the Zapatista comandancia
and the Mesa Directiva of Las Abejas at Acteal—such as a breastfeeding doll project funded by
FONAES, the agronomy arm of INI, which bordered the INI camp; electrical cables supplied by
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RAP; an atole53 making project funded by DIF, Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (Integral
Development of the Family), a government social service agency which provides services to
young children; and, most importantly, federal aid, which amounted to a $43.00 settlement per
person, finally delivered to those who left Las Abejas because of it, in 2008, that was offered by
COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa Gamboa in January, 1999, poising the camp to split and
causing the continuing fracturing of membership in Las Abejas, which continues to this day. This
was the case nowhere else.
Because studies of both the EZLN (e.g., Forbis 2003; Speed 2006) and Las Abejas
(Tavanti 2003; Kovic 2003) have tended to focus upon those at the top rather than the base of
their organizations, there has been an incomplete rendering of the decision-making process among
those at the bottom. Relentless poverty drove the displaced at INI to accept government “gifts” of
aid at times—and these decisions came from the base, reaffirming the instrumental value of the
Mexican state’s counterinsurgency strategy of offering resources to EZLN and Las Abejas base
supporters to create divisions among the EZLN. For some displaced families, the state appeared
to offer more than Las Abejas, with its communal coffee and craft cooperatives and international
donations. For these IDPs the primary objective was to have land to work and to escape abject
poverty. In their minds, they had little choice but to accept state aid.

What Made Aid Rejection Possible and Substitutes Less Than Perfect?
Rejection of food and medical help, given the severe need in the communities and the
camps, was an anomaly which only made sense because starting in 1994 the eyes of the world
were on Chiapas, and international aid agencies supplied the necessary foodstuffs and medical aid
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Atole is a kind of corn porridge given to children.
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to the many IDPs created by the Chiapas conflict. Humanitarian aid agencies such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, Doctors Without Borders, and local
agencies, such as CCESC and the Fideicomiso para la Salud de los Niños Indígenas, were in
1998-99 working quietly in San Cristóbal and the surrounding countryside to provide the
displaced with food, medicine, dry latrines, medical consultations, and other necessities. Zapatista
and Las Abejas camps and organizations could afford to reject federal aid because they knew that
alternative entities would pick up the slack. By rejecting government “gifts” of aid, the Las
Abejas and Zapatista bases of support cast what indigenous spokespersons refer to as “mal
gobierno,” or bad government, in a supremely negative light, and accentuated the fact that even
IDPs, dependent upon others for absolutely everything, could make a political statement through
selective aid acceptance.
Las Abejas, like the EZLN, made decisions by consensus, following Maya tradition. The
Mesa Directiva at Acteal issued—and still issues—a directive and people in individual camps and
communities decided—in open voting—whether to accept it or not. The aid agencies did not
operate through consensus. There were times when agencies distributed material aid that Las
Abejas and EZLN communities had not requested. In such cases, a backlash against well-meaning
NGOs occurred. Muñoz Ramírez (2008a; 2008b) cites the example of a water pipe that was
installed by an NGO at the Zapatista base camp at Polhó in the early 2000s; according to Muñoz
Ramírez (2008), the camp never asked for a water pipe—the NGO imposed its “Western”
mentality of “organizing help” and installed it with no consensus on the matter. Muñoz Ramirez
notes that this was a measure that the women would have opposed because the stream was where
they met to gossip and where single women met men; by installing a water pipe, traditional social
life was interrupted. After the formation of the caracoles in 2003, such measures would be
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rejected if the caracol members did not agree by consensus. As Muñoz Ramírez (2008) notes,
NGOs approached the question of humanitarian aid with the wrong framework in mind: they had
come “to help” rather than ask people what they needed. It never occurred to most NGOs to cede
the decision-making to the people—and this was infantilizing. Eversole (2003, xi) notes,
‘Outsider’ NGOs arrive to help, and a process of relationship building with local
communities begins. These NGOs may act in local communities as catalysts, organizers,
educators, solidarity workers, or bearers of money, supplies, and information. As
concerned outsiders, NGOs may offer considerable resources, but they also bring along
outside biases and interests. Outsider organizations will generally have a different
culture from the locals: different attitudes toward what is important, and different
understandings of how things get done. Their goals may be very different from
community goals. Mistrust must be overcome, and common ground established, before
any sort of productive relationship can take place. Even then, communication may be
clouded and often incomplete.
Although I worked with a local NGO (CCESC), and although I had contact with many
“outsider” NGOs (for example, the INGO, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the
CPT, or Christian Peacemaker Teams, were both “outsider NGOs, coming from Switzerland and
Canada, respectively), I was most preoccupied with the acceptance of government aid at the INI
camp. The EZLN rejection of aid was a proactive political stance taken to assert indigenous
autonomy. As a result, government agencies had few incentives to provide aid that would increase
displaced communities’ ability to self-govern. Aid recipients were at times hostile to aid agencies,
because of the poor quality of aid they dispensed —in the few cases where government aid was
actually received, as at the camp at X’oyep, the medications had passed their expiration date and
the latrines were in deplorable condition54 (SIPAZ April, 1998, 7), leading to further mistrust, as
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The latrines installed by the state government differed from the dry latrines installed by many NGOs, including
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Fassin (2012) observes for refugees in his critique of humanitarian reason. The EZLN quickly
moved to stop these shipments and SIPAZ (1998) branded giving out expired medications a kind
of genocide. It was clear that aid rejection as a political strategy had resonance because the IDPs
mistrusted the Mexican government and its state “gifts” of aid.
Aid rejection, however, was a visceral struggle. By rejecting government aid, the EZLN
and Las Abejas actively fought the loss of autonomy inherent to refugee and displaced persons
camp settings (Harrell-Bond 1986). The rejection of aid, however, was often contested. From
time to time the IDPs at INI depended on government humanitarian aid, almost exclusively
relied on state-provided health care, and took advantage of government education, the “gifts of
enemies.” They were subject to both state and NGO oversight. Yet, out of this series of
conflicting demands they attempted to shape their destiny. They resisted the EZLN, numerous
NGOs, and the Mexican state. And they questioned the aid given to them. They exerted their
agency at every turn. The displaced of the INI camp sought their own version of selfdetermination and autonomy, constrained as it might be.

Assistentialism and Aid Giving
Mistrust of humanitarian aid can be traced to the many critiques of assistentialism
(asistencialismo) in Latin America that stem from Liberation Theology and social work. In a
footnote to Education for Critical Consciousness, Paulo Freire states that “assistentialism [is] a
term used in Latin America to describe policies of financial or social “assistance” which attack
symptoms, but not causes, of social ills. It has overtones of paternalism, dependency, and a
“hand-out” approach. It contrasts with “promocionalismo” which, on the contrary, “promotes”
CCESC, in 1998.
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people to “a state of vigorous self-capacity to solve their own problems” (1973,115). In the
introduction to Education for Critical Consciousness, Denis Goulet writes that Freire, in
discussing agronomists [or “extension agents”] implies that “there can be no valid ‘aid’ and that
there is no room in development language for the terms ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’” (1973, xi).
Huesca (2008, 182) further adds that Freire (1973) went so far as to “label the various top-down,
modernization projects as ‘assistentialism’, or social and financial activities that attack
symptoms, not causes, of social ills that function as disguised forms of colonial domination.”
Adriance, (1986) concretizes this concept, marrying social work and Liberation
Theology. Adriance tells us that:
“assistentialism… is a term commonly used in Brazil to denote what people in the
United States would probably call the casework approach to the problem of poverty. It
usually consists of giving money, food, used clothing and medical aid to people who are
unable to work or whose employment does not provide adequate income to support their
needs and/or the needs of their families. This concept has recently come under heavy
attack by progressive Church people who point out the injustice of the whole income
structure and who advocate replacing assistentialism with social activism aimed towards
a more equitable distribution of … wealth” (1986, 17-18).

Boff (1995, 71-72) adds a discussion of what this means for those living in poverty:
Common understanding of the poor is of those who have not –food, housing, clothing,
work, culture. Those who have, it is said, should help them to free themselves from their
poverty. This approach is loaded with goodwill and right intentions; it underlies all
assistentialism and paternalism in history. But it is neither efficient nor sufficient. It does
not free the poor, since it keeps them in a regime of dependency: what is worse, it fails to
appreciate the liberating power of the poor. The poor are not simply those who have not:
they also have—culture, capacity for work, for collaboration, for organization, for
struggle. Only when the poor trust in their own potential and opt for their like are true
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conditions created for authentic liberation. The poor make themselves into the historical
agents of their own liberation; they also become free, capable of self-determination for
solidarity for those who are not their like.
Yet, given the amount of thought given to assistentialism in Latin America, what is
perhaps more surprising is that much humanitarian aid giving continues to be assistentialist (for
good examples of this tendency, see Tovar 2006). Patricia Tovar states that “despite discussions
and theoretical advances, there are still many projects framed within the assistentialist paradigm,
in which a resource is introduced into the community with the end of offering temporary
assistance, without any vision of bettering the existing long-term social conditions….” (2006,
210). In humanitarian aid giving situations, “assistential approaches are normalized to
compensate for the persistence of structural problems related to rule of law, democratic
accountability, public services and deep-seated social division” (Fiori et al. 2016, 56).
Consider, for instance, a development project which failed that Tovar (2006, 196-7)
described in which the European Union gave small refrigerators to indigenous Wayuu women in
Colombia who sold fish in the outdoor market and men appropriated the refrigerators to sell beer
at soccer fields. In retrospect it is easy to see why this development project failed. The
refrigerators were too heavy for the women to carry—especially with ice in them. Although the
EU’s flag was proudly displayed in 2004 in La Guajira, Colombia, with a sign that read
“Program to support Wayuu women transport fresh fish,” the women were still transporting and
selling fish over ice in the market. No one asked the women if they needed refrigerators. Thus
the development project had an unexpected outcome and failed in its objectives. This mirrors
another instance observed by Tovar in Haiti, in which Haitians were selling donated shoes to
Dominicans on the border years after the 2010 earthquake. Much of the humanitarian aid given
was useless—people needed clean water and salt and they attained cash for these items by selling
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the shoes to Dominicans to acquire the items that they really needed (Tovar, personal
communication). The direct corollary at INI were flip flops donated by Musicians for Peace
being sold in the San Cristóbal market by children. The children—especially the girls—were
accustomed to going barefoot; but they really needed chayotes and melons and vegetables, things
not included in the aid shipments. Likewise, they sold the cans of sardines that they received
from the ICRC in the market in San Cristóbal for these same foodstuffs. The aid agencies
provided only dry goods and no fresh food at all in their shipments, but these campesinos were
accustomed to growing their own vegetables, so the newly-displaced persons exerted their
agency to provide their families with the things that they really needed. And at INI, the families
were recipients of a shipment of used shoes from a hospital in Villahermosa, and the shoes were
useless for the Chiapas highlands, which are muddy from May to November, during the rainy
season—and many of the women’s shoes were, incredibly, high-heeled (See Figure 1.1 below).
Indigenous women wear plastic sandals when they can afford shoes because they can work in
them. So the families sold the shoes for chickens. One Sunday afternoon in May, 1998 at INI, I
was offered a bowl of chicken soup, a rare bounty, obtained with the proceeds from the shoe
sales, a precious gift. What the IDPs really needed were foodstuffs, things not included in their
meager aid rations of corn flour and beans. The aid given was clearly assistentialist, but the IDPs
accepted it, only to sell it in order to obtain the items that they really needed.
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Figure 1.1 Shipments of high-heeled shoes were a useless aid shipment at INI in 1998. Photo by author.

At INI, the IDPs born of the Chiapas conflict were dependent upon humanitarian aid for
their every need, but they were critical of the aid which was dispensed by the Mexican Red Cross
in particular, but also by CARITAS and the ICRC. As I will discuss in Chapter Six, Sebastián,
the responsible, or elected representative, of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas at INI in 1998, was
replaced by Gerardo in May because he was suspected of taking extra food for his very large
family. The ICRC at the time was giving equal rations to all family heads, regardless of family
size, and Sebastián was outspoken about the lack of anything other than the most basic staples in
1998. Sebastián would leave Las Abejas in 1999 and decide to remain behind at INI because of
the insufficiency of humanitarian aid, in the process reaffirming the idea that aid giving is
contested terrain.
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However, not all aid in the INI camp was assistentialist. The doll project, which his wife,
Angelina, and 21 other women participated in, discussed in Chapter Seven, has been a successful
microcredit development project that is still operational as of this writing. It is successful
because it is small scale and, more importantly, because the dollmakers receive cash for their
labors. And, because it is a craft project, it is not assistentialist. It is work of which the women
can be—are are—justifiably proud. The dolls (See Figures 1 and 2, Chapter Seven) are beautiful
and they are representative of IDP women from Chenalhó, wearing the same traje (“suits”) that
the Pedrano55 women wear.

“These Little Tiny Ones, Armed With These Arms (Brazos) Stopped Them in X’Oyep”
A stirring story in Chiapas is the tale of unarmed women, many of them mothers with
babies on their backs, pushing back invading soldiers from the highland camp at X’Oyep on
January 3, 1998. Federal soldiers from the seventh military command had encircled the camp,
and the women, all members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, held hands around the camp
perimeter all day and night in a peace belt. The soldiers had been trying to set up a camp next to
a spring where the displaced got their water (Toledo Tello and Garza Caligaris 2006:111). When
the soldiers tried to march into the camp, the women used their bare hands to stop them, literally
pushing the soldiers back by their rifle straps. This story made the front page of La Jornada on
January 4th, and was captured in a prize-winning photo by Pedro Valtierra. The photo became an
icon of non-violent resistance and female strength, as well as conveying the non-violent message
of Las Abejas. It inspired the women of Polhó to follow suit a few days later, pushing the
soldiers back there as well. Capturing the non-violent spirit of the protest, the caption underneath
55

“Pedrano” is the term that people from Chenalhó use to refer to themselves. It comes from San Pedro Chenalhó
(for example, see Eber 1995, 1997, 2003).
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the photo read “These little tiny ones, armed with these arms (brazos), these hands, stopped them
in X’Oyep.” This brief description and the photo were the extent of the story, but the photo
traveled around the world, spreading the non-violent story of resistance in X’Oyep everywhere.
This vignette illustrates the turn toward civil society and non-violence that the Zapatista rebellion
began to take on after 1996, with the signing of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights
and Culture. Living in San Cristóbal de Las Casas during this heady time, many elements of civil
society—NGOs, activists, international observers, students and academics—banded together to
protest the army’s incursions into Zapatista territory. Almost every day there were
demonstrations in front of the cathedral. The wooden cross on the site became an icon and also a
meeting place. A permanent scaffold was set up beside the cross to give speakers a stage from
which to rally the crowd. Banners were painted on bedsheets and there was color all around the
Cathedral’s plazuela. The crowd grew by the day, reaching a peak on the day of the shooting of a
Zapatista woman in Ocosingo in January 1998.56 But these gatherings, and this rebellion was not
an entirely new phenomenon for the region.

Resistance and Autonomy Before Acteal
Perhaps the worst cruelty was to be found at the very beginnings of colonization. The
Spaniards treated indigenous Arawaks in Española worse than they treated animals; as Bartolomé
de Las Casas recounts for the contact period, the Spaniards:
…forced their way into native settlements, slaughtering everyone they found there,
including small children, old men, pregnant women, and even women who had just given
birth. They hacked them to pieces, slicing open their bellies with their swords as though
they were so many sheep herded into a pen…. They grabbed suckling infants by the feet
56

On January 12, 1998, Guadalupe Méndez López was shot by federal forces along with her two-year old daughter
and a young man. Méndez López died of her injuries in the hospital.
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and, ripping them from their mothers’ breasts, dashed them headlong against the rocks….
They slaughtered anyone and everyone in their path, on occasion running through a
mother and her baby with a single thrust of their swords. They spared no one, erecting
especially wide gibbets on which they could string their victims up with their feet just off
the ground and then burn them alive thirteen at a time, in honour of our Saviour and the
twelve Apostles, or tie dry straw to their bodies and set fire to it (De Las Casas 1992, 15).

Bernal Díaz, writing nearly a century later, wrote of the moment, in March, 1519, “Lady Day,”
in Mexico this time, when Cortés and the thirteen horsemen riding alongside him so terrified the
Indians who outnumbered the Spaniards three hundred to one, that they turned tail—“the Indians
thought at that time that the horse and rider were one creature, for they had never seen a horse
before” (Díaz 1963, 76). They were run through by swords, cannon, muskets and cross-bows.
More than eight hundred Indians were killed. This was Cortés’s first battle in New Spain.
Although diseases to which the Indians had no natural immunity would do the job of conquest,
as the Conquistadores were sorely outnumbered, such Spanish brutality would give birth to the
“Leyenda Negra,” or “Black Legend” by primarily non-Spanish authors. Sixteenth-century Philip
II was the monarch who was credited with the most ruthlessness, although some of this
defamation was unfounded, given Bartolomé de Las Casas’s efforts on the part of the indigenous
population to lessen the abuses. Still, the legend stuck, as there was more truth than not to the
excesses of cruelty on the part of the Spanish invaders.
Indigenous Mexicans had every reason to rebel. One wonders why the bulk of the
rebellions, occurring in the 18th century, took so long to be executed. The history of Indian and
Ladino, or mestizo, is fraught with desperation, anxiety and justifiable anger. That history is one
of barbarism carried out by the Spaniards upon the Indians.
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Mexico—and Guatemala before it, as Chiapas was part of Guatemala until 1841—has
a long history of indigenous rebellions, many of which were religious and some of which
transmogrified from religious beginnings into secular movements and civil resistance. Religion
and protest have long been conjoined in Mexico’s largely indigenous south. The 1994 Chiapas
rebellion—although not religious—has antecedents dating back to at least 1712.
The first recorded major Indian uprising in Chiapas was the Cancuc Revolt of 1712, a
religious and political insurgency in which an apparition of the Virgin sparked a rebellion of
5,000 to 6,000 Tzeltal Indigenous people against Spanish priests, including those who charged
for the administration of sacraments, and Spanish finca, or plantation, owners. Part of the
rebellion’s cause was increased tribute burdens, which forced indigenous peons to work on
distant fincas (Womack 1999, 80). Robert Wasserstrom (1980, 2) asserts that religious events
such as this expressed the “radical disaffection” of Tzeltal Maya with the colonial and postcolonial orders. It also contained elements of both resistance and submission as a syncretic
indigenous Christianity and local communal governance provided the idiom of resistance. This
was neither the first time nor the last that Indigenous people would attempt to bring Spanish rule
to an end: rebellions occured in 1660 in Tehuantepec, Oaxaca in 1761 in the Yucatan.
Anthony McFarlane (1995) writes that in 1760, Hapsburg hegemony over its colonial
dominions, including those in Latin America, was challenged as was the Hapsburg empire itself,
soon to be toppled by the Bourbons. The resultant rebellions were large in scale, more massive
than anything yet seen in Spanish America, especially in Quito, New Granada, and Mexico.
Quito, in particular was wracked by revolt. In 1810, rebellion convulsed Mexico under Father
Hidalgo; this insurrection soon came to resemble a civil war. A rebellion in what is today
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Hidalgo, Mexico57 in the 1780s bore some resemblance to a race war as “Indian peasants” fought
whites. Once Hidalgo was defeated, the insurrection spread into southern Mexico. It continued
for an extended period of time before it was defeated by government forces (McFarlane 1995,
314-16). Popular riots and rebellions were, according to McFarlane, “structured, restrained and
targeted” rather than “random disorder or undisciplined violence.” Rebellions came from below
rather than from above and “were underpinned by a sense of legitimacy, a sense that common
people could behave illegally when officials or governments transgressed established customs
and norms” (1995, 327). McFarlane (1995, 327) and Edelman (2005, 331) both stress the
continued currency of the term “moral economy” of the peasant, as used by E.P. Thompson
(1971; 1976; 1991) to refer to bread rioters and English crowds, or, as Thompson put it: to “the
profiteering and the beliefs, usages, forms, and deep emotions that surround ‘the marketing of
food in time of dearth’” (Thompson 1991, 337-338). Likewise, they subscribe to its use by James
Scott (1976) when he refers to “subsistence security” (Thompson 1976, 101), or “a generalized
aversion to risks that might threaten this security and an utter dread of those ‘thresholds’ past
which a household could spiral downward to hunger and misery” (1976, 101). These antinomies
were only to be resolved by their appearance in different contexts and historical epochs. All
peasants experience bumps in the agricultural cycle. In the case of campesino farmers in Maya
territory, work on the fincas provided the only safety net, if one could call it that. Because of the
misery under which the agricultural proletariat lived, households were often subject to starvation.
Rebellion was often the only answer to absolute poverty.
In Chiapas, the Cuzcat rebellion, an attack on indigenous people by ladinos rather than “a
Caste War,” was a defining event in the highland city of San Cristóbal, whose coletos feared a
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Named for Father Hidalgo.
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new war with every passing year (Castellanos 1957, 1962; Wilson 1995; Rus 1983, 23). The
defeat of the highland indigenous people in the ‘Caste War’ did not resolve animosities between
Ladinos and the indigenous population, and genocidal practices continued.
Wassesrstom (1980) suggests that many indigenous people in Chiapas preferred to
struggle to make a living rather than rebel. An outcome with dubious rewards—along with the
very real possibility of being killed—precluded them from rebelling. As a result, many left
Chiapas for Tabasco or elsewhere. But it hardly mattered whether they rebelled or not, as from
the beginning of the Conquest, Spanish brutality knew no bounds. The Spaniards felt they were
doing God’s work, that the devil was the Conquest’s greatest opponent. So, when they
encountered blood sacrifice in the Aztec world, which by the 1490s, extended all the way to
Tabasco and Cozumel, the Spaniards believed they had found justification for the Conquest. All
the while they “wield[ed] swords with the Sign of the Cross on their hilts” (Galeano 1971, 12).
Ironically, although the Indigenous people they found were exhorted to convert to Christianity,
the Requerimiento, which justified the Spanish Crown’s claims of sovereignty over their lands,
provided reason enough to slaughter them.58
And slaughter they did. Estimates of population size at the time of the Conquest in the
Americas vary. By some calculations, there were 70 million people living in the Americas in
1492, and in Mexico alone there were between 30 and 37.5 million. Newson reports that
estimates for the region range widely, from Alfred Kroeber’s 8.4 million to Henry Dobyns’s 90
to 112 million (Newson 1985, 41). Newson estimates that Chiapas had a relatively small
58

These instructions, which they heard only in Spanish, warned:
If you do not, or if you maliciously delay in so doing, I certify that with God’s help I will advance
powerfully against you and make war on you. Wherever and however I am able, and will subject you to the
force and obedience of the Church and of their majesties and take your women and children to be slaves, and
as such, I will sell and dispose of them as their majesties may order, and I will take your possessions and do
you all the harm and damage that I can (Vidart, 1968).
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population decline, falling from 400,000 during the contact period to 78,580 in 1611 (1985, 44).
In this, the remoteness of Chiapas helped preserve the population. Although diseases for which
the native population had no immunity were responsible for most of the deaths, overwork was a
factor. Newson reports that a variety of factors account for depopulation: “disease59; the
systematic killing, ill treatment and overwork of the Indigenous people; the disruption of Indian
economies and societies caused by conquest and colonization, including its psychological
impact; and miscegenation” (1985, 47). By the middle of the 17th century, the overall indigenous
population was reduced to 3.5 million, a tiny fraction of the original number. Indian labor was
exploited, as were Latin America’s natural resources: silver, gold, mahogany, cacao and hemp, to
name just a few. It was an Indian world which was being transformed into a Spanish world—but
that never happened completely. Even the term, indio is a Spanish creation, used to replace
“individually-identified peoples” (Bonfil Batalla 1996, 76). Berkhoffer states that: “the first
inhabitants of the Americas were by modern estimates divided into at least two thousand cultures
and more societies, practiced a multiplicity of customs and lifestyles, held an enormous variety
of values and beliefs, spoke numerous languages mutually unintelligible to the many speakers,
and did not conceive of themselves as a single people—if they knew about each other at all.” The
creation of the word indio made description easy but it also led to stereotypical beliefs about the
people so characterized (Berkhoffer 1978, 3).
And we see the consequences, even today. Indigenous people were forced to use
deference behaviors when interacting with their Spanish overlords. Aguilar (1982) notes that
indigenous people walked behind Ladinos, that they ride with the cargo in a cart or motor
vehicle, that they are addressed in Spanish in the familiar “tú” form when speaking to Ladinos,
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Most notably, smallpox, measles, typhus, plague, yellow fever, and malaria (Newson 1985:47).
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while the Indian will always address the Ladino as the formal “usted.” Additionally, “Indigenous
people normally use what they call ‘voz baja,’ a soft, low, docile tone of voice and are often
addressed in ‘voz brava,’a firm, almost angry, tone” (1982:158). I witnessed people stepping off
a sidewalk if a non-Indian approached, or avoiding the sidewalk altogether, which was
something I saw in San Cristóbal. Indigenous people habitually looked down rather than catching
a coleto’s eye, and if they wore a hat, they were required to sweep it off their head and hold it in
front of their chests while addressing Ladinos. As late as 1997 I saw a coleto push an indigenous
man with vegetables in a basket on his head off the narrow walkway that runs into the market.
He nearly fell but recovered himself and nothing fell out of his basket. Ten years earlier,
indigenous people had been banned from walking on the high but narrow sidewalks in San
Cristóbal and forced to walk on the cobblestones barefoot, or during the rainy season, knee-deep
in fast-running water.
Robert Wasserstrom (1976) traces the origin of these practices to the sixteenth century.
In formal petitions to the royal visitador in the late 17th century, indigenous people used the stiff
bureaucratic language that the Spaniards used themselves to mask their true feelings (1976:2).
They wanted to disguise the fact that they were indeed “relics” of a conquered civilization.60

A Theology of Liberation
Popular religiosity would resurface, although in a very different guise, almost a half
century later. The Indigenous Congress of 1974 asserted the conception of God-given rights and
made it a basis of the tradition of liberation theology in Chiapas. This event was inspired by the
Medellín Bishop’s Conference of 1968, under the leadership of Pope John XXIII, which is
60

Interestinly, Wasterstrom asks how many ethnographers have “left unanswered one of the most perplexing and
difficult questions which confronts anthropological science: how did native social life recover its vitality after the
Spanish Conquest and evolve into its present form” (1976:1)?
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credited with the growth of liberation theology (Floyd 1997; Morales Bermúdez 1991; Harvey
1998; Womack 1999). In Chiapas, liberation theology grew into la teología india, or indigenous
theology under Bishop Samuel Ruiz’s watch. It combined a syncretic indigenous Catholicism of
indigenous and Catholic beliefs with liberation theology. As bishop, Ruiz ordered the translation
of the Bible into Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Chol and Tojolabal (Tavanti 2003; Floyd 1996; Kovic 2003).
Ruiz did not come to Chiapas a revolutionary, but the misery he saw when he arrived in
San Cristóbal in 1960 converted him into one. “I am like the fish that sleep with their eyes open,”
he wrote:
For a long time, I didn’t see. I passed through communities where people were being
beaten because they didn’t want to work more than eight hours [a day]. But I saw old
churches and a popular religiosity in process, and I said, “What good people.” I didn’t
see the tremendous oppression of which they were victims (1994, quoted in Kovic 2004,
187).

At the same time, the Catholic Church, too, was changing. Floyd (1996, 145) tells us that:

Pope John XXIII’s call in 1959 for a Vatican Council (1962 to 1965) to modernize the
church took the Mexican hierarchy by surprise. During the Second Vatican Council
(Vatican II) the Catholic Church experienced a dramatic revolution. Pope John XXIII
proclaimed he ‘wanted to open up the windows…to let fresh air in from the outside
world.’… Vatican II marked, among other accomplishments, the elimination of the Latin
mass and the emergence of a positive, open attitude within the church toward the world.
The church was redefined as the ‘people of God.’ Community and the church as an
instrument of church liberation were emphasized rather than the hierarchical structure of
the institutional church. The church was considered a servant and thus was not aligned
with the politically powerful.
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Nowhere was this break with the past clearer than at the 1968 Bishop’s Conference in
Medellín, Colombia. There bishops gathered from all corners of the continent to chart the Latin
American Church’s future. Although most bishops were conservative, the one exception was
Mexican bishop Sergio Méndez Arceo from Cuernavaca. He decided to embrace Vatican II’s
changes—including a theology of liberation and the creation of comunidades de base, or
Christian base communities, with open arms. This was in keeping with sweeping changes he had
already made in his diocese: the addition of mariachi music to mass, and a general radicalism
that swept away traditionalist ideas—and which had drawn disapproval from the Mexican
Church. For all of these reasons, he was nicknamed “the red bishop;” he was a key protector of
the poor and powerless at a time when few in the Church saw this as their mission (Floyd 1996,
146).
During this period, Ruiz was in the process of converting from a theology rooted in
mainstream Catholicism to what would eventually be called the “teología india” of Chiapas. It
was a theology centered upon the work of the approximately eight thousand indigenous
catequists, or lay preachers “who have developed prominent roles as community/political
leaders, bridging the gap between political and religious power structures and the base, and
creating an arena in which civil society has flourished” (Floyd 1997, 2). This strain of
Catholicism is known in Chenalhó as the Word of God (Eber 2003).61 This pastoral activity, also
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Catholic catequists, trained by Ruiz García himself, have been a force for change, especially in the
regions around Chenalhó. Kovic (2003: 60) tells us:
By the 1980s, Chenalhó catequists were meeting two or three times a year to discuss changes and
innovations in liturgy and to study specific readings of the Bible but also to share news of community
achievements and to attempt to work through difficulties. In addition, pastoral workers in Chenalhó
organized courses for local health promoters and midwives and workshops on human rights and
cooperatives.
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spurred in large part by the 1974 Indigenous Congress, was a protest against the absolute poverty
the people of Chiapas suffered. Ruiz García could have chosen Tuxtla Gutiérrez, a humid
lowland city and the state capitol, for the diocesan seat when the diocese of San Cristóbal and
Tuxtla Gutiérrez was created in 1965, but he chose San Cristóbal because even then he preferred
to work with the most marginalized of the poor, the indigenous, and rejected identification with
their oppressors (Fazio 1994, 74; Floyd 1997, 69).
As a result of Ruiz’s “option for the poor” and emphasis on “la teología india,”
indigenous Chiapanecos, Christian base communities, and especially Las Abejas saw him as
something of a prophet. In contrast, President Salinas de Gortari portrayed him as the author of
the EZLN uprising for his pro-Indian stance (Floyd 1996, 143). As a result of his central role in
Chiapas, and his role as mediator in 1996, Samuel Ruiz established a church body, CONAI,
Comisión Nacional de Intermediación, the National Intermediation Commission, to work with
the Human Rights Center, Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas. He had founded Frayba in 1989 as an
ecumenical body to investigate human rights’ abuses in the diocese. He founded CONAI to
mediate the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, in the same way as he had
brokered the cease-fire between the EZLN and the government in 1994 (CDHFBC 1998a).
Although he stood with the Zapatistas in their quest for indigenous rights and culture, he did not
back their use of arms.
Bishop Samuel Ruiz’s legacy was revived by Pope Francis, emphasizing the way that
Samuel Ruiz Garcia was a force for change.62 Many times during his long career as bishop
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On February 15, 2015, Pope Francis, an immensely popular Pope with a bent in the tradition of liberation
theology, visited the San Cristóbal cathedral. ABC News reported that:
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(1960-2000) his views clashed with the more conservative hierarchy of the Mexican Church—as
well as with the Vatican. He can be seen as emblematic of the type of cleric in the post-1970s
Church in Mexico, a period that has seen independent and active leadership by church officials,
with both pro-state stances and anti-clericalism now officially reversed and belonging firmly to
the past (Klaiber 1998, 242).

Conclusion
Poverty in Chiapas is absolute, due to structural causes, and based in the marginalization
and oppression of indigenous campesinos in “deep” Mexico (Bonfil Batalla 1989). The poverty
lived by my interlocutors in 1997-99 was truly startling upon first sight: most women did not
have shoes and were forced to go barefoot, even when few men did, the accustomed diet was
deficient, often just beans and tortillas, or tortillas with a pinch of salt and chili, even before the
IDPs’ displacement, when it worsened to the barest essentials by May, 1999, and, to make
matters worse, Subcomandante Marcos announced in August of 1996 that the CCRI-CG
comandancia had decided to reject all aid and services that came from the government. The
EZLN base supporters and members of Las Abejas, many of whom were displaced by the
conflict, were already dirt poor. This decision, which they accepted “on grounds of faith rather
than resolve” (Barmeyer 2009, 112), contributed to their abject immiseration, forcing the hand of
many and causing them to turn to the PRI government for support, for the time being accepting
“the gifts of enemies.” Among these “gifts” were problematic conditional cash transfers, since
discontinued by President López Obrador (Development Pathways 06/02/2019). Mora (2017,
172) showed how participants complained that “the government wants to control us” and limit
Crowds chanted "Long live the pope of the poor!" (“Viva el Papa de los pobres”) and "Welcome, pope of the
struggle!" (“Bienvenidos, el Papa de la lucha!”) as he arrived (Feb.15, 2015).
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the number of children that families could have. This would prove to be a Trojan horse,
alienating all but a few participants; its real purpose was the aim it took at the EZLN in order to
control unrest. As a government program, recipients had to abandon their participation in the
struggle. However, although the EZLN would eventually—by 2016—begin to do better than its
nearby PRIista neighbors, many people would not be able to hold on until conditions improved.
Among them would be some of my interlocutors.
The next chapter examines the theory behind the idea of the gift, from Marcel Mauss
(1924), the gift economy, from Bronislaw Malinowski (1920, 1922), and the critique of
humanitarian reason, from Didier Fassin (2012). I also look at clientelism/patronage, and
hegemony, from Antonio Gramsci. Taken together they help illustrate the actions taken at the
INI camp in 1998 and 1999 by the IDPs living there.

85

Chapter Two:
Theoretical Debates Critical to this Study: The Gift and Gift Economy, Critique of
Humanitarian Reason, Clientelism, and Hegemony

Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the
guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the
people against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that keeps
all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery.
— Che Guevara (1961)

Labor should not be sold like merchandise but offered as a gift to the community.
— Che Guevara

In this chapter, I show how the idea of the gift, from Marcel Mauss, and the gift
economy, from Bronislaw Malinowski, animate this study, with its emphasis on gift-giving
among social actors from the PRI and indigent IDPs, among other humanitarian aid givers.
Challenging David Graeber’s notion of debt as something accumulated among social equals, I
show how debt was transacted among vastly unequal categories of people creating a debt of
loyalty and political support in a clientelistic mechanism which amounted to a gift economy, and
I show how gift-giving occurred between people in a hierarchical relationship, and how these
gifts were reciprocated whenever possible so as to not be construed as “charity.” I contend that
humanitarian aid was a “free gift,” that is, a gift given with no intention of reciprocation or
counter-gift, and that the IDPs were mostly critical of this assistentialist aid. In this, I illustrate
Didier Fassin’s (2012) critique of humanitarian reason in two preliminary respects:
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1) The IDPs were critical of the aid they received, considering it not good enough, a
major theme of this study. I ask when and how do aid recipients become critical of the aid they
are forced to receive? How does charity hurt the recipient to such an extent that they become
resentful of the aid they receive? What is the result? How is this criticism also true of the Latin
American concept of asistencialismo, assistance, or charity, which does nothing to change the
underlying structural conditions in society or the fundamentals of people’s lives? In the Latin
American context, assistentialism arose as a framework in the 1960s to critique charity from the
standpoint of social work and liberation theology, among other fields, and was first brought to
American audiences through the work of Paulo Freire (1973). Freire stated that assistentialism
attacks the symptoms of social problems rather than the underlying causes—and through his
work and activism sought to change that by teaching Brazil’s poor to read and to learn their
history (much as the Zapatistas are engaged in doing in their autonomous schools).
Asistencialismo is not about social reform, as per the epigraph from Che Guevara that opens this
chapter; it is about charity that makes the giver feel better than the receiver.
2) The visual suffering of women and children “moves and mobilizes” people to act, as
did the global press’s publication of a photograph of “a desperate Algerian mother who…
learned that her eight children had been massacred the day before in Benthala, along with four
hundred other people. What the global press published on their front pages about the slaughter
was not the image of the lifeless or mutilated bodies of the victims, but the representation of this
woman’s pain. Thus the reader became a spectator of suffering rather than of violence, and the
emotion to be felt was compassion rather than terror” (Fassin 2012, 25). This directly parallels
the aftermath of the massacre at Acteal. Suffering—and the screaming faces on Jens Galshiot’s
“Pillar of Shame,” erected at the entrance to the Acteal, Las Abejas camp in 1999 and identical
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to the one erected in Hong Kong in 1997 to memorialize the protests at Tiananmen Square in
Beijing in 1989—and pain came to represent the massacre in the long term, and the IDP victims,
some of whom walked barefoot for many miles in the incessant rain, mud and cold to arrive at
San Cristóbal’s camps. The images inevitably focused on crying women and children, who had
been the most numerous of the victims of the massacre itself. In visual terms, they came to
represent the massacre.63
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However, several national news magazines published a photo of the 45 coffins lined up in a representation of the
brutality in the hamlet, in addition to the suffering of the victims’ families.
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Figure 2.1 Crying women and children came to represent the massacre at Acteal. Photo courtesy of Liliana Cendón.
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Because the ethnography on which this study is based takes place in two displaced
persons camps in Chiapas, embedded within this framework are further questions raised by the
critique of humanitarian reason: When does humanitarianism supplant an emphasis on human
rights and become compassion-based? When does a “politics of life” emerge in a delicate
balance between “lives risked” and “lives saved” as expatriate humanitarian aid workers receive
credit for risking their own lives in a “sacrificial order” which puts refugees, victims and
internally displaced persons on the bottom rung of the hierarchy, as at Médècins Sans
Frontières—because aid workers do so for the good of others? How does witnessing atrocious
events become the jurisdiction of the aid worker who listens to an emotional account rather than
the victim who lives it? And, I would add, how does it become the jurisdiction of the
anthropologist? And, in a related concept, when and how do human rights actors reengage their
constituents with a human rights agenda, such as happened in 1999 at Acteal? When does a
“state of exception” become the rule, as it has become in the United States post 9/11 and as it
became in Chiapas in 1998? These are Fassin’s main points, many of which I touch on in this
study, although in this work, I focus largely on the recipients of aid on the ground, and thus, I ask
in this study, why do some people embrace (government sourced) humanitarianism in a context
in which it is rejected politically by powerful local actors, such as the EZLN?
The most divisive, and thus, controversial humanitarian aid treated in this dissertation
was the governmental aid offered by the PRI contingent at the INI camp in 1999. Because
governmental aid was rejected by the EZLN’s CCRI-CG, or comandancia, it was the most
political of all the aid on offer at the camp. When it comes to aid, however, money is somewhere
between gift and commodity, yet in the camps I studied, it was clearly a gift, offered by PRI and
COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa Gamboa on January 28, 1999 to the impoverished IDPs at the
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INI camp, nearly half of whom felt compelled to accept it. I argue that government-sourced
humanitarian aid in 1990s Chiapas was both patronage and a gift economy, as the IDP recipients’
loyalty and political support for the PRI was implied in the exchange.

Morality and the Free Gift
Subtending this line of inquiry is an emphasis on morality, as per both Didier Fassin
(2012) who reminds us of the importance of recognizing the “moral history of the present,” and
David Graeber, who writes of the moral grounds for economic relations, drawing on Marcel
Mauss (Graeber 2014b, 2011). But I foreground the discussion with the idea of the morality of
gift giving, drawing on Frederick Klaits (2017) who follows Mauss’s emphasis on the
importance of reciprocity and the return gift. Because, (in this framework) if there can be no
return gift in situations of humanitarian exigency, asking for help will be problematized, as
Klaits’s groundbreaking (2017) volume asks: “what kinds of moral force do acts of giving and
asking possess?” (2017, 2). Klaits compares humanitarian discourses to charity, clarifying that
“giving to those in need is widely construed as the epitome of moral action, while asking for
charity is liable to be seen as merely utilitarian” (2017, 3). At times, asking for charity is
“systematically concealed in the context of the free gift” (2017, 9). For example, the
soteriological religion of Jain renouncers in northern India practice a process called “grazing,”
hovering around doorways as lunch is being prepared, waiting to be asked in to eat and taking so
little that their presence is hardly noticed before they move on. They, thus, ask only through
body language and not through speech and in this manner, they avoid relations of obligation.
Donors are rewarded through the impersonal system of karma rather than by renouncers’
gratitude (2017, 9-10). Klaits notes that “receiving and asking occupy residual positions because,
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ostensibly, such acts do not confer obligations in turn—even though we might regard the
Maussian gift itself as a request in light of the obligation it entails to reciprocate” (2017, 3). In
other words, receiving and asking do not contain an obligation to return the gift. Parry (1986,
463-67) also noted that this debt places the recipient in a dependent status, and, as with charity or
alms, a pure gift may set up a “poisonous” relationship between the recipient and the giver who
washes away his or her sins through the act of giving. The idea of a gift as “poison” comes
directly from Mauss, who reminds us that the old German word for gift means “poison,” and
even non-market relations “are never based on altruism or kinship-based sharing, but themselves
contain powerful elements of egoism, self-interest, competitive striving, and antagonism,” James
Ferguson relates (2015, 126). Mauss had argued that “the ancient morality of the gift has become
a principle of justice;”—“generosity is an obligation because Nemesis avenges the poor and the
gods for the superabundance of happiness and wealth of certain people who should rid
themselves of it”—hence, the need for almsgiving (Mauss 1990, 23). A Canadian sect, The
Children of Peace, in Ontario in the early 19th Century analyzed by Albert Schrauwers (2011)
illustrated the way that through the transition to capitalism, this temple dedicated to giving
charity found that giving out charity could be challenging for recipients, who found themselves
close to bankruptcy and vulnerable to lawsuits and imprisonment for debt. Instead of accepting
the free gift of charity, in the end, the organization elected to take out loans. This directly
parallels the CCESC originated, FONAES funded breastfeeding doll project I discuss in Chapter
Seven. The women to whom the project was oriented, the “INIti,” those who remained behind at
the INI camp in February 1999, were hesitant about handling money but excited about the
project, as it was not “charity” but a loan that had to be paid back. Yet, these were isolated cases.
In general, in 1990s Chiapas, humanitarian aid from NGOs, INGOs, Catholic charities and
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individuals was given freely with no expectation of a return. Governmental humanitarian aid was
part of a gift economy, as I argue below.
Humanitarianism exists in societies with market structures, an advanced labor division
and a significant business sector, all requirements of “pure” (or free) gifts according to Parry
(1986, 467), that is, in societies allowing for altruism (Mauss 1990). Marcel Mauss (1990, 95)
was clear in observing that for those who “accept [gifts at the potlatch] without giving in
return… is to become client and servant, to become small, to fall lower.” “The unreciprocated
gift,” Mauss observes, … makes the person who has accepted it inferior, particularly when it has
been accepted with no thought of returning it” (1990, 83). Mary Douglas avowed that “there
should not be any free gifts. What is wrong with the so-called free gift is the donor’s intention to
be exempt from return gifts coming from the recipient. Refusing requital puts the act of giving
outside any mutual ties. Once given, the free gift entails no further claims from the recipient”
(2002, ix).
This dynamic is apparent among refugee and IDP populations who have little, if nothing
to give. If they can give back, they give the little that they can just to even the exchange, so as
not to be less than the giver, and erasing the debt they find themselves in—in contradistinction to
David Graeber’s (2011; 2014a) fundamental point on debt (and gifts), that the giver and receiver
be of equivalent status, a point I discuss below. I was humbled when Gerardo’s family gave me a
gift of chicken soup, paid for with shoes donated by a hospital in Villahermosa, which were
useless to the IDPs. But the shoes had exchange value, and they sold them in the nearby market
for a chicken, which they shared with me. The gift of chicken soup (caldo de pollo) was a
luxury, an absolute rarity, something the IDPs had two or three times during their year and twomonth long tenure at the INI camp (for those who returned to Acteal, such as Gerardo and his
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family). I felt deeply indebted, even though I had managed to organize help for the group from
foreigners living in San Cristóbal, and was working for CCESC at the time. A chicken was an
extravagance in my own economy, as well—I was living on pasta and turkey ham or rice with
Japanese style peanuts and eggs cooked on my hot pot, from ISSTE, the state subsidized
supermarket bordering the San Cristóbal market (frequented mostly by indigenous people). And
Lucía, Gerardo’s wife, had given me a drumstick, a choice cut of meat. I couldn’t wait to
reciprocate. Yet, I had social capital and they were “the beholden of the world” (Fassin 2012,
233); we were not on equal footing, yet we exchanged gifts.

Governmental Humanitarian Aid as a Gift Economy and as Clientelism, and Hegemony
As in the previous example of a gift of chicken soup, a gift economy likewise requires
reciprocation, as it establishes a debt between trading partners (e.g., Gregory 1982), perhaps for
their loyalty. Cheal (2016, 3) observes that “we have only just begun to comprehend the dynamic
nature of the gift economies of contemporary western societies.” I contend that “unacceptable”
government-sourced humanitarian aid in 1998 and 1999 was part of a gift economy, as loyalty
was demanded by the PRI. Foremost among the implied return obligations of government and
development aid and federal cash transfers was the recipients’ rejection of Zapatismo, a social
control mechanism instituted by the government that was meant to quell protest. This was due in
large part to the EZLN; in a rare instance of not consulting the base, the Zapatista CCRI-CG
(comandancia) set the ground rules. Acceptance of government humanitarian and development
aid was grounds for expulsion from the EZLN. Knowing this, the federal government devised the
successful cash transfer program, Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera in 1997. Cash transfer
programs as they exist in present day Mexico require school attendance, medical checkups and
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immunizations, as well as health and hygiene workshops—and unwanted family planning
advice, as I discussed in Chapter One. In short, the program required state oversight for
participants, and was extremely intrusive. In their to-some-extent-successful attempts to buy off
adherents of the neo- Zapatista social movement, and gain their loyalty, these conditional “gifts”
illustrated the Maussian binary between gifts and war. Mauss (1990, 105) tells us that “it is by
opposing reason to feeling, by pitting the will to peace against sudden outbursts of insanity…
that peoples succeed in substituting alliance, gifts, and trade for war, isolation and stagnation,”
with the conditional governmental gifts helping to prevent unrest in the short term, in the
Chiapas case. By buying off adherents and former adherents of the EZLN, and decreasing their
numbers [well above 300,000 support bases, or indigenous supporters of the EZLN political
cause, at their height in 1994 to around 250,000 twenty years later (Castellanos 2014)], the PRI
government succeeded in staving off the structural conditions causing dissent among former
Zapatista base supporters and former members of Las Abejas, who numbered 4,000 in 1997.
Even though it appeared that the federal government—the “intellectual author” of the Acteal
massacre—was the “reasonable” party by ostensibly controlling unrest, the Zapatista project
post-1996 was a non-violent one and its autonomous thrust was clearly aimed at peace. As Fassin
(2012, 79) reminds us, this is a Marxian reading of “history from below”:

The publication of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward’s book Regulating the Poor,
in 1971, sparked intense debate among English-speaking social historians. The authors
showed how improvements in public assistance to the poor served to control social unrest
during periods of economic difficulty and how, conversely, periods of stability in the
production of wealth made it possible for greater pressure to be exerted on the workforce,
thereby enabling a reduction in social protection provisions. Historians of welfare
criticized this Marxist reading of “history from below,” arguing that social progress was
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essentially the result of progressivism on the part of government or business elites,
motivated not by the fear of popular unrest but by increased awareness of the degraded
living conditions of the poor. In the continuation of this debate, the institution of the
Social Emergency Fund in France, although a minor development in the history of aid,
certainly provides ammunition for historians of conflict rather than the historians of
consensus. The primary aim of the fund was not to relieve the hardship of the poor but
rather to forestall a protest movement that was beginning to spill out beyond the
‘movement of the unemployed and the precarious’ (Fassin 2012, 79).

It was clear that Mexico had done exactly this in 1997 with Progresa; it was an attempt
to forestall further violence and entice supporters of the EZLN to leave for the PRI. For its part,
it was likewise apparent that the EZLN possessed the intrinsic rewards of the commons, the
collective and the autonomous body of the caracoles64 and MAREZ,65 rather than the extrinsic
reward of money. Las Abejas likewise is a non-violent, yet religious organization possessing
intrinsic rewards. The PRI government, to gain supporters, had to buy them in an age-old
clientelistic pattern in Latin America with the use and manipulation of resources, and the both
hidden and open mechanisms and dynamics of exercising power, while the neo-Zapatistas set out
to win hearts and minds. By 2016, the EZLN had achieved near-complete autonomy, and were
better off than their PRI neighbors. My interlocutors at first embraced, then rejected the PRI,
even going so far as to sue ex-President Ernesto Zedillo in an American civil court in 2011, by
then rejecting “the gifts of enemies.” Yet, it was a long struggle.
Loyalty, karma, or honor—all social or intangible rewards—are often part of a gift
economy. In writing about gift economies in Latin America, Carlos Hoevel (2014, 110) comes
very close to my research findings when he states that a gift economy “implies… think(ing)
64
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Post-2003.
Now the CRAREZ.
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about the circle of relations around which the entire society is organized, putting emphasis on
traditional forms of political relations [i.e., clientelism66] and the market, along with other forms
of reciprocity.” Things given out in patron-client transactions include: clothing, mattresses,
medicine, milk, corrugated metal, construction materials, blankets, hangers, utility bill payments,
money, eyeglasses, chickens, trees, magnets (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes 2004), favors
(Oliveros 2016), alcohol and drugs (Szwarcberg 2015), access to water (Herrera 2017), and
furniture, animals, food, and tools (Gonzalez-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio and
Nickerson 2012), among many other items. As one client in Javier Auyero’s well-known
ethnography of an Argentine slum put it, “Because she gave me medicine, or some milk, or a
packet of yerba or sugar, I know that I have to go to her rally in order to fulfill my obligation to
her, to show my gratitude” (Auyero 2001, 160, cited in Gonzalez-Ocantos and Oliveros 2019,
12). And clientelism can take different forms. Domingues (2008, 19) calls attention to what he
calls “bureaucratic clientelism” in Brazil: committees of the poor have been founded by the state
through political mediators in order to decide who is eligible to receive the cash transfer benefit,
Bolsa Familia, from the government. In Bourdieuian terms, patron-client relationships oppose
the individual (or family) good to the common good, and are, thus, problematic (Hoevel and
Mascareño 2016). For his part, Luhmann (2005) showed how clientelistic networks are
functionally parasitic (Hoevel and Mascareño 2016, 50).
While patron-client relationships are problematic, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony fits the
Chiapas case well. The Chiapas rebellion is different in form and content than the typical Indian
revolt in Chiapas over the centuries since the Spanish Conquest. In the first case, religion played
no part in the uprising, which was political and economic, as well as cultural, fighting centuries of
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immiseration from the Spanish overlords. For the second, its three hundred thousand
protagonists—the Zapatistas and their base supporters—have been proletarianized agricultural
and seasonal laborers—and semi-subsistence campesinos, or peasants—for the five and a quarter
centuries since the Spanish Conquest. Although their structural position remained fixed in the
creoles’, or Spanish descended elites’, eyes, there was certainly a great deal of change over the
centuries, and when the colonizers’ system became too oppressive, there were revolts and
conflicts. As a result, these protean qualities defy easy categorization, leading to scholars’ ever
greater reliance upon Gramscian categories such as “subaltern” groups, hegemony, organic
intellectuality, and “passive (bourgeois) revolution.”
In the midst of these debates, Gramsci’s use of organic intellectuals and subalterns has
become de rigeur for the study of the neo-Zapatista movement and especially the EZLN. In the
academy, the Subaltern Studies Group took up the study of subalterns in the global south in the
mid-1980s and has been the most vocal in the use of the term subalternity for the poorest of the
poor, in the global north, those subjected to capitalist hegemony and its mode of social
reproduction. And in the global south, according to Gayatri Spivak in Can the Subaltern Speak?
(1988.), “on the other side of the international division of labor,” including female labor.
Gramsci saw subalterns as lacking common sense (senso comun, or popular opinion), yet he saw
organic intellectuals arising from the subaltern “masses” under the aegis of the Communist Party.
The fact that Gramsci singlemindedly refers to the Communist Party—breaking with Lenin who
put considerable stock in social democracy—makes Gramsci’s brilliant analysis of bourgeois
regime change, after Vincenzo Cuoco, a 19th Century conservative thinker, whom Gramsci puts

98

in a footnote but which belongs in the text, of doubtful applicability to the EZLN case.67 The
same goes for “passive revolution,” which IS bourgeois revolution, and is more accurately a
“regime change” than a true revolution. Gramsci believed that the proletariat would eventually
rise up in revolution, but this revolution would be anything but “passive.”
Gramsci originally defined ‘hegemony’ as a dynamic process of “establishment of
unstable equilibria” shaped in important ways by the “actions and reactions” of the subaltern
classes (Forgacs 1988, 205-6).
John Gledhill (2000, 77) tells us that:
Gramsci argued that both ruling and subaltern classes are ‘historical blocs’, fragile
coalitions of diverse social forces. Their unity needs to be built by hegemonic practices,
which include real politics and its dirty deals as well as cultural and ideological
dimensions.

As Roseberry (1994, 360-1) shows us, hegemony may more fruitfully used as a heuristic to
understand “struggle” rather than “consent,” as in Italy, where Garibaldi was unsuccessful in
carrying out radical social reforms which would require mobilizing the peasant masses and
smashing the power of the Catholic Church, the army and the landlords (Gledhill 2000, 78). In
this sense, Las Abejas had to accommodate to a hegemonic state through aid rejection in an
attempt to win over the hearts and minds of civil society (“a war of position”) rather than through
a direct challenge to the regime (“a war of movement”). The organization could not openly rebel
in the late 1990s, although it was involved in the neo-Zapatista lucha (struggle). From the state’s
point of view, the gifts of aid, problematic as they may have later become for the IDP recipients,
were a way for the state to become hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense.
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Russia in 1917, although the 19th Century bourgeois regime change differed in form and content from the 1917
Bolshevik revolution.

99

In Latin America, patron-client systems operate as a form of a gift economy, with
reciprocation, as Marcel Mauss described in 1924 (Hoevel 2014). In gift economies, money
occupies an ambiguous middle case between gift and commodity exchange (Gregory 1980;
Strathern 1979; Yan 2012). Money can be both gift and commodity, as it was for the PRI
government in Mexico in 1999. Whatever the medium, the obligations of the recipient from this
donor establish the fact that the relationship is indeed one of exchange.
But is this just a false duality in the first place? As James Ferguson (2015, 124) so
pertinently relates, the Maussian dichotomy between non-market and market societies is an
incorrect interpretation of Mauss’s intentions:
Anthropologists have often shared traditional socialism’s antipathy to market sociality
and have sometimes invoked Marcel Mauss’s famous essay on the gift in support of a
moralistic and nostalgic dualism. As Keith Hart has noted, the idea that modern Western
capitalist societies have an asocial ‘commodity economy’ while other, radically different
societies feature morally inflected ‘gift economies’ has come to be widely circulated,
‘routinely reproduced in introductory anthropology courses everywhere’ (2007, 11).
Starting with such a binary, it is only too easy to tell the familiar anti-market story,
arguing that whereas pre-capitalist, traditional societies were built on virtuous things like
giving, sharing and human connection, capitalism and its cash economy have increasingly
replaced this full, meaningful world with the cold and inhuman hand of the market. But
as Hart has usefully pointed out, such accounts attribute to Mauss ‘the very ideology his
essay was intended to refute’ (2007, 11). In tracing the ways that the circulation of
objects, across a range of different societies, is always bound up with both social meaning
and personal interests, Mauss aimed to show that ‘human institutions everywhere are
founded on the unity of individual and society, freedom and obligation, self-interest and
concern for others’ (Hart 2007, 9) (Ferguson 2015, 124).
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Anthropologists have debated this sharp separation between gift and commodity
exchange since the 1980s. Arjun Appadurai (1986, 11-13) and James Carrier (1990, 20-25), for
example, have noted that the radical opposition between gifts and commodities is a result of the
ideological construction of the Western pure gift and the “romanticization” of gift giving in nonWestern societies, and both suggest that this binary should be aborted. Just as self-interest and
concern for others exist in non-market societies, according to Mauss, they exist in market
societies. Thus, gift economies exist in capitalist societies, as well, as David Cheal (1988, 2016)
shows us, and as I argue for governmental humanitarian aid provisioners under a neoliberal
regime in late 1990s Mexico.

Markets and Mutuality
In a crucial point about the importance of market exchange to Marcel Mauss, Ferguson
cites David Graeber (2004) who relates that Mauss, a lifelong socialist, was bothered by the
Bolshevik “experiment” which would do away with markets. Graeber writes that:
The essay on the gift should be read with an appreciation both of Mauss’s active lifelong
commitment to socialism and of his critical response to the Bolshevik experience in the
early years of the Soviet revolution. He wrote the gift essay (published in 1924) following
his visit to the Soviet Union, and it is best read in conjunction with his extended
evaluation of the Soviet ‘experiment.’ (Mauss [1924] 1983). Mauss’s critique of the
Bolshevik experience was based precisely on his conviction that markets were both
desirable and necessary. Among the Bolsheviks’ chief mistakes was their attempt ‘to
destroy the essential constituent of the economy itself, i.e., the market’ [1924] 1983, 353).
This was an elementary error, since modern society without market exchange (i.e.,
without a system in which people have a right to buy and sell goods via ‘alternative prices
freely ’supplied and demanded’’) is ‘inconceivable’ ([1924] 1983. 353). ‘Freedom of the
market,’ he wrote, ‘is the absolutely necessary precondition of economic life,’ and
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socialistic ideas about dispensing with money were deeply misguided ([1924] 1983,
353)…. Crucially, Mauss made these criticisms as an advocate of far-reaching socialist
transformation, not as some sort of capitalist opponent of it (Ferguson 2015, 125).
Ferguson continues the point, stating that “we may say that market exchange is not the
negation of sociality; on the contrary, it forms a vital—indeed, irreplaceable—part of the
coordinated social life of any modern society. And any socialism worthy of the name must build
on, rather than destroy, such actually existing forms of social life.” Both disinterested sharing
and “asocial calculation” are “fantasies; “real sociality always unites sharing and self-interest in
a single act. This state of affairs is sometimes glossed as ‘reciprocity’ but might be better…
expressed as mutuality.” Mutuality is to be found in the kula, the potlatch, and the peasant
marketplace; it is found as well in the modern corporation and “the competitive frenzy of the
stock market trading floor” (Ferguson 2015, 126).68
David Graeber (2011; 2014a) identifies a difference between moral obligation involving
mutuality and the gratefulness expected of a more hierarchical exchange. Yet, gratefulness was
never in evidence among the IDPs at INI when receiving humanitarian aid from any source, with
the exception of a FONAES government-funded development project making breastfeeding dolls
for sale in which a loan was given to the women. On the FONAES-funded project, while the men
tended to strong-arm the women, the women themselves were intrigued by the project and
excited to be given work that at least twenty of them could do, although the compromiso to pay
back the loan at first frightened them, as they were not used to handling money. Yet, all
humanitarian aid, whether of government, religious, NGO or INGO origin, was seen as suspect
by the IDPs, and was objected to, although the IDPs accepted their meager food rations as they
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were hungry. Yet, they reminisced about all the varied foods that they ate in the countryside prior
to their displacement. Mary Douglas (1990, ix) likewise points out in her forward to Mauss’s The
Gift, that recipients of charity do not like the giver—“charity wounds,” Douglas observes. Mauss
himself uses these very words in his conclusion to The Gift, stating that “the whole tendency of
our morality is to do away with the unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver”
(1990, 83). As we will see in Chapter Six, PRI dinosaurs’ wives were benefactors of the Mexican
Red Cross, and many withdrew their support in the wake of the Acteal massacre, when
humanitarian aid was given exclusively to the IDPs of the Chiapas conflict—that is, to those with
whom this class was in direct conflict. The upper class women supported the Red Cross because
it was a charity that was perceived as apolitical, providing aid to all Mexicans, regardless of
class. Yet, a hierarchical dimension was present in this situation, and, by withdrawing their
support, the upper class ensured that the Mexican Red Cross would run out of funds by midSeptember, 1998, causing a crisis at the Red Cross. A state of exception was then declared, as the
Mexican Red Cross asked the ICRC (the International Committee of the Red Cross) to step in to
provide the necessary funds. Mexico had temporarily lost its status as a sovereign nation.
A hierarchical relationship is ever-present in humanitarian aid giving, however
inconspicuous it may seem at times. As Halvorson (2017, 84) states, “giving thanks can imply
that the ‘giver’ has a choice to give or not, and, in particular, the request for stated
acknowledgement makes explicit the exchange’s hierarchical dimensions, however slight.” The
opposite is often true. Aid recipients are often critical of the aid received, and neither grateful nor
docile, as Fassin (2012, 139) mentions, almost in passing. In addition to the criticisms of DIF’s
atole-making project, discussed in the introduction, I found the INI IDPs to be highly critical of
ICRC aid, especially the two-week food supply which included cans of sardines (an unfamiliar
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food) and which, for the first year of displacement, was given out to family heads without regard
for family size, among many other criticisms of humanitarian aid, which never extended far
enough for the INI population of IDPs. They received considerably less humanitarian aid than
did the Acteal camp, and this was also a sticking point. However, the IDPs were not without
agency—I discovered at least one case of a woman from Chenalhó moving herself and her two
young daughters to the Acteal camp in order to receive aid in 1999 where aid was more plentiful,
and people moved at will between the San Cristóbal and the highland camps throughout 1998
and 1999.

The Idea of Equivalence in Debt and Gifts
Central to the exchange relationship is the idea of debt. David Graeber (2011; 2014a)
argues that only exchanges between formal social equals generates debt, and that other
transactions do not give rise to debt. I take issue with this contention. The fact that IDPs living in
abject poverty could accumulate a debt to a hegemonic Mexican state ruled by the PRI by their
acceptance of “forbidden” governmental humanitarian aid is proof of the fact that individuals
who are not formal social equals can accumulate debt, in this case, a debt of loyalty. That is, the
PRI government, in clientelistic fashion, demanded political loyalty from those who accepted its
“gifts.”
A debt is an incomplete exchange. In exchange modalities, reciprocity is implicit but
unstated, and it includes prestation, as well as buying and selling. Debts only exist within
exchange networks, not with pure gifts. Graeber, importantly, argues that credit was the earliest
form of money—and that money is “an accounting tool” for estimating debt. This version of
events contradicts the field of economics, which, after Adam Smith, characteristically places
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money first. Graeber observes that the dualism between states and markets is incorrect: each is
co-dependent on the other (2014a, 71). However, I argue that the existence of a gift economy
consisting of governmental humanitarian aid (with its unstated reciprocity demanding loyalty)
between impecunious IDPs and an all-powerful Mexican state suggests that debts can exist
between actors who are not formal social equals, challenging Graeber’s axiomatic point on debt.
This point has been uncritically accepted. For instance, Frederick Klaits (2017, 11) states
that “less often mentioned is the fact that progressive political agendas are likewise premised on
modalities of exchange among formal equals insofar as they advance claims that gifts must be
recompensed in commensurate fashion” (emphasis added). Bill Maurer (2013), likewise
uncritically passes over the issue of social equals, or equivalence, as solely creating debt in his
sober review of Graeber’s “Wunderkammer,” or “wonder cabinet,” chock full of ethnographic
cases of debt relationships. He summarizes Graeber’s modality of exchange as follows:
‘Exchange is all about equivalence’ (103). The equivalence of people and the equivalence
of words, deeds—potentially anything. Both commercial exchange and Mauss’s gift
exchange fit under this modality. And from this equivalence derives debt. Equivalence
implies that there is always a way to make up for a good, a deed, a word dealt out to you:
you can always pay it back, somehow, by finding something equal to it. During the time
the debt goes unpaid, hierarchy rules (121). Unpayable debts are unbearable precisely for
this reason: they place us in a state of suspended animation in a relation of hierarchy
which we cannot escape unless and until we repay” (Maurer 2013, 85).
While this is largely correct, “the equivalence of people” is faulty. Debt can, and clearly does,
exist between hierarchies of individuals and institutions, and between vastly unequal categories
of nations, as Graeber himself notes. The fact that Graeber begins Debt: The First 5,000 Years
with a long preamble about an activist lawyer with no knowledge of the IMF and its unequal
loans to the developing world, and the novel idea that debt does not need to be repaid speaks
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explicitly to this inequality among creditor and debtor, and here, among creditor and debtor
nations—debtors can be states, businesses or individuals. “Third World debtor nations are almost
exclusively countries that have at one time been attacked and conquered by European
countries—often the very countries to whom they now owe money” (2014a, 5), Graeber tells us.
It is the people—the populace—who have to pay back these loans via the stranglehold of fiscal
austerity measures. Taking Haiti as an example, he observes that:
Haiti was a nation founded by former plantation slaves who had the temerity not only to
rise up in rebellion, amidst grand declarations of universal rights and freedoms, but to
defeat Napoleon’s armies sent to return them to bondage. France immediately insisted
that the new republic owed it 150 million francs in damages for the expropriated
plantations, as well as the expenses of outfitting the failed military expeditions, and all
other nations, including the United States, agreed to impose an embargo on the country
until it was paid. The sum was intentionally impossible (equivalent to about 18 billion
dollars), and the resultant embargo ensured that the name ‘Haiti’ has been a synonym for
debt, poverty, and human misery ever since (2014a, 6).

In the ancient world, “all revolutionary movements had a single program: ‘Cancel the
debts and redistribute the land,’” Graeber (2014a, 8) reports; this is not dissimilar to the Zapatista
uprising which proclaimed “tierra y libertad” (“land and freedom”) after Emiliano Zapata, from
whom the EZLN takes its name—and autonomy from Mexican law, as well as the demands in
the First Declaration of the Selva Lacandona, for “housing, food, health, education, work,
independence, democracy, justice and peace” (January 1, 1994). Such programs were an attempt
to suppress conflicts over “interest payments, debt peonage, amnesty, repossession, restitution,
the sequestering of sheep, the seizing of vineyards, and the selling of debtors’ children into
slavery” (2014a, 8). In the past, it was, in short, an attempt to equalize the vastly unequal. Yet,
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this was a short term solution and the cycle would begin anew with each new despot, making this
injunction impossible to maintain for very long.
Not just exchange, but also gift giving entails an equivalent status, according to Graeber;
that is, gifts are given between equals (Graeber 2014a, 120), a point I likewise contest.
“Regálame,” “give me (a gift),” the IDP population at INI would ask in 1997-99, virtually every
time I came to camp.69 Although I never felt that I possessed power over the group of IDPs, I had
more power than they did—thus, we were not on an equivalent footing, and it could have been
construed as a hierarchical relationship: I had social capital. In particular, I could marshal the
help of other foreign nationals in San Cristóbal who had more resources than I did to help the
IDPs out. A gift of money, enough corn flour for 110 persons (costing $300 pesos, provided by
Dana Woods, an American national, on several occasions), beans, or an occasional chicken (or in
one case, a tin roof for a shared outdoor kitchen costing $500 pesos and paid for by Maria
Landolt, a Swiss national) would help this impoverished population to survive with dignity. The
symbolic value of the gift was in keeping with their needs, which were overwhelming. In
monetary terms, small gifts of cash, corn flour (for making tortillas with—something that María,
a mother of nine, taught me in turn how to do, although my early attempts were full of holes),
bags of beans or cookies had limited value. The IDPs were much more likely to express gratitude
in return for these small gifts from individuals, rather than aid agencies, which were mistrusted—
and criticized. Where the children were concerned, I was told to only buy enough candy or
cookies to feed all of the children, and not individuals. The collective was the important unit.
Perhaps the most important gifts that I brought the IDP population were photographs of the
people themselves. On the afternoon that I brought them to camp, just about everyone became
69

By bringing occasional small gifts and playing with the children every day, I ensured that I was completely
accepted at camp.
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very excited over the photos. In them, the women and some of the men are laughing and children
are playing. Some people had never been photographed before. Others had never been
photographed except for formal portraits. I didn’t realize how valuable a gift the photographs
were until the moment that one of the girls excitedly ripped the envelopes from my hand and a
group of teenagers ran around distributing them. There was an abundance of smiles on that day,
lifting my heart—all the gratitude I needed.
In return for my many small gifts, the IDPs taught me things: how to make tortillas, how
to make a fire, how to make pozol (although they didn’t have lime), how to catch a chicken; they
gave me the best coffee I have ever had once I was living at Acteal with those who returned
there. They gave me a bowl of chicken soup, bought with donated shoes and sandals, and they let
me record their stories, which they told me “were all the same.” Thus, like Didier Fassin (2012,
81), they gave me the “gift” of themselves—of “fragments of their life”—in a variety of ways. I
interviewed them. I went to school with their children, both at the INI camp and at Acteal. I
accompanied them on health visits to the Clínica de Campo and at the INI camp, I played with
their children daily, both at the INI camp and at Acteal, I gave them unwanted advice on hygiene
as a member of the CCESC team, I lived with them at Acteal. And now I have reproduced their
stories here, ensuring that their histories of violence live on. I intend to share the results with the
INI population of IDPs in an effort to “give back.” Yet, ultimately, it is a debt I can hardly repay,
once again refuting Graeber.

Moral Grounds for Economic Relations
Graeber (2014a, 90) cites the need to create new theory apart from the logic of the
marketplace. He sketches three modalities: communism, exchange and hierarchy. These are
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likewise moral grounds for economic relations. “Communism,” according to Graeber (2014a, 94102) develops from the general idea of “from each according to their abilities, to each according
to their needs;” such “baseline communism” existed in the distant past and common ownership
of collective resources may one day return (in opposition to actually existing communism, which
Graeber, an anarchist, would brush aside, arguing that “since the days of the French Revolution,
it has inspired millions, but… has also done enormous damage to humanity” (2014a, 95). Yet,
Graeber goes so far as to state that communism is “the foundation of all human sociability”
(2014a, 96) and the “different sorts of ‘commons’ the collective administration of common
resources” (2014a, 100).
Graeber tells us that the modality of exchange comes next, that can be thought of as
equivalence, often with an element of competition, as in a gift exchange (2014a, 103)—a point I
take issue with. Like Mauss, Graeber cites examples from the potlatch, from North American
and African hunting and gathering societies, and the ancient Celts, among a multitude of other
cases. Unlike communism, which can be thought of as eternal, exchange relationships can be
ended at any time by either party (2014a, 103). Hierarchy follows; according to Graeber, it is the
polar opposite of reciprocity. A precedent is established when one gives gifts to kings or to
superiors. This forms the basis for tribute that then becomes customary (2014a, 110). But there
are elements of other modalities in each of these. Hierarchy, thus, has elements of communism;
for example, patronage, and communism can slip into inequality (Graeber 2014b, 74-5). Yet,
Graeber points out that “communism does not slip inevitably into hierarchy—the Inuit have
managed to fend it off for thousands of years. But one must always guard against it” (2014b, 75).
Tellingly, Graeber ignores class relations, the relationship between wage labor and capital,
Marxian modes of production and commodity exchange at the center of Marx’s analysis of
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capitalism. It is a large omission. Money represents exchange value and it, rather than an
equivalence of persons, is what allows a wage laborer to sell his labor power to a capitalist in the
absence of any other commodity for sale—for the wage laborer who has nothing to sell but his
labor power. Money, thus, facilitates commodity exchange between both different classes and
the same class of persons.
Graeber, for his part, comments that the market is a mathematical model and human
behavior—“economic or otherwise” is not expected to conform to mathematical formulas
(Graeber 2014a, 115). He asserts that the idea of reciprocity allows us to idealize society,
although real people often behave in unpredictable ways (2014a, 115).
Mauss’s idea of “total prestation” is important here. The part stands for every aspect of
the society it is part of, thus, the gift is “economic, political, kinship-oriented, legal,
mythological, religious, magical, practical, personal and social” (anthrobase.com). “The very
complexity in gifts,” Graeber tells us—“which so often form the nexus where different moral
orders intersect, shade into one another, and shift back and forth—has allowed them to become
such an endlessly rich subject for philosophical reflection; yet to insist on treating gifts as a
unitary category has stood in the way of understanding what these moral principles actually are”
(2014b, 76). By this, David Graeber means moral grounds for economic relations—“three
different moral logics lying behind phenomena that we class together as ‘the gift’” (2014b, 67),
that is, baseline communism, exchange and hierarchy as people live these modalities, exchanging
with one another, and exchanging all sorts of gifts, from Mauss’s heroic gift, common in
“aristocratic” societies such as the Kwakiutl and the ancient Celts, where elites engaged in oneupmanship, to common folk exchanging gifts and going about the business of everyday life
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(2014b, 67). Graeber owes an important debt to Mauss, yet just begins to give recognition where
recognition is due.

Alienability vs. Inalienability of Gifts
The idea of a gift economy originated with Bronislaw Malinowski’s fieldwork in the
Trobriand Island because of the centrality of the Kula Ring exchange network to the islanders.
Ornate armshells moved south in the ring, while shell bead necklaces moved north. Although not
all villages participated in the Kula (meaning “to go”), those that did saw their men traveling
over long and dangerous distances over rough waters in specially designed, shell-studded canoes
to deliver the gifts. The recipient would keep the gift in trust for a period of time, often a year,
during which time he received renown, recounting how he received the article and from whom
and how he would make a return gift in due time to another of his trading partners. Although the
promise of a return gift was expected, there was no guarantee that a return gift would be
forthcoming. These feats formed the basis of daily conversation and gossip as men discussed
both commoners’ and chiefs’ participation in the Kula (Malinowski 1920, 100). According to
Malinowski, possession of the gift is temporary and the receiver must make a return gift at some
future juncture or else he will never receive another gift. The Kula never stops, and it links island
villages from distant points on the Kula Ring as men participate over the course of their lifetimes
(Malinowski 1922). The gifts were alienable, as the giver gave up rights to them, prompting
Malinowski to take on Mauss and the spirit of the gift. Annette Weiner revisited Malinowski’s
fieldsite in the 1970s in order to study Trobriand women’s exchanges. Weiner found that women
exchanged women’s wealth—banana leaf bundles and grass skirts, much as the men had
exchanged armshells and shell necklaces, and that these exchanges were as complex and
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variegated as the men’s networks, likewise spanning time and distance. Because they were
oriented towards exchange rather than production, and value rather than reknown—and because
of the idea of reflexivity (Malinowski was male), Malinowski had overlooked the female trading
networks which were economically central to the women’s lives (Weiner 1976). Perhaps as
significantly, Weiner revived Malinowski’s intellectual debate with Marcel Mauss; to Weiner,
the exchange objects were inalienable, retaining some part of the giver in the exchange, that of
“keeping while giving” (Weiner 1992).
On the other hand, David Cheal (1988, 2016) argues that in capitalist societies, gifts are
alienable, separated from the giver once and for all upon receipt “and their alienability is a
precondition for their being gifts rather than loans or shared possessions” (Cheal 2016, 10)70—or
governmental humanitarian aid. Mauss’s fetishism of the gift holds exclusively for non-market
societies. As Osteen (2002, 245) makes clear, for Marx, commodity fetishism obscures the
relationship between the capitalist and worker—“in the absence of a capitalist economy
producing surplus value, true Marxian commodity fetishism cannot exist”—while laying bare the
desire for a commodified object created by perception and advertisements. As Liep (1990, 165)
shows us, Marx and Mauss were both occupied with the idea of peoples’ alienation from the
products of their labor. However, Marx emphasized commodity exchange in modern, capitalist
society, while Mauss focused on gift exchange in ‘primitive’ societies and indigenous belief
systems. Jean Baudrillard (1993) showed how capitalism is a binary system with exchange value
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Cheal (2016, 11) cites Goody’s (1983) research which demonstrated that legal ownership of land in
medieval Europe was alienated from corporate kinship groups, giving rise to a gift economy in which property and
land could now be donated to the Church and was increasingly done so, allowing the Roman Catholic Church to
amass enormous wealth. The ejido system in rural Mexico is community-owned land, rather than Church-owned,
but with the elimination of Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution, that land began to take on an exchange value in
monetary terms. That is, the government opened the way for the ejidos to be bought and sold on the market—rather
than inherited, leading to further impoverishment of an already desperately poor indigenous population.
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and reciprocation (ending the relationship), while Mauss (1990) showed us a tripartite system of
giving and receiving, with a counter-gift sometime in the future (maintaining the relationship). In
non-market societies, according to Mauss, the previous owner of the gift leaves his or her “spirit”
or personhood, prestige, history and kinship relationship on the object that is passed on to a new
owner (Osteen 2002, 245).
As Yunxiang Yan (2012, 278-9) tells us:
The reciprocal obligation in gift exchange, the spirit of the gift, the opposition between
gifts and commodities and the relationship between the person and things are four themes
in Mauss’s work and they continue to be of central interest to contemporary
anthropologists. In fact, it is not an exaggeration to say that economic anthropology itself,
as a distinct subfield, has emerged from a long series of debates regarding the nature of
the gift in various societies (Yan 2012, 278-9).

We see echoes of the Northwest Coast potlatch examined by Mauss (1990) in Chiapas,
where there are non-market elements in traditionalist Catholic communities such as those in
Chenalhó, the township from which my interlocutors originated, particularly the cargo system by
which a married couple takes on the cargo, or duty to throw a feast for the town’s patron saint for
which they save up for a period of years and spend in one or two days on food and pox (corn
liquor). Interestingly, Sociedad Civil Las Abejas continues this tradition in modified, communal,
form.71

Social Reproduction and Gifts
David Cheal (2016, 12) argues that the defining feature of gifts is that they are redundant
transactions and it is this feature which separates them from other economic systems. By this,
71

The difference being the elimination of the use of alcohol, which Las Abejas forbids, in keeping with the EZLN.
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Cheal means that gifts are “gratuitous favors,” or as Arlie Hochschild put it, redundant in a
normative sense, or “transactions which fall outside the range of legitimate expectations,”
(causing the exclamation “you shouldn’t have!”) and which grant no advantage to their recipients
or no net benefit to them. Gift giving takes place in a moral economy within close kinship
networks in which social ties are institutionalized (Cheal 2016, 14-15). The role of gift giving in
social reproduction, the replication of human families, and thus, society, has been neglected.
Cheal treats this important facet of society in The Gift Economy (Cheal 2016, 87-105). Besides
“the physical reproduction of persons in the production of new members” (birth), and “the
psychological (i.e., affective-cognitive) development of personal relationships,” the third type of
social reproduction takes place in the community. It “includes the collective production of actors
as members of particular social categories or statuses, and responsibilities within the social
division of labor” (Cheal 2016, 89-90). The production of “adult men and women” is prominent
among this labor division, which is often most visible in the rites of passage surrounding
marriage (Cheal 2016, 90). At INI and at Acteal, the provisioning of “acceptable,” nongovernmental humanitarian aid—and the FONAES (government) doll project—allowed social
reproduction to continue in the physical, affective-cognitive, psychological and community
sense.
Gifts which were acceptable or unacceptable in the physical, affective-cognitive,
psychological and community sense were based on social reproduction needs at the INI camp.
The atole-making project was a failure for cultural reasons, and because the women couldn’t get
along to cooperate on the project, but it was also unacceptable in the affective-cognitive,
psychological and community senses, although it provided assistance with social reproduction
needs. The humanitarian aid shipments from the Mexican Red Cross and later from the ICRC

114

were tolerated but never really “accepted” in the physical sense, although the IDPs were forced
to accept them for lack of other alternatives—that is, a starving family might take aid because it
is a “physical” decision. Top-down public health infrastructures threatened the IDPs’ fragile
autonomy, but they were coerced into accepting it. The CONAFE school was, after nearly a year,
accepted, as it met community needs for education. The loan from FONAES was accepted, after
some coercion on the part of the NGOs, but the women were excited about the project from its
inception. Yet the NGOs approached the men first, thus burying the women’s reaction under
layers of resistance from the men. Thus, political decisions became “community” decisions, even
if the entire group of IDPs were not in complete agreement about their outcomes. As with the
decision whether or not to accept the government aid of COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa
Gamboa in January of 1999, political decisions were sometimes made on the personal and
familial level as the IDPs proved themselves to be social agents with “a feel for the game”
(Bourdieu 2005) in accepting political patronage.
Children, although losing weight, were surviving in the camps, and teens were marrying
and babies being born. During the first year of my fieldwork, six babies were born to the group
of 110 IDPs at INI, one of whom was Gerardo’s, the new responsable, or community leader. The
first time I visited Gerardo’s home72—apart from the rest of the IDPs in a freestanding
building.—I was amazed to see that Gerardo and his family owned a television set. In conducting
my ethnography (excepting interviews), I most often let my research participants tell me what
they thought was important rather than asking questions, unless it was critical information, so I
decided not to ask how he had obtained it. It was unlikely that it could have come from their
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Gerardo was in an expansive mood that day and even joked with me that his wife had a tipped uterus, and so,
when they had relations, it was always to the left. Everyone laughed. I was surprised by this level of intimacy from
my interlocutors, but it meant that I was completely accepted at camp. This was the moment that I made that
realization, in May of 1998.
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home community of Canolal, and was more likely that he had bought it in one of the stores
offering credit near the San Cristóbal market, which bordered the INI camp. Since Gerardo was
one of the first to ask for gifts from all comers, it is possible that he had received enough money
for a down payment from a willing donor. Perhaps the tv had even been a gift. Although I was
curious, I would never find out the mystery of the consumer item which was such an incredible
luxury that it had to be hidden inside a “private” house—although the children occasionally came
in to watch it, in a cooperative or sharing mechanism.
Much in this vein, the now-classic (1975) work by Carol Stack demonstrated that sharing
or exchange networks existed among poor black families in a Midwestern city in what amounted
to a gift economy. If one person or family had a given resource, it was shared among all the
members of the social network. This cooperation or sharing was a survival strategy, and mutual
aid could be counted on by all members of the kin network. In this way, if one person received
large sums of cash or other non-monetary resource, it would be apportioned to each member of
the social network, or the person could temporarily withdraw from the kin network but reenter it
by giving gifts or exchanging services at any point. Stack cites the example of two sisters who
come into a small inheritance. One hoards the money and withdraws from the kin network, but
she experiences social sanctions, and her marriage breaks up. The other shares according to
social network expectations, but is left with nothing but a coat and a pair of shoes in a short
period of time. The first sister re-enters the network by giving gifts to everyone. Stack drew on
Elizabeth Bott’s (1957) social network analysis when conducting her research and demonstrated
the affective ties among affines. Gifts of food, childcare, money or rides, among other services
and commodities, moved along the network of related families and cemented personal ties.
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Gifts of humanitarian aid, health care provisioning and public health, atole-making
ingredients and supplies, schooling, a loan from a government source, and government aid all
contributed to shoring up social reproduction at the INI camp during 1998 and 1999. And social
reproduction was something that was not a given as the health of both children and adults was
fragile, illnesess were common, weight loss was endemic, and parasites rampant. There was a
risk of cholera. Public health was a concern, but it threatened the IDPs’ tenuous autonomy.
Schooling lasted for a mere two months at camp—and it meant accepting a state-run school,
counter to the neo-Zapatista and CCRI-CG rule on rejecting government aid. Social reproduction
itself, thus, was a gift that was fundamentally necessitated at the INI camp, and it was one that
was accepted by the majority in the face of dire need.

Emotions and Gift Exchange
Many gifts are exchanged as part of a “culture of love” in Western, industrialized society
(Cheal 2016, 61-86); these include gifts for Mother’s Day, birthdays, Christmas, weddings,
bridal showers and engagements, all of which bolster otherwise fragile family ties. Cheal tells us
that these traditions are invented (Cheal 2016, 79). Yan (2012, 288) notes that the EuroAmerican idealized pure gift may overstress emotionality and obscure the fact that gift-giving in
Western society is bound by the same kinds of rules and obligations documented for nonWestern societies.
As Carrier (1992, 204) put it, a “straightforward reading” of Mauss’s The Gift leads many
anthropologists to the orientalisation of the ”alien other,” and the occidentalisation of the modern
West. Accordingly, “the model that had focused on difference between us and them, ignoring
similarity, became a definition that denied or elided similarity” (Carrier 1992, 204), a point that
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Keith Hart also makes. This affective, emotional aspect of gift exchanges among ordinary people
has been largely unnoticed in the classic literature on non-Western societies (Yan 2012). Weiner
(1992) deviates most strongly from the rational choice model of gift exchange and most
thoroughly explores the spirit of the gift. Still, we have scant evidence for sentiment among
Melanesian and Polynesian exchange networks, although its existence is logical as emotion is
what separates gift giving from commodity exchange (Yan 2012, 288-9). At INI, there was anger
in the face of the gift—the aid given was never enough, never fed all the IDPs sufficiently, and
there were no vegetables in the aid shipments, causing discontent. Emotions ran high when the
subject of aid came up. Likewise, there was frustration among the NGOs who represented the
donors, as evidenced at a meeting held in July 1998 to spur the camp members to try to achieve
unity in the face of the camp’s disabling disunity, with differing political affiliations and
religions and community origins among the disparate group of IDPs preventing their securing
adequate humanitarian aid. The meeting profiled in Chapter Six raised tense reactions among the
NGO community, as well, as they asked, “what are we going to do?” “how are we going to get a
little borrowed land to work?” and “it is a crisis.” And, tensions were high in Mexico City among
PRI dinosaurs’ wives, who were patrons of the Mexican Red Cross in 1998, as they withdrew
their support in anger over the agency’s support for the victims of the Acteal massacre and the
20,000 IDPs in the highlands. Neo-Zapatistas were not a popular cause among this elite class. At
Acteal, it was a different story. The “martyrs” of Acteal express emotion in the context of the
Acteal massacre, and this was a defining factor in drawing a greater amount of humanitarian aid
to the region after 1997 than even the EZLN had procured—and far more than at INI. A brick
mausoleum for the victims was built with humanitarian aid largely from the Christian
Peacemaker Teams, CARITAS and other religious charities in response to the atrocity of Acteal.
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Eventually, a new, outdoor church would be built, as well, and barrack-style housing was built of
wood with tin roofs to house the many visitors who came to Acteal. All of this was based on the
outpouring of emotion because of the 45 who died at Acteal, mostly women and children.
Emotion inspired an influx of humanitarian aid from Canada, the EU and the United States in
December 1997 and well beyond. The aid giving cycle continued for years after the massacre,
and the Mesa Directiva, the Table of Directors at Acteal, maintains an active website
(https://acteal.blogspot.com/) through which it communicates directly to the outside world. Most
of its communications concern injustices and violations of human rights against original peoples,
both members of Las Abejas, and other groups, and transgressions against these rights. From
time to time, the Mesa announces humanitarian aid and new projects undertaken in the
community. The posts are always emotional in nature, and, as a gift to civil society, among
whom are donors, Las Abejas invites the public to Acteal on the 22nd of each month to celebrate
mass for the victims of the Acteal massacre. An especially sumptuous mass presided over by the
bishop is held on December 22nd of each year, and there is housing and free food from the
community kitchen for those who wish to stay at Acteal. This is the community’s counter-gift to
civil society, which has been very generous to the inhabitants of the Acteal IDP camp. As Lutz
and White (1986, 409) put it, “the ability to feel defines the human and creates the
meaningfulness in individual and social life.” At Acteal, and to an extent at INI, this was as true
of victims of the massacre and their families as it was of humanitarian aid donors who supported
both the social life and social reproduction of the camps through the outpouring of emotion that
was so heartfelt in 1997.
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Humanitarian Aid and the Gift
Humanitarian aid and the gift is a relatively new field. In 2006, Adloff and Mau would
write that:
sociologists have overlooked or paid little heed to forms of social interaction that can be
localized either on the side of self-interest or on that of morality. In our view, it is the
logic of the gift … that accompanies and structures all forms of interaction, from the
social micro- to the macrolevel (2006, 95).

Kowalski (2011, 190) discusses the gift with relevance to humanitarian and development
assistance, affirming that “despite the basis of the whole enterprise being founded upon giving,
concepts springing from Mauss’ The Gift have not been used in any systematic way to explore
and enhance our understanding of development assistance. It is time to address this omission.” In
the years since, this has become a growing field. A market approach to exchange is found in the
western cultural agenda underpinning international development assistance and humanitarian
assistance “that places great store on the formalization of the exchange, on the importance of
delivering value to the donor, and on the short term nature of the commitment. As such it cannot
foster those positive attributes of The Gift; in particular the trust, the spontaneity and the
mutuality that focuses upon the nature and characteristics of the other party in the exchange”
(Kowalski 2011, 196). The paradox of the gift is that one gives with no expectation of a return,
but in exchange systems, a counter-gift is reciprocated or else the gift cycle ends (Mauss 1990).
The same is true when applied to development and humanitarian aid.
Korf et al. (2010, S61) contend that the Maussian altruistic gift suggested by
humanitarian discourses—which appeared in Sri Lanka in 2005 the form of post-tsunami aid—
inevitably comes into conflict with “divergent discourses, practices, and expectations associated
with ‘gift’ when it enters a local domain”. Aid then “becomes a culturally charged, political
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commodity. In other words, post-tsunami gifts—seemingly altruistic acts of generosity—became
entangled in the economy of charity and reciprocal obligations in the political economy of aid”
(Bastian, 2005; Korf, 2007). Or, as Stirrat and Henkel (1997, 74) put it in reference to charity in
development aid more generally, “[w]hat starts off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world
(gifts versus markets) ends up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the end, the
currency of systems of patronage.’” In Sri Lanka,
the inflow of foreign money and agencies changed dynamics and incentives in the gift
economy and replaced practices and discourses of pure kindness and local solidarity. The
gift became competitive in the evolving aid market. This commodification of the gift also
saw the entrance of new kinds of brokers: consultants, foreign volunteers, and project
managers with their own rationales and procedures that were largely shaped by actors
from outside of Sri Lanka—private donors in the North expected to be shown the effect
of their gift. When the housing relocation programmes started, the foreign gift was
appropriated as a patronage resource within Muslim politics (Korf et al. 2010, S66).

At the INI camp, a patronage system was set up with governmental humanitarian aid and was, as
I argue, likewise part of a gift economy, as the aid required political loyalty. As Gergen and
Gergen (1974, 125) have observed, and as happened at the INI camp in 1999, “aid may also be
used to secure more immediate ends, such as favorable economic concessions, political
influence, protection of business investments, and military bases.” And “donor states have long
been aware that technical assistance can be employed as an instrument of statecraft, and that
political outcomes can be secured with what are ostensibly economic gifts” (Gergen and Gergen
1971, 87).
Mauss rightly separated the roles of giver, recipient, and reciprocator for, as Carr,
McAuliffe and MacLachlan (1998. 189) put it: “How does it feel to be an aid ‘recipient’?”
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Emerson (1983, 536) asserted that: “It is not the office of a man to receive gifts… We wish to be
sustained. We do not quite forgive a giver” cited in Kowalski (2011, 194). This echoes Douglas’s
point made earlier, that “charity wounds.” No one quite likes to be on the receiving end of
charity, and giving aid feels better than receiving aid. Korf et al. (2010, S60) report that many
victims of the tsunami in Sri Lanka in 2005 were unhappy with the “process and outcomes of
aid” while others felt “humiliated” and “reduced to being passive ‘victims.’” This outcome
collides with the dominant humanitarian imperative (Korf et al. 2010). And this was true at the
INI camp, as the IDPs looked their “gift horse in the mouth” every two weeks, when their
meager rations were brought to camp. Then there is the additional thorny problem of “the
Samaritan’s dilemma”: aid creates dependency (Buchanan 1977). This was broken at INI with
the doll project, which was a loan rather than aid, and with the return to Acteal, where there were
coffee and craft cooperatives that the IDPs could join, thus breaking the cycle of aid dependency.
As Stirrat and Henkel noted: “the transfer of the gift from a Northern to a Southern NGO
does not exemplify disinterest but is marked by calculation, negotiation, and, at times, suspicion”
(1997, 75-76) and “it is clear that the development gift is no longer a free gift but the object of
calculated systems of exchange and negotiation” (1997, 77), once again blurring the distinction
between alms and the market.
Mauss showed us that gift giving is a tactic related to alliances, identities and honor
among agents for cultivating power relations (da Silva 2008, 242). As Bourdieu put it: “The
exchange of honor, like every exchange (of gifts, words, etc.) is defined as such ... that is, as
implying the possibility of a continuation, a reply, a riposte, a return gift, inasmuch as it contains
recognition of the partner to whom, in the particular case, it accords equality in honor” (1992,
100 quoted in Kowalski 2011, 191).
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Yet, honor does not preclude debt between trading partners. To take the example of East
Timor (and, indeed, any country which is largely dependent upon AID), this new nation “is
obliged to receive and to take upon itself the weight of a certain debt, even though [as a “free
gift”] this aid is offered with supposedly no strings attached. We are not speaking here of a
monetary debt, but of a moral one” that positions the new Timorese state, in a manner of
speaking, as “subservient to foreign interests. This is what gives the so called ‘logic of the gift’
its heuristic power. The often chaotic overlapping of humanitarian and development aid projects
which exists in East Timor and in other parts of the world is an indicator of the force that the
obligation to give that often imposes itself on the rational management of AID” (da Silva 2008,
243).
In a case of foreign interests competing for aid giving—and the competition went into the
hundreds of millions of dollars for many wealthy nations, Korf et al. (2010) trace the gifts of aid
in post-tsunami Sri Lanka down through the “intimate entanglement of various forms of gift in
co-evolving, yet often contradictory, gift rationales” and, in the process, write an ethnography of
aid (2010, S61). The authors argue that gifts are not just material transfers of ‘aid’, but also
“embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political affiliations.” The tsunami gift
“reinforced and reconfigured exchange relationships among different patrons and clients in Sri
Lankan communities, perpetuating the political economy that has continued to drive social
conflict and discontent in the post-independence years” (Korf et al. 2010, S61). Korf et al.’s
material, however, also locates numerous patronage relationships “beyond the realm of politics,”
in an interesting twist to the gift story (2010, S61). It is one that has resonance with the story of
IDP behavior at the INI camp when presented with the tantalizing offer of government aid from
PRIista agent and political broker Emilio Rabasa Gamboa in January 1999.
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Thus, humanitarian aid is ostensibly a free gift, yet there may be strings attached, and it
may be attached to market mechanisms and to the political economy of a region, such as in Sri
Lanka. The gift may even transcend politics, and the gift regime may be identity, honor or
alliance based, as both Mauss (1990) and Bourdieu (1992, 100) show. Mauss (1990) has had a
lasting influence on the social sciences, and The Gift is broadly and closely applicable to
humanitarian and development aid, as well, as Kowalski (2011) and others aver. The gift model
is a perfect corollary to a field that is, first and foremost, based on giving.

“The Gift of Empire”
One gift-related case that might be useful in thinking through humanitarian aid and gifts
in Chiapas is the formerly colonized peoples of the Caucasus who “spurned” the “givers” of “the
gift of empire” (Grant, 2009). Drawing on Russian captivity narratives in the nineteenth-century
Caucasus as a basis to tell a tale of gift and sacrifice, Grant “think[s] of the gift—in the Russian
case—as being found both in the perceived act of giving in real-life instances of military
investment in the southerly Caucasus landholdings of the empire and discursively in the tellings
and retellings of how ‘our boy Ivan’ [Ivan Susanin, a national hero and a symbol of Russian
peasants’ dedication to the tsar] got captured when all Russia was trying to do was good” (2009,
xv-xvi). This highlights the need to understand who is colonizer and colonized, as reflected in
differing conceptions of “the gift.”
In Chiapas, that “gift” was ultimately rejected, coming as it was from the enemy. And the
idea of “the gift of empire” being refused by the colonized holds in the Chiapas case, as well.
The Chiapas rebellion speaks loudly to a rejection of the Mexican state, as does the instauration
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of Zapatista—and Las Abejas’—autonomy. Ultimately, “the gift of empire” is an unwanted
“gift” that one tries to return to the giver.

The Gift Applied: Food or Money
In a point directly relevant to humanitarian aid, as received by the IDPs at INI at Acteal,
James Ferguson (2010) argued that food aid in refugee and IDP camps would be better replaced
with monetary aid, especially in the case of famine. Amartya Sen (1983) first argued that with
the provision of food aid, local producers’ prices are depressed and the distribution system
damaged so that the “temporary” crisis becomes permanent. Sen’s followers then argued for
direct cash payments to people at risk for hunger. “People with money in their pockets, Sen
points out, generally do not starve,” Ferguson (2015, 131) relates; in addition to food, money can
be used for seed crops and livestock, boosting purchasing power (Sen 1983; Drèze and Sen
1991). Recipients can decide for themselves what their most urgent needs are. The provision of
cash can work with markets rather than against them to let recipients find relief (Ferguson 2015,
131). I argue that many people left the Las Abejas and EZLN social movements in favor of
monetary aid and cash transfers from the PRI—technically midway between gift and commodity
exchange—but perceived by both the indigent IDPs and the PRI as a gift with implicit
reciprocity. Because it required their loyalty, it was part of a gift economy. The IDPs who
accepted this aid knew that they would have to leave Las Abejas because of it.
Yet, my research participants’ actions are direct proof of the accuracy of this argument
about monetary aid, showing that it is a tactic that works. People prefer money over food aid, as
nearly half of my research participants did in 1999. After Amartya Sen (1983) and James
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Ferguson (2010), I suggest that monetary aid would better serve displaced and refugee
populations than would food aid, which is often contested, as I show in this study.

Conclusion
In Chiapas, NGO and INGO humanitarian aid was a “free gift” and governmental aid was
part of a gift economy, requiring a debt of loyalty. Thus, both have strings attached, and I show
in this study that both were contested in various ways by impoverished IDPs. Charity (or
“assistentialism”) is a gift that no one, least of all recipients, like to receive. I show how this is
the case in this study. And the gift itself is a paradox, one that Jacques Derrida explicates for us:
In Given Time, Jacques Derrida (1992, 24) maintains that Mauss’s Essai sur le don talks
of everything except the gift (cf. Jenkins, 1998, 85, 87)—or the ‘pure’ gift, the gift as an
interruption of ‘economy’. The pure gift denies reciprocity. But then, a pure gift becomes
an impossibility as any act of giving is already entangled in reciprocal relations of
obligations, return, and recognition. The problem with the pure gift, according to Derrida
(1992), is that ‘as soon as a gift is knowingly given as a gift, the subject of generosity is
already anticipating a return, taking credit of some sort’ (Barnett and Land, 2007,
1072)—a pure gift could not be recognized as a gift by another party (and thus, not even
by the receiver). Indeed, Derrida (1992) asserts that there is no such thing as a ‘pure’ gift:
it is not possible to give without immediately entering into a circle of exchange that turns
the gift into a debt to return, an obligation to reciprocate (cited in Korf et al. 2010, S62).
And, thus, I separate the humanitarian “pure gift” of aid from the gift economy of
governmental aid, when the only difference is that patronage accumulates a debt of loyalty and
the “free gift” does not. In fact, the free gift most often creates ungratefulness in recipients, as I
show time and again. In this study the free gift—which was assistentialist—was the most
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contested of all gifts the recipients received at the INI camp. And, as I show throughout this
study, the free gift of humanitarian aid had strings attached—it carried unwanted talks on
hygiene from the teams at CCESC, unwanted NGO meddling in the form of community
meetings, and interference with Las Abejas’ and the EZLN’s project of autonomy on matters of
health as IDPs came under the allopathic health umbrella and mistrust as even the aid itself came
to be suspect, with family heads clustered around the responsable, as he checked off the rations
from the Mexican Red Cross, and later the ICRC, to be given out every two weeks. Yet, if the
gifts of compatriots were questionable, the “gifts of enemies” were to be more equivocal still as
impoverished IDPs succumbed to political and economic forces they believed stronger than the
neo-Zapatista movement. History, however, would prove that the neo-Zapatistas had incredible
resilience and more than a little grit.
By offering a gift of cash to impecunious IDPs in a face to face political encounter in
exchange for their political loyalty and support, the PRI contingent was offering a personal favor
that stood a good chance of being accepted. Those who agreed to take the governmental aid of
COCOPA member and political broker Emilio Rabasa Gamboa on January 28, 1999, following
IDP Sebastián Gómez Pérez’s lead, were placed in Rabasa Gamboa’s—and the PRI’s—debt
through clientelism in this gift economy, although they would receive $43.00 Mexican Pesos
from the government only in 2008, along with problematic cash transfers starting in March,
1999, while resident in San Cristóbal. The cash transfers, especially, were a means of
government control over the indigenous population and were contested. These “gifts” in
Maussian terms fit the obligation to receive: “to refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse
to accept is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality”
(Mauss 1990, 17). In Marxist terms, the government aid and cash transfers were meant to stave
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off unrest. Yet, for these IDPs, it would not do for very long. The IDPs would have to make their
own individual and collective decisions, in a twist to Bourdieu (2005), who opposes the
individual good to the common good—these IDPs were doing both. This included suing former
president Zedillo for crimes against humanity in 2011 as a group and forming a new faction of
Las Abejas in 2012. By accumulating a debt to the PRI of loyalty, those who were not social
equals were disproving Graeber’s (2011) axiomatic point on debt, that debt can be transacted
among persons who are of different social statuses. In retrospect, it is clear that the stage was set
early on for a rebellion against these IDPs’ PRI “patrons” and once and future “enemies.”
Let’s now turn the testimonies of the members of Las Abejas, their stories of persecution,
and trace how they became displaced. The story of Las Abejas represents the quest for dignity
and autonomy, which is central to understanding the Chiapas conflict, a topic central to this
study.
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Chapter Three:
Paramilitarization and Civil War: Becoming IDPs
We are indigenous, we are desplazados (displaced, or IDPs), that is our new identity, some of us
are Zapatistas, some Las Abejas, some not, but we have to learn to live together.
--Gerardo, responsable at the INI camp, March 1998
The Acteal Massacre
At ten thirty on the morning of December 22, 1997, eighty-eight members of a
paramilitary squad opened fire on a group of displaced civilians belonging to the pacifist
organization Sociedad Civil Las Abejas73 as they prayed in a wooden chapel on a hillside in Los
Naranjos, Acteal, in the municipality of Chenalhó, Chiapas, Mexico. The gunfire killed nine men,
15 children, and 21 women, five of whom were pregnant and had their stomachs sliced open and
fetuses ripped out (CDHFBC 1998A).74 Approximately 25 others were wounded. Occurring at a
place of worship, the massacre outraged the world and embarrassed the Mexican government. In a
crude attempt at a cover up, the bodies were removed before officials from the Justice Department
arrived.75 The shots, from high-caliber weapons,76 could be heard in neighboring Polhó, Chimix
and Majomut, all within a kilometer from Acteal.77 The army was stationed a short distance away.
The massacre was an attack on both the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional
(EZLN) and the Catholic diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas; the Sociedad Civil Las Abejas,
an unarmed community of believers, and an ally of the EZLN, fasted and prayed for peace in the
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Civil Society the Bees, whom I call Las Abejas (The Bees).
As they chopped up the fetuses, crying “matar la semilla” or kill the seed of the insurgency.
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The bodies were taken to the state capital, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, in an attempt to cover up the scene of the shooting in
Acteal. They were later returned to Acteal (Nadal 1998, 19).
76
Most carried AK-47s.
77
General Absalon of the seventh military command was stationed near the entrance to Acteal; he denied hearing
anything and did nothing.
74
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chapel where the paramilitary band, Máscara Roja butchered them. Because of the signing of the
San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture between the EZLN and the government in
February 1996, the army was forced into a cease-fire with the EZLN and used paramilitaries to
attack Las Abejas instead. Most observers agree that the massacre was part of a low-intensity war
which has been simmering since 1994. The long ruling political party, PRI (Partido
Revolucionario Institucional), would lose the presidency in the next election while many
discontented people overwhelmingly supported the Zapatistas’ right to self-determination—and
Mexico would be under scrutiny from the United Nations and human rights organizations from
1997 onwards. The U.S. Supreme Court, in 2013, dismissed charges against former President
Zedillo of all damages brought forward in a civil lawsuit by survivors of the massacre, all
members of Las Abejas in 1997.78
The massacre, while brutal and unpredictable, was the outcome of a series of events set
off by the uprising in San Cristóbal de Las Casas on New Year’s Day morning 1994 by the
EZLN. Observers on the ground, especially those in the oppositional civil society, understood that
forces backed by the once-dominant but now politically challenged PRI, were increasingly relying
on violence to resolve longstanding social problems. Conflicts over economic resources, how to
take advantage of them—whether development would be autonomously decided by indigenous
communities or carried out via political brokers and the Mexican state—and the social
development of historically marginalized people in Chiapas pitted families and communities
against each other. Mobilization by the EZLN and communities supporting the Zapatistas and
78

On Friday, September 16, 2011, former President Ernesto Zedillo was sued for crimes against humanity in New
Haven, where he was then a visiting professor at Yale University. The damages sought were greater than US$10
million (Navarro, 2011) yet were dismissed in 2013. Heads of state are granted immunity, according to U.S. law.
Yet, Sociedad Civil Las Abejas maintained that it was not responsible for the lawsuit, and stated that “our demand
does not center on obtaining money, but on the demand for justice and for an end to impunity" (Sociedad Civil Las
Abejas official website https://acteal.blogspot.com/2013/03/ accessed March 3, 2013). In 2017, court documents
were released which showed a Mexican expert witness’s testimony, shedding even more light on the case.
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their political project faced a spectrum of opposition, in its most violent aspect carried out by
paramilitary forces.
The paramilitaries who carried out the massacre were, without exception, young
marginalized79 men, members of the Máscara Roja, or Red Mask organization (Aubry and Inda
1998); other paramilitary groups, such as Desarrollo, Paz y Justicia (“Development, Peace and
Justice”), had terrorized the northern zone since 1995. In fact, just six weeks before Acteal, they
carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Chiapas Bishop Samuel Ruiz García, his
sister, María de la Luz Ruiz García, and Coadjutor (co-curate), Raúl Vera (Muñoz Ramírez 2008,
161). Bishop Ruiz was seen by the PRI government as abetting the neo-Zapatista80 movement and
thus, became a target.
At least 3,500 members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas—nearly its entire membership of
4,000 in 1998—and BAEZLN (support bases, or bases de apoyo de EZLN)81 fled from their
homes and communities during the period from September 1997 to June 1998. The social fabric
of indigenous communities began to unravel as paramilitaries threatened and sometimes killed
indigenous campesinos (peasant farmers), burning houses and stealing land, animals, crops, and
tools—culminating in the massacre at Acteal in December. The waves of displacement in the
highlands took place in November and December of 1997, and again in 1998 and 1999, just as
campesinos were to harvest the main cash crop, coffee (Toledo Tello and Garza Caligaris 2006).
People generally owned small plots of land some distance from their homes; these were taken
over by the approximately 250 members of paramilitary bands in the highlands (Moksnes 2004).
Without revenue, land, or houses, life for the displaced in the rural highlands became untenable.
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Without access to ejido—communal—or private lands.
As opposed to Emiliano Zapata’s Zapatistas. Leyva Solano (2001).
81
The EZLN and BAEZLN together numbered some 300,000 persons in Chiapas in 2000.
80
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During November and December of 1997, fear within Sociedad Civil Las Abejas was
palpable, and mounting by the day. Just days before the Acteal massacre, the Centro de Derechos
Humanos Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas, a Human Rights center, established by bishop Ruiz
Garcia, locally known as “Frayba,” went to the press with warnings that violence would escalate
(CDHFBC 1998).
Between November, 1997, and June, 1998, over 7,000 additional campesinos (beyond the
20,000 already displaced from the early days of 1995 when entire communities fled their homes
due to military and paramilitary actions) fled their lands in the highlands, leaving their homes and
animals to be occupied or destroyed by supporters of the PRI. The fleeing campesinos became
internally displaced persons (IDPs), forced to hide out in the mountains, seek shelter with
relatives in other communities, or flee to IDP camps. The first waves of violence from armed
PRI-supporters hit the northern zone (zona norte) of Chiapas and the rainforest (Selva Lacandona
and Las Cañadas) in 1995 and 1996, but by late 1997 the conflict had moved to Los Altos, the
highlands, the mountainous area ringing San Cristóbal de Las Casas.82 Even after the construction
of the Pan-American Highway in 1950, this area remained isolated, but its relative peace was to
prove little more than a memory. The massacre at Acteal, a displaced persons’ camp at the end of
a remote mountain road to Pantelhó, marked the zenith of displacement and violence.
International news coverage was immediate and condemnation universal. In the wake of the
massacre, the Acteal camp, initially cut off, poorly-served, and inaccessible, received an influx of
aid from national and international donors, or international civil society.

82

San Cristóbal de Las Casas is commonly referred to as San Cristóbal. I will use the terms interchangeably.
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Overview
This chapter discusses the paramilitary threat in the highlands in 1997 and 1998 and its
effects, as well as the military presence and the state of exception that Chiapas lived under
during the height of the conflict. Then I discuss the testimonio of the displaced during the
resultant civil war in the state. The state of exception, with the army in control, meant that the
paramilitary were likewise in power in the countryside, although they were under the thumb of
the army.
National and global crises require responses by sovereign states of martial law, called
states of exception, a modality of power which Eric Wolf (1999, 5) called “structural power.”
Giorgio Agamben (2005) discusses states of exception with the Nazi regime in mind. During
times of crisis, or supposed crisis, sovereign states take on powers that they do not normally have
in peacetime. Didier Fassin (2010) calls the state of exception “humanitarian government” by
which he means the “principle of intervention” which has become a new global norm with
peacekeeping troops and military interventions for humanitarian purposes around the globe on
the increase (Labbé and Daudin 2015, 186; Fassin 2012). Fassin (2012, 151) discusses
Agamben’s thesis that the camp “is the space that opens when the state of exception begins to
become the rule,” an insight that comes from Walter Benjamin shortly before his suicide in 1940
due to his flight from the Nazis in Paris. Craig Calhoun (2010) calls this declaration of
humanitarian emergency “the emergency imaginary,” which may “conceal acts of domination”
over the global poor who are the subjects of the emergency, be they famines or forced
displacement. “…Sovereign power takes the form of a biopolitics that defines and delimits the
right to life and has the power to decide who lives, who dies, and who is reduced to bare
existence” (Beckett 2013, 89). Or, as Fassin (2012, 181-2) adds, the “desire for exception” that
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comes from natural disasters; “the capacity of disasters to mobilize sympathy for the victims has
lost nothing of its power…. In this sense the earthquakes in Turkey and Pakistan, Hurricanes
Mitch and Katrina, the eruption of the Nevado de Ruiz volcano in Colombia and the floods in
Bangladesh form part of our everyday affective landscape, with the pathos of its terrible
disasters, and presuppose unconditional emphatic engagement, even if it is at a distance in the
form of a check sent to a humanitarian organization.”
In Venezuela in December 1999, the minister of the interior signed a declaration of
emergency after almost five hundred inches of rainfall fell in the coastal region of the country on
the day that President Hugo Chávez called for a national referendum on the constitution. In a
state of exception gone terribly wrong, during this emergency, the army and the police shot
looters—and looted themselves in a sort of “war booty.” It was a delicate moment in Venezuelan
history, with Chávez himself coming down on the side of the rule of law. In the end, the press
reported on both the depredations of the security forces and the solidarity that prevailed
throughout the disaster. Alfredo Infante, a Jesuit priest and member of the refugee assistance
team of his congregation stated that “What great deeds are we able to accomplish when we work
hand in hand with those who are in need!” Fassin comments that “the exception was necessary,
and the crimes merely an exception within the exception” (Fassin 2012, 195-8). In the social
sciences today, we can paradoxically speak of “an alleged normalization of the state of exception
and the generalization of the discourse on exception” (Fassin 2012, 185). One is always
accompanied by the other. Fassin asks, “to what observable realities does the state of emergency
correspond today? How can we grasp the issue of sovereignty in the full complexity of its
meanings and its consequences?” (2012, 185). In the United States, post 9/11, the state of
exception has become the rule, although Fassin notes that the contemporary state of exception
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has become “modulated, and therefore euphemized” as it challenges individual liberties (2012,
186).
In Mexico, after the Acteal massacre, Roberto Albores Guíllén, the Chiapas governor,
was forced from power, as Ernesto Zedillo struggled to remain at the helm in the wake of the
uproar over the crimes in Chiapas. While martial law was not directly imposed upon the
populace, a state of exception became the norm as a bloated military took over operations in
Chiapas: 2,000 troops were based in Chenalhó right after the massacre (Department of State,
Secret, 1997 declassified document); military checkpoints controlled entry and exit points from
the militarized zones of the state, the areas with a strong Zapatista—and Las Abejas—presence;
70% of the Mexican military was stationed in Chiapas, in the conflict zone, and the military’s
comings and goings and overflights circumscribed life in indigenous communities in all parts of
the state. Expulsions of foreigners soon followed, as a wave of xenophobia washed over the
federal and state government, (migration files were kept on foreigners, many of whom were
deported). Phones were tapped. The military infiltrated civil institutions, such as tourist bars and
restaurants. The paramilitary terrified the local indigenous population, although Las Abejas
members remained stoic in the face of the ongoing threat. Indigenous communities were
surrounded and the indigenous population was held in a vise, neither able to move freely or at
will. The growing population of IDPs struggled to subsist on inadequate resources and national
and international aid givers vied for aid giving in the camps. Chiapas in 1998 found itself in
crisis.
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Paramilitarization in the Highlands, 1997
How did these tragic events come to unfold? The perpetrators of the Acteal massacre
were, as Aubry and Inda (1998) tell us, marginalized young men who were members of the
Máscara Roja, or Red Mask, paramilitary organization; these were men who had not been
eligible for ejido lands, who stood to inherit no land from their fathers, and who faced a lifetime
of poverty (Aubry and Inda 1998). According to Hirales, an ex-Communist and guerrillero who
has since modified his views and become a government functionary (Bellinghausen 2007a),
Máscara Roja was founded in November 1996 in the area around Oventik, a Zapatista stronghold
(Hirales 1998:37). It was responsible for painting slogans against Bishop Samuel Ruiz García
and against the autonomous municipal government of Oventik. Hirales (1998:37) reports that,
according to the diocese of San Cristóbal, Máscara Roja’s “radius of action” comprises the
municipalities of San Andrés Larráinzar, San Juan Chamula and Chenalhó, particularly in the
communities of Los Chorros, Puebla, Pechiquil and Yashjemel.
The origins of the violence that led to the massacre at Acteal, according to Hirales and
the White Paper on Acteal, are relatively prosaic. The story began with a conflict over a sand
bank at the entrance to the ejido of San José de Majomut. It was a ridge of sand forming a
hillside outside of the EZLN municipio autónomo (autonomous municipality) of Polhó. Various
parties had contested ownership of the sand bank, and on February 15, 1994, 29 young men,
members of the Cardenista party,83 had gained title to the sand bank when they occupied the Los
Chorros parish (Hirales 1998:40, 25, 27). Their claim to title was made legal through a federal
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Eber (2003) relates that “a third oppositional group in Chenalhó at the time was the militant party Frente
Cardenista de Reconstruccción Nacional, the heir to the former PST party which had been the first oppositional
group in” Chenalhó. After 1994, Cardenistas “were easily attracted to the Zapatista base groups, which were
perceived as even more militant and having the potential to make a substantial political impact. Within a short time
span, the Cardenistas lost most of their members to the Zapatistas. Until the fall of 1996, the remaining Cardenistas
identified politically with both the Zapatistas and Las Abejas, but took distance from them later.”
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program called el Fideicomiso 95 (Trusteeship 95). Two-and-a-half years later, on August 16,
1996, the EZLN took possession of the sand bank, a bold claim on the Zapatistas’ part over
territory that they asserted fell within the municipio of Polhó and a challenge to neighboring
inhabitants with different political loyalties.
With the reappropriation of the sand bank in 1997, however, Zapatismo became the thing
that the inhabitants of Los Chorros feared most—they were afraid that Polhó’s municipio
autónomo, (Zapatista) would keep the sand bank, which it had begun to exploit commercially,
beginning in March, 1997. Hirales’ retelling of events in Los Chorros relies on the account of
Sebastián Pérez Pérez, who in turn quotes a comment by one Antonio Santiz López in an ejidal
assembly. Santiz López publicly declared that “the Zapatistas were already entering all the
communities, and they were going to kill us”—and that Las Abejas were helping the rebels.
According to this version, Los Chorros inhabitants began to arm themselves with AK-47s, saying
that “we have to have arms to defend ourselves. I am not afraid that the Zapatistas will arrive
because I have my gun and can defend myself” (quoted in Hirales 1998, 41).
Tensions were high in Los Chorros with EZLN supporters from Polhó and PRIistas from
Los Chorros in conflict that on occasion broke out in violence. The tensions were exacerbated by
municipal and federal elections which were scheduled to take place on July 6th. The Zapatistas
had called for a boycott. Although two members of the autonomous municipality of Polhó,
Lorenzo Hernández Gutiérrez and Manuel Ruiz Hernández, were detained by the police and held
in the Cerro Hueco prison in Tuxtla Gutiérrez for several weeks, state authorities did little to
alleviate the conflict or stem the violence. A pact was made to end the aggressions on June 3rd
but it was broken on June 9th when presumed sympathizers of the autonomous municipality of
Polhó attacked agents of the Seguridad Pública, the state police force. On June 24, in the

137

community of Yabteclum, a rapprochement was reached between both the municipality of San
Pedro Chenalhó, controlled by the PRI, and that of the EZLN’s autonomous municipality of
Polhó. Participants in the effort to end the dispute included members of the PRI and the PRD.
When agents of San Pedro Chenalhó detained two members of the autonomous municipality of
Polhó talks were on the verge of breaking down. What had been a moment of calm, however,
ended on July 22nd when the approximately 200 inhabitants of Polhó expelled 27 families that
did not sympathize with Zapatismo. Another effort was made to end the dispute at the end of
July, but in Hirales’ account, the July 6 elections had upset everything. In carrying out their
“peaceful” boycott of the elections, EZLN sympathizers (BAEZLN) in the autonomous
municipality of Polhó burned 12 of the 18 ballot boxes in Chenalhó (Hirales 1998, 27, 28).
Although the EZLN maintained its truce, Norberto Gutiérrez Guzmán, one of the few
PRIistas who had stayed on the San José Majomut ejido, charged that Zapatistas threatened him.
Tensions increased when the municipio autónomo abolished the boundaries between Polhó and
the sand bank on August 27, 1997. Inhabitants of neighboring Los Chorros interpreted the action
as a provocation. The very next day, the Zapatista families of the ejido were threatened with
expulsion. From this point on, the situation turned more “delicate,” as prospective ejidatarios, in
fact budding paramilitaries, began to take justice into their own hands (Hirales 1998, 28).
Meanwhile, Las Abejas was one of the groups the paramilitaries asked to “cooperate” in
the purchase of arms (Interview with Gustavo Gómez, July 11, 2016; Tavanti 2003, 78). They
refused, and violence in the region of Acteal escalated during the fall of 1997—specifically
against Las Abejas and others who were not PRIistas. The massacre at Acteal was now looming
on the horizon.
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Hirales’ account focuses on the sand bank and the independent decision of the
paramilitary forces to arm themselves. The contest over the sand bank was important to my
interlocutors, as well. They cited the sand bank as the paramilitary pretext for acquiring arms and
the beginning of the conflict in Chenalhó. Someone originally bought weapons to reappropriate
the sand bank, although the details are contested and probably unknowable. Sebastián, the exresponsable at the INI camp, told me that the violence in Chenalhó started with the
reappropriation of the sand bank, but those leveling formal charges after the events of January
1997 would contest Hirales’ story. What he leaves out is the government’s involvement in
arming paramilitary bands.
Although both Hirales (1998) and Héctor Aguilar Camín (2007) argue that
intercommunal conflict was the progenitor of Acteal, the Zapatistas’ seizure of the sand bank at
the entrance to the Majomut ejido did not cause the paramilitarization but was a convenient
excuse. The Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal points to the sand bank, but as Pablo Romo, ex-director
of the CDHFBC put it, “Acteal was more than a sand bank… Problems in Chiapas of sand
banks, of disputes over land, of differences of religion, of political parties or ideologies have
existed and continue to exist. For these reasons, they do not commit massacres such as that of
Acteal” (Romo 2007).
The paramilitarization of Chenalhó and its environs was hardly spontaneous. Of the many
paramilitary members who were caciques and teachers, occupations likely to provide leaders,
two particular individuals, Antonio Pérez Hernández and Jacinto Arias Cruz, became promoters
of armed groups. Pérez Hernández had controlled political groups in Chenalhó for thirty years;
he began as a health promoter at INI in 1961 and by 1964 was a bilingual teacher. He was the
municipal president of Chenalhó from 1968 to 1979, and delegate of the PRI in the municipio
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and secretary of Indigenous Affairs of the CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina) (National
Peasant Confederation). Jacinto Arias Cruz was a Presbyterian and member of the PRI from a
cacique family in Chenalhó. The Consejo Autónomo Zapatista of Polhó accused them of
founding armed groups (Balboa 1997:10). Los Chorros was, according to Aubry (1997), the
“cradle” of the paramilitaries in the region. After August 1997, what existed of the fragile
equilibrium in the community was lost when the municipal president, Jacinto Arias Cruz, obliged
his municipal agents to conduct a census in each parish (to count inhabitants so that they could
“cooperate” in the buying of arms). After this the Ayuntamiento sent the paramilitaries to first
burn the houses of the dissidents and then called on the PRI to discipline and sanction them. The
cause of the conflict is not, as they say, the difference over the sand bank, that is a pretext, but
rather the census generated by the paramilitarization (quoted in Balboa 1997, 11).

The Military and Low-Intensity War
Although CDHFBC had publicized the existence of paramilitaries in Chenalhó since well
before the massacre at Acteal, the Mexican government itself would not recognize their existence
in Chiapas until the November 12, 2000 election of Vicente Fox (La Jornada 2000; Tavanti
2003, 76). As one observer, Father Oscar Salinas, Pastoral Vicar of the San Cristóbal de Las
Casas diocese, observed:
With Acteal, the war of paramilitaries was unmasked. This massacre shows the violence
of political and economic interests when the life of the indigenous people is considered
nothing…. The massacre of Acteal is, as Don Samuel [Ruiz García] calls it, a historic
divide (quoted in Tavanti 2003, 79).
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This “historic divide” occurred in large part because of the low intensity war, which the
Mexican government began carrying out in Chiapas with the Zapatista uprising. The plausible
deniability that low-intensity strategists aim for had little traction. The counterinsurgency
strategy of the military was well-known. Observers in Chiapas knew that Acteal “was no
accident” (CDHFBC 1998, 39). In 1998, CDHFBC and other NGOs reported 70,000 federal
troops were stationed in Chiapas.84 Many of the troops were concentrated around the area of
Chenalhó in 1998, as were most paramilitary actions after 1996. CDHFBC (1998, 43-44)
diagrams the army’s strategy of completely encircling the “guerrilla” camps, showing a ninepronged entrance into Zapatista zones. The paramilitaries received training in Mexico using U.S.
School of the Americas manuals from the Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (the Secretariat of
National Defense). Training came out of the Manual de Guerra Irregular (Manual of Irregular
War 1995), which invoked Mao’s famous dictum that “the people is to the guerrilla as water is to
fish” (CDHFBC 1998, 41). The manual states that “Mao… undoubtedly stated a truth of longlasting validity… you can make life in the water impossible for the fish by agitating it…” and
can make “the life of the fish a nightmare” (CDHFBC 1998, 41). Frayba emphasizes how the
scorched earth policy employed in Guatemala was used in Acteal.
Direct proof of a paramilitary connection with the Mexican military was late in coming.
CDHFBC and other NGOs attempted to trace the weapons used in the massacre at Acteal, but
“because of the complex chain of intermediaries, it was difficult to prove any direct or indirect
link with the Mexican army” in the 2000s (Tavanti 2003, 76). Nonetheless, proof would come in
2009, with the publication of declassified documents from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency
(National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 283, August 20, 2009). Then newly
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Accounts differ on the exact number of federal troops in Chiapas. The left-wing newspapaer La Jornada reported
the presence of 50,000 soldiers. Part of the discrepancy can be explained by the army’s propensity to move between
different Zapatista strongholds (Tavanti 2003:88).
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declassified documents would reveal a telegram sent to the U.S. DIA headquarters on May 4,
1999 showing an irrefutable connection between the Mexican army and the massacre. The
documents cite “direct support”—and “human intelligence teams,” which are responsible for
creating paramilitary groups in the highlands in blatant contradistinction to the Libro Blanco
Sobre Acteal. In 1998 the Libro Blanco stated that:
The Attorney General’s office has documented the existence of groups of armed civilians
in the municipality of Chenalhó, neither organized, created, trained, nor financed by the
Mexican Army nor by any other government entity, but whose management and
organization respond to an internal logic determined by the confrontation, between and
within the communities, with the Zapatista bases of support. (PGR 1998, 32, emphasis
added)
After the massacre at Acteal, which was ordered by the top echelons of government, it
was difficult to prove a connection between the government and the paramilitary until 2009
when CIA classified documents were declassified. Even at the time, however, there was little
doubt among observers on the ground in Chiapas that through acts of commission and omission
the Mexican army was involved in a covert war against supporters of the EZLN. The declassified
telegram clarified the situation greatly. It stated that “in order to promote anti-Zapatista armed
groups, the teams provided ‘training and protection from arrests by law enforcement agencies
and military units patrolling the region.’” The U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Mexico pointed
out that army intelligence officers “were overseeing the armed groups in December, 1997”; the
office provided heretofore unknown details. The military teams “were composed primarily of
young officers in the rank of second and first captain, as well as select sergeants who spoke the
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regional dialects.85 The HUMINT teams were composed of three to four persons, who were
assigned to cover select communities for a period of three to four months. After three months the
teams’ officer members were rotated to a different community in Chiapas. Concern over the
teams’ safety and security were paramount reasons for the rotations every three months”
(National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 283, 2, August 20, 2009).
The federal government’s attempt to wage war against its own people without attracting
attention followed but one point in what long-time military analyst Alejandro Nadal (1998, 21)
described as a three-pronged strategy:
The first rests on the strong military presence in Chiapas in order to neutralize and, if
possible, destroy the EZLN. The second consists of a façade of being actively engaged in
a peace process. The third element is the growing set of paramilitary groups that are the
backbone of the counterinsurgency war in the North and Los Altos region of Chiapas.
Julio César López (1999, 6) remarks that the 31st military zone located in the state of
Chiapas had, in 1999, a confidential map listing the paramilitaries operating within the zone—
and it was an exhaustive list: Los Ztzizimes, Los Chinchilines, Arriera Nocturna, Sociedad Civil,
Desarrollo, Paz y Justicia, Qichán Chanob, Los Aguilar, Pantelhó, San Bartolomé de los Llanos,
OCEZ, Barrio El Convento, Bases Armadas del Pueblo, Comuneros de la Casa del Pueblo,
Paraíso Grijalva, Comuneros Básicos 3 de Marzo, OPEZ and Justicia Social. Although some
groups, such as Desarrollo, Paz y Justicia y Desarrollo, Peace, Justice and Development, and
Justicia Social, Social Justice, hid behind misleading names, all were founded in the mid-1990s
to counter the EZLN, and each was armed and prepared for action. López tells us that the map
was pasted on the window in the committee room of the 31st military command—and that these
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were only some of the groups which can take cover under the Ley de Amnistía para civiles
armados, the Amnesty Law for Armed Civilians, introduced by then-governor Roberto Albores
Guillén to the state congress on December 15, 1998. According to the office of the Procuradería
General de la República (PGR) (Attorney General of the Republic), there were even more
paramilitary bands. Another group that goes unmentioned include MIRA, the Movimiento
Indígena Revolucionario Antizapatista, the Indigenous Revolutionary Antizapatista Movement,
which is largely present in Oxchuc and Ocosingo, that is to say, in the selva zone86 (López 1999,
6). The presence of paramilitaries in all parts of Chiapas was part of the government’s
counterinsurgency plan against the EZLN, since the 1994 cease-fire between the Zapatistas and
the army precludes military intervention. All paramiltaries were PRIistas and were backed by the
Mexican army in one form or other. La Jornada and Excelsior (8 September 1997) reported on
the presence of these groups before the crime of Acteal, and their existence was uncontested
except by the federal government, prior to 2000 (López 1999, 6).

“Labor social”: Social Labor among the Displaced
One of the features of the Chiapas conflict is that federal army troops were ubiquitous in
the Chiapas highlands in 1997-2000. Their official purpose was to provide “labor social” (social
labor) for impoverished local populations, but most observers agreed that this was a smokescreen
for their actual purpose, which was to oversee the local population. In illustration of “labor
social,” the social labor undertaken by the military to accustom the people of Chiapas to the
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receive $1,250 a month from the state government, quite an attractive sum in an area where the going wage is $3 a
day.”
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growing military presence, General Mejía87 of the Majormut military encampment near
Chenalhó, stated in a meeting with the Christian Peacemaker Team in January of 1999: “The
presence of many heavily armed soldiers in camps and passing through villages serves to prevent
violence among the indigenous people and to promote neoliberal economics,” repeating the PRI
doctrine. CPT team member Kern reported on these government “gifts”:
Gen. Mejía spent a long time explaining the humanitarian function of his troops, saying
they are concerned about education, and willing to build schools, homes, and water
systems. Col. Rodríguez described the medical program. There are twenty nurses and five
doctors for the twenty military camps. Besides meeting the medical needs of the military,
they offer free medical treatment and dental care to the local population. The colonel
said he sees 20 to 30 patients a day. He showed us what appeared to be a well-stocked
pharmacy. They also offer at least one meal a day to local people (Kern 1999).
The army’s presence has been a crucial element of the government’s counterinsurgency
campaign against the EZLN and labor social its version of offering a carrot to the besieged
population, which, in some cases, may accept it. Although the EZLN and Las Abejas have
rejected the presence of the army, in isolated cases, the civilian population may take advantage
of the “gifts” proffered—and those who accept the aid may turn away from the EZLN and
towards the government. These offers of aid are part of the low-intensity war in Chiapas and
come straight out of SEDENA’s training manuals on guerrilla warfare (SEDENA 1995), which
originated in the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. SEDENA’s Manual de
Guerra Irregular (Manual of Irregular War), which was released in 1995, is a nearly word for
word translation of the United States’s Defense Department’s Field Manual Psychological
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Operations which is used to train troops for counterinsurgency operations in the United States
(Mazzei 2009, 59).

Background to Paramilitarization
Just as the EZLN had predicted, NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, led
to a collapse in maize prices (due to imports and dumping of US maize) and a withdrawal of
state subsidies, causing local poverty to deepen and peasant farmers to be forced off already
overcrowded lands. It was in this context that landless and marginalized young men were
recruited by paramilitary bands (Aubry 1997). In this chapter, I show how fear and threats by
paramilitaries intensified in the fall of 1997 in Chenalhó, leading to the displacement of 20,000
people.
Land grabs by landless paramilitaries and the militarization of the highlands were a
result of structural poverty and the loss of ejido lands in the late 1990s (Aubry and Inda 1998;
Harvey 1998; Benjamin 1996, Nash 1997). Ejidatarios took back their lands, or “recuperated”
them, as a result of the Zapatista rebellion and others, who had no title to ejido—or private—
lands, joined the paramilitaries. By this time in Chiapas, displacements were part of the lowintensity war against the EZLN; paramilitaries threatened families who would not—or could
not—pay the “cooperación” the paramilitaries demanded to pay for arms in the fall of 1997, just
prior to the Acteal massacre.88 Although the federal government’s report on Acteal, the Libro
Blanco Sobre Acteal, or White Paper on Acteal, blamed inter-ethnic and inter-community feuds
for the violence in the highlands, paramilitary bands paid by the Mexican military were part of a
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counter-insurgency strategy put in place by the army. The violence had both material and
ideological ramifications as the fabric of social life in Chenalhó was torn apart. Paramilitary
activity also meant that there were no safe conditions of return. Several families returned to the
communities of Quextic and Canolal in 2001 and were hyped in the media, but most of the
displaced have become permanently dispossessed.

The Paramilitary Presence in the 2000’s
Although La Jornada reported in 2000, that
Close to one thousand troops from the Federal Judicial Police and the Federal
Preventive Police were mobilized yesterday to Los Altos of Chiapas in order to disband
paramilitary groups such as Development, Peace and Justice, Red Mask, Los
Chinchulines and the Anti-Zapatista Indigenous Revolutionary Movement (MIRA). The
purpose is to establish the conditions necessary for the inauguration of the Governorelect, Pablo Salazar Mendiguchía, on December 8 (Galán 2000).
It was clear that this was, to some extent, a public relations stunt. On Mexican
Independence Day in 2009, in San Cristóbal, I witnessed a parade commemorating independence
from Spain in 1810. After school children and hotel workers and various civic organizations
marched by with drums and flutes, the military and the police rolled by. I recognized the face of
the tall, almost Anglo-looking soldier who had been pushed back by a woman in X’Oyep with
her bare arms, from the instantly iconic and well-known photograph by Pedro Valtierra. Behind
the tanks and marching brigade came several open-back trucks full of men in black t-shirts.89 A
man behind me commented, “ah, los paramilitares, those who conduct the real violence.” The
89
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“official” disbanding of the paramilitary arm of the government—like the government’s official
non-recognition of their existence in the 1998 Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal (White Paper on
Acteal), had been a sham. Here they were, riding right behind the army, in the same parade,
applauded by the admiring public, the coletos of San Cristóbal. Bearing the arms of the military
and working in conjunction with the federal army, paramilitaries were part of the government’s
counterinsurgency strategy against the EZLN. In 2008, there had been a renewed paramilitary
build-up in Chiapas (Cevallos 2008). On April 27, 2010, paramilitary violence travelled to
neighboring Oaxaca, where two observers, one from Finland and the other Mexican, were killed
by paramilitaries while on a solidarity caravan to the autonomous municipality of San Juan
Copalá. Three more people were disappeared and others were wounded in the attack (La Jornada
2010). In 2017, the paramilitary began rearming in Chenalhó, over a land dispute with
neighboring Chalchihuitán. In 2017-18, over five thousand people in Chalchihuitán were
threatened with death and displaced by paramilitary, in events reminiscent of the fall and winter
of 1997-98 in Chenalhó (SIPAZ 2017).

Violence, Trauma, and Massacre
Since the early days of 1994, the conflict in Chiapas had raged in a low-intensity war. By
1997, the conflict had become a civil war. While both designations, low-intensity and civil war,
are avoided in all official communications about the conflict, the dual character of the war is
borne out by journalists’ accounts, human rights reports, national and international observers,
anthropologists, sociologists, and inhabitants of the highlands. Ethnographic investigation
reveals family after family with members on both sides of the battle lines. In a low-intensity
conflict, there are more than two sides; usually a guerrilla organization is targeted by a
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paramilitary network as well as by military forces, as in Chiapas. The paramilitaries quoted
Mao’s dictum “you can drain the water to get to the fish” in Chiapas as it had in Guatemala, and
introduced a kind of “scorched earth” policy although not on the same scale as in Guatemala . In
situations like this it is a truism that low-intensity war is not low-intensity for the people being
targeted.
How are we to make sense of these events? Sanford (2003) used exhumation and forensic
examination of the skeletal remains of the victims of the massacres and disappearances in Ixil,
K’iché, Kaqchikel, Q’eqchi’, and Achi villages in the northwest highlands to the central
lowlands, from 1994 to 2002, and conducted largely clandestine interviews with more than 400
survivors, collecting their testimonio; testimonio “presents lived experience from the perspective
of the Latin American subaltern” (2003, 25). Their stories problematize “truth, memory and
terror” and measure “the construction of the rule of law” (2003, 25). This “giving of individual
testimony represents an expansion of both potential and real individual agency that, in the
collectivity of testimonies, creates new political space for local community action” (2003, 72).
As Rigoberta Menchú’s (1982) testimony also shows us, testimonio “obliged the world to
recognize Maya women as agents of their own history whose participation in political
movements shaped those very movements regardless of their initial catalyst” (2003, 51). 90
90

The terror against civilians perpetuated by the army resulted in horrific stories, such as Don Salvador’s, in which
the army personnel forced elderly campesinos to dig deep graves, into which they had two groups of younger men,
divided into “heaven” and “hell,” trample upon the other. The group, “heaven” was to beat the unfortunate men
collected into “hell” to death. Then the army shot into the graves, killing any survivors. Don Salvador couldn’t eat
for a month afterwards (2003:89-98). Then there were the civilian patrols, replete with deprivations—men and boys
had to forage in the mountains, and work for up to three weeks at a time, for a total of five and a half years of
unwaged labor; they were also the first to be killed, as they acted as a buffer for the army (2003:117). Also worth
noting, as Sanford (2003:61) asserts, is how problematic David Stoll’s (1998) revisitation of the Rigoberta Menchú
story is, as it “cannot withstand the type of scrutiny to which he subjected her book;” it conflates differing strains of
activists, as well as academics, and, unbelievably, “blame(s) the guerrilla for army atrocities” (2003:60), as well as
blaming victims, such as Menchú’s father, for their own deaths. Yvon Le Bot, an anti-Marxist, likewise points a
finger at the guerrillas. Both simply parrot the Guatemalan army’s pernicious story, as exemplified by General
Hector Gramajo’s “self-proclaimed ‘objective’ historical analysis that used the fight against ‘subversion’ to justify
the army’s Scorched Earth campaign and obfuscate the genocide” (2003:205).
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The massacres, the assassinations and the disappearances collectively led to what Sanford
terms “the phenomenology of terror,” which was most difficult—and deadly, noting how
ongoing militarization of community life [especially through civil patrols. Patrollers were often
forced to kill or be killed] is part of a path that leads to a living memory of terror [“a tree is not
just a tree:” it is the memory of a torture and assassination] (2003, 123).
In Guatemala, where Sanford did her research, Mamá Maquín was possibly the most
prominent of the massacre victims, machine gunned down in the 1978 Panzós Massacre while
giving a speech in the town plaza in front of her granddaughter and many other onlookers
(2003). Maquín had joined the guerillas in the 1960s but by 1978 she was a 60-year old
grandmother and protest leader. She had just finished asking the military to put down their
weapons when the gunfire separated her skull from her head. Yet, this first massacre of 200 was
typical of the many in Guatemala during La Violencia, a time from 1978 to 1982 in which state
terror and “scorched earth” policies were used against the largely indigenous Maya. Many of
victims were women, some elderly and some mothers with babies, most accused of being
members of the guerrilla, under the regimes of General Lucas García (1978-82) and General
Ríos Montt (March 1982-August 1983). There were 440 massacres, 1.5 million people displaced,
150,000 refugees and 100,000-150,000 dead or disappeared (2003, 14).
Guatemala violated the human rights of its population; these rights are non-derogable by
every standard and violated the UN Genocide Convention. These violations occurred under
Generals Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt; under Rios Montt, women, children and the elderly, the
vast majority of them highland Maya, were systematically targeted (Sanford 2003, 157).91 (2003,
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The fact that milpa, the cultivation of maize, beans and squash, was systematically destroyed gave credence to the
conclusion by the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) that “the army committed acts of genocide.”
Nevertheless, U.S. President Reagan apportioned more than $6 million for the Guatemalan military in 1983
(Sanford 2003,178).
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165). Argentina, likewise, took state terror to extraordinary heights, “disappearing” more than
30,000 Argentinians, whom the state saw as “subversive” and violating their human rights in
what Feitlowitz characterizes as a “lexicon of terror” from the standpoint of memory; that is,
what are the words one still cannot bring oneself to say? (1998).
Post-conflict situations such as the civil wars in Guatemala, El Salvador (Silber 2011)
and Peru (Theidon 2012), and survivors and relatives of the disappeared of Argentina’s Dirty
War (Feitlowitz 1998), arouse a great deal of interest because combatants—soldiers, guerrillas,
military commanders, torturers, civil patrollers and civilians—all rub shoulders and are forced to
interact every day in the post-war reconstruction period and after. Ethnographies of post-conflict
states (many of them longitudinal), thus, represent something new in anthropology, especially in
Latin America, where post-conflict situations have proliferated since the 1980s (Silber 2011).
Many, such as civilians in Ayacucho, Peru, were victimized by longtime neighbors, friends, and
even their own families, such as happened in the lead up to Acteal, where son-in-law robbed
mother-in-law and son robbed mother. In Ayacucho, relatives murdered each other, making
reconciliation a fraught and difficult construct as “intimate enemies” were forced to interact in
the post-conflict milieu.

The Experience of Paramilitary Violence
In Chiapas, with paramilitary bands largely drawn from or near the communities they
control, it was almost inevitable that some victims would suffer at the hands of members of their
own families. This happened in the lead up to Acteal. In a land marked by dire poverty, material
gains increased the stakes in the conflict. While the displaced were hardly well off, most owned
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some land, and because the paramilitary members were among the poorest in their communities
they saw an opportunity to take over vacated property (Rebón 2001, 78; Aubry and Inda 1998).
Fear of violence paralyzed everyday life as the displaced fled intimidation, threats, arson,
house burnings, and repression at the hands of indigenous caciques (leaders) and paramilitaries.
The paramilitaries in Chenalhó began to circle the communities, as though they were police
forces. Houses of Las Abejas in Acteal and Chenalhó had white flags and “Sociedad Civil, Paz,
Zona Neutral” painted in white across their wooden fronts (see Figure 1); paramilitaries painted
over these words in mud and began to shoot at the flags. Paramilitary shouted “here we don’t
want peace, today we are in a time of war,” throwing the white flags to the ground. They began
to burn houses of BAEZLN and EZLN supporters, causing them to flee to camps such as Polhó
and Acteal bases de apoyo. Las Abejas began to pray for peace in their churches and to fast. The
paramilitary took note of the fact that they gathered in the hermitage in Acteal every afternoon,
and they began to fire at them, even before the massacre (Interview with Gustavo Gómez, July
11, 2016).
Marcela, an intelligent woman of about 50, angular, work-worn, and insightful in her
commentary, came originally from near Pantelhó at the end of the road that goes to Acteal. She
related that her husband’s brother was a member of Máscara Roja, the paramilitary band that
was responsible for her family’s flight—and for the massacre at Acteal. Her brother-in-law was a
PRIista, and Marcela feared that her family would be unable to reclaim the land it fled. Noemí, a
woman from Canolal who first took refuge in the Don Bosco camp in San Cristóbal and then
came to the INI camp, recounted that one of her sons was a PRIista, and possibly in the
paramilitaries. She worried for her daughter-in-law because her son hit her often. In addition, her
son had been harvesting and selling their coffee and taking the proceeds (interview June 7,
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1998). By taking her daughter-in-law’s side against her son, who was a probable member of the
paramilitary, Noemí was choosing the right path, according to both religious writings, such as
the Bible, and Las Abejas’ teachings and also in accordance with Zapatistas’ women’s
revolutionary law, which is a feminist collection of laws stating, for example, that women have
the right to choose their own husbands and to choose how many children to bear. It meant that
she was an enlightened woman by any standard, and it makes her narrative stand out among the
other testimonio.
Rosario, a nineteen-year-old mother of two who fled the highland village of Canolal,
recounted that “People from my pueblo began to kill people.” “The paramilitaries had red
bandanas on their heads instead of around their necks—this is how we knew that they were
Máscara Roja,” the Mesa Directiva at Acteal would clarify in January of 2001 (Interview with
Mesa Directiva at Acteal, January 4, 2001).
PRIistas began to threaten the civil society group [Las Abejas], who only want peace.
Four were killed in the pueblo, all men, members of the civil society group. They were
killed with pistols. I don’t remember when. We came here after one week in Tzaljachen.
We came by … bus. Most of the families came together. Some of my family are PRIistas.
My grandmother and her family stayed in Canolal. They are PRIistas. My brothers and
sisters went to Don Bosco. We arrived here two days before Christmas. It was cold, and
we didn’t have blankets or anything to sleep on (Interview with María, June 16, 1998).
Twenty-one year old Rocío told me that she had to run because she was religious, an
Abeja who believed in the Word of God, and that she and her family were threatened—twice.
She remembered that on October 23 or 24, 1997, the problems began. PRIistas threatened her
family and members of Las Abejas and forced them to flee into the mountains that rainy night.
The group escaped to the EZLN highland camp Tzaljachen but left again after only two weeks.
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“We left because the PRIistas followed us all the way to Tzaljachen and threatened to kill us
there.” The stress exacted its toll in many ways, most tragically when Rocío’s father died “out of
fear” in the mountains (Interview June 22, 1998).
For some families, fleeing involved forced separations, which were wrenching. “We
were all crying when we left,” Rosa recounted. The paramilitaries prevented her from speaking
with her sister-in-law because her husband, and Rosa’s brother, was a PRI supporter. “My sister
was crying when we left. I had four brothers in the paramilitaries. But I was afraid for my life [as
a member of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas]. We were threatened…. (Interview June 28, 1998).

Figure 3.1 Houses at Acteal in 1997, 1998 and 1999 painted with “Sociedad Civil Paz Zonal Neutral.” Photo by
author.

It was a time of sadness, sorrow and fear. “We decided to flee,” Gustavo told me. “We
left our houses, our belongings and our lands.” Gustavo was in the sixth grade during this time.
Abandoning school, he and his family, originally from Yibeljoj, fled to San Diego X’Oyep, a
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tiny community where only twelve families lived. Months later, people from Puebla, Yaxgemel,
Chuchtic, Los Chorros and others from Yibeljoj would join them in San Diego X’Oyep. Here
they would hear word of Acteal. As Gustavo put it, “besides the 45 massacred, there were four
unborn who were taken out of the bellies of their mothers at the hands of the paramilitaries as a
trophy of the guerrilla.” This act inspired much fear in the camps in Chenalhó.
Because the Chiapanecan displaced remained within their own country, their own state,
and for some, such as Gustavo, within their own municipality, even during the height of the
emergency, this very proximity to their homes was both tantalizing and cruel. The proximity of
many camps to the communities from which the displaced came highlighted the ever-present
threat of an army attack on the camps themselves. Through long nights of uncertainty inhabitants
remained vigilant; both army and paramilitary were all around. At the same time, camp
inhabitants were well aware of who had moved into their houses, usurped their lands, and killed
or stolen their animals.
On January 3, 1998, the military entered Gustavo’s camp, San Diego X’Oyep. It was a
cloudy, rainy day; every ten meters the military stood, stationing themselves near a water source
where women collected water daily, and engendering the possibility of sexual violence and
abuse. The children, women and men surrounded the soldiers, chanting “Chiapas, Chiapas, no es
cuartel, fuera ejército de él!” A helicopter arrived by orders of the Mexican government to
protect the sizable military presence. A young woman, Rosa Méndez, in the peace cordon pushed
back a soldier, grabbing him by his rifle strap.92 Zapatista compas arrived and threw sand at the
military to force them out. The army backed off (Interview, July 11, 2016).
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This was the woman captured in Pedro Valtierra’s arresting photograph, on the cover of La Jornada on January
4th, 1998. In it, a girl of no more than 14 pushes a large, Anglo-looking soldier back by his rifle straps while he
grimaces. It is a poignant testament to non-violent resistance and female strength. The photo, instantly iconic,
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After Acteal the pressure for Las Abejas supporters to flee their communities mounted.
The flight from home communities to the camps in the highlands continued to be sudden and
shrouded in fear. Celia and her husband explained why and how they fled Canolal in January
1998:
The PRIistas were having a meeting that night. They were going to kill everybody the
next day. We had to leave. We came right to San Cristóbal. The paramilitaries were
present. CDHFBC and the Nacional Centro de Derechos Humanos (the human rights
center Fray Barolomé de las Casas and the national human rights center) sent trucks to
get us and the Procuradería General de la República, the Attorney General’s Office, sent
a little plane to protect us because we couldn’t leave for fear of the paramilitaries. We
were surrounded.
The day they left, Seguridad Pública arrived in the community and the PRIistas stocked
up on arms when they traded their cars for weapons in Pantelhó. By that time, the army was
already in Canolal (Interview, July 6, 1998).
There could be no thought of returning to their home communities while paramilitary
squads roamed the countryside, targeting political activists, active supporters of the EZLN, and
Las Abejas. Most who had fled their homes had no option but to remain in displaced persons
camps. More than 7,000 of the 16,000, 44 percent of the indigenous population of the region’s
displaced, came from Chenalhó, the area most affected by violence in 1997 and 1998.

traveled around the world and was reproduced in many news outlets, including that of The Graduate Center of the
City University of New York, The Advocate, in 1999, where I was surprised to see it upon my return from Chiapas.
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Testimonio: “Our Stories Are All the Same”
Six months after Acteal, when I asked how her vision of the future has changed, Amalia,
a woman nearing 50, summed up the experience of many of the displaced. Touching the corner
of her huipil to her eye and with her voice thickening, she began crying:
I don’t want to go back. I have already spoken to my husband. We left Acteal on October
27th. We felt that something would happen. There was a feeling in the air. We left to save
our lives. We left running. I want to sell my house, if we can. But there are already other
people living in my house. We used to rent out our land but now they took that too. My
husband’s brother is a PRIista. My husband is a member of Las Abejas. He can’t make a
declaration [against the government] in Acteal because it is PRIista [governing-party
controlled] now. It is a civil war. (Interview, June 2, 1998)
Then Amalia took me by surprise saying, “You talked to us, you don’t need to talk to us
again.” Did she misunderstand my role at the camp? Did she believe that one story could stand
for all of the others, that all families had the same reason for leaving? It was a story which
certainly made sense, that essentially all families’ reasons for leaving could be substituted for
one another, something that is not necessarily mistaken.
Amalia meant that her story was no different in severity or in tone from anyone else’s at
the INI camp, and this is something that she wished to convey to me.93 Camp inhabitants often
preferred to come to an agreement on how to present things before speaking to representatives of
the outside world, and, although eventually trusted, I was initially no exception, hence Amalia’s
initial reluctance to be interviewed at length. Over time she became one of my best research
93

The substitution of one individual’s narrative for the community or vice versa is something that surfaced in the
Rigoberta Menchú controversy in the mid-1990s. It may be an indigenous convention to speak individually but
implicitly as part of a collectivity. David Stoll’s controversial 1998 book, Menchú and the Story of All Poor
Guatemalans highlights the controversy, indicating that non-Western Mayan testimonial storytelling substitutes
many voices for one. In the Menchú case, this meant relating the brutal murders of her brothers as though she had
witnessed them herself, as well as overstating the family’s poverty. As Sanford (2003) notes, Stoll implicates the
guerrilla for the 626 massacres and the countless murders, displacements and refugees created by the war.
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participants, and I ran into her time and time again even after she left INI in early 1999 to go to
Pantelhó. “Our stories are all the same. We all say the same thing. We can’t go back for fears of
our security. And we don’t know how we are going to live here. (Interview at the INI camp, June
2, 1998)”94
Ximena, a woman in her thirties, left Chimix with her family on October 27, 1997. One
evening, she told me, “PRIistas came onto our land and to our door.”
They wanted to take my husband. We left instead. We didn’t rob or do anything. I don’t
know why they came for us. PRIistas broke my lámina [sheet metal roof] with a rock [she
cries]. We first went to Pantelhó, then came here. The PRIistas blocked the road in the
night. My husband is an EZLN sympathizer (BAEZLN). After we left, the PRIistas robbed
everything and burned the house and killed the dogs. They interrogated my husband.
They asked if he was a representante [a representative or community leader]. They
wanted to kill him. They wanted to rape me (Interview, June 7, 1998).

After arriving first at the Tzaljachen camp she ended up settling in at the INI camp.
Camp inhabitants were anxious to get out of harm’s way, but the army, which should
have protected them, bungled its responsibility to disarm the paramilitaries. Knowing that
Máscara Roja had secreted away arms, the army offered children from the camps 15 pesos to
identify where weapons were hidden. When the children revealed the hiding spot in the agencia
municipal, the army failed to follow through, but members of the Seguridad Pública threatened
the children and women with death if they told on them again (Interview, August 21, 1998).
Once their lands had been taken over by paramilitary forces, the indigenous
campesinos—many of whom were members of Las Abejas or BAEZLN—lost the little that they

94

This statement also reflects the reality that many victims of human rights violations give accounts of the same
events over and over. This tends to produce rather formulaic account and a subjective sense that “I’ve said this many
times in the same way….”
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had—their subsistence crops (called milpa95), chickens, turkeys, dogs and their houses and
cafetales.96 If before they had been poor campesinos, now they were indigent and displaced. The
Zapatista rebellion brought only violence and unrest to their communities. As members of Las
Abejas, they only wanted justice—and peace.

Conclusion
Although The Libro Blanco, Sobre Acteal, PRI analysts and many other people, including
my interlocutors, blamed the Zapatista’s appropriation of the sand bank in Majomut for the
paramilitarization of the highlands and subsequent conflict that led to the Acteal massacre, as
Padre Pablo Romo put it, “Acteal was more than a sand bank.” There have been religious
differences, land disputes, disputes over sand banks, differing political affiliations, and
ideologies without paramilitaries committing massacres such as Acteal (Romo 2007). Yet it is
clear that Acteal was “no accident,” and the paramilitary buildup in the highlands, as reported in
the press is a testament to this fact. The proximal cause, as reported by my research participants,
was the cooperación demanded by the paramilitaries to buy arms, amounting to 100 to 300 pesos
per family, a hefty sum for impoverished campesino families. Many fled into the mountains
because once they could not afford to pay, they were threatened with death and their homes and
lands as well as livestock were taken over or burned by the paramilitary. For most, the
displacement would be permanent. Most would not return. The next chapter discusses the lenient
sentencing of the material authors of the Acteal massacre, the paramilitary band, Máscara Roja,
or Red Mask. Most would serve between eight and thirteen year sentences, although some were

95
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Traditional corn, beans and squash plots (which together create protein complementarity).
Coffee crops.
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sentenced for up until 40 years, none of the sentences were concluded, and the federal
government, the “intellectual author” of the massacre, would remain free.
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Chapter Four:
Aftermath of a Massacre
The Acteal massacre illustrated the basic precepts of low-intensity war, the use of the
army to surround the conflict zone and of paramilitaries to conduct violence. The massacre at
Acteal was first and foremost a human rights violation engineered by a government that would
soon be ushered out of power in part because of outrage over the killings and the continuing
conflict in Chiapas. The massacre was a watershed moment in Mexican history. The killing of 45
unarmed Abejas in a chapel on a remote hillside in Chiapas would reverberate around the world;
in Mexico, at least, nothing would be quite the same afterwards. This chapter analyzes the
aftermath of the massacre at Acteal.
In this chapter, I show that the light sentences that paramilitary members received
demoralized civil society sectors because of the “slap on the wrist” the paramilitary received and
the sense that the government had washed its hands of the problem of responsibility. Eightyeight paramilitary operatives—impoverished young men with no access to land—were charged
in the killings. The Mexican military stood by while the paramilitaries carried out this atrocity.
There were “irregularities” in the case, notably the failure to treat the Los Naranjos Acteal site as
a crime scene (SIPAZ 1998b). Those who planned the raid were not formally charged except for
ex-President Ernesto Zedillo, who was the target of a 2011 lawsuit in a U.S. civil court in
Connecticut by ten survivors of the Acteal massacre.97 Since 2009, 87 of the 88 persons charged
with the crime of Acteal have been freed, “one by one” (IGD News Jan. 25, 2018). Six were
absolved. None remain incarcerated. This contrasts with the postwar period in Guatemala, where,
97

Compare this with what happened to Augusto Pinochet. He was arrested in London on a Spanish indictment for
significant human rights violations, and spent a year and a half in a British prison. He was then extradited to Chile
and indicted and charged with war crimes. The EU overturned local amnesty laws, applying the principle of
universal jurisdiction. However, he died before he could be sentenced in Chile.
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in a landmark case, an example was made of three (civilian) civil patrollers. As Daniel
Goldhagen did for the Holocaust, implicating “Hitler’s willing executioners,” so the trial of three
civil patrollers from Xococ did for the Maya, allowing the courts to pass judgement on “ordinary
citizens” who became implicit in crimes of genocide against their neighbors. The three were
sentenced to death in 1999 for their part in the Río Negro massacre in 1981, setting a legal
precedent for the 626 massacres in Guatemala during the 1970s and 80s. Most of the guilty
remain free; no one is asking for forgiveness. Indeed, there is no word for “forgiveness” in Achí.
What was being sought instead is an end to impunity in post-conflict Guatemala (Sanford 2003,
267-71)—and Peru (Theidon 2012), where forgiveness and reconciliation are two separate
constructs. Indeed, the case of Acteal is analogous. No one has ever called for forgiveness,
although reconciliation and peace are sought, if elusive (Kovic 2003).
The presence of paramilitaries in Acteal—and at the INI camp, which was unfenced
and unguarded—a year and a half after the massacre proved the wisdom of Las Abejas’
proscription on violence. Most told me that, if attacked again, they would fast and pray as they
had done prior to the massacre of Acteal, when rumors of an impending attack were flying.
Nonviolence is a cornerstone of Las Abejas’ faith; dignity and faith were at the center of their
struggle against the Mexican government. In 1998, the membership of Las Abejas from
Chenalhó swelled and displaced persons’ camps were created at Tzaljachen, Polhó, X’Oyep, INI,
Nueva Primavera and Don Bosco. Acteal—and the communities of Chenalhó—was the central
point from which the newly displaced fled.
“Deterritorialization” in the sense that a global sensibility had come to replace a local
sensibility (Appadurai and Gupta 1996), and dispossession of peoples have become
commonplace in the global marketplace “as capital and labor flows come to replace the politics
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of place” (Nash 2005, 16). Capital and labor have both become more flexible,98 as the top-down
neoliberal economic model has come to replace Keynesian philosophy, traceable to the New
Deal, before Keynes aided the construction of the Bretton Woods system at the 1944 conference;
state intervention in the economy was the abiding principle.99 As a result of these changes in the
economic order, power and privilege have come to rest in fewer hands and inequality—a feature
of capitalism—has only worsened in the late 20th and early 21st century.100 Yet in Latin America,
there have been some signs of a reduction in social inequality in many countries between 2002
and 2014, according to CEPAL, brightening the worldwide situation (CEPAL 2018). However,
in Chiapas, poverty was deepening. Dispossession and accumulation by dispossession were
doing the work that feudalistic economic forms had historically done in Latin America (Semo
1990) by uprooting the most indefensible and precarious.

Aftermath of the Massacre at Acteal
According to many authors, the executive branch of the federal government planned and
executed the massacre at Acteal (Moksnes 2004; Tavanti 2003; CDHFBC 1998a; Bellinghausen

98

“Flexible accumulation” (D. Harvey 1989) has been replaced by flexibility of capital and labor in the late 20th and
early 21st centuries.
99
The IMF and the World Bank (IBRD) (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were formed to
reconstruct war-torn nations. Both saw their beginnings in this conference, as economists from 44 allied nations—
including Mexico—met in New Hampshire to discuss how to best “develop” economies destroyed by World War II.
After Europe and Japan were rebuilt, development monies were lent to “developing” nations in the so-called Third
World. Mexico used these funds to create a social security system, government hospitals, educational institutions, a
military—whose special units were trained at Fort Benning, Georgia—and INI.
100
Piketty (2014:200) has disputed Simon Kuznetz’s (1955) theory that inequality peaked with the rise of
agriculture and that it has been on a downward course ever since, through the Industrial revolution through to the
Informatics revolution of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Kuznetz argued that poor countries experience more
income inequality, while rich nations experience less income inequality because largely agricultural nations have
roughly fixed incomes. As nations experience economic growth, disparity in income first increases but then begins
to decrease. Piketty sees income inequality increasing with information economies because education is critical to
job creation. In industrialized nations there are technical jobs that go unfilled because employers cannot find
qualified labor.
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2007; Romo 2007; García 2007; Concha 2007). The “intellectual authors” of the massacre have
not been brought to justice. With the exception of Jacinto Arias Cruz, the ex-mayor of Chenalhó
who served time, all ex-public servants are free. Meanwhile, of the 88 paramilitaries, six were
absolved—only 82 served time, although the sentences were between 18 and 40 years in prison,
none of which were concluded. Twenty-seven arrest warrants were not given out (Mariscal
2009).
On November 19, 1998, the Attorney General’s Office (Procuraduría General de la
República or PGR) released a report of two hundred pages, the Libro Blanco Sobre Acteal, in an
attempt to exonerate the perpetrators of the massacre and to call the conflict “inter-ethnic and
inter-community violence” both a result of the sand bank dispute and revenge for the death of
Agustín Vázquez, close relative to leaders of the community of Quextic, whose assassination
occurred days before the massacre (PGR 1998). The Libro Blanco report blamed the violence on
inter-religious disputes using the example of witchcraft conducted by traditionalist Catholics
upon Protestant converts’ fields and animals and against Evangelicals in general (PGR 1998). It
blamed the violence for the military regimentation under which Zapatista autonomous
municipios lived, even in areas in which non-Zapatistas lived as well. It cited page after page of
killings of both PRIistas and members of the EZLN in the communities of Chenalhó. Perhaps
most damningly, the Libro Blanco stated that the massacre was a “battle;” it stated that the over
one hundred attackers actually numbered nine, and it maintained that there was a “defeated”
counterparty—revising the earlier “official” version in which there was paramilitary
involvement—and raising the impunity of those responsible to an even higher level (PGR 1998;
Bellinghausen 2007). The report stated that “the killings were an act of unjustifiable barbarism
originating in a years-long confrontation between social and political antagonists in Chenalhó”
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(PGR 1998, García and Villafuerte 1999, 9). The Wall Street Journal added soon after the
massacre that “violence has become an increasingly frequent way to settle political and juridical
differences in Chiapas since the start of the EZLN armed rebellion” (January 9, 1998).
On August 26, 2009, twenty of the paramilitaries serving sentences of twenty-five years
were released from prison on technical grounds; 30 more were freed several days later, as the
Supreme Court in a 4-1 decision ignored eyewitness evidence and chose to spotlight
“mismanagement” of the investigation rather than the severity of the crime (LibertadLatina.org,
August 28, 2009). Acteal had been a crime of the state, and the Supreme Court justices were
dismissing the material perpetrators on formal and substantive legal grounds—although the
atrocities and their guilt to which many paramilitaries had confessed were never in question. It
was a brilliant maneuver on the part of the Mexican state to exonerate those who had carried out
the material crime; the intellectual authors were never charged, except informally by the three
human rights’ centers, Frayba, CNDH, and CIDH, who to no avail took every opportunity to
incriminate the executive branch,101 especially in the lead-up to the tenth anniversary of the
massacre (Bellinghausen 2007; Romo 2007; Garcia 2007; Bellinghausen 2007; Concha 2007).
Several months after the twentieth anniversary of the Acteal massacre, SIPAZ reported
that:
On March 23, the Acteal, Root Memory and Hope campaign was launched from the
offices of the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center (CDHFBC) in San
Cristóbal de Las Casas. The campaign will take place within the framework of the XX
years of the Acteal Massacre and of the XXVth anniversary of the founding of the civil
101

Acteal was a crime ordered by the executive branch of the government. The rationale was that Las Abejas were
an easier target than the armed Zapatistas. Máscara Roja, the paramilitary responsible for the massacre, shouted
“Kill the seed!” as they ripped open pregnant womens’ wombs to remove the unborn fetuses. This tactic was the
same as used by the Guatemalan kabiles, an elite counterinsurgency unit that has reportedly trained 50 high-ranking
Mexican military officers since the 1994 uprising of the EZLN (el Financiero, January 25, 1998). The federal army
does not operate without orders from the executive branch. A Chase Bank memo in 1994 advised the Mexican
government to neutralize the EZLN. This order came directly from the United States.
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society organization of Las Abejas to “make visible our journey as survivors and victims
of the Acteal Massacre and as members of the Civil Society Organization Las Abejas de
Acteal […] exchange and share experiences with men and women from towns and cities
who also fight for the same cause as us” as well as to “to point out the material and
intellectual authors of the Acteal Massacre and that the Mexican State recognizes its
responsibility that Acteal is a State Crime of Humanity. And to denounce that the
Mexican State has not been able to ensure the non-repetition of events such as Acteals.”
They affirmed that “it is the way to search for truth and true justice. But it is also
memory, because we will be remembering, informing and denouncing.”
During the launch, Gonzalo Ituarte, Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CDHFBC
and Vicar of Justice and Peace of the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, shared his
testimony. On the day of the massacre he reported receiving two calls from Chenalhó
informing him of the approach of an armed group firing. He indicated that he had twice
called the government secretary to address this situation. However, no aid was sent for
which Gonzalo Ituarte denounced “the way in which the government had deceived us and
how he [the government secretary] had allowed, what he means, how he had provoked
that massacre. AND the government that could stop all this did not do it and I am
convinced that it did not because it was part of their plan, they wanted to kill, they
wanted to destroy the heart of civil society, which sought just causes and the solution of
the problem. They wanted to kill and killed conscience and this causes indignation and
this is a crime unpunished today” (SIPAZ Report March 2018).

And the National Center for Human Rights (CNDH) issued its recommendation which
likewise determined irregularities in the case:
Based on its investigation into the incident at Acteal, on 8 January 1998, CNDH issued
recommendation 01/98 addressed to the Governor of the State of Chiapas and the federal
Attorney-General, in which it pointed to a series of omissions and irregularities on the
part of the state authorities which it considered amounted to human rights violations….

166

On 1 April 1998, PGR [Procuraduría General de la República] established the Office of
the Special Prosecutor to investigate the crimes committed in Chenalhó municipality,
State of Chiapas […]In the document PGR explained the Acteal massacre as the
culmination of long-standing and unresolved conflicts between local indigenous
communities, and concluded that the authorities had contributed to the increasing tensions
and insecurity by failing to take appropriate action to investigate a series of crimes
committed in the region before the incident on 22 December 1997 (Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre 2005).
The true authors of the crime remained free, as did a majority of the paramilitaries who
carried out their orders. Most observers agree that the paramilitary attack on unarmed Las Abejas
members was a result of the cease-fire signed by the EZLN and the Mexican military; with their
hands tied, the military had to arm paramilitary bands to do its handiwork—and to take the
blame. Yet most of the 88 aggressors involved in the attack served less than half of their twentyfive-year sentence, causing the human rights centers to reiterate that the government was
washing its hands of the massacre. The government denied the low-intensity war that it was
waging in Chiapas, and its flagrant human rights violations, instead blaming the violence on
interethnic and inter-community feuds. The truth was much more damning.
In this chapter, I profile Manuel, a man in his sixties and father of eight who was present
in Acteal on the day of the massacre (his ten-year-old son was wounded in the knee), and present
a human rights’ workshop held by the Centro Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas
which was held at Acteal on July 4, 1999. I use these cases to analyze the aftermath of the Acteal
massacre.
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“God Wanted There to be Abejas”: The Community that Attracted the Paramilitaries’ Ire
The Christianity-based Las Abejas allied itself politically with the Zapatistas but
proclaimed its independence by its practice of pacifism. Manuel, a man in his sixties and father
of eight who was present in Acteal on the day of the massacre, saw the difference between the
two groups in religious terms:
We say that God wanted there to be ‘Abejas’ and Zapatistas, but because the Zapatistas
use arms we don’t want to be part of this organization. For us, our arms come from God.
We are a civil society. We pray in our churches and temples, asking God to fill us with a
non-violent spirit for the fight ahead. We are rich, not in wealth, but in happiness before
God.
In 1994, three years before the massacre, Las Abejas were resisting the government by
pirating electricity from power lines that ran along the highway and refusing to pay taxes or for
municipal water. In an affront to the government and in keeping with the Zapatista agenda of aid
rejection, they turned down help from the Secretariat of Health, from Albores Guillén, the
governor of Chiapas, and from the state agency Asuntos Indígenas (Indigenous Affairs). They
refused to be cowed despite well-founded fears. The IDPs who had fled to Acteal faced
paramilitaries bent on violence and plunder. Fear permeated the village: “we were caught
between bullets and the paramilitaries who were robbing us. In fact, we heard rumors that the
paramilitaries were coming to massacre us, to destroy the community” (Manuel, Interview at
INI, February 8, 1999).
Manuel remained stoic. He recognized the diminished life chances he and his community
faced, but he was defiant in his Christian faith and will to do what was right.
We ask God because He is the only God. Because in all the world He is the only one, He
knows how to give justice. For us, the riches of wealth aren’t everything. We say that we
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hope for death through disease because we don’t want the sickness that comes through
money.

After the massacre, Las Abejas directly confronted Emilio Rabasa, the government
representative to COCOPA, the federal agency charged with negotiating with the EZLN, and
demanded that the government put paramilitary members behind bars and aid those displaced
from Los Altos in reclaiming their homes. Manuel conveyed the sentiment of Las Abejas. The
paramilitaries had to be neutralized because they threatened the day-to-day safety of the IDPs. In
1999, members of the Abejas community finally could harvest their cafetales (coffee plots) with
the protection of the International Red Cross, but they also needed machetes and hoes, tools they
had lost when they fled the violence, Manuel related to me on the morning of the move back to
Acteal when most everyone was in an expansive mood and we were awaiting the press
conference with the Mesa Directiva recounted in Chapter Six (Interview with Manuel at INI,
February 8, 1999).
On May 21, 1999, the federal attorney general finally arrested Victorio Arias Pérez
Pérez, the organizer of the Acteal massacre. Pedro, one of the IDPs from the INI camp describes
what happened that day. The PGR (Procuraduría General de la República, the federal Attorney
General’s office prosecutors) took Pérez to the jail in Pantelhó. Two hundred PRIistas, men and
women from Canolal, came to block the highway to Pantelhó to stop them.102 “They had arms,
machetes, everything.” The car the PGR sent could not get past the crowd so they dispatched a
helicopter. At 2 or 3 in the afternoon, the crowd dispersed. According to Pedro, “they couldn’t
fight against the helicopter. They didn’t have the high caliber arms to stop [the helicopter]. They

102

Support for the paramilitaries was hardly unanimous within the PRI. The municipal president of Chenalhó, a
Priista, was opposed to the paramilitaries.
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[the PGR] took him to Tuxtla Gutiérrez and put him in prison” (Interview with Pedro, August 2,
1999).

Acteal, June-July 1999
Early one misty morning in the summer of 1999, enveloped by the clouds that cloak the
mountaintops of highland Chiapas, I walked down the alternately rocky and still-muddy path
leading to Manuel’s family’s rough-hewn shack about a quarter mile from the Acteal camp. I
was invited for breakfast. Hot, strong freshly brewed shade-grown coffee boiled in a pot, black
beans were cooking on the kettle over the fire and tortillas were on the comal just outside the
house as Manuel’s wife, Catarina, squatted and flipped smoky tortillas to make tostadas on the
metal comal. There was much to discuss, and this was the first sign of normalcy as the family
attempted to carve out its own space in the Acteal camp’s environs. Technically, the family was
squatting on the land, on the outskirts of Acteal. I was reminded of a conversation I had had with
Manuel in early February of 1998 at INI, when Manuel had poignantly discussed the meaning of
loss of land to IDPs, who had lost not only their homes but most importantly, their lands. “Land
is life,” Manuel related, on the verge of tears, in February, 1998, when, for the first time, the
IDPs could not harvest their cafetales (Interview with Manuel at INI, February 1, 1998). His
voice growing thick, this former campesino turned desplazado was feeling desperate. Without
land to plant, Manuel felt lost. He could not return to the land which was home, subsistence,
succor, and on which his ancestors were buried. Land has the meaning of “territory” for Maya
who have lived on it for thousands of years (Vergara-Camus 2014, 89). Vergara-Camus relates
that this relationship to land becomes “a moral discourse” for the EZLN: “subsistence needs and
the right to a dignified life take precedence over legality” (2014, 82, 89). In Chiapas, this land
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takeover occurred with displacement, too, as the IDPs colonized new lands in the selva and in the
highlands, land to which they had no title, but which they occupied and planted, beginning in
1999, in Acteal, with their return. Gonzalo Ituarte of CDHFBLC explained that for indigenous
people,
the land is much more than something to buy and sell; the land is their mother. When
indigenous people are preparing to plant, they first ask permission from the mother
earth: “Forgive me, I’m going to hurt you. But we need the food that comes from you.”
Then they give thanks for the harvest. It’s a sacred relationship. Nature is part of their
lives. The new Mexican laws invite indigenous people to buy and sell their own
mother. But for the landowners, land is a business (Ituarte 1998, 106).

During the four weeks I spent living at the Acteal internally-displaced persons’ camp. I
spoke with Manuel many times. On this particular morning, we discussed the events leading up
to the massacre. Manuel related the following:
In ’94, we organized. We resist here by not paying for water, light or taxes. We set up our
lights from the wires that run down the highway. We rejected the aid of Ramón de La
Fuente, of the government, of Albores Guillén, the governor, Asuntos Indígenas
[Indigenous Affairs, a state agency].
The Mexican Red Cross came, and we accepted them right away because they are
neutral. Dr. José Luis Nájera, a coordinator for the Mexican Red Cross came here to
Acteal the day before the massacre to bring clothing—he brought three truckfuls of
clothing. We didn’t know who these people were, from the Mexican Red Cross, who
wanted to help the displaced.
Only one day before [the massacre] the things they brought were inside the hermitage
[the church which was fired upon]. We were all there, to distribute the aid. The clothes to
be distributed were in big black bags. We were going to distribute the things on Monday
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[the 22nd]—everyone was gathered here for that. The paramilitaries took everything.
Many other bags were hanging on trees— food, clothing, skirts for the women, toys for
the children—we were all waiting to give this out, but they took everything.
We were simply here, praying to God. More than 300 people were living here. There
weren’t any problems then between the PRI, Las Abejas, and the Zapatista bases then.
Although not a representante, Manuel took it upon himself to speak for the group of IDPs
at the INI—and later, Acteal—camps. Manuel was foremost a campesino, but was also a natural
leader, exuding a confidence that some of the actual representantes lacked when presenting
themselves to outside personnel—myself included—who approached the camp leadership. Part
of the reason for this may have been Manuel’s age; a man in his sixties, he was one of the elders
at camp. And because Miguelito, his youngest son, was shot in the knee at Acteal, he had
become accustomed to speaking to organs of Frayba and the press who approached his family.
His eldest son elected to remain behind at INI once his father and slightly more than half the
group returned to Acteal in February of 1999, because he was developing a customer base for his
loom, bought with the proceeds from the government settlement for his brother’s injury at
Acteal.
Problems intensified once the paramilitary band, Máscara Roja, became a peripheral
presence—recognized on sight—at both the INI camp and Acteal. Because the paramilitary
operatives were members of the same communities from which the displaced fled, they were
well-known to Las Abejas. Juan Javier Ruiz Pérez, at the time, 13, and originally from Canolal—
the community from which Sebastián, and many other research participants at INI came—related
that he heard his father, a paramilitary, tell his mother, ““I used my machete against those who
were pregnant.” He told my mother. I heard what my father said” (quoted in Rabasa 2010, 169).
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The subject of the paramilitary came up again and again, as research participants at
Acteal recounted the events after the massacre. Pepe, a teenager in charge of the children at INI,
and knowledgeable of the threat of paramilitary there, as at Acteal, told me:

Here in Acteal, people are very afraid. They say that they are going to come by a second
time to kill us. Because of this, we have begun to fast and to pray again—we congregate
in the church [the hermitage].
In January, 2001, tensions were still high in Acteal. Pablo Vásquez Ruis, president of one
of the coffee cooperatives organized by Las Abejas, talked about the military. “They weren’t
here before the massacre. They arrived in late 1997. But Seguridad Pública (the police) were
here since 1994. Before the massacre, Seguridad Pública came with the paramilitaries to rob Las
Abejas while whole families were out harvesting their coffee.” “They also robbed things like
televisions and cars,” related Mariano Pérez Vásquez, president of the Mesa Directiva in 2001.
Under circumstances of fear, in the immediate aftermath of the killings, it was difficult
for people to think of much more than fasting and praying, given their emphasis on non-violence
and religious expression rather than fighting back. This did not preclude learning about human
rights and human rights violations.103 But this was something that required education in the
vocabulary of human rights.
This is illustrated in the next section, which profiles a human rights workshop attended
by representantes from the communities of Chenalhó and survivors of the Acteal massacre where
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The upsurge of indigenous activism in the Americas in the 1990s can be traced to the Spanish government’s
naïve celebratory plans in the lead up to the Columbus quincentennial in 1992—celebrating Columbus’s arrival
instead of protesting it the way indigenous peoples did. Because the EZLN had given voice to the voiceless,
subaltern, marginalized groups, women and the poor, indigenous peoples throughout Mexico began to feel pride in a
status which only a few years before had garnered ridicule and rejection. In 1992, even before the 1994 uprising,
indigenous peoples in San Cristóbal de Las Casas toppled the statue of Diego de Mazariegos, a conquistador, in a
popular fury on the “día de la raza,” (“Day of the race”), October 12, in an unexpected counter-rebellion against the
quincentennial “celebration” of the Spanish Conquest over indigenous peoples in Latin America.
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the concept of rights was taught to representatives of the communities and survivors. Many of
the workshop attendees learned about their rights for the first time, vernacularizing the idea of
rights, seeing human rights through their own eyes, and trying to make sense of them. The
workshop gave the displaced survivors of the massacre an opportunity to make sense of what
they had been through and frame an appropriate response to the events.

A Human Rights Workshop at Acteal, July 4, 1999
According to cultural theorist José Rabasa, the aftermath of the massacre at Acteal
engendered cross-cultural competency and Western forms of discourse, best expressed in
indigenous victims learning the codes of human rights organizations (Rabasa 2010, 170). The
human rights workshop for 75 Las Abejas representantes from the communities of Chenalhó,
profiled here, is a fascinating example of the way Western discourses are manipulated by the
powerful against the powerless. Rabasa believes that Las Abejas were well on their way to
leaving their subaltern status behind as a result of taking on the language of these discourses.
This code is also an example of what Sally Engle Merry termed “vernacularization,” i.e., how
human rights norms are understood on the ground in different settings. “Vernacularization” is
defined as “the appropriation and local adoption of globally generated ideas and strategies.” In
an article comparing women’s rights in India, China, Peru, and the United States, two dilemmas
are raised, “a resonance dilemma and an advocacy dilemma,” which both arise from the disparity
between human rights as law and human rights as a social movement (Levitt and Merry 2009).
Both of these insights apply to the human rights workshop at Acteal, where Frayba, the
human rights center in San Cristóbal, arranged a series of workshops to teach the survivors of the
Acteal massacre their human rights as expressed in the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.
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Vernacularization occurred when university-educated human rights lawyers came to Acteal to
teach representantes their human rights so that they could teach their constituents, the indigenous
communities from which they came. In this, the center was operating under the guise of human
rights law, rather than human rights as a social movement. This was the most common treatment
of human rights. However, the larger framework of the center was clearly arranged as a social
movement as Frayba became the nexus for indigenous victims of crimes and NGOs to come
together under the human rights umbrella. The following account illustrates the way both
concepts, human rights as law and as a social movement, were at work in Acteal in July 1999.
But it also raises the issue of how participants understood what they were hearing.
Among those present at the workshop were some of the elected representantes
(representatives) of the Zapatista and Las Abejas communities, who serve for two years as
representitives of their communities in political forums and other events that require a
community voice. The representantes act as liaisons between their communities and outside
groups and individuals and are the persons first approached when outsiders want access to the
community. The group nominates individuals, and then the men, women, and children of the
community vote. There were two women in attendance, representantes of the communities of
Tzaljucum and Chijiltón, both desplazadas who now lived in Acteal. One seemed outspoken, far
more so than is common for women. Several times she answered the questions being asked in a
loud voice. While she waited to go up to read the card she has been given—each representante
has been given such a card— there was a clamor in the room (an open, outdoor space), and
several of the men called out teasingly, “antz!” (“woman!” in Tzotzil) as in “the woman wants to
talk.” Women were not accustomed to speaking at meetings where both women and men are
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representatives. When she went up to read a few minutes later, her voice came out weak and
difficult to understand, although she gained a little confidence towards the end.
On the first day, workshop leaders from Frayba taught participants about the Mexican
constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The second day’s subject was
crimes, specifically the crime of Acteal. Frayba had engaged in human rights defenses since
1994. Lawyers were well aware of the severity of the crimes carried out against largely
indigenous victims. The majority of the human rights cases handled by Frayba are in defense of
the indigenous clients that Bishop Samuel Ruiz founded the Center to defend. Alma tells the
participants “you have to learn the law so that one day you can make new laws which take into
account ‘la palabra de la indígena’ (the word of the indigenous). The military has jurisdiction
only over the military and not over los civiles, civil society, or civilians.” This was a clear
example of vernacularization, learning the law so that new laws can one day be made.
As if to highlight Alma’s concern about the importance of the rule of law, two men came
ambling by and the representantes (including the two women representantes) hissed, laughed and
booed. I asked whether these two men are the paramilitaries who were spying on the camp the
day before: my assumption is right. The previous night I had learned that in Canolal Las Abejas
members feared leaving their homes and going to their fields because of the strong paramilitary
presence. The men had been joking that the women have to go out and do all the shopping
because the men are staying off the highway. A representante volunteered that he saw Manuel
Luna, one of those charged with the Acteal massacre, in Pantelhó buying lámina, an aluminum
roof. The representante commented that poco a poco (little by little) the police will round them
all up. They had apprehended only a small number so far, but there were arrest warrants for the
remaining 75 others. Except for the few in prison, all but one were still living here in Chenalhó.
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We returned to the presentation, and Alma explained various components of the law and
why the law is necessary. She defined “daño” (harm) and noted that it includes burning a house.
“It destroys it,” she says, stating that “these are all crimes.” “The harm has to endanger someone
to be a crime.”104 A representante replied that it is not the custom to take the person to the
authorities rather than to take the law into one’s own hands if someone trespasses. In reply,
Alma used the example of crimes multiplying, saying that this “is why the law is important—to
keep this from happening.” “You kill the horse that has been eating your plants, the horse’s
owner kills your horse, you kill his brother.… This is why we need laws, to stop this.”105
A discussion then ensued between the representante serving as an interpreter and Alma:
“When can you apprehend someone?” he asks. Alma explains the contradictory nature of the
Constitution, how it protects those who carry arms. The representante interrogates her further: “If
there is a group of men carrying arms, can we capture them?” Alma says that carrying arms is
not enough; “only when they are in flagrant violation of the law” can violators be arrested. “And
in Mexico, people have the right to bear arms. If it is an urgent moment, if your life is at stake,
you have the right to apprehend them. Not otherwise.” She also relates that Article 16 of the
Mexican Constitution allows citizen arrests, but otherwise, apprehending armed civilians is the
law’s jurisdiction, the police’s right.106 Within this brief exchange between Alma and the
interpreter is the conundrum that the displaced face when they choose to work within a human
rights framework. The rule of law is hardly settled. Individuals have the right to carry arms. That
right can be challenged by other individuals when they are under threat, but ultimately the
104

Except for so-called victimless crimes which do no harm to individuals.
This doesn’t take into account the concept of legal pluralism,” i.e., the existence of two different and often
overlapping legal systems. The concept of usos y costumbres in Mexican law is to some extent an acknowledgement
of this.
106
Alma said “right,” but most legal systems distinguish between “right” and “power” when it comes to the police.
Here the police have the “power” but not a deeper “right.”
105

177

exercise of these conflicting rights depends on institutional power, which is subject to political
power. And institutional power is the state’s right, a point made by Leavitt and Merry (2009).
Esperanza then took over the workshop, remarking that everyone will now work in
teams. “We will learn the names of the laws. Each team has 20 people” (there are 74 at the
workshop). She handed out a drawing of a crime, a shooting and a house burning, a colored page
describing the law, and then a paper detailing how long a criminal can be held in jail.
Participants were to look for a corresponding drawing to match the crime with the law that it
offends and its punishment. Assuming that workshop members learned best when they have to
present material, the group quietly divided into four teams—and did this twice. Doing this twice
means that most would learn at least two laws. Mauricio, who is doing the translation, joked
while setting up the teams that “this is like [the children’s game] ‘a pares y nones’” (evens and
odds).
When picking numbers there was confusion over 1,2,3—the numbers had to be translated
into Tzotzil. Then Mauricio joked, “the women can’t speak [Spanish] so they can’t be broken
up!” They spent about 20 minutes in their groups. The two women were put together in group
two. One of the laws is “la ley de explosivos”—the law of explosives—which is a federal law. In
the case of Acteal, Esperanza said, “it wasn’t a crime for the paramilitaries to carry arms, but the
massacre—the use of arms against innocent people—was a crime.” Then she seemed to pivot,
“in the Libro Blanco there is no low-intensity war, there IS no war.” Alma added, that “in the
case of Acteal, it is very difficult. There is a war but the government doesn’t want to know that it
is happening here. This is the government’s way.”
By saying this, Alma and Esperanza explained the legal rights of the workshop attendees,
emphasizing throughout that the law is complicated. They added that the government does not
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want to know what is happening. They seem to have undermined everything they had just said.
Or were they adding context? Their point is that rights are real and a basis for action, but it is
necessary to analyze power to understand the possibility of rights.
“For the investigation of the crime of Acteal,” she continued, “there are 45 deaths and 22
injured. There were house burnings, shootings, robberies, carrying arms with the intention of
killing, threats. But the authorities didn’t act. They didn’t do anything to stop the massacre, so
the massacre continued. From the Libro Blanco, it seems that there are no paramilitaries.
Paramilitaries are here to kill, to commit crimes. For the authorities this isn’t much. Therefore, it
is very important for us to understand political matters. We have to think how we are going to
organize ourselves so that we can fight.” From Frayba’s point of view, knowing the law was the
first step.
Vicente asked, “What can we do about the paramilitaries? His wife was killed at Acteal,
he added. Alma said: “the 23rd (the day after Acteal) was the [day of the] denuncia (formal
accusation),” just a little while after the crime. We have to remember that the government
received the news the next morning. The government said ‘it seems as though the police will find
a solution. This is not a problem for the federal and state authorities—they created the problem
and haven’t done anything. In this case, the authorities were carrying arms—by law it is also
prohibited to carry arms. This deed was a crime. The authorities didn’t do anything on that day.
They began by asking the police, the justices, how could this happen?” Then Alma asked, “Who
made the denuncia? How many were apprehended?” The answer: “twenty-four people were
taken in, but they were only held until January 1998. Seguridad Pública, the police, could have
prevented their passage on the roads—yet they and the military did nothing.” Then she asked,
“Who should be accused? The answer: 1. Seguridad Pública; 2. The PGR, the authority which
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should do the investigation and the truth-finding. But to do this you need a denuncia, to make
formal charges. What happened? Who did it?” A young man in the audience answered that “I put
in a denuncia on the 25th.” Alma continued, “Others to be blamed are: The Undersecretary of the
Interior, Uriel Jarquín, Tonilla Cristiani; the Police of Seguridad Pública. The paramilitaries
robbed before the massacre and on the day of the massacre, and nothing happened.”
“We have to apply these laws to both victims and to perpetrators,” Alma continues. “Just
like it’s not a crime to do brujería (witchcraft), it’s not a crime to have paramilitaries. [Yet,] the
PRIistas in Canolal and Quextic planned how they would attack. They organized to kill Las
Abejas and Zapatistas, to rob coffee, houses, to intimidate. But they organized to do this—and
this in itself is a crime. The government does not want to accept that the crime was planned
beforehand. The government does not want to accept that there is a war here—there is no
punishment of the authorities. They also let armed groups pass through the country. This, too, is
a crime and they have ignored it.” Alma asked, “What are we going to do if there is no
punishment?”
Unwilling to let matters rest, Alma challenged the workshop participants: “What should
have been done?” She announced that the paramilitaries should have been detained until the 25th;
the authorities should have been publicly accused, and “we need to speak of truth-finding;
something needs to be done and nothing is.” What happened:
1. The denuncia: before the Ministerio Público (there were many declarations).
2. Twenty-four were taken to Cerro Hueco, the prison in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.
3. Some of the people involved were turned in—this and conducting an
investigation are the roles of the Public Ministry. This is much deeper.
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“The CDHFBC role is to support the representantes and to teach human rights,” Alma
continued. As the workshop ended, I reflected on its significance. It covered many points of law
and, although partisan, presented an evenhanded view of the law as would any law team. The
representantes had an intense interest in the workshop. Their questions at the workshop reflected
concerns they had in the wake of the massacre. In 1999, paramilitaries were wandering freely in
Chenalhó, a daily threat to them, to their families, to their livelihoods, and to their future.
The practice of disappearances or murder, forced displacement, and ambush are crimes
against humanity that violate the International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute, which went into
force on July 1, 2002 (CDHFBC 2011; Enlace Zapatista 2011). Prior to the Rome Statute, rights
to life, liberty, and personal integrity were protected by international treaties and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and these were clearly violated in the massacre at Acteal, as they
were violated in the zona norte by the paramilitary group, Desarrollo, Paz y Justicia
(Development, Peace and Justice) from 1995 to 2001 (CDHFBC 2011). The human rights
workshop at Acteal focused on the rights of the person and explained to the representatives,
among whom were victims, why Acteal was a crime from a legal standpoint. The workshop
facilitators stressed that proof—documents, local and expert witnesses, testimonies, and
confessions and the direct, material evidence of death, the bullets and high-caliber rifle
wounds—was critical to making a legal case.107
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In fact, The Ministerio Público, Frayba, and ARIC Independiente each accused particular perpetrators
of planning and carrying out the massacre. The Public Ministry, to whom the Seguridad Pública reported, however,
pointed its finger at the paramilitaries and eleven planners of the crime, including Julio César Sebastián Díaz, a
retired general and head advisor to the state’s Seguridad Pública, and the regional public security police in
Majomut. It forced the resignations of Chiapas Governor Julio César Ruiz Ferro and the interior minister, Emilio
Chauyfett. Frayba, the Centro Nacional de Derechos Humanos (National Center on Human Rights, CNDH) and the
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, CIDH), and ARIC
Independiente, a campesino union, made broader claims and pointed to a general amnesty that had gone into effect
and freed aggressors in 1999.
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What made this workshop so important was the presence of Acteal survivors and that the
participants all came from Chenalhó, where violence had been escalating since August 1997. All
had either had been victims or were potential victims. They recognized paramilitary members on
sight. Even as the workshop was in progress their reaction was to laugh and mock them, applying
classic social sanctions to those whose intentions were violent. Laughing and jeering, along with
gossip and shaming, are social control mechanisms which operate in every society, and here they
were being used against the paramilitary band that had killed 45 members of Las Abejas. This
seemingly mild reaction remained consistent with Las Abejas’ proscription of violence. Many
now residing at Acteal, even when rumors of an impending attack were rampant, told me that if
they were attacked again, they would fast and pray, as they had done the first time.
The workshop provided an opportunity for the representatives and survivors to process
the crime of Acteal and served as a psychological coping mechanism for Las Abejas members,
who were ever more convinced that their non-violence was the key to their survival as a group, if
not to their individual survival. They needed to hear the very specific ways that their human
rights had been violated, and the lawyers at Frayba were well aware that theirs was pressing
information that representantes would spread to other members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas.
Before concluding the discussion of the workshop, it is worth pausing to note how the
participation of the two women representantes in the workshop suggests ways in which
traditional gender relations were changing. Among Las Abejas, women occupied positions of
responsibility, but they carried out those responsibilities with ambivalence. That ambivalence
was a reflection of the social position that women were increasingly inhabiting. Even among Las
Abejas, women have positions where they speak publicly, such as they did at a conference in San
Cristóbal exploring the non-violent links with Gandhi in 1998. Yet, even at Acteal, as noted

182

above, to survive the repression and fear that accompanied the spread of paramilitaries women
had to take the place of male family members in public spaces. Yet women faced difficult
constraints. More than men, Maya women were less likely to speak Spanish or to have
experience working in the money economy.
One of the women at the workshop spoke softly, conforming to traditional standards of
comportment in Chenalhó and among indigenous women in the highlands more generally. The
other woman representante was more assertive and spoke in a loud voice when answering
questions. Among Zapatista women, there have been more obvious changes in traditional gender
relations over the past two decades, including learning Spanish, speaking out at public forums,
and carrying weapons (Toledo Tello and Garza Caligaris 2006; Millán Moncayo 2006;
Hernández et al, 2006; Klein 2015). These changes came to Las Abejas women only slowly.
Because the two women spoke only Tzotzil, the men at the workshop agreed that they couldn’t
be broken up when the groups were formed. Their monolingualism was a hindrance to their full
participation in the workshop, which was conducted in Spanish because none of the team from
Frayba spoke Tzotzil. Furthermore, ideas of rights and legality frequently require loan words
from Spanish, and a workshop conducted entirely in Tzotzil would have been difficult. The
women’s monolingualism, even though they were representatives of and spoke for their
communities, prevented their full participation in the political affairs of Las Abejas and in the
committee of reconciliation that Las Abejas and Zapatista representatives had created in the
spring of 1998 (Eber 2003, 153).
Las Abejas women did change, though. They nominated themselves for election in
community meetings (Speed, Hernández Castillo and Stephen 2006), which was an obvious
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break in gender relations and something that could not have occurred before 1994 when
Zapatismo opened up space for women’s political (and military) participation.

Conclusion
The idea that human rights law takes on the state—and its vernacularization occurs in
different settings—is an important insight. The human rights workshop at Acteal addressed this
issue. Levitt and Merry (2009, 443) also address the notion that culture is key to cultural
appropriation and vernacularization of human rights on the ground. Here I have shown that
culture is, indeed paramount to vernacularization and that the idea of human rights had to be
taught to survivors of the Acteal massacre, within a human rights as law framework, as the idea
of human rights was present merely in outline form in Tzotzil Maya culture—an idea that Fassin
(2012) develops within the critique of humanitarian reason, when he explores the idea that
France during the 1990s turned away from a human rights framework towards a compassionbased framework, evaluating refugees on a case by case basis with reference to their sick bodies
and ill health. Human rights had become an unwieldy issue, with many unemployed immigrants,
and a special dispensation, Article 12b11, would allow very ill foreigners, such as those with
AIDS, to remain in France (2012, 83-5). The parallel is that human rights were an underused
vehicle of law, as among the indigenous population in Chiapas. Yet, since the uprising,
indigenous communities were often steeped in the idea of human rights without necessarily
having a rights-based vocabulary, as the IDP Noemí illustrated in the last chapter, when she took
her daughter-in-law’s side over her son’s in a situation of domestic violence. Her son was a
PRIista and possibly a paramilitary, and often hit his wife. Noemí unambiguously took the
feminist and human rights position without realizing it herself. As Levitt and Merry (2009)
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remind us, women’s rights are human rights, and many women just don’t have the words for
their rights, although they have the ideas, such as “the idea that women should own property,
have the right to divorce, inherit money and land, earn income and express their views” (Levitt
and Merry 2009, 447). This was clearly the case among both women of the EZLN, which was
actively teaching women their rights through the women’s revolutionary law, holding, for
example, that women had the right to choose their husbands or partners, and to determine how
many children to have, and among Las Abejas. Las Abejas, for example, was founded over a
land dispute between a man and his two sisters over the right to the sisters’ inheritance. The
CDHFBC was actively involved in working to make human rights a reality in indigenous
communities, although its resources were limited. And, in the wake of Acteal, the breastfeeding
doll project was founded by CCESC and FONAES at the INI camp to provide work for the
female dollmakers so that they could support their families during a time of crisis. Yet, at the
human rights workshop at Acteal in 1999, there were two women representantes, and this
represented a sea change in Chenalhó, where women comported themselves according to
traditional standards, and were unwilling to put themselves up for elections, as I show in the next
chapter at a meeting of NGOs held at the INI camp. In the aftermath of Acteal it was critical that
both men and women learn their rights—their human rights—and that those rights never be
trampled on again.
The massacre at Acteal had forever changed the IDPs’ lives. Manuel’s son was injured in
the knee with a high-caliber bullet at Acteal and was a victim, with all the trauma that that
entailed. He suffered PTSD and had nightmares, but his father was extra protective of him
afterwards. And, as a group, the IDPs had gone from being self-sufficient campesinos and coffee
farmers with title to ejido lands to being landless IDPs. Manuel had told me that “land is life,”

185

and now he was left with none, forced to squat on a small piece of land in the environs of Acteal
starting with the return to Acteal in February of 1999, and left with no crops, although with the
aid of the ICRC, he was able to cut his cafetal in Quextic in 1999. His eldest son elected to
remain behind at the INI camp, as he had bought a loom with the proceeds from his younger
brother’s injury at Acteal and had developed a customer base. Yet, most of the IDPs, both those
who returned to Acteal and those who remained behind at the INI camp, were living lives of
uncertainty and pathos, as they had to eke out a precarious existence based on humanitarian aid
givers, “gifts” which they could not, for the most part, return—although they returned gifts to the
anthropologist, to whom they related on human terms, as I was on site at the INI camp every day.
I discuss humanitarian interventions and humanitarian crises, as well as the acceptance of
“forbidden” governmental humanitarian aid in the next chapter. I also discuss the split at the INI
camp and the return to Acteal in February, 1999, the moment when the IDPs’ commitment to Las
Abejas would be tested. Either they would break away and forge their own destiny or return to
Acteal, site of the massacre. It was an impossible choice but it was one that was theirs to make.
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Chapter Five:
The Struggle for Autonomy in the Context of a Humanitarian Crisis and the Return to
Acteal
“Do you want peace? Please contribute in whatever manner to bring about justice.”
“The indigenous IDPs in Acteal, Polhó and X’Oyep are around 8000 persons who need food,
kitchen utensils and medicines, principally. Their situation will not be immediately resolved.
They cannot return to their homes, they cannot do their work, they are impeded from living their
daily lives and for this they require humanitarian aid urgently.”
--Poster at
CARITAS, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, May, 1998
--Instituto Nacional Indígenista (INI). There are 19 families, some 110 persons originally from
Quextic, Canolal, Chimix and Yibeljoj. Some have work as peons in the city. They have had
much difficulty organizing themselves and because of this, their conditions of life are deficient” --Memo at CARITAS, June 3, 1998
As these epigraphs show, the IDPs in the highland camps in 1998 were living in dire
circumstances; they did not have enough to eat and, as a consequence, were malnourished and
losing weight. They had left everything behind in their home communities and were dependent
upon aid organizations for their very survival. This chapter examines the politics of humanitarian
and development aid in the summer of 1998, a time when the lack of assistance had become a
crisis as aid for displaced Las Abejas and BAEZLN was reduced to the barest essentials.
Crucially, I discuss international humanitarian aid interventions—the Mexican Red Cross, the
International Committee of the Red Cross, CARITAS and others, and the ways in which these
“gifts” were received or rejected at the INI camp. There was also a struggle between the ICRC,
backed by the European Union, and the Mexican government for control of the aid-giving
process in 1998. The challenges the displaced faced in this project of autonomy were many. As
Nash (2005, 17) recounts, by 2003, “many of the people living in the autonomous communities
had begun to accept government medicines and to send their children to public schools.”108 I
108

JBG caracoles, formerly autonomous municipalities. The caracoles are snail shells which wind into themselves,
representing the political structure of the post-2003 communities which is governed by the Juntas de Buen Gobierno.
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show that government aid acceptance began in 1998 among former partisans of the EZLN. I
make the case that the newly displaced taking refuge at the INI camp in December of 1997 were
harbingers of political shifts that would occur because of structural pressures that affected even
some of the most committed Zapatista supporters. Structural poverty was the most important of
these factors, but during the height of the emergency in late 1997‒early 1998 humanitarian aid
was inadequate, as rations tapered off to only the most basic foodstuffs; by 1999 aid was a virtual
trickle.109 In the highland camps, there was discontent as the many thousands of displaced lived
in grim conditions, with insufficient potable water, inadequate shelter, no more than a two-week
ration of basic foodstuffs from the ICRC110 and the omnipresent threat of disease.111
Integral to this chapter is the ways various humanitarian aid agencies, both national and
international, jockeyed for position in the aid giving process during 1998 and the ways in which
they were received at the INI camp, with some accepted and some rejected. This set up a
competition for resources among the agencies in a Gramscian war of position, with some
humanitarian aid agencies receiving international cachet for their ability to aid the IDPs of the
Chiapas conflict, and especially those coming from Acteal after the massacre.112 The offer of aid
from COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa Gamboa in January 1999 caused internal division among
Sociedad Civil Las Abejas members at INI and split the camp into two over the acceptance of
forbidden humanitarian aid. Those who accepted aid, who included Sebastián and his family of
eight and eleven other families, were forced to relinquish membership in Sociedad Civil Las
109
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Six people died in early 1998 of curable diseases at X’Oyep, a Las Abejas camp in the highlands; common
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massacre, and was accoladed for getting things done. The Fideicomiso por los niños indeigenas, likewas, was on the
scene early on, as was CCESC. Many other NGOs jockeyed for position among these well-established NGOs and
among the INGOs, such as the ICRC.
110

188

Abejas as a consequence. Twelve families remained at INI, and 17 families returned to Acteal
amidst great fanfare, even though they expressed fear at returning to the site of the massacre 14
months earlier. At least one family remained at INI because of a man’s drinking, which was out
of control—and prohibited at the Acteal camp, as in the EZLN’s MAREZ. And finally, most of
the “gifts” of aid received at INI were assistentialist, only providing for two week’s needs, and
not working towards enacting structural changes in society, and this was the aid of which the
IDPs were the most critical. The primary exception to this assistentialist aid was the doll project,
treated in Chapter Seven. But, although the IDPs were critical of the ICRC’s “gift” of food aid,
they had little choice but to accept it. Assistentialist or not, this food aid ensured their survival in
the short term.

Displacement in the Highlands, 1997-98
In 1994, at the beginning of the conflict, 19,996 people were officially displaced in
Chiapas; and another 6,929 in 1998. According to Las Abejas spokesperson Lorenzo Pérez
Arias, in the municipio of Chenalhó there were 14 displaced communities in six camps, or 982
displaced families of 5,083 persons,113 4,000 of whom were Las Abejas and the rest BAEZLN
(PGR 1998). This was directly due to the Zapatista uprising, and differs markedly from
economically-based local or interstate migrations which had occurred in Chiapas since the 1970s
to find work in factories or, in the case of migratory labor on the fincas, since the Spanish
Conquest.
This desplazamiento, or displacement, was of a different sort: one-third of the displaced
in 1998 came to the city of San Cristóbal, while in 1994 and 1995, most remained in the zona
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norte as displacement remained purely a rural phenomenon. In 1994, nine percent of the
population of Los Altos was displaced. That percentage increased fourfold by 1998 when 34
percent had fled their highland communities. Twelve percent of the displaced were members of
Las Abejas, and 65 percent were members of the EZLN. Two-thirds of the displaced remained at
Polhó, Tzaljachen, Acteal, and other highland camps. By the end of January, 1998, the number
taking refuge at INI in San Cristóbal de Las Casas swelled to 230—by March, it had dropped
down to 110; in January, 1998, Nueva Primavera and Don Bosco, the other two camps in San
Cristóbal held 108 and 221 respectively (Rebón 2001, 87, 18, 91, 112, 76).

An Overwhelming Concern
During 1998 and 1999, Las Abejas and the EZLN were preoccupied with the question of
accepting or rejecting humanitarian aid. If they accepted the forbidden government aid, the
government might decide to use that as propaganda. At the very least, compliance would be
demanded—that is, the EZLN and Las Abejas would be forced to be silent and not complain
about the abysmal conditions in their camps. At that point, plastic sheeting and poles made up
the extent of the housing for many families in the highland camps, and at INI there were no beds,
petates (traditional bedding) or blankets. Despite most aid agencies’ good intentions,
humanitarian aid is rarely neutral—even from the International Committee of the Red Cross—
but rather, represents the agenda of the donor, government or NGO. It is life-giving in times of
crisis, but what is asked in exchange? I argue that displaced members of Las Abejas were forced
to adhere to an agenda that they didn’t create, giving up both agency and sought-after autonomy.
What role did NGOs and the diocese of San Cristóbal have in forging—and forcing—consensus
among the displaced at INI? How did the question of humanitarian aid contribute to the
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ideological split at the INI camp, when half the Las Abejas members returned to Acteal in
February 1999 rather than accept state aid? And most importantly, how did offers of aid detract
from the EZLN’s project of autonomy and freedom from government control? These were
questions that arose in 1998 and 1999, as displaced members of Las Abejas struggled for
autonomy at a time when little humanitarian aid was available in the camps, and are questions
that remain relevant in similar situations today.
Of the few in-depth studies of internally displaced persons in the social sciences, many
are neither historically, politically nor economically-situated nor theoretically strong (Malkki
2002; 1995; Hein 1993; Loescher 1988). Although fields such as international relations, public
health and humanitarian assistance have begun to study forced population movements, the
subject has usually been treated in a manner that addresses the short-term, emergency nature of
such crises or management of resettlement or return (Loescher 1988; Billings 1995). One
exception is Long (2011), who frames displacement from an international angle and asks if the
displacement phenomenon is a “permanent crisis.” Issues which have received attention over the
past several years are mental health, armed conflict as it affects women in the camp and the
“hidden crisis” of internal displacement (Porter and Haslam 2005; Swiss et al. 2019; Morton and
Burnham 2008). Yet, in general, scant attention is paid to external, international linkages and
resistance in the camp setting.
The lack of attention to these issues in the social sciences has created an unfortunate gap
in our knowledge at a time when the increasing numbers of refugees and internally displaced
persons throughout the world reaches a critical mass, heightening an already precarious stability
in many states. It is crucial that qualitative social sciences, such as anthropology, begin to work
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to close that gap. Because, as Greg Beckett (2013, 85-6) reminds us, “few words more clearly
define our time than emergency.”

The State of the Emergency
In an often-reproduced photograph in La Jornada, a woman seeking refuge at Polhó in
November 1997 arrived clutching an infant to her bare breast—she had been washing her clothes
in a stream near her home community of Tzajalhukum when paramilitaries opened fire (La
Jornada, 1997). Tzajalhukum was a community composed primarily of Las Abejas members.
Facing paramilitary threats, they fled en masse to Polhó, abandoning their community and
leaving their possessions. This event occurred three weeks before the massacre at Acteal, but it
was clear that the level of violence had intensified since early September when PRI
paramilitaries first forced EZLN sympathizers and members of Las Abejas from their homes and
communities in the highlands. Violence had been occurring in the zona norte since 1995, causing
high levels of displacement and fear. When I first visited Chenalhó in September 1997, in the
company of Rosa, a Chamulan woman who had been born in a community which bordered
Chenalhó and who was visiting her father who lived nearby, there was some concern that it
might be too dangerous to visit. The violence intensified during October and November, with
house burnings, threats, and crop and animal theft, culminating in the massacre at Acteal in late
December.
The displaced arrived in the camps with only what they could carry. Some, like the
woman described above, had little clothing, certainly nothing to keep them warm, while others
had no change of clothes. Those fleeing to INI and other camps brought no food, no animals, no
farming implements, no possessions at all. Many had no sweaters or shoes. Humanitarian aid
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became critical for their survival. Despite this, with officially-sanctioned indigenous autonomy
shelved because of the stalled San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture, the newlydisplaced still wanted to reject aid that came from government sources. This was one way and
the most explicitly political way of retaining a degree of autonomy in the context of the camps,
although it did not always prove feasible. This insistence on agency was costly, as it pitted the
IDPs against some of the very aid agencies that would help them. But whether they wanted to
take the assistance or not, lack of aid was becoming a crisis, causing more discord. International
and local NGOs were called upon for help, but they were not always forthcoming with aid. The
situation would become dire by the summer of 1998.

An Overnight Change
When the displaced arrived at the INI camp, on the night of December 22, 1997, they
faced a stark new reality. Overnight they became completely dependent upon others for their
basic needs. Without their milpas (subsistence plots) and their coffee plots they were left without
food or cash. María, a mother of nine, related that she hadn’t eaten meat since she became
displaced. Food was a mainstay of discussion, with men and women reminiscing about animals
to slaughter and eggs to eat. Such things now could only be dreamed about. Although IDPs had
food rations, which at first consisted of corn kernels, black beans, coffee, sugar, and salt, and
canned sardines (which they sold in the market for vegetables) anything outside of these staple
foodstuffs had to be bought at the market whenever occasional work could be found. And those
initial rations would soon seem generous, because by May 1999 they disappeared except for the
corn flour and beans. Literally overnight, cash, and its absence, would become a central concern
of the displaced population. As Ana, a mother of ten living at the INI camp, told me:
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In the campo [the countryside], we ate everything. In the milpa we had all types of
greens—squash, chayotes, chilis, our corn behind the house. Now if we want to eat
vegetables, we have to go to the market. But we have to use money to go to the market.
My children ask for special foods but we can’t provide them because we have no money.
She finished her thought with some surprise, “Everything here has to be bought –even corn.”

The move from the countryside to the edge of the city was for most families a
profound change. Although local economies were integrated into regional, national and
international markets, indigenous communities still retained significant subsistence-based
economies, especially in more isolated regions in the highlands and the lowland Lacandón
rainforest. They depended upon female subsistence labor on the home farm while men
migrated in search of wage work. Yet, with the low-intensity war in the highlands of Chiapas,
subsistence work, too, was disrupted. For displaced families, this was something of a shock as
they found themselves without the means to either grow or buy food. The INI camp bordered
the market in urban San Cristóbal de Las Casas, an irony not lost on the displaced themselves
who could rarely afford to buy the fruits and vegetables displayed there. 114
“We don’t have mattresses. Three families cook in one pot and we need so much,” said
Ana. “We only have our cooking fires outside now,” she continued—“what can we do when it
rains?” In the next breath, she told me that now that the rains have begun, at the camp, water
pours inside the house where her family sleeps, a wooden structure with an open front shared
with another family. When we first spoke, there was no electricity in any of the buildings.
Conditions often were cramped and uncomfortable, with little furniture, no beds, bedclothes or
petates for sleeping on, and few chairs. Families habitually used flat rocks for sitting or preparing
114
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food, always done outside. Some dormitory-style rooms housed six or seven families instead of
the one or two families they were supposed to shelter. There were too few rooms to house 110
people comfortably, and overcrowding was the norm. In response, some families moved out back
to several garage-like structures; Ana’s “house” was one of them. There were never enough
utensils, mattresses, blankets, comales for cooking tortillas, plastic pails or enamel pots to go
around. There was no gas and little wood or charcoal for cooking, and half of the residential
units had no electricity and, therefore, no light to see by in the dark afternoons and evenings
when the heavy rains outside limited daily activities. Because the living conditions were so
challenging, the result was increased discord and discontent among the families in the spring,
summer and fall of 1998, as families had to keep their cooking fires going even given the rain,
which came in to the shared open kitchens, and the fires doubled in purpose for warmth as well
as for cooking. There was not enough room for everyone around the two fires, and, as a result,
gossip and tussles were rife among the small population at INI during the rainy season, from
May, through November, of 1998.
Lack of wage labor was another cause of discord among the IDPs at INI. In post-1995
Mexico, as a residue of deregulation of the economy in the 1980s with President Miguel de la
Madrid’s trade liberalization and international capital flows, 1992 NAFTA’s deregulation of the
banking system and privatization of the largest commercial banks, and the subsequent
devaluation of the peso in December, 1994 under President Ernesto Zedillo, banking, economic
activity and employment steadily dropped in all parts of the nation. These measures reversed the
Import Substitution Industrialization, high tariffs and barriers to trade that had characterized
Mexico’s economy since the Great Depression (Musacchio 2012). By the 1990s, because of
loose banking regulations, debtors were protesting in the streets and due to the devaluation of the
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peso and subsequent lack of jobs, emigrants left Mexico in large numbers, with many coming to
New York City and not California for the first time. The United States bailed out the Mexican
government in 1995, as the banking crisis was Mexico’s worst ever.
This national economic climate directly affected the displaced as men competed against
one another for the few jobs that were available, and at the INI camp, their participation was
limited to one or two days of work per week in order to spread the work around. Men at the INI
camp had experience selling their labor power and occasionally found temporary jobs as janitors
or as laborers (peons) repairing roads. Women, on the other hand, had little experience working
in the cash economy and few opportunities arose in the camp setting. Initially, the women were
an untapped resource. In the meantime, though, in the camps, this lack of work meant a growing
dependency upon providers of emergency aid.

The Relief Effort
In 1998, the relief effort was plagued with problems. Coordinating aid presented
humanitarian organizations with logistical difficulties. There were 21 camps in the highlands
alone, and eight more in the zona norte and the selva (CDHFBC, May 2002). How, then, to
coordinate the relief effort in such a far-ranging series of camps? And why did it prove so
difficult for humanitarian actors to work together? Anthropologist Marc Sommers answers that
coordination is inherently conflictual: “even in dictionaries, the word coordination has
conflicting meanings,” one being horizontal (“the same order or degree”), and the other more
hierarchical (a “proper order or relationship”)—and therein lies the problem of conflicting
interests, agendas and even political affiliations (Sommers 2000, 1). Although in theory
humanitarian aid agencies are committed to “neutrality,” the nature of the conflict in Chiapas
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brought to the surface divisions and animosities. In Chiapas during 1997-1999 various
organizations vied for position in the aid-giving process, with some preferred by the EZLN or
Las Abejas and others rejected. Aid rejection was contingent upon political factors — factors
over which IDPs sought control.
The Mexican Red Cross, CARITAS, Medecins Sans Frontières, Médicos del Mundo, and
NGOs such as CCESC were involved in the relief effort, which was initially coordinated by the
Mexican Red Cross but later shared with the ICRC. It was not easy to avoid duplication and
waste (Interview with Hannah Moschird at ICRC San Cristóbal office, February 9, 1999).
Everything in the camps was donated by these organizations. Donations included purified water,
water tanks, food rations, pots, pans, buckets, comales, stoves, corn grinders, sanitation,
consisting of both latrines and lime, portable and stationary health clinics, visiting and stationary
medical teams, medications, clothing, shoes, housing, blankets, teachers, books, paper, Bibles,
priests and masses, lawyers and legal expertise, basic photography training and disposable
cameras, nutrition and hygiene workshops, atole-making ingredients, play and drawing
workshops for children, music, radios, volleyballs and nets, toys, and even a kitten and several
puppies at the INI camp for the children.
Camps at Polhó, X’Oyep, Acteal, and Tzaljachen, those that most strictly adhered to
principles of autonomy, immediately rejected aid from government sources. When the Mexican
army attempted to deliver food to Polhó in late December 1997, the community rejected it stating
that “they aren’t going to come and kill us and then give us food” (Ferrer Arias 1997). These
problems were not to be resolved overnight.
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Problems at the Mexican Red Cross
Aid rejections sometimes began because the food or donations provided in the relief
efforts were substandard, old or simply not acceptable for cultural, religious, or health reasons.
SIPAZ (Informe 1998a, 7) reported that Polhó received a shipment of outdated medicines from
the Mexican Red Cross, as well as wormy candy and moldy cookies from an anonymous donor.
Camp inhabitants interpreted the aid as at best neglectful but suspected it to be genocidal—
mistrusting the Mexican Red Cross (La Jornada 1998a). Incidents such as these helped to
politicize the displaced and led them to carefully examine the aid they actually received. Polhó
and X’Oyep, the largest and arguably the most political of the camps, were clear in banning the
Mexican Red Cross from making donations to EZLN autonomous camps; Las Abejas followed
suit. At INI, the displaced rejected the first shipment of food that arrived from the Mexican Red
Cross, incorrectly believing that it came from PRIistas, whereas aid was accepted at Acteal right
after the massacre in December 1997. The EZLN reluctantly allowed the Mexican Red Cross to
renew its activities in the camps shortly thereafter, however, because it promised not to send
outdated medications again.
As this incident shows, acceptance of aid depended on confidence; the following story
indicates why trust was important at all levels. Juan Ramón de la Fuente, then Minister of Health
in the Zedillo administration, visited several displaced persons camps by helicopter in late
December 1997 and early January 1998. He promised medicine, food, blankets and housing. The
EZLN promptly rejected the “gifts” of aid he proffered and, following their lead, the Las Abejas
camps and communities did the same. Humanitarian aid agencies such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF, Medecins sans Frontières, and local agencies, such as
CCESC, the Fideicomiso por los Niños Indígenas (el Fideicomiso) and Melel Xojobal, quickly
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stepped in to fill the void, working to provide food, medicine and other necessities. The Mexican
Red Cross, however, was a special case. After much internal debate, Las Abejas at INI decided
that the Mexican Red Cross was a “neutral” organization, and so, would be allowed to provide
humanitarian aid.
But there were close ties between the Mexican Red Cross, Mexican elites and the
Mexican government and much of the power in the aid community was held by donors. Toward
that end, it was not clear that the Mexican Red Cross could be trusted. José Barroso Chávez, the
Red Cross’s president, asserted in October 1998 that the organization’s contributions to the
camps amounted to a weekly expenditure of 700 pesos ($60.00 U.S.) per person—to serve a
population of 8,000 persons. This was both a boast about the Mexican Red Cross’s donation base
and a statement of efficacy. But not long after he made this boast, accusations of internal
corruption in the massive relief effort for victims of Hurricane Mitch in September and October
of 1998 began to emerge. Barroso and other high-ranking officers of the organization were
accused of misusing funds. Although Barroso Chávez received scrutiny, he remained in office
until the following January, when his term ended (La Jornada, 1998c).
Because of these problems, in September, the coordination of the aid effort was taken
over by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ICRC (Gil Olmos 1998e). In
November, Barroso Chávez admitted that the controversy over the misuse of funds for Hurricane
Mitch had damaged the Mexican Red Cross’s reputation internationally (Angeles Cruz 1998).
Since the EZLN uprising in 1994 until 1999, the Mexican Red Cross—with more than 50
vehicles, more than one hundred employees in the zone, and almost a thousand volunteers—
provided more aid in the “conflict zone” than any national or international organization. Its
presence in Chiapas had doubled since 1994 (Quarto Poder 1999).
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The scandal in the Mexican Red Cross reverberated in the very heights of Mexican
society. Patrons of the organization were heads of industry and commerce in Mexico City, and
they, too, felt betrayed. Complicating matters further, it came to light that Barroso Chávez had
impeded an audit by the Junta de Asistencia Privada, or JAP, Private Assistance Board, the body
that checks the transparency of authorized donations under the law, that had been planned for
July 1998—well before Hurricane Mitch. Secretary of Health, Juan Ramón de la Fuente opined
that “absolute transparency” was critical at the Mexican Red Cross (Angeles Cruz 1998).
The Mexican Red Cross was the organization providing the bulk of aid to the displaced
from Chenalhó, and it was apparent to many that Barroso Chávez’s dismissal had more to do
with politics than anything else. The Mexican Red Cross is the only organization in Mexico that
provides aid to ALL Mexicans, rich or poor, without regard for their ability to pay. By aiding the
EZLN, its base of support and sympathizers, the organization was alienating its main sources of
funding, conservative upper-class Mexicans (and PRI “dinosaurs”), who consider it as a way to
be seen as patrons of those in need without appearing to take sides on any issue. Many upperclass wives, especially, were benefactors of the Mexican Red Cross and felt alienated by its
current cause—aiding those with whom this class was in direct conflict. Evidence for this
interpretation comes from the fact that in January 1998, Barroso Chávez indicated that the
Mexican Red Cross would not accept the help of the ICRC, that caring for the displaced victims
of the Acteal massacre and the other displaced in the highlands was purely a matter to be
resolved within Mexico alone. When he ultimately did accept the aid of the ICRC, when the
Mexican Red Cross ran out of funds on September 15th, the ruling party became displeased with
Barroso Chávez’s acceptance of international aid packages and looked for the smallest possible
excuse to remove him. The Mexican Red Cross was not at any time during the conflict the
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neutral body it purported to be. This was impossible, as its funding was contingent upon
Mexican donations, largely from urban Mexico. However, if it wasn’t neutral, it achieved one
thing: the alienation of people on all sides.
However, this is also a reflection upon sovereignty. The PRI government was intent on
keeping Mexico a sovereign nation, and ICRC funding from the European Union and other
countries threatened that self-sufficient status. International humanitarian aid packages are an
exercise in soft power, and this threatens national sovereignty. Since autonomy was a muchdiscussed term during 1996, 1997 and 1998 because of the stalled San Andrés Accords which
sought to instill indigenous autonomy into law in the nation itself, sovereignty and estado de
derecho, or state of law, something which Mexico claimed did not exist in Chiapas during the
rebellion and its aftermath, was threatened by foreign aid which helped the rebels and, after
Acteal, Las Abejas. Although neoliberalism had abruptly become the most discussed economic
model in the 1990s because of the signing of NAFTA in 1992, foreign aid—especially when it
was benefitting the IDPs from the low-intensity war—and, indirectly, the rebels—was an
important issue facing the Mexican government; its presence hurt the government’s—and the
PRI dinosaurs’—pride and ultimately, hegemony. The EU was a key player in the first “postmodern” revolution’s continued existence, even while the heavy military presence, funded by
Mexico and trained by the United States, attempted to dismantle the Zapatista army, base
supporters and allies, such as Las Abejas. It was a “war of position,” in Gramscian terms
(Vergara-Camus 2014; Morton 2016; Rabasa 2010). It called attention to the state of exception
in existence in Chiapas as a result of the heavy military—and paramilitary—presence in 1998,
since Governor Ruíz Ferro’s resignation on January 8th and his replacement with Governor
Albores Guillén in a time of lawlessness when estado de derecho (rule of law) was absent.
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DIF: Making Atole, Accepting yet Contesting Aid
Practically as soon as the displaced arrived at INI at the end of December, 1997, DIF,
Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, a federal agency, provided infants and children under five and
lactating mothers with a gas stove, eggs, sugar, chocolate, masa (corn flour), and condensed milk
to make atole. Atole is generally not made with eggs, although in this variation, the eggs were
meant to provide much-needed protein and nutrients; the atole was meant to serve as an
important dietary supplement for children below the age of five and for lactating women, the two
groups most in danger of malnutrition at camp. Because of the urgent need and despite a deep
distrust the IDPs accepted this “gift” of aid from the government. The aid, though, was
channeled through CCESC, an agency whom the displaced trusted—workers at CCESC picked
up the ingredients from DIF and brought them to the camp. Yet, there were problems. Only a
month into the program several women accused a group of men of stealing the eggs donated by
DIF and griped that other women controlled both the ingredients and the stove for making the
atole, which was located in one corner of the camp in one of the two outdoor kitchens. Women
with older children became jealous of those with younger children who were eligible to
participate in the program.
Because of this strife only two women still made the atole by May of 1998. Ana María, a
dentist working as part of a medical team for CCESC, and with whom I worked daily, told me in
May that she couldn’t understand why more women didn’t participate in the project, which was
free to the women. Ana María also said so to the women, telling Ramona, that of the group, her
children were most in danger: “Why won’t you make the atole? Rocío (Ramona’s daughter,
about 3) has lost 400 grams, almost a half kilo, because she is sick with diarrhea. Miguel Angel
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also has lost weight. You have to make the atole every day to fight this. It is very dangerous for
the children to lose this kind of weight. You are going to get sick because of the rain. You are
going to get very sick if you don’t try and fight it” (as Ana María talks, the women care for their
children, embroider, and listen to her in a casual manner).
Ana María will later tell me that the reason for the group’s resistance to making atole is
that it is a food to which they are unaccustomed. Its government source was less important. Atole
is not used in indigenous communities, and it is a food unfamiliar to the displaced, she says, even
though it is ubiquitous in Mexico among the mestizo population. Ana María, however, relates
with some frustration that there is no other option at present. Although she has tried repeatedly,
she has been unable to get any more beans for the INI group—and atole has more vitamins. Ana
María tries to get this message across but assumes that it will be ignored once again. She asks
María with a laugh if she is going to make the atole or not, and María also laughs, knowingly
(July 14, 1998). Yet, even given the considerable problems with the project, DIF’s atole-making
project at INI provided emergency nutrition assistance, but it was only a partial success, largely
failing in its objectives, to counter the childrens’ alarming weight loss. Yet it illustrates the
important role that government agencies such as DIF played in the relief effort. DIF was
auxiliary to the Mexican Red Cross and the ICRC, yet for those who accepted this “gift” of aid, it
could be a lifeline. Yet, because most women refused to make it by May 1998, and because men
were stealing the eggs, the project was rendered unsuccessful. And the IDPs’ resistance to the
unfamiliar food illustrates the importance of perception in the camp setting and in the relief
effort overall. As with the provision of canned sardines from CARITAS, indigenous displaced
perceived mismatched foods as culturally insensitive or mysterious, and aid workers perceived
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their rejection as stubbornness or fatalism. The resistance to the atole was both cultural115 and
practical—the atole making required a seemingly unattainable level of cooperation, that is to say,
the sharing the one stove DIF provided for its production—on the part of the women, thus
making it was more trouble than it was worth in the women’s eyes. Additionally, men were
stealing the eggs, leading to further complications. And, like the food aid they were
simultaneously receiving, DIF’s atole making project was assistentialist, merely placing a band
aid on the IPDs’ absolute poverty, leading the women to not see it as important for their
childrens’ health and well-being. In criticizing the project—by refusing to participate, for both
political and for cultural and practical reasons—the women were illustrating Didier Fassin’s
(2012) critique of humanitarian reason. The IDPs were neither accepting nor grateful, but once
again voted with their feet by rejecting the project, much as they were critical of the rations they
received from the ICRC, as discussed below.

The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
The ICRC had a steady presence in Chiapas well before the massacre at Acteal in
December 1997. It was present during the early days of the uprising in 1994 when the EZLN
issued its (First) “Declaration of the Selva Lacandona,” on January 1, 1994, stating its “intention
to respect international law regarding warfare and requesting the presence of the ICRC.” The
ICRC arrived on January 17, 1994 and only left in 1997 when it relinquished all but its
coordination role, that of directing operations on the ground. As noted above, the Mexican Red
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Cross took over operations because the Mexican government wanted to be seen taking charge in
the aftermath of Acteal. From 1994 to 1997, the ICRC played an important role, because of its
perceived neutral position in the conflict zone, and subsequently acted as a coordinator for most
of the relief organizations bringing aid to the displaced (La Jornada,1998a). This was no small
feat for an international body involved in a conflict in which most outsiders were viewed as
suspect in some way.
Neutrality is a cherished NGO value with a long history. It occupies a central place in the
NGO Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief (Labbé and Daudin 2015). Yet, post 9/11, and for at
least a century before, neutrality is at times seen as “suspended morality” or “indifference;” that
is, “putting all sides on an equal moral footing” (Labbé and Daudin 2015, 190). The
humanitarian imperative takes precedence, followed secondarily by aid, which is not to be used
to further a particular religion or political viewpoint. Yet, in this way, the principles underlying
humanitarian activities—“humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence”—remain the
subject of considerable debate because they create tensions and paradoxes that lead to crises.
One of these is that countries which are traditionally recipients of aid are now playing a greater
role in aid delivery. And, as noted previously, aid itself is now playing a critical role in world
government. These “Fundamental Principles” go back to the founding of the ICRC in 1863 after
Henry Dunant intervened in the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino in 1859 to care for the
wounded and dying on the battlefield, no matter which side they were on (Labbé and Daudin
2015, 184-6). Médecins Sans Frontières, unlike the ICRC, does not have a formal mandate as it
is not commissioned by any state; in its Charter, the three “Dunantist” principles of neutrality,
impartiality and independence, which it takes from the ICRC, are basic principles. It was
founded during the Cold War to provide medical care, which it affirms as a universal right
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(Sa’Da and Crombé 2015, 134). Like MSF, Médicos del Mundo (Doctors of the World) staffed a
clinic at Acteal during 1998 and 1999, and, as I show in the next chapter, long lines awaited the
doctor’s return in the rainy summer afternoons and thick mud of the central courtyard.
The ICRC’s special status, granted in the 1864 Geneva Convention because of the
enormous push by Clara Barton,116 and its mission, providing humanitarian assistance during
wartime, made its presence in Chiapas a logical one, even though the conflict there has been
intra-state rather than inter-state. The ICRC employs only Swiss citizens. The organization
counts Switzerland’s neutrality—and those of its citizens who work in the ICRC—as a strong
asset. Hannah Moschird, a Swiss woman, who in 1999 represented the ICRC in Chiapas, offered
the following account of its presence in the conflict zone:
“Since 1994, the ICRC has been in Chiapas to facilitate negotiations between the
government and CONAI. The ICRC helped the parties both reach an accord and acted as
a security belt,117 until 1997.118 We are international human rights’ promoters. We give
aid, provide health care and medications, blood banks—but only in those countries where
there are conflicts. We protect the civilian population. This is our number one priority.
We make sure that there are no violent acts or incarcerations. Besides all this, we
support persons who do not participate in armed conflict. We give assistance, food,
medication. We are also facilitators for the displaced who want to return to their
communities.”
“For our presence to be accepted, the government has to be in accord. Both parties have
to be in accord. Las Abejas are ...a civilian population affected by these events. But we
participate on behalf ... of both parties to a conflict….”

116

The full name of the Geneva Convention is the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, signed in Geneva by twelve European nations in August 1864. The
United States finally signed the Convention in 1882, after the persuasive efforts of Clara Barton (Berry 1997:9).
117
Security belts, or cordones de seguridad, are human chains around a meeting or protest site.
118
Although Moschird would say only that the reasons the ICRC withdrew from the conflict zone were
confidential, the climate changed after the Acteal massacre.
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“Now we have a program of medical assistance for the displaced, for Zapatistas, and for
PRIistas—it’s not important to us what side they are on.”
Of the Mexican Red Cross’s involvement, she remarked:
“The Mexican Red Cross runs clinics financed by the ICRC. We are of the same family.
Since we don’t have the capacity to obtain nurses, doctors or medics, we use those from
the countries affected. When there are international wars in countries, we enter, giving
medicine, medics, vehicles, etc., whatever is needed. But only in these cases.”
“In Acteal, the Mexican Red Cross, the German Red Cross, and the European Red Cross
were present before the ICRC. The ICRC went into Acteal in September, 1998, giving all
of the aid dispensed, which was financed by the European Union.”
Moschird expressed the distribution of food in the camps in these terms:
“We have done a census. There is a food distribution once every two weeks—of beans,
corn (both flour and kernel corn), sugar, rice, oil, canned sardines, and soap. Now
rations are given directly to each family. We have reorganized so that now we give
rations based on the number of children and persons in the family. We give to each
household head, man or woman. Before, we gave a package of equal rations to each
family head.”
“We give material help, as well, grinders and tools. These tools are given out to every 8
or 10 persons, who are organized into groups to work with them—they are not given out
by family groupings.”
The coordination process is seen as especially important:

207

The ICRC is involved in the coordination process—making sure that there is no
duplication among the many NGOs involved in the relief effort. But the NGOs do not
always listen (Interview, February 9, 1999).

Coordination is one of the ICRC’s most important functions because it helps avert duplication
and waste. This role became particularly important because, as Gerardo told me in February
1999, “475 NGOs continue to aid Las Abejas” (Interview, February, 7, 1999). The ICRC has a
long history of NGO coordination:
The ICRC, donor agencies, and key NGOs like CARE and Médecins Sans Frontières
have developed a division of labor that has become standard to the point that NGOs can
set up an operation efficiently anywhere; the ICRC can begin subcontracting work as
soon as it arrives on the scene (Ahmed and Potter 2006, 170).
But problems in coordination, not only among NGOs, but between the NGOs and the
IDPs, sometimes arise and they can produce destabilizing effects on the political and social
equilibrium of the camps. For example, the system of distributing aid by family size had worked
elsewhere, but it caused problems at the INI camp and was, in fact, one of the first conflicts at
the camp. Sebastián, the responsable at the time, was immediately distrusted when inhabitants
accused him of keeping extra rations for his large family. He was replaced in an election by
Gerardo who was already a responsable, albeit in a junior position. After this, inhabitants
monitored rations carefully; when “gifts” of bi-weekly rations were portioned out, family heads
would cluster around Gerardo, who held the list in his hand, checking off the rations accordingly.
Thus, the ICRC, the agency ultimately in charge of distributing rations at the camp, was
perceived as not completely trustworthy as an entity by the group of IDPs at INI, and the IDPs
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were agentic and critical of it, in illustration of Didier Fassin’s (2012) critique of humanitarian
reason in which refugees are neither docile nor grateful.

Humanitarian Aid and Agency
The importance of these multiple levels of coordination were clear at a meeting held at
INI on July 17, 1998 with the organizations that provided aid to the displaced at the camp. The
meeting had a twofold purpose: to coordinate efforts and to spur the INI contingent to organize
themselves, that is, to stop griping that others received more or less aid, or were stealing. Ending
the griping and bolstering self-organization were presented as a way to increase humanitarian
aid. In the meeting the NGO representatives made it clear that camp inhabitants should accept
their external authority. But these NGO efforts were eventually to prove unsuccessful. One of the
suggestions at the meeting was the question from the NGOs of how to end assistentialist aid in
favor of having “a little borrowed” land to work. This question was never resolved, although it
was critical at this juncture.
At the meeting just discussed, Padre Gonzalo Ituarte of Frayba and representatives of
CARITAS and Melel Xojobal came to INI to discuss the seriousness of the division in the camp
in addition to the topics broached above. Padre Ituarte spoke in Spanish, saying that they were
working to get support for the group; a religious sister who said she had been working with the
children spoke eloquently to the entire group about ways of alleviating the extreme conditions
under which the children lived. She said that there were many problems that must be
addressed—“we are from different communities but we have to pull together to end the problems
and the division in the camp.” Lara from MELEL spoke to the group and with Luis from
CARITAS. Food has been suspended because of the situation here. “It is a crisis,” she said;
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“CARITAS will directly speak to the group, to see if there is a solution, to see if the group can
organize itself. If you can’t organize, support will not be forthcoming.” She said, “This is why
we are here.” While she spoke, the women were lined up against the wall closest to the door, and
the men on the other side, with the three members of the ecclesiastical delegation sitting in front.
The women listened, but talked among themselves and the children fretted. Manuel translated
everything into Tzotzil.
Padre Gonzalo Ituarte asked Roberto to come forward, and he shyly made his way to the
front, shaking the hands of the delegation. After talking to the group of the problems in the camp,
Roberto, a catequist, lead the group in prayer in Tzotzil. The women covered their heads with
their shawls. Then he sang a hymn in Spanish and the group began singing along. Children
played noisily on the floor, on all fours, laughing throughout, and wetting the concrete floor as
they crawled. No one made any attempt to stop or to quiet them. Some of the women continued
to embroider throughout the meeting.
One of the women—who had been silent up to this point—answered Sebastián, accusing
him of stealing the eggs. Then María, with a big smile, spoke up, saying that they have nothing,
that it is muyuk (“all gone” in Tzotzil), and she addressed her comments to Manuel because the
three from CDHFBC were still huddled together. Then they raised their hands and gave her their
attention. When she finished, several said lek hoy (“welcome” in Tzotzil), muy bien.” Then
María, the women’s representante, began to speak in a more commanding voice. She, too,
brought up the situation with the disappearing eggs.
Padre Gonzalo Ituarte spoke again. Not addressing the eggs, which were of most concern
to the women, he lost much of their attention. He continued in general terms, “How are we going
to organize? We have to be together, we have to think about what we are going to do, how we’re
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going to get food. What are we going to do? It’s not only one family but all of you who are in the
same predicament. How are we going to get out of it? Maybe you didn’t have to think this way
in the communities, but here you do. Together.” Lara continued, “This is a serious problem. We
all have different religions and political beliefs but we all need food and we are all in the same
situation. What are we going to do to alleviate the problem of hunger, the lack of food? We have
to see if we can get a little borrowed land in order to plant food. What are we going to do?”
Ana, the woman from CARITAS spoke and asked for another volunteer to ask support from
another organization, Chiltak, whom they haven’t contacted before. She said one person (one
representante) is very few—“we need at least one or two more.” Then she asked for three
representatives to ask for frijol and maíz, beans and corn. Two men were nominated and then
they tried to nominate a woman. The women laughed and looked bashfully into their shawls,
none wanting to be nominated, while the men laughed, too.
Two men were nominated, Miguel Sánchez López and José Luis López Gómez.
Consensus determined that Miguel Sánchez López won. All the men and most of the women
voted, with the most votes going to Miguel Sánchez López and only 17 out of 110 going to José
Luis López Gómez.

The Message of the NGOs
In many societies, pluralism is the normal order of things. In the meeting profiled above,
consensus was forced because that was the only way that the NGOs believed that it could be
reached, but it was never achieved at INI; the camp eventually split in two, regardless of efforts
on the part of the NGOs to unify it. The most common complaint of the NGOs was that there
was no unity at all at INI, and that it was primarily this disunity that was responsible for the
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group’s lack of access to resources: other camps had access to more food, soap, cooking
facilities, and housing than they did because other camps, even those within San Cristóbal de Las
Casas—Don Bosco and Nueva Primavera—and in the countryside — such as, Polhó, Acteal,
X’Oyep and Yibeljoj — were better organized than they, more politically cohesive, and better
able to reach a consensus. Consensus was the decision-making process in the communities from
which the displaced came, and it was impolitic for the aid agencies to be seen dictating to the
displaced—they were invested in the EZLN’s project of autonomy, and aware that the group at
the INI camp was failing to act autonomously, that is, failing to cohere and to reject unacceptable
services and “gifts” of aid. Yet, the considerable disunity among the displaced at INI prevented
them from acting collectively on their own behalf. Hence, the aid agencies were in a bind and
were trying to get the displaced at INI to act collectively—which they could only do by deciding
to leave the INI camp. There were too many disparate actors among them, and the best that they
could do was to agree to disagree, although they managed to elect two new representatives to
contact other aid agencies.
Consensus would allow organizations to give aid safely because they did not fear that
resources would be misused or not shared equally. In a case of compassion fatigue (Fassin 2012),
donations had fallen off by the summer of 1998, when this meeting occurred, and the NGOs did
not want the scarce foodstuffs that they could give misappropriated by families with access to the
aid givers, as had happened previously at the INI camp. In addition, the NGOs were trying to end
the camp’s dependency on assistentialist humanitarian aid, although it was only six months after
their arrival—hence, the question, “what are we going to do?” Yet, the irony is that in forging
consensus, the NGOs were guilty of treating the displaced like children—the very opposite of the
autonomy that the Zapatista comandancia was in the process of delimiting. At the INI camp,
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however, people resisted this control—and ultimately the NGO presence—by voting with their
feet.
An additional problem surfaced after the meeting, when a worker at Melel Xojobal
related to me that one of the problems was the literal openness of the INI camp. With its
unfenced grounds and buildings anyone could enter at will. The other two camps in San
Cristóbal, Don Bosco and Nueva Primavera—and all of the highland camps—were physically
more closed. Because anyone could enter, well-intentioned, although unaffiliated, individuals
had been able to come to INI and provide help. It had the unintended result of raising peoples’
hopes and spreading confusion, gossip, and resentment. NGO coordination, thus, tried to
disallow unaffiliated aid, and attempted to provide for all camp inhabitants’ needs, if
unsuccessfully.
Democracy, however, was an ideal which the displaced clung to, despite their inability to
reach consensus without the strong-arming of the NGOs. Democratic processes are one way to
create order in heterogeneous societies. Via elections, some form of order is created, even if it
means that there is a defeated party. Here, the NGOs indicated that two new representatives were
needed to approach other NGOs in order to receive additional aid and elections were held.
Women were not excluded from the voting, and one woman spoke up to voice her opinion, that
Sebastián and some of the other men were stealing the eggs meant for atole-making. In general,
though, women resisted the idea of putting themselves up for office as representatives—and men
demonstrated their disagreement with the idea of women representatives through their laughter.
The women behaved in a very traditional fashion by modestly looking into their shawls when the
time came to nominate representatives—they behaved very differently from women in the EZLN
who put themselves forward at such junctures, and, through their concern with their children,
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clearly identified as mothers first. There was also clearly a sexual division between the men and
the women in the room—women were lined up against one wall, and continued to embroider
throughout the meeting, or to hush crying children. They were participants in the events, but only
to a limited extent. As evidenced by friends sitting together and talking throughout the meeting,
many women interpreted the meeting as a social event rather than a political one—although most
voted.
Several factors made the INI camp less cohesive: (1) weak leadership and divisiveness,
which it was unable to overcome; (2) location on the edge of the San Cristóbal market and with
porous borders, which opened it up to influences that other camps didn’t have; (3) limited wage
labor and extreme poverty; (4) it was beyond the reach of the EZLN and even at times the Mesa
Directiva of Las Abejas at Acteal; and (5) diverse political actors, which included political
neutrals as well as base Zapatista supporters. These factors made consensus impossible, and
opened up the camp to criticism by the NGOs.
The IDPs ultimately rejected the NGOs’ attempt to control many aspect of their lives.
Although the reason for their return to Acteal hinged upon the visit to INI by Emilio Rabasa
Gamboa, a member of COCOPA, and his offer of aid, the group was poised to split well prior to
Rabasa’s visit. Although none of my interlocutors would permanently remain with Las Abejas,
and most would leave the organization in 2008, again upon the offer of government aid, for them
January 28, 1999 was a historical moment, in which their idealism was being tested: would they
remain in the civil society organization and return to the site of the 1997 massacre or leave Las
Abejas entirely and remain at INI? Over the short-term, autonomy and dignity trumped
expediency and pragmatism.
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The meeting profiled above is also indicative of the INI camp’s Las Abejas’ very
resistance to the idea of reconciling with those with whom their political views came into
conflict. Because they represented a cross-section of their communities, rather than a single
political affiliation—PRIista, Abeja and Zapatista (BAEZLN), their disunity could have been
predicted even prior to their arrival at INI. These factors alone differentiated INI from the other
camps, which were politically more unified. Yet, disunity brought about by different political
viewpoints is a hindrance to autonomy—and autonomy relies upon reaching consensus, neither
of which were possible at INI. To achieve both unity and autonomy, the group of Las Abejas at
the INI camp had to split apart.

The Split at INI, INI Camp, February 8, 1999, Return to Acteal
It is 7:40 in the morning, and the sun is climbing higher in the sky. Las Abejas are to go
back to Acteal today, but the day begins for me with a wild chicken chase because the six or so
chickens that Manuel has will have to be brought to Acteal. Chickens run off in all directions and
we run after them. Everyone joins in. It is teamwork. There are many smiles and laughs as the
chickens squawk.
Manuel is playing his guitar, playing “Bolomchon,” a traditional Tzotzil song, playing
almost despondently at first—no one knows what will happen once they get to Acteal—Manuel
was there on the day of the massacre, and is uncertain about returning to where his son was shot
in the leg, and 45 people murdered. All of a sudden, the music turns joyful. The mood has
changed to one of hope. Sacks of clothes and boxes of pots and comals and dishes are piled high
under the portico, lining the outer cement walls of the barrack-type rooms at camp.
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10:46AM, INI camp:
Agustín Velasquez, Representante of Las Abejas in Acteal gives a press conference to the few
reporters present:

All Las Abejas are going to Acteal. Twenty-six families are leaving. They are going to
suspend this camp at INI. They are going to be displaced once more because of the
presence of Rabasa.119 We are not in agreement with Rabasa. We ourselves see the
presence of Rabasa. He has an interest in dividing Las Abejas. Rabasa has created a
great division between us. But Las Abejas are always united.
We have a queen, the queen of God is our beehive. No one can enter at will. They have to
enter through the door at Acteal. On the projects of the government (for the displaced) I
don’t know if the government has supported many of the displaced. We want the
government to get rid of the paramilitaries and complete the Accords of San Andrés.
Three families are staying here. We still don’t know if they are going to separate from
Las Abejas. We are inviting them to leave with us.
Today there is a meeting with all of Las Abejas of Chenalhó. There will be a great
celebration in Acteal for our brothers and sisters who are going to return today.
We invite all of you to attend. The IDPs (“desplazados”) are walking towards Acteal
(Author’s translation).

The press release issued by Las Abejas on February 1, 1999, read:
On January 29, there appeared in the press notice that the Coordinator of the dialogue in
Chiapas, Emilio Rabasa, met with members of Sociedad civil Las Abejas to make an
accord on federal government aid for the IDPs. About this meeting we want to declare
119

Emilio Rabasa Gamboa, a PRIista member of the negotiating body, COCOPA, met with Sebastián and a few
other IDPs at INI to discuss their acceptance of governmental humanitarian aid. Sociedad Civil Las Abejas claimed
no knowledge of the meeting and remained in disagreement with it, as the press release shows.

216

the following: The organization Sociedad civil Las Abejas met in an extraordinary
session to declare that in no moment had there been an official meeting with Mr. Rabasa.
This civil society organization has a Mesa Directiva, and through this Mesa it treats the
affairs that affect this organization. If Mr. Rabasa met with some few IDPs at INI and if
they agreed on something, this accord is not accepted by the organization Las Abejas.
(Author’s translation).
The press release went on to accuse Rabasa of trying to divide Las Abejas, and to say that
the grave problems that the displaced Las Abejas are living with cannot be resolved by the
limited aid given to a few IDPs. “The national and international clamor after the massacre of
Acteal demands that the problems we live with in Chiapas be resolved deeply and not
superficially,” the Mesa Directiva wrote. The third point asks “if Mr. Rabasa wants to dialogue,
why doesn’t he fairly complete the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture,
demilitarize Chiapas, indemnify the displaced for the burning of their houses and the robbing of
their harvests and belongings, liberate the political prisoners, and lay the foundations of a
serious and respectful dialogue” (Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, Press Release, February 1, 1999,
author’s translation).
11:30 AM, INI Camp:
A rosary is said by Roberto, one of the catequists. Women, children, and men are crying.
“We ask God’s help to keep us safe from the paramilitaries and to arrive safely in Acteal.” The
boxes and bags are loaded onto the back of two trucks.
A school bus pulls up, provided by the Cruz Roja Méxicana, the Mexican Red Cross. In
front of the procession is a blue pickup truck, a redilla, or colorful painted truck with sheet metal
reinforcing the sides. This one bears the placard of the Virgin of Guadalupe, “la Virgen de la
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Masacre,” “the Virgin of the massacre,” as Las Abejas now called her, in front. The painting is a
shield against the road ahead. Under it congregate Las Abejas, asking for the protection of God
for the journey. Men, women and children line up in double file, women and children on the left,
men on the right, and begin to board the bus. The truck pulls away followed by the bus and vans
and a Mexican Red Cross ambulance. Under the banner of the Virgin, Las Abejas depart for
Acteal, leaving nothing but dust in their wake.
Las Abejas’s First Fracture
Emilio Rabasa Gamboa’s visit—as a member of COCOPA, the Commission for Peace
and Reconciliation in Chiapas—to INI on January 28, 1999, precipitated the split between the
two contingents of Las Abejas living there. Although the Mesa Directiva at Acteal—proclaimed
on February 8, 1999 that all 26 families would be leaving, the reality was different, as twelve of
the families of Las Abejas remained behind, rejecting the move. For them, remaining was a
pragmatic decision as the promise of some aid trumped the uncertainty they would face at the
site of the massacre. Those who left did so in the spirit of group solidarity. The other group of
IDPs, numbering twelve families and now referring to themselves as “INIti,” a name their former
campmates took up, decided to accept aid from Chiapas governor Alberto Albores Guillén. As a
consequence—as required by the Mesa Directiva at Acteal—they renounced their membership in
Las Abejas. The 40 or so INIti remained on the grounds of INI and utilized a patchwork of
temporary employment and aid from various sources to survive. Although they relinquished
membership in Las Abejas in favor of receiving humanitarian aid, the promised government aid
would not materialize for another ten years. Only in 2008 did these families finally receive funds
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from the Mexican government, a mere $43 Mexican Pesos, a symbolic amount.120 However, as I
discussed in Chapter One, these families were eligible to receive Oportunidades funds while
living at the INI camp in San Cristóbal, provided that their children were attending the CONAFE
school on site and were under the care of state allopathic medical providers.
In the case of one man, Juan, the decision to remain behind was probably because his
drinking was out of control—he was continually drunk during daylight hours at camp—and there
was no jail nor way to enforce locking him up inside the dormitory-like room he shared with
nine other families. I asked Manuel once he had moved to Acteal, his opinion of the disharmony
among the displaced, and was told:
The lack of harmony at INI happened because we came from different communities. Men
also drank a lot—the responsables couldn’t accept that we drank there—even if they
themselves drank, too sometimes. They thought it better that we not drink at all. Juan,
one of Las Abejas, in particular, was drunk all the time, and still is. He was the source of
lots of problems. Here in Acteal, we can’t drink, smoke or use drugs. At the INI camp,
some people broke this law that Las Abejas made. No one was allowed to drink, but many
did. Juan passed out in the bathroom many times. As a result of the drinking, there were
problems with the women—they were beaten, mistreated (Interview July 6, 1999).
Although alcohol and its abuse have often been cited as problematic in Chiapas (Eber
1995), in this context, it adds a new dimension to the divisive nature of political life at camp.
Both the EZLN and Las Abejas forbade drinking in their camps and communities, but at the INI
camp, alcohol remained a serious problem as well as a serious offense. The best that the
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The INIti contingent was not the only group to renounce Las Abejas membership in exchange for government
aid. On February 7, 2008, 193 Las Abejas and Zapatista families housed at Polhó, a highland Zapatista camp, were
the first to receive $43.00 (M) each, a mere symbolic amount. These families abandoned their participation in the
Zapatista movement but continued to live in the community of Polhó, which during my fieldwork was one of the
camps with the most challenging living conditions. They cited the need for better schools and health care as their
primary reasons for leaving the EZLN (Expreso Chiapas, February 7, 2008).
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displaced could do was to place the offender under a sort of house arrest, while he slept it off. At
Acteal, both at Acteal Las Abejas and Acteal bases de apoyo, or support bases, there was an
actual jail with bars on the door for those who succumbed to drink, and the penalties were more
severe: threatened expulsion from Las Abejas and the EZLN for drinking. Las Abejas at the INI
camp had little power to do the same due to the open nature of the camp and the distance from
the Mesa Directiva at Acteal.
Within families, the decision to leave the INI camp usually came from the male head of
household. Most of the women told me that they did not want to return to Acteal, although they
would eventually like to return to their home communities in the municipality of Chenalhó.
Many women at the INI camp had a harder time leaving family members behind to retnrn to
Acteal. Unlike the men, they had become more connected to others at the camp, particularly the
women, through the cooperation required to live in the close proximity of barrack-type living
arrangements and communal kitchens and through endeavors such as the earlier-mentioned
project making breastfeeding dolls (although not the making of atole, which tended to fracture
women’s relationships with one another). These women often made an early decision to stay.
But when the final choice was made, their husbands overruled them. Mothers with children, in
particular, put their family needs first and feared returning to the more dangerous countryside.
Besides this division based on gender, another division became evident through both aid
rejection and the decision to leave camp—age. Younger members of the group almost uniformly
exhibited more idealistic beliefs, desired to leave the INI camp at much higher rates in early
1999, and were more reluctant than older women or men were to accept humanitarian aid from
other than acceptable sources.

220

Conclusion
NGOs and humanitarian aid agencies remained the nerve-center serving the displaced in
Chiapas after the Acteal massacre and remained important until the early 2000s when
organizations such as Maya Vinik and Kinal Anzetik, coffee and craft cooperatives, respectively,
could be established and some small level of self-sufficiency restored.121 Because the level of
need was so high in 1997, 1998 and 1999 everything the displaced required had to be trucked in,
as the emergency continued for an extended period. Shipments of food were delivered under the
worst conditions: rain, mud and cold weather. Yet, there was never enough food and the
displaced went hungry at the end of each two-week aid-giving cycle. As we will see in the next
chapter, poor health was an issue, malnutrition and parasites were rampant, especially among the
children whose bellies were distended from parasites and a lack of nutritious food. Even beans
were in short supply, and the situation worsened until tortillas and salt became customary fare for
all the displaced at the INI camp as they had been in the communities under the duress of an
insecure growing cycle where soils were thin and only the hardiest crops took hold in the
mountainous soil cover. Yet in the communities, some campesinos had been better off than
others; now they were equally desperate. In early 1998, the humanitarian crisis became an
international crisis as Las Abejas reached out to international NGOs for help. Yet, by the fall of
1998, they had been all but forgotten as Hurricane Mitch received the bulk of the press.
Various NGOs stepped in to aid Las Abejas during 1998 and 1999: INGOs like the
ICRC, funded by the European Union, which the Mexican government interpreted as an affront
to its national sovereignty and an exercise in soft power by the EU, CARITAS, a Catholic NGO,
the Mexican Red Cross, CCESC, FONAES, DIF, CONAFE, Melel Xojobal, Alianza Civica,
121

By 2001, Maya Vinik (meaning “Maya Men” in Tzotzil) had 801 socios, or “partners,” IDPs who were growing
their own coffee for sale to this Las Abejas cooperative. Kinal Anzetik has since closed (Moksnes 2012).
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Chiltak, Christian Peacemaker Teams, el Fideicomiso por los niños indígenas, and many others.
Las Abejas at INI accepted aid from these INGOs and NGOs, whether of government origin or
not. At a remove from the Mesa Directiva at Acteal, their decisions were pragmatic ones,
although at times they had ideological discussions about rejecting state aid, and this was
especially true of younger members of Las Abejas at INI. Ultimately, though, they went along
with the NGO, CCESC, whom they trusted, but it was clear that they were most critical of the
Mexican Red Cross’s, CARITAS’s and the ICRC’s meager “gifts” of food aid, as well as the
atole-making project from DIF—and the shipments of rubber flip flops from Musicians for
Peace, and of mostly high-heeled shoes from a hospital in Villahermosa discussed in Chapter
One, all of which was assistentialist aid—although they had little choice but to accept the
insufficient food aid given to them. They sold the flip flops and shoes in the market for cash in
order to buy food items which they really needed, such as chickens and vegetables, as neither
meat nor vegetables were provided in the aid shipments. When the Mexican Red Cross was
forced to turn over the operations of aid giving to the ICRC in September 1998, Barroso Chavez,
the Mexican Red Cross’s president, came under public scrutiny, ostensibly over corruption
involving funds for Hurricane Mitch, but the Cruz Roja Méxicana’s aid to the Zapatistas and its
allies, such as Las Abejas, was a sticking point in urban Mexico, and he left office when his term
ended, proving that humanitarian aid is rarely neutral within countries, as well as among target
populations, as at INI. And the group of Las Abejas at INI had to split apart because it could not
organize itself; its disunity was responsible for the lack of access to adequate resources such as
food, soap, cooking facilities and housing at INI. Yet, the reason for the return to Acteal by
seventeen families was Emilio Rabasa Gamboa’s visit to INI on January 28, 1999 and his offer
of government aid. The Mesa Directiva at Acteal called all of the members of Sociedad Civil Las
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Abejas at INI back to Acteal rather than allow acceptance of forbidden government aid, as
directed by the EZLN. Yet, not everyone at INI listened.
Once they left Las Abejas, those who remained behind at the INI camp became
depoliticized at the same time as their level of cynicism increased—while those who left became
more cohesive and religious. Yet, there was a clear struggle during 1998 for control at the INI
camp: would it be the NGOs or the displaced themselves who would make the ultimate
decisions? In the end, more than half of the displaced at INI were empowered enough to leave
INI behind, but this was a slow process which began with the struggle for humanitarian aid,
which as I showed was always contested. The struggle for health services in the camps is the
subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Six:
Autonomy in the Context of Displacement and Public Health
This chapter analyzes the ways that the political economy of illness and suffering affects
populations in war-torn regions in the developing world. Pain, illness, famine, malnutrition,
torture, disease, depression and suffering are more acute in critical situations such as
displacement and war. I examine how structural violence and structural poverty affected the
delivery of health services in the camp at INI and at Acteal and the ways that medical attention
became available to populations that experienced little of it prior to the armed conflict, that is,
under conditions of normalcy.
To understand conditions in the camp, the chapter also addresses the limits of those
services, and along the way, IDPs’ reactions to those services and their behavior when faced with
a biting and debilitating poverty that they could not overcome. Public health was the overarching
health stratagem of NGOs, the ICRC and Mexican governmental health providers in 1997-1999
in Chiapas. That is, patients were not seen as individuals, but rather, as members of a community
who could spread panic and fear over contagious illnesses such as cholera, bacterial infections or
parasites, as I illustrate in this chapter. I examine the ways in which the IDPs were infantilized as
they were exhorted to improve their hygiene and overall state of cleanliness when good hygiene
was impossible in IDP camps given the extreme overcrowding and lack of adequate quantities of
purified water.122 CCESC and several other NGOs installed dry latrines at X’Oyep123 and a
water pipe at Polhó which imposed good sanitation but was perceived as a top-down display of
power over the displaced, as Gloria Muñoz Rámirez made clear in The Fire and the Word
122

The water tank would routinely run out well before its two-week replenishment in 1998 and 1999, causing IDPs
to revert to the polluted stream running through the INI camp, as I show in this chapter.
123
Necessary to prevent the transmission of disease.
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(2008)—no one asked for a water pipe to be installed. Its installation disrupted traditional social
life as the stream was where women went to gossip and single women met men. I argue that such
NGO attention, whether medical or hygienic, detracted from Las Abejas’—and the Zapatistas’—
project of autonomy, as important health decisions were made outside of the autonomous body
of Las Abejas and the EZLN, and came from the NGOs. This will be discussed with regard to the
issue of vaccinations. The MAREZ, and after 2003, the caracoles, provided inhabitants
autonomous health clinics using both allopathic and indigenous medicine; in 1998, the NGOs
took on this role. This degree of medical attention was, I argue, new to most of the displaced in
Chiapas. Over the past fifty years, most rural clinics were staffed mostly off and on by male,
mestizo medical students doing their year long residency in Chiapas. The care was inconsistent,
and there was (and is) a high degree of turnover among providers, very few of whom would stay
on in Chiapas where the conditions of medical intervention are largely inadequate but where
need is therefore greatest.
In order to better understand the health situation in Chiapas during the height of the
conflict, I examine the practice of medicine, both allopathic and indigenous, in the IDP camps
and highland communities in 1998 and 1999, among the IDPs living in conditions of chronic
poverty. After describing the roles of outside medical personnel and indigenous health promoters
and the expectations that IDPs had for the medical system, I show the constraints that the IDPs
faced in 1998 and 1999 and how they used indigenous medicine as an alternative to allopathic
medicine to cure a child’s high fever and lifelessness when all other avenues had been exhausted.
I also demonstrate how through encounters between IDPs and public health professionals, public
health reminders remained incompletely implemented. The constant overt messages exhorted by
public health teams angered the INI population; because conditions at the camp were extremely
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unsanitary it was impossible to implement the basic public health measures that were
recommended. Yet, the displaced were blamed for their perceived shortcomings. The displaced
had no agency, as it was stripped away by the NGOs; autonomy was practically non-existent.
Public health personnel and largely unwanted “gifts” of medical aid were a significant
presence in both the INI and Acteal camps during 1998 and 1999, as were the lack of autonomy
they represented. The use of indigenous health promoters in the camps, such as in the
administration of vaccinations at Acteal in 1999, was one way of reasserting autonomy, but was
limited in scope. Without enough food, malnutrition and hunger were on everyone’s minds; skin
diseases, parasites, intestinal complaints, as well as serious ailments such as tuberculosis and
asthma afflicted the displaced, who needed the services of health professionals, although there
was often a disconnect between the providers of medical aid and the patients. Other complaints
seemed trivial, such as the lack of lights or warm sweaters during the rainy season, but they, too,
led to illness in one way or another, making the public health presence at camp necessary.
Alcoholism was prevalent at INI, although alcohol and its use were prohibited by both Las
Abejas and the EZLN. PTSD was serious, and although eight-year-old Miguelina did not talk at
all over the course of her displacement at INI, from December 22, 1997 to February 8, 1999,
only occasionally would professionals attempt to treat it. The trauma and play workshops
discussed in Chapter Eight were the most sustained therapy that the IDPs had to treat their PostTraumatic Stress Disorder, and this was primarily directed towards the children. Over the
summer of 1999 at Acteal, I had occasion to witness a University of Alabama psychologist treat
the children using the same play and drawing methods we had used at INI—and I joined in. In
general, though, the medicines and expert knowledge represented by modern medicine could not
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by themselves overcome the extreme poverty that defined life among the displaced both at INI
and at Acteal.

The Political Economy of Illness and Suffering
Taylor (2013, 289) tells us that “in almost all indices of physical, mental and social
wellbeing, asylum seekers and refugees suffer a disproportionate burden of morbidity”; they are
among the most vulnerable of populations and should not be denied basic health services.
Studies dealing with health and armed conflict are becoming legion within anthropology.
Whiteford (2009), for example, details refugee and IDP reproductive rights, addressing issues
such as rape of refugees by men and boys from the surrounding towns, and even from within the
camp, and the lack of emergency contraception given by humanitarian aid agencies, which
compounds the trauma. Refugees and IDPs may be attacked while in flight or while in exile
(UNHCR 1995). STDs and HIV are common. Vaginal fistulas often result in war zones, where
women are raped with guns, branches and broken bottles (Whiteford 2009, 92). In Haiti, after the
2010 earthquake, the Commission of Women Victims for Victims, or KOFVIV, reported that
there were 230 rapes in 15 camps and Médecins Sans Frontières reported that in April there were
68 rape cases seen in one of their clinics (Schuller 2011, 152). Women were forced to bathe with
small tubs of water out in the open, leading many women to be raped as a matter of course. Men
could easily cut the flimsy tents with a razor and enter (Schuller 2011). In Chiapas, during the
height of the conflict in the 1990s, sex abuse, rape, harassment and prostitution became common
near army installations, leading the Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas Human Rights Center, SIPAZ
and other leading NGOs to decry the very large military presence in the state (CDHFBC 1998a;
SIPAZ 1998a; Hirales 1998; Nash 2001; Álvarez Fabela 2000; Aubry 1996; Marín 1998; Kovic
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and Eber 2003; Eber 2003; Olivera Bustamante 1998). Pregnant women and children face special
risks, not the least of which is rape. As Whiteford (2009, 91) reminds us, “child and maternal
mortality increase in times of crisis because of a complex array of factors including, but not
limited to, nutritional deficiencies, unsanitary living conditions, trauma and stress, and lack of
medical services, all of which are exacerbated by pregnancy and birth.”
And then there is the criminal behavior and violence that seeps into healthcare. In one
study, Carolyn Nordstrom (2009) examines the ramifications of extra-legal pharmaceuticals in
2006 in Angola, a war zone where it is cheaper to buy a gun than medicine. Some of the
pharmaceuticals have been purchased at their full price, “imported for military, hospital, and
development uses and then moved into the black market” and sold on the streets, their sale reaps
untold profits for the pharmaceutical companies before they hit the black market (2009, 71;
Nordstrom 2004). Yet, this is one of Nordstom’s “fault lines”; illicit pharmaceuticals in places
like Angola can save lives and are often the only medicines available in war zones (2009, 71).
Bourgois (2009, 35) directs us to recognize invisible violence, such as the fact that there are
more deaths from criminal violence in postwar El Salvador than during the civil war. In fact,
violence has lately become recognized as a public health problem (Krug et al. 2002; RylkoBauer, Whiteford and Farmer 2009).
In medical anthropology, there was, up until the Ebola outbreaks in West Africa in 2014,
which redirected attention to ecology and economy and disease, a growing interest in mending
the rift between these triple factors (McElroy and Townsend 1996; Baer, Singer, and Susser
1997; Kleinman et al. 1997). These studies touched on virtually every health crisis in the
developing world and recognized that most illnesses are as social as they are individual, hinging
in one way or another on poverty: inadequate health infrastructures, inadequate vaccinations,
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non-potable water, unhygienic conditions, poor sanitation, illiteracy, and poverty itself create the
conditions for disease and further their spread. Hence, there is an AIDS epidemic in
impoverished communities in the United States primarily among men who have sex with men
and injection drug users (CDC 2008), with African American men representing 46% of all new
cases (Campbell 2014), and there are epidemics in 2019 in South Africa and Central Asia,
among other places with high poverty rates and poor health infrastructures (Allinder 2019; Avert
2019). I saw many walls in impoverished sections of Mexico City that were, in 1997 and 1998,
during the cholera pandemic of the 1990s, painted with public messages that read “aguas con
cólera”124—cholera in the water, whose subtext is that unboiled, untreated water is unsafe.
According to the World Health Organization, extreme poverty is “the main reason why babies
are not vaccinated, clean water and sanitation are not provided, and curative drugs and other
treatments are unavailable and why mothers die in childbirth.... (It is) the main cause of reduced
life expectancy, of handicap and disability, and of starvation.... (and) a major contributor to
mental illness, stress, suicide, family disintegration and substance abuse. Poverty wields its
destructive influence at every stage of human life from the moment of conception to the grave”
(WHO 1995, 5).

Potable Water and Hygiene: INI, 1998
In June 1998, Felipe is playing in the foul-smelling stream where Ana María has just finished
telling the fathers that the children should not play. At INI in 1998, it is dark and uncomfortable
inside the open-faced structure María shares with two other families, and very tight, and she
worries about the rain. But medical personnel—both institutional medical teams, such as those
124

This expression, “aguas con cólera” has a double meaning, meaning also that there is anger in the air, “al filo del
agua” right before the storm. Al Filo del Agua is a novel of the Mexican Revolution by Augustín Yáñez, written in
1947.
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from the Clínica de Campo, the IMSS regional hospital, and the ICRC, Médicos del Mundo and
the Cruz Roja Mexicana as well as indigenous health promoters—fear the rain for another
reason. As the season changes from dry to wet, there is an increased risk of serious health
problems, from cholera, diarrhea, typhoid, and intestinal parasites to respiratory problems and
dysentery. Many of the ill-constructed temporary shelters in the camps were built of cardboard
and tin, with a tendency to collapse during the torrential rains that fell during this season, from
May to November. More critically, the water which flooded the area often carried with it fecal
matter and garbage in the process spreading disease as there was no systematic way to deal with
the waste of the many thousands of displaced living in many of the camps. Several agencies
planned to install portable stoves and dry latrines at Polhó in 1998, and actually did so, to
address the worst of these problems, but as the memory of Acteal began to retreat into one scar
among many on the face of the nation they, too, were hindered by lack of government and
private support.

In mid-July, 1998, Ernestina coughs, plagued by respiratory problems. Most of the
children have lice. María slowly removes nits from her daughter’s freshly washed hair. Although
there is treated water at the INI camp in 1998, in many communities in Chiapas there is still no
potable water, creating conditions for poor hygiene, cholera, lice, and skin and intestinal
ailments. Coupled with overwhelming poverty, water can be lethal. And, although there is clean
water at INI for the moment, it is used for everything. Meant for cooking, it is also used for
cleaning and for washing—for hair as well as for clothing—and it typically runs dry well before
its two-week replenishment.
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At the INI camp inhabitants wash clothes and play in a stream, although Ana María has
warned camp inhabitants that it is polluted and unhygienic for both these purposes. The stream is
especially dangerous for children to play in, and during the six-month-long rainy season, human
and animal waste is carried into the water at an even faster rate. During this season diarrhea is
spread from person to person through physical contact with the water and the mud or soil
surrounding it, and from the waste that makes its way into the stream during the hammering rains
that fall sometimes for several hours each afternoon. The following narrative details the efforts
of CCESC, the Centro de Capacitación en Ecología para Campesinos, or the Ecological
Training Center for Peasants, to teach campesinos about the spread of disease, sanitation, and
hygiene, especially during the rainy season.

On June 16, 1998, a meeting is held between Ana María and the adults at the INI camp to
discuss sanitation and hygiene. The first heavy rains of the season have begun and hygiene is
becoming a serious health concern. Many adults have diarrhea, the result of parasites, and
women inadvertently spread it to children and to men because they often prepare their family’s
food, making tortillas, pozol, and frijol with unwashed hands. Although soap is provided in the
aid shipments, most people do not have the custom of handwashing, as there is no running water
in their communities of origin. Another reason for the high incidence of diarrhea during the rainy
season is the custom of bodily elimination in the open fields and grounds. When torrential rains
fall, the rain loosens the soil and unearths the subsoil, inevitably carrying human and animal
waste with it… on to a new human host. Proper sanitation (there is one bathroom each for the
men and women, each with two working stalls and one sink—for 110 people in all, but both
bathrooms are flooded throughout the rainy season, making them largely unusable) is limited.
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Hot water, showers and good water drainage are absent. Conditions are ripe for the spread of
parasites and disease. Cholera is … a distinct possibility, if infected human waste enters the
water system at any point, hence the need for purified (and protected) water sources, such as that
trucked in by the Mexican Red Cross.

These conditions constrained life in the INI camp in 1998 and 1999. As Werner
(1977:154) tells us in Where There is no Doctor, a virtual bible for rural health workers around
the world, malnutrition causes diarrhea, and diarrhea reinforces (or causes) malnutrition. It is a
vicious cycle and in the book is presented as a circular diagram. Many children die as a result of
malnutrition, and poor nutrition is not something taken lightly by either medical personnel or
health promoters. Hence, even the water is a danger in the camps and communities where
urinating in the water is common. Hookworms enter the bare feet of people not wearing shoes—
in this case, primarily women and children—even when few men go without shoes.125 In a few
days, hookworms enter the lungs, causing a cough. When a child or adult coughs up the worms,
they inevitably swallow them again, and this causes diarrhea. The worms attach themselves to
the stomach walls causing anemia and weakness. Their eggs travel through the child’s (or
adult’s) stool, and the cycle is repeated when defecation occurs outdoors. The use of latrines and
shoes—both in short supply at INI, with its two flooded bathrooms for 110 persons, and at
Acteal, where the latrines are reached down a long, muddy slope—prevent the transmission of
hookworm. Hence, this is one of the most important points made both by health promoters and
by allopathic health providers caring for the displaced at INI and Acteal. Indigenous health
promoters at Acteal participated in a workshop on skin diseases, outlined later in this chapter,
125

At Acteal during the summer of 1999, a baby boy wore shoes and socks while on a sling on his sister’s back. She
wore nothing at all on her feet.
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which addressed both the characteristics of common diseases at the camps and their underlying
causes. This focus was entirely different from the approach taken by the institutional medical
system in Chiapas and specifically those caring for the displaced at INI where little attempt to
use indigenous promoters sent a clear and important message of disregard.

At INI, María told me the following in the summer of 1998:
The children have diarrhea and parasites. Pedro Gerardo (eight month old baby) has
diarrhea. Lucía (daughter) has a temperature. Sometimes the adults also get sick with
diarrhea. It is a problem. The nurse (from IMSS Clínica de Campo) does not give good
medicines. The nurse says that “because we don’t bathe and fix ourselves up, we get sick.
But they don’t give us tubs to heat the water or to bathe in and there is no shower, so how
can they tell us to bathe? They also tell the children not to play in the dirt because this
gets them sick, but how can we stop them? (Interview, August 20, 1998).

María also became angered at Alianza Cívica over health matters. She related that Luisa
(from Alianza Cívica) asked if they were drinking tap water. María replied that, yes, they were,
but that she always drank tap water in her community, Chimix. She said that the nurse told her to
eat well to cure parasites and to avoid tap water, but how can she? she asks; there is little choice
of foods and not enough potable water (Interview, June 7, 1998). In June 1998, the Mexican Red
Cross supplied a water tank to the INI camp. This measure began to address some of the more
dangerous health risks, such as drinking water from the bathroom tap or worse, from the polluted
stream running through camp, but children continued to play in the stream even though warned
by the CCESC medical team of its dangers, and women continued to wash clothes there. This
lack of awareness on the part of the medical team of the inequality in the camp setting mirrors
Seth Holmes’s (2013, 146) discussion of a report in the health Centro in San Miguel, Oaxaca,
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which misrecognized the indigenous Triqui’s overcrowding as “culture and custom” and “not
always using latrines” as poor hygiene and pollution instead of the fact that their houses lacked
latrines. Additionally, the report listed “’housing.’ with the explanation that ‘promiscuity exists
in this population because in some houses, three families live together.” When asked to explain
further, a nurse at the Centro “listed ‘custom’ instead of poverty, neoliberal corporate capitalism,
or social and economic inequalities as the underlying cause” (2013, 146). The INI camp,
likewise, was subject to extreme overcrowding, although only the inhabitants complained about
it. In their home communities, the IDPs were accustomed to living in their own houses, at a
remove from their neighbors. At the INI camp, overcrowding was apt to spread disease,
something I discuss below.

Confidence in the Medical System
Although survival is difficult in Chiapas, childhood and all associated with it are the most
precarious. While pregnant women fare somewhat better than young children, there are many
risks associated with pregnancy, and because most indigenous women are pregnant or nursing
for the better part of their childbearing years, such risks are not inconsequential ones. The lowintensity war and displacement in the late 1990s exacerbated the risks that go along with
childbearing—and with childhood. Malnutrition and mortality of both mothers and their children
is much more common among the indigenous population, and this was even more true in 1998
and 1999 in the context of the Chiapas conflict. Pregnant women fleeing the Acteal massacre
aborted spontaneously, babies were stillborn, while others, also born early, had low-birthweights.
Iron deficiencies, anemia, hypertension, mental health conditions, eclampsia, pre-eclampsia,
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gestational diabetes, and hyperemesis gravidarum126 are all complications of pregnancy, and they
are worsened by war and displacement. Servan-Mori et al. (2014) report that many conditions are
much more prevalent among the indigenous population than among non-indigenous women.

Sensitive maternal and child health indicators highlight the disadvantage that indigenous
people experience. For example, maternal mortality among indigenous women is as much
as five times higher than that among non-indigenous women, and one out of four
indigenous women has no access to family planning methods. Additionally, at least 60
per cent of indigenous women who were pregnant had iron deficiency at the time of
delivery. Lastly, the prevalence of child malnutrition among indigenous children was 44
per cent in comparison to 17 per cent among non-indigenous children, and the infant
mortality rate was 50 per cent higher among indigenous children compared to nonindigenous children. (Servan-Mori et al. 2014)

“Poverty has been reduced, but the inequality is worrying,” Rodolfo de la Torre, head of
the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) human development research office in
Mexico, reported in 2010. Of eight Millennium Development Goals, “the least progress has been
made on cutting maternal mortality” in Mexico— the fifth of the eight goals set by the world
leaders gathered at the U.N. General Assembly in New York in 2000 (Inter Press Service 2010;
UNDP Report on Mexico’s Indigenous Peoples). “It is not hard to find a case of a woman dying
from childbirth in Chiapas,” Samuel Lowenberg (2010) reported in The Lancet. In Chiapas, 82
out of 100,000 women died from complications from childbirth between 2007 and 2012, while
the national average was 53 (Programa Nacional de Salud, 2007-2012, 38). During the first nine
weeks of 2018, there were 130 deaths in Mexico due to birth-related complications, and the
highest number—14—were in Chiapas (Portella 2018). In Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero, among
126

Extreme nausea and vomiting throughout pregnancy, leading to dehydration.

235

the indigenous population, there was a general lack of prenatal and post-natal medical visits due
to bad roads, bad transportation, machismo (which deters women from being seen by a male
doctor), the necessity of childcare, and overcrowded hospitals which meant a bed might not be
available when a woman needed it. Because women often waited until they are at a critical stage
to be seen by a doctor, it was often too late. Maternal mortality was, thus, often of preventable
causes, particularly hypertension caused by eclampsia and pre-eclampsia, hemorrhages and
unnecessary Caesarian sections which often become infected due to a lack of medical care. And
in those cases where a woman may have needed a C-Section, she often went without one, further
complicating pregnancy and birth (Lowenberg 2010).
Freyermuth Enciso and Garza Caligaris (1996), who have studied maternal death in
Chenalhó for more than twenty years, conducted a detailed study of the deaths of ten pregnant or
post-natal women—all from preventable causes due to the class, gender and ethnic inequality
and marginalization they faced as indigenous women. One reason for increased mortality may be
a decrease in confidence in medical services and in some cases the discomfort most women feel
being seen by a doctor, almost invariably male and mestizo. One woman they interviewed put it
this way:
“They look very young, not so much like doctors, appearing as though they don’t have
much knowledge to tell you what you have. And besides, we can’t speak with them in
Tzotzil, they are all ladinos. If I don’t understand them, what can I do? They don’t
explain what it is that they are going to do there in the hospital, there in the clinic. All
Spaniards (Mexicans), Castillians, no one speaking Tzotzil there. I just can’t”
(Freyermuth Enciso and Garza Caligaris 1996, 34). Translation by author.

This problem is exacerbated by the lack of translators, and thus the unreliability and/or
informality of the translations conducted by family members and local people without
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knowledge of medicine or medical terms.127 Yet, at root there is an additional issue: a
disagreement over what constitutes effective medicine. There is both interest in traditional
medical practices and a disagreement over which types of medications are effective. Many
indigenous patients prefer injections to orally-administered pills, feeling that the rapidity with
which a medicine enters the body is related to how well the medication will work.
This practice may also exist among mestizos, as needles and the paraphernalia for
injections are sold in most pharmacies throughout the country. In Chiapas, Candelaría Pérez
Hernández, a midwife from the highland community of Chanal, notes that medicine is sorely
needed, but “you (government) send us pills which don’t calm what ails us.” What the people
demand are “injections to fight fever and vomiting” (La Jornada, 1998b).
Even prior to their displacement, which occurred as a result of a violent act, the
Tzotziles of Chenalhó were accustomed to many ailments, all related in one way or another to
poverty. The primary cause of death among adults, causing 25% of deaths, was diarrhea and
intestinal infections, because of cholera or massive parasitosis. Together with gastrointestinal
infections and respiratory ailments, these accounted for 40% of all deaths in Chenalhó
(Freyermuth Enciso 2003, 31). In their communities, most ate only tortillas with chili and a little
salt or pozole; beans were complementary but not always eaten. Some had chickens, but these
were eaten only infrequently, on feast days, and largely useful for their eggs which many sold
rather than consumed. The consumption of Coca-Cola was an additional problem, leading to
malnourishment when people used cash to buy soft drinks and chips rather than beans
(Lowenberg 2010)—although, as Seth Holmes (2013, 147) notes, this medical gaze could be an
example of “structural medical racism and classism at work” when “a medical index developed
127

A recommendation to help with this problem is that the Mexican government should train indigenous women in
medical assistance. There are programs to train midwives in the communities, but they are not comprehensive
enough (Lowenberg 2010). I will address the issue of indigenous health promoters below.

237

among one ethnic group and class is applied normatively to another group in such a way that the
patients are defined as abnormal, monitored, and at times, shamed for their assumed behaviors.”
Some grew coffee for sale, and then could eat better while the money lasted. Those with a little
land grew chayotes and corn, beans and squash for their subsistence, but not all could.128 In the
camps, they had no land, but were provided with beans, which was in many cases an
improvement over their accustomed diet. As a result, a varied diet was impossible and
malnutrition was one of the most serious complaints among the population of displaced, but so
were diarrhea, parasites, a lack of clean water, a lack of shoes and inadequate housing. Their
displacement served to amplify these conditions and because fleeing the low-intensity conflict in
the highlands threw so many people from different communities together, disease was apt to
spread quickly. In the 1990s, there was a cholera pandemic in Mexico, and health providers were
hypervigilant about preventing its spread in the camps. However, because of the duress they
lived under, many indigenous Chiapanecos believed that allopathic medicine failed them—or
more simply, they had limited access, so it was “not for them.” Because of the difficulties the
displaced had with various medical personnel they lost faith in the curative possibilities of the
medical system. They doubted the good faith of the medical personnel when they wouldn’t give
injections, or when they gave creams and washes instead of “good medicine.” The healing
process is a relationship, and the practitioners of modern medicine were not living up to their
side of the bargain because they were powerless to correct conditions and likely did not view this
as being within their competence or mandate. Staffed primarily by medical interns who spent one

128

In their communities, before the EZLN forbade Las Abejas and EZLN base supporters from accepting
government aid, they received 200 pesos ($18.00 US) PROCAMPO funds each month and this helped them get
through the long agricultural cycle.
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year in Chiapas (including regular vacations) and then moved on, the healing system was, in
1998, and is, in crisis.129
At the INI camp in 1998, there was a general feeling of mistrust for the nurse from
IMSS Clínica de Campo who was present most mornings. In fact, the IDPs reported, this “clinic”
was even worse than the ones in their communities. At least there, indigenous health workers
would try to treat common illnesses. Here the nurse did nothing, and, instead, told people to
bathe more often and boil their water. Doing so was difficult due to a lack of wood or other
flammable materials. There was only one Rotoplast tank for drinking, shared by the entire camp.
A clear example of this sort of advice came near the end of July 1998, when the parents of baby
Eva, who had a terrible skin rash which extended from behind her ears to her entire head,
became angry when a nurse and a doctor told them that they should bathe their baby every day.
The doctor and nurse blamed the rash on infrequent bathing. Celia, the baby’s mother, said that
she has an allergy and that she does bathe her. Both parents were furious at the nurse and the
doctor because they only blamed poor hygiene and did nothing. This was an especially harsh
criticism, as there was not enough water and the parents were doing the best they could. A Swiss
volunteer, Maria Landolt, who was with me that day, believed that the cause was the large
mosquitos which invaded the crowded living quarters during the rainy season (Fieldnotes July
29, 1998).
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Dr. Mariana Espy Fedola, personal communication. The sparse staffing of the rural clinics remains a perpetual
problem, with interns staying only one year and then moving elsewhere. In addition, interns often return to Mexico
City for vacation, vacating their posts for weeks at a time. Dr. Espy Fedola did her internship in Chiapas in the
2000s for one year, like most, then returned to Mexico City, where she now practices psychiatry.
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One Family’s Encounters with Institutional Medicine: INI Camp, July, 1998
The following scene recounts the meeting of two worlds at the INI camp on July 16,
1998. What was evident in this meeting were the differing styles between Nancy, the doctor, and
Ana María, the dentist, whose job it was to oversee the health of the families at INI during 1998,
as well as the clear public health standpoint taken by the doctor. It involves an encounter
between a doctor from the IMSS Clínica de Campo and a family whose son had Down
syndrome, and who was ill with a bacterial infection and had a protrusion in his mouth. The
family did not know what to do, and even joked, at one point, about selling the antibiotics to buy
the family a chicken.
Juan, a child of ten, was lying in a single, white hospital bed whose mattress was too
narrow for the frame in the infirmary at INI. There was a small table, which could be used for
examinations, and several plastic stackable chairs. In this room, the size of a small bedroom, Ana
María examined Juan and asked Gerardo, Juan’s father, if it hurt to swallow, while Pedro spoke
to Juan in Tzotzil. Juan nodded that it did. Ana María thoroughly examined him and shook her
head, saying to herself and looking at me, “what do I do?” It was clear to Ana María that Juan,
whose overall state of health was fragile, needed to be seen by a doctor. Leaving the family in
the infirmary, she walked to the offices of INI to use the telephone and called IMSS, the Clínica
Hospital de Campo (Field Clinic) to have a doctor come. We all sat quietly for 20 minutes before
the doctor arrived.
When she arrived, Nancy, a mestiza doctor, came with an assistant, Jesús, also a
mestizo. Seeing the patient’s age, Nancy exclaimed to Ana María, “You said he was a baby! I
brought medicine for a baby!” Ana María replied, “No, I said a niño (child) and he is a niño!”

240

After an exchange between Nancy and Gerardo, translated by Pedro, their son, the family had a
good laugh at both the dentist’s and doctor’s expense.
When Nancy began her examination of the patient, it was evident that she and Ana
María had very different clinical styles. Nancy was more guarded in her relations with the
family: upon diagnosing Juan with a bacterial infection and parasites, Ana María exclaimed, as
though the thought had never occurred to her before, “Is it contagious?” to which Nancy quickly
responded, “Calma! (calm down), we don’t want panic on our hands. They will panic if you tell
them, so why tell them?” At this point, she calmly began to explain to the family—through
Pedro—that Juan has a bacterial infection that can only be cured by taking all of the antibiotic
medication she is prescribing (which she has brought with her and now hands over to Gerardo).
Ana María looked a bit chastened by the interchange; more inexperienced, she believed that she
had the family’s best interest at heart.
Nancy, as a visiting doctor, had not established any personal rapport with inhabitants,
and there was no sense of any personalized relationship, except with the translator, who had to
understand what she told him. And this difference in approach was borne out by distinctions in
dress and manner; while Ana María dressed casually at all times (even though, as a dentist, she,
too, is a health professional), Nancy wore a skirt and a white lab coat over her clothing. As a
health worker and dentist who interacted daily with the displaced, Ana María aimed to dispel
fears and build trust, erasing boundaries as much as possible. For example, she discussed her
pregnancy with the women and sometimes with the men, alluding that her unborn child was
kicking or that she was tired and not feeling well. Such human communication created a bond
and reminded all present that her concerns were not all that different from their own.
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Because Nancy thought that the patient was a baby, and thus, brought medicines in
small and diluted doses appropriate for a baby, she is now forced to double the dosage for 10year-old Juan. As she handed over the four boxes of medication, two for parasites and two to
treat the bacterial infection, she explained that the plastic bottle must be filled with purified cold
water and the mix shaken. Pedro joked that “the family should sell the medicine to buy a
chicken!” Everyone present laughed, but he was cutting close to the bone: Nancy flashed a grim
little smile, aware of the truth of the comment. Ana María, with Nancy’s approving nod, told the
family in parting that the medicine would not take effect tomorrow, but, rather, it would take
several days for Juan’s fever and diarrhea to subside and appetite to return. And, because he was
taking antibiotics, even then, he must continue with the medication twice daily until the bottle
was finished—in 10 days’ time.
Juan’s mother wore a look of strained concentration as she grappled with both the
unfamiliar medication and treatment instructions. Gerardo, her husband, seemed far more at ease.
He had a much better grasp of Spanish than his wife, who was effectively monolingual, and
greater comprehension of the consultation and treatment as it unfolded. In addition, he was used
to taking a leadership role because of his position as a responsable at the INI camp and had
interacted with outside authority figures more than his wife. He remained sure of himself
throughout his encounter with the medical practitioners, something which was a common
leitmotif in terms of gender interactions among indigenous men and women in Chiapas where
hegemonic masculinity was and is the norm—as mentioned earlier it is less so among the EZLN
because of the “awakening” of indigenous women combatants. Although in this case, the doctor
was a woman, she represented “scientific” allopathic medicine and Lucía did not utter a word to
her in keeping with usual gender norms in the highlands.
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On the border between indigenous belief and traditional practice and institutional
Western medicine is a subtle but mutual mistrust that each side holds for the other. The doctor
feared that the patient and his family would not correctly mix the antibiotics with boiled or
purified water; unpurified water will sicken the child considerably. She feared that all of the
antibiotics would not be taken, allowing the infection to take hold and become drug-resistant.
She feared that Ana María would inadvertently spread panic by admitting that the boy was
contagious. And she feared that there is more than a little truth to the joke that the teenager,
Pedro makes about selling the medicine to buy a chicken. A chicken is a concrete bounty—a
luxury item that can be shared, while medicine taken to clear up an infection is perhaps a wasted
expense—tenuous at best and one that may not even work. Although Pedro does not come out
and say that he believes the medications to be useless, it is there by implication. And it is likely
that Ana María protectively, or perhaps paternalistically, called Juan a “niñito” on the phone, as
there is a tendency in Mexico to use diminutives. This was a misunderstanding that was cleared
up when the doctor was confronted with the actual child.

Autonomy and Rejection of Medical Aid: The Example of Vaccinations
The health of the displaced is an issue of public health. Gostin (2002, 31) writes that
“public health had been defined in terms of its aims and goal — to reduce disease and maintain
the health of the population — rather than by any specific body of knowledge. Many different
disciplines contributed to effective public health work: physicians diagnosed contagious
diseases, sanitary engineers built water and sewage systems, epidemiologists traced the sources
of disease outbreaks and their modes of transmission, statisticians provided quantitative
measures of births and deaths, lawyers wrote sanitary codes and regulations, public health nurses
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provided care and advice to the sick in their homes, sanitary inspectors visited factories and
markets to enforce compliance with public health ordinances, and administrators tried to
organize everyone within the limits of health department budgets. Public health thus involved
economics, sociology, psychology, politics, law, statistics, and engineering, as well as the
biological and clinical sciences.” It is clear from the administration of vaccines at Acteal in 1999
that the displaced population was being coerced into the public health agenda, which “involves
‘organized community effort,’ and… is not simply the outcome of isolated individual efforts”
(Gostin 2002, 31). That is, the mission of public health is “to ensure that organized approaches
are mobilized when they are needed” (Gostin 2002, 33). Smallpox eradication exemplifies the
tasks—organizational, political, and intellectual—that public health undertakes to fulfill its
mission. The vaccination “of countless individuals and treatment of unvaccinated patients would
not have rid us of smallpox without strategies aimed specifically at the communitywide (in this
case, the worldwide) level, such as epidemiologic studies, consistent reporting of cases, and
organized distribution of vaccine” (Gostin 2002, 37).
Public health measures are only as effective as their application to a population; before
1998 in many communities in the highlands, public health measures were spotty at best—and
medical oversight was largely absent (Freyermuth Enciso 1993; 2003). It was only within the
camps and under the aegis of Médicos del Mundo and the Mexican Red Cross that such
measures could reliably be applied. During the summer of 1999, children and their mothers were
vaccinated, reinforcing the idea that there had been no medical oversight in their lifetimes. Thus,
I argue that during their tenure in the camps, the displaced came under the control of quasi-state
structures, the Mexican Red Cross and Médicos del Mundo—and state structures such as the
IMSS Clínica de Campo field hospital, for the first time.
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The history of vaccinations in Chiapas since the beginning of the Chiapas conflict
foreshadowed the rejection of aid in the camps. The on again off again nature of the
government’s various campaigns was a precursor to how aid rejection played out in the INI
camp. CCESC, the Centro de Capacitación, Educación y Salud para los Campesinos, a health
and education NGO that monitored the health of the displaced reported the conflict over
vaccinations in the following way:
According to CCESC (1996), since the beginning of the armed conflict in Chiapas, that
is, in January 1994, vaccinations (most often carried out by representatives of the state from
IMSS) were completely interrupted in many regions. Once the conflict began, the health
institutions pulled out. Afterwards when things quieted down and they wanted to return to
continue their work, they found out that the communities had lost confidence in them and
wouldn’t let them carry out their work. There arose the idea that vaccinations wouldn’t be
accepted if they came from the government.
Some NGOs which worked on community health projects insisted that the vaccinations
continue in order to ward off epidemics, that is, to prevent many children from getting sick and
becoming contagious to others. They explained that tuberculosis, polio, diphtheria, tetanus,
whooping cough and measles are diseases that can kill or cause grave injury to children, yet
which can be avoided thanks to vaccinations. They also explained that vaccinations are a right of
the people and the responsibility of all.
CCESC argued that institutions of government have the obligation to vaccinate or to
provide vaccinations. The communities have the responsibility to organize to receive
vaccinations and ensure that no child remains unvaccinated. The health promoters have the
obligation to train themselves to apply vaccinations correctly, and NGOs must support them so
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that vaccinations are correctly administered in all locations. After these explanations in many
communities, the populations that still didn’t want them decided to accept them, but asked that
they be applied by their own health promoters, whether the Mexican Red Cross, the ICRC, or an
NGO. The government would not accept these conditions (and continued to send institutional
health workers to administer the vaccines).
One problem, which aggravated the vaccination situation in Chiapas, was an event that
occurred in October of 1995. Three nurses from the Secretary of Health who tried to vaccinate
the population in the municipality of (San Andrés) Larráinzar (also known as San Andrés
Sakam’chen de los Pobres, the site of the San Andrés Accords) were attacked and raped by
unknown men. “This grave crime put all health work at risk, CCESC stated; we all must be
attentive that nothing of the sort occurs again in any area of the state” (CCESC 1996, 2).
CCESC said that:
the problem we are experiencing now, at the beginning of 1996 is that after two years of
conflict, thousands of children haven’t been vaccinated. For this reason, the danger that
there will be epidemics grows by the day. If an epidemic of measles, such as occurred
eight years ago, were to recur, hundreds of children could die. It is all of our
responsibility to avoid this. Vaccinations must not be the only medical attention which
the population receives, but it is very important that it not be absent in any community,
however small” (CCESC 1996, 5).

Vaccines were first developed in Mexico in 1905 under the direction of the Secretería de
Instrucción Pública y Bellas Artes. Anti-vaccine sentiment goes back to the Cristero War, from
1926-1929. Anti-clericalism, public health and anti-alcohol campaigns were seen by many as
impositions from above and violently rejected (Beezley 2011). Anti-vaccination sentiment is
deep-seated in Mexican society (Beezley 2011).
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Vaccinations, thus, have been part of the Chiapas conflict in the sense that they are part
of the contested terrain of health work and aid rejection. Paradoxically, children’s health fared
better in the displaced persons’ camps. Because of inadequate health services in rural areas,
many more children went unimmunized, while in the camps, tight control meant that all children
received vaccinations for the most common illnesses—measles, tetanus, diphtheria, rabies, polio,
and tuberculosis. The tighter living quarters in camps, however, made the spread of disease a
greater threat than in rural communities, hence the greater urgency in providing vaccinations.
At Acteal in June 1999, Médicos del Mundo used a video on vaccinations to give
inhabitants an idea of what to expect and how to protect themselves from preventable diseases.
Indigenous health promoters stopped the presentation to explain the procedure in Tzotzil and
answer questions. Coordination went well between Médicos del Mundo and the indigenous
health promoters. Its work was to “acompañar” (accompany) the indigenous health promoters: to
train and give workshops in diagnosing and treating illnesses. I noticed that the mothers and
children who lined up to be vaccinated brought their vaccination cards in tightly wrapped plastic
bages, protecting them from the daily rains. There was a great deal of fear among the children,
but their mothers and the health promoters attempted to calm them down. As with children
anywhere, they were only partly successful, as children began crying at the sight of the needles.
Many of their mothers chose to receive vaccinations, as well, as they had never been vaccinated
before, thus illustrating the fact that this was their first encounter with quasi-state structures and
INGOs, bringing them under the allopathic health umbrella for the first time. Elena, a mestiza
doctor from Médicos del Mundo, not only staffed the clinic, hiring the promotores de salud, but
oversaw the staff. Health promoters were bilingual and without them there would have been
more mistrust than there already was.
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If 1998 began with significant medical aid, which was not altogether welcome as it
threatened to reduce the autonomy of IDPs at the INI camp and at Acteal, 1999 presented an
entirely different set of problems. By June 1999 aid rejection had severely affected the Acteal
camp. There were few medications, and the clinic run by Médicos del Mundo was sparsely
staffed. In some ways, this camp and others like it were worse off than INI because they refused
any government support. There was no atole in the stores and no supplemental nutritional foods
for the children. The lack of food was made worse by the risk of contagious diseases. In the
camps IDPs were exposed to people from other communities and more prone to new diseases, as
a result. Thus, life was more difficult at Acteal than at the INI camp in some important ways.

A Skin Disease Workshop at Acteal in 1999
The following profiles a skin disease workshop given to health promoters at Acteal
during the summer of 1999 by Médicos del Mundo, the NGO that trained indigenous health
promoters in 1998 and 1999. What made it different than traditional medical orientations was its
political and sociological thrust—accentuating poverty as the main cause of the Chiapas
conflict— as well as the way in which health promoters, under the aegis of Médicos del Mundo,
an international NGO, performed a state function, one of the features of the autonomous
municipalities in Chiapas that Barmeyer (2009) argues has replaced state power. The health
promoters were all members of Las Abejas or Las Abejas bases of support for the EZLN, or
supporters of the movement. The workshop first addressed the roots of hunger—a form of
poverty touching 40 million people in Mexico—and then chronicled the consequences of
malnutrition, the number of children under five who die each year from hunger, the loss of
height, and neonatal deaths from lack of proper nutrition. Then diet was addressed—the
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“custom” of eating only beans and tortillas with a little chili, a custom, of course, born of
poverty. It also explored the attendant facts of poverty—not enough money for soap or enough
clean or potable water—problems not only in all the camps but in the communities, as well. The
course then addressed differing political affiliations and religious differences, lack of land, war,
violence and conflict, and lack of education, which is at the root of many of these problems. The
workshop failed to mention illiteracy, but that was covered under the section on education.130 In
general, this course was as much about the sociology of disease as it was about curing skin
complaints, and it was entirely different than the medical oversight that I observed in the year
prior at INI.
The course covered the following points written on an easel at the front of a large
outdoor covered space:
Statistical Information:
1. There are 40 million poor people in Mexico;
2. 75 percent of the children who die under five die from malnutrition;
3. Ninety percent of malnourished children in Mexico reside in Chiapas;
4. In Mexico, every six years, children lose a centimeter of expected growth;
5. In the poorest zone in the south of Mexico malnutrition is responsible for half of
newborn deaths.
How is this going to be resolved?
Who began the violence?
What are our understandings for our peace?
The damage is done by eating only beans and tortillas.

130

UNICEF (2001) has shown that illiteracy, especially among women leads to poorer overall family health.
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On July 24, 1999, twelve indigenous health promoters are seated at the Acteal Las Abejas
IDP camp in the large outdoor meeting space, all from the communities of Chenalhó. All are
male; there are no midwives present. The instructor is the Médicos del Mundo doctor Elena, who
stands at the easel. The promoters are sitting in pairs. Elena writes the names of illnesses at the
top, and pairs of indigenous health promoters come up to the easel to write their answers, the
causes of the illnesses, on the table below (see Table 6.1). Along with a lack of food and money,
a lack of organization and the general filthiness of the camp are mentioned as causes of illness
directly related to poverty. Other health promoters add a lack of water, dust, ignorance, and lack
of education to the list. War and low-intensity war are mentioned as reasons for poverty along
with lack of land, lack of potable water, displacement, and campesinos killing campesinos. There
is also a designation of the EZLN, Las Abejas, and paramilitaries as organizations to help
campesinos rise out of poverty, which was an objective view of the paramilitary organizations so
soon after the massacre of Acteal. Participants offered the nuanced view that poverty is, in one
way or another, responsible for the creation of the EZLN, Las Abejas and the paramilitary bands.
The second table (see Table 6.2) discusses “things which divide us,” and “those who are free”
was counterposed to “those who are slaves”; correctly, two things which divided campesinos in
1999 were religion and politics, with Catholics, Pentecostals, Baptists, Church of God and
Mormon under the category of religion, and PRI, PAN, Cardenistas, Workers’ Party, PRD,
PVEM and PVEPD mentioned as political designations which divided campesinos.
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Table 6.1
CAUSES OF ILLNESSES (in Las Abejas)
Lack of food
Eating only beans and tortillas, water,
chili, tostadas
Lack of money
Expenses: food, clothing, medicine
Lack of organization:
Filthiness of camp:
-for not bathing
-dust
-no one teaches us
-lack of education

Table 6.2

Those who are free
Religion:
-Catholic
-Pentecostal
-Presbyterian
-Baptist
-Church of God
-Mormon

THINGS WHICH DIVIDE US
Those who are slaves
Politics:
-PRI
-PAN
-CARDENISTAS
-WORKERS’ PARTY
-PRD
-PVEM
-PVEPD

The course then continued by offering medical content, dividing the attendees into two
groups. There was little of the joking that I observed at the legal workshop earlier in July here in
Acteal. The promotores de salud were more serious and possessed more of a professional
demeanor on the whole, as if they were aware of their important role in the camp setting.
Group One came up to the board to write out their answers (in Spanish) to the queries,
“what diseases of the skin do we know,” “how are they treated?” and “what are the causes of this
disease?” followed by Group Two’s answers to the same questions. Group One wrote, abscesses,
lumps, hives, scabies (mange), and dandruff, while the second wrote scabies, hives, blotches,
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acne, head infection, herpes, labial moniliasis, diaper rash and skin rash. Treatment was then
listed as a “scabisan” and antibiotics for Group One, and benzyl benzoate lotion, miconazol
nitrate, ketoconazole cream, bicarbonate and a soap and water wash for Group Two. The causes
of the diseases mentioned were filth, not bathing, dust, and, for Group Two, lack of hygiene
because there is no water. The workshop continued by discussing diseases of the skin: scabies,
rosacea, mites, lice, pests, fleas, flies and hives, as well as common complaints in the camp:
insect bites, mosquitoes, flies, pests, bugs, fleas, lice, wasps, ants, worms and hookworm.
Mentioned, too, were herbs which can hurt you (sagebud, nettles, glasswort), burns, (sun, fire,
hot water, acid), and allergies (to medicine, chicken feathers, cat fur and flower pollen) (July 24,
1999).

Such workshops ensured that promoters knew what to do in the case of emergencies
and how to best treat patients. Their significant skill sets were a “gift” to their communities in
many ways: because they were indigenous themselves, they ensured trust with their patients;
because they were trained by INGOs and NGOs, they had a high level of competence, and saw
many patients, thus ensuring a proficient and more than adequate knowledge base. The health
promoters’ emphasis throughout, however, was on poverty and its political and sociological
orientation in creating illness and disease in the first place, and this focus never wavered, as they
highlighted patients’ needs and the choices they made in the camps which were born of
poverty—such as bathing in polluted streams or washing clothes there—and as the promoters
looked for ways to ameliorate those choices and meet those needs as health providers first. This
“gift” is entirely different than the allopathic or conventional health system, which is top-down
and monolithic, and if anything, erodes trust, as the nurse at the INI camp did, by telling the IDPs
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to bathe and to use washes and creams rather than their accustomed injections. In the end, it
came down to a difference of culture. Indigenous health promoters were bicultural and could
translate the allopathic health system to indigenous IDPs in a way that they could easily
understand. This was their most important “gift” to the IDP population at Acteal, where they
were depended upon most heavily. The INI camp, unfortunately for the IDPs living there, did not
use indigenous health promoters at all.

Gender, Indigeneity, and Health
Although there were no indigenous health promoters at the INI camp, they were used
extensively in the Las Abejas and BAEZLN camps in the countryside. If doctors also saw
patients, many times the health promotors were the ones who urged patients to go to the clinic.
Their presence in the camps during 1999 was critical. They eased tension, saw to it that patients
understood their diagnoses, and, in many instances, were the sole practitioners whom patients
saw. Mistrust, fear, and lack of confidence in the conventional medical system were common
themes in Chiapas in 1998 and 1999; Las Abejas’ displacement—all had originally come from
Chenalhó and now they were IDPs both at Acteal and at INI—did little to dispel these fears, and
in some respects, deepened these fears further. Only with the presence of indigenous health
promoters did some level of confidence in conventional medicine become more apparent. They
were excellent liaisons between conventional medicine and local custom and belief, which often
centered on indigenous medicine as a first resort. Yet, there were never enough health promoters
in any of the camps, Las Abejas camps, Polhó and Tzaljachen included, and mestizo medical
personnel there may have unintentionally fostered an even higher level of mistrust than before.
Not one mestizo doctor was bilingual, and many of the doctors at the clinics were male, although

253

that was changing, as this chapter shows; however, the presence of male doctors fueled women’s
fears which were, given this long history of wariness of outside medical personnel—and of men,
in general—not unfounded.
Indeed, the UNAM anthropologist Guiomar Rovira recounts an important meeting to
discuss the state of indigenous health in San Cristóbal and surrounding indigenous communities.
Held on October 21, 1995 in San Cristóbal de Las Casas; it was one of six meetings with the
local populace dedicated to the negotiations that the Zapatistas had over the proposed political
legislation, “Rights and Indigenous Culture,” which would become known as the San Andrés
Accords. It was attended by four female Zapatista comandantes and government delegates, as
well as many indigenous women. As recounted by Rovira, a woman named Luisa María vividly
told the assembled delegates:

I am from San Pedro Chenalhó. There is a health center but no medical attention, no
doctors, no medicine. If there happens to be a doctor and an indigenous woman arrives
for treatment, he doesn’t treat her if she has no money. “Go clean your feet because they
are very muddy,” they tell us because we poor and indigenous women go barefoot. “I
can’t treat you while filthy (cited in Rovira 1998, 217). Translation by author.

Another very real concern in indigenous communities is the fear of rape. As is often the
case with forced sexual acts, rape is used as a means of social control in the highlands. At the
same time as these meetings on indigenous culture were being held in the El Carmen convention
center in San Cristóbal, unknown men raped three non-indigenous nurses from the Secretary of
Health (described above), thus spreading fear and inhibiting vaccinations in many highland
communities. Indigenous women learn from an early age to be modest in their conduct and
dress—largely to deter would-be rapists, who would blame the woman herself for provocative
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dress or action. Hence, women learn to fear both the possibility of rape, and perhaps more subtly,
for their reputations—if rape or sexual liaison can occur, it will be assumed to have occurred,
weighting the appearance more heavily than the reality. And one of the few places in which
women find themselves alone with a man is at the health clinic or hospital.
At the same meeting described by Rovira, María, a Tzotzil woman from Chamula, relates
both the threat of and fears of accusations of rape and sexual misconduct at hospitals when she
states:
Why does this [rape] occur? Only because we are indigenous and we are poor, for this
they rape us in the hospitals. Women die in the communities because we have no
confidence any longer in the hospitals, in doctors, in nurses. We are always maltreated,
always trampled upon.... (cited in Rovira 1998, 217). Translation by author.

Rape is an extreme, but all too common, form of personal and social intimidation in the
highlands. Yet, the problems indigenous women have with institutional medicine are best
illustrated by those they encounter in everyday life; one of the most important is their mistrust of
male practitioners.
In May 1998, I accompanied a medical team from the INI camp as it assisted Ximena,
an indigenous woman in the distant San Cristóbal neighborhood of Colonia Emiliano Zapata.
The encounter illustrated the fear that indigenous women feel upon interacting with male health
practitioners and the distrust apparent at all times, even when not in an IDP camp. My presence
and the presence of Ana María was necessary to erase some of the fear surrounding the medical
interactions with men. Our medical call involved a relatively diverse team: the dentist and
medical liaison Ana María; José, the ill woman’s husband; our driver Roberto, who was also our
Tzotzil interpreter; the doctor, Gilberto; and me. It was a long, bumpy ride on dirt roads to the

255

colonia, which consists predominantly of expulsados from Chamula whom fellow village
members expelled on religious grounds. Along with the expulsados were several desplazado
families, people displaced in October and November 1997 from Chenalhó, before there were so
many that they had to be housed in camps. The young wife, a pretty woman of about 20, sat
squatting and pained, surrounded by her two young daughters, ages around 2 and 5. Her house
with its earthen floor was stocked with bags of corn and had a cozy, if simple feel.
Gilberto began asking—with the interpreter speaking in Tzotzil—where does it hurt? Is
your bleeding bright red or rust colored? What precipitated this? To José: are you sure that she
was pregnant? The woman kept her eyes plastered to the floor, as if greatly ashamed, and
responded with brief words and phrases, discomfited by our mostly male entourage who had
invaded her home. The younger child seemed near tears, possibly picking up her mother’s
anxiety. The older woman at the door did not miss a beat. She showed keen interest in everything
happening in the house. When the questioning was through, the doctor briefly touched her belly
where the pain was. It is decided to bring her into the IMSS Clínica de Campo. Ana María,
however briefly, the doctor, and Ximena’s husband, each had an input in the decision—Ximena
was forced to defer to the men, as she had limited power in the household or in the medical
system. José worriedly asked if they would have to operate. The doctor answered most likely no,
but he almost smiled at the naïveté of the question, a common one, knowing the concerns housed
in such a query (in his mind—and in Ximena’s, likely, was the question, what good is an
indigenous woman if she cannot bear more children?). The older child was left with the older
woman, who is most likely a relative (she, too, wears the huipil of Chenalhó). The baby who was
still suckling was wrapped around her mother’s front in a shawl as we piled into the pickup to
take the mother to the hospital. When we drove back from the clinic without Ximena, whom the
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doctor decided should stay overnight for observation, I could almost sense the dread in the house
as the two, doctor and husband, walked towards it. The older woman who was watching the
older child was fearful and would have to watch the child overnight. And, although an operation
was unlikely, the possibility couldn’t be ruled out entirely.
At the INI camp, Ana María’s ubiquitous and soothing presence served as a buffer
between medical personnel and patients, and, whenever possible, female doctors were used, as I
showed in the vignette about the boy, Juan and his family’s encounter with institutional
medicine, earlier. Women were perceived as less threatening, and, because there were more
women than men at camp, there were more female patients. In the next section, I turn our gaze to
indigenous medicine, the practice of which runs parallel to allopathic medicine in Chiapas
(Ayora Diaz 2000).

Loss of Prestige in Allopathic Medicine and the Importance of Indigenous Medicine
Since 1994 the EZLN has brought a heightened sense of political awareness to
indigenous communities. At the same time, the medical profession has suffered a loss of prestige
in Chiapas. Another facet of the story of medical mistrust is an oft-expressed preference for
traditional medicine, as evidenced by the following story from the summer of 1999 in Acteal:

Benjamín Pérez Pérez, a member of the Mesa Directiva at Acteal, told me that he wasn’t
able to go to yesterday’s human rights workshop because his 20-month-old son almost
died. Last Tuesday, on the day of the fiesta for San Pedro (the patron saint of Chenalhó,
the municipality, at Acteal, now called San Pedro Desplazado), his son was fine in the
morning and at midday. Then, about 3pm, he said, his wife came running to where he was
in the mesa office with tears in her eyes. “Our son is dying,” she said. He went with her.
His son’s eyes were immobile, and although his heart was still beating, his fingers had
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gone cold. He had a 104 degree fever, dangerously high. They rushed him to the Cruz
Roja Mexicana on the highway, where they gave him drops which revived him, and then
took him home. It was the day of the fiesta. Then, in the evening, his fever shot up again,
so they went back to the Cruz Roja, which gave him an injection this time. He recovered,
then the next day, his fever came back. This time, they went to Elena, the doctor for
Médicos del Mundo (trying a different venue each time). She gave him a different
injection, which seemed to work, but the fever came back on Saturday. Elena had already
left for Mexico City, so they went to the pharmacy in Yabteclum. The fever once again
came back, and they didn’t know where else to turn (by now, having zero confidence in
the medical system). So THIS time, they tried traditional medicine. Benjamín called on
an “anciano,” an older man who is skilled in the ancient ways of herbal medicine.
Benjamín said that when the man, Mario saw the boy, he knew immediately which plant
to use. Benjamín says that Mario went to look for the plant himself, and then gave his son
a tea of it to drink. They then all prayed over the boy all day yesterday, and he related that
today, for the first time, the boy had an appetite. They will wait to see what happens. The
last option is always the hospital in San Cristóbal, but whether due to distance, cost, or
mistrust, it seems usually to be the last option taken (Interview with Benjamin Pérez
Pérez, July 5, 1999).
The boy recovered with the intervention of traditional medicine, and its curative powers
were reinforced at Acteal, as, of course, everyone living there heard the miraculous story.
Indigenous medicine, long of interest to anthropologists, has, since the 1970s, come to be of
interest to health professionals; since 1994, it has become part of the contested terrain of the
EZLN’s autonomous municipalities. Its use is one way to gain the trust of indigenous
communities. One reason for the renewed interest is the ubiquity of traditional curative methods;
another is the government support it has received since the 1980s. Traditional medicine is also of
interest because, technological advances in Western, hospital-based medicine notwithstanding,
this “modern” medicine has reached only a small percentage of the population. The economic
depression in Latin America in the 1980s and the adoption of a neoliberal economic model in
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Mexico has meant that, although the state did not shrink, as per the neoliberal archetype,
investment in Mexico’s national health care system diminished as social services were all too
often privatized. As a result, the low-cost measures of traditional cures have come to the
attention of trained health professionals (Freyermuth Enciso 1993).
Toward that end, in the 1980s, government-based and independent organizations in
Mexico instituted a series of programs focusing on the practice of traditional medicine. These
programs centered on strengthening primary medical care through the use of traditional methods.
Organizations held workshops and training sessions, the most interesting of which addressed the
collection and classification of traditional medicinal plants, and the work of midwives. At this
time, however, none of this work investigated curative rituals themselves or the different courses
of herb therapy used in indigenous communities. The thrust of government policy was to
incorporate indigenous curing practices into institutional or allopathic medicine (Freyermuth
Enciso 1993). Programs instituted by INI (Instituto Nacional Indígenista), IMSS (el Instituto
Mexicano del Seguro Social), and SSA (la Secretaría de Salubridad y Asistencia) ambitiously
sought to accomplish this by forming community health committees and collaborating on
environmental sanitation projects, vaccination, oral rehydration therapy, and other basic health
measures.
The roots of these efforts lie in earlier, not entirely successful attempts to try an opposite
approach, programs that began in 1951 as part of Mexico’s assimilationist agenda (Forbis 2006,
178): “bringing the benefits of modern medicine to the indigenous” (Holland 1963, 211, quoted
in Forbis 2006, 178-179), or, more succinctly, “as a hook to assimilate indigenous peoples to
mestizo modernity” (Forbis 2006, 179). The indigenous of Chiapas who were the first to undergo
this program were treated “as the failed objects of modernization,” and “as children” (Forbis
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2006, 179), a stance that the EZLN has tried, with varying degrees of success, to change. Then,
as now, many indigenous patients were approached as though they were “ignorant” and unable to
understand conventional medical practices (Forbis 2006, 179). It was not until the 1970s and
1980s that “government programs took an intercultural turn, building on the work of INI and
leading to a program of ‘parallel medicine’ that incorporated traditional medicine and plant
medicine” (Freyermuth Enciso 1993, 79-85).
Indigenous promotores de salud are critical to this enterprise. Because there are still two
distinct visions of both health and the world among practitioners of allopathic, or conventional,
medicine and indigenous medicine, it has taken bilingual, bicultural indigenous health promoters
to link the two. Freyermuth Enciso (1993) faults the lack of training on the part of institutional
medical practitioners in the “sociocultural realities” of those they treat, namely indigenous
peoples. In her view, this impedes the establishment of an adequate relationship with patients and
creates a frustrating situation that in itself prevents medical practitioners from staying in
impoverished indigenous communities longer than they must (Freyermuth Enciso 1994). On the
other hand, she also criticizes practitioners of traditional medicine for medicine’s restricted
therapies, and even more for its rising commercialization. The institutions of health in Mexico,
however, have tried to incorporate both methods, and especially to use indigenous curing
techniques in primary-level health care, reserving institutional medicine for patients whose needs
were more “sophisticated,” and could not consequently be met by traditional medicine
(Freyermuth Enciso 1993; 1994; 2003). Although traditional medicine is often viewed as both an
“exotic” cultural product and an “authentic” one, it can be understood as a hybrid, combining
herbal and spiritual healing with the sensibility—and drugs—of institutional medicine (AyoraDíaz 2000, 176). Ayora-Díaz cites the example of traditional Tojolobal-speaking healers
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working in a hospital in Comitán who combined traditional cures with patented medications and,
in an attempt to secure additional legitimacy, wore white lab coats and stethoscopes.
One of the points that medical anthropology stresses is that many in the global south are
steeped in Western medical models—biomedicine—as a result of their colonial pasts. Medical
practices in these nations often favor a curative medicinal approach, which emphasizes finding
cures for diseases such as cancer, over preventive medicine, which, given the proper health
infrastructure, would help far larger numbers of patients in many contexts (Baer, Singer and
Susser 1997, 29). Epidemiology, pharmacology (especially the search for curative plants), and an
emphasis upon hospitals with the latest diagnostic technology are all part of this legacy. In places
such as Chiapas, however, basic medicines and medical training would help assuage the pressing
but unmet need for adequate preventive health measures such as vaccinations, adequate diet and
nutrition, and regular medical examinations and self-exams.
The training of indigenous health promoters by Médicos del Mundo for the EZLN, bases
de apoyo camps, and Las Abejas, as well as in indigenous communities was one positive step in
this direction. Yet, as I observed during fieldwork in 1997-1999, institutional medical providers
did not take this approach. Poverty has long been the greatest obstacle to good health in
Chiapas—but its effects are often disregarded by practitioners of institutional medicine. The use
of health promoters and indigenous medicine and an alleviation of poverty are part of the
solution but so, too, is the provision of vaccinations. Too often, the EZLN has rejected
vaccinations in its autonomous municipalities and caracoles—although it accepts them when
provided by INGOs such as Médicos del Mundo. Because of this, the EZLN’s mandate to reject
aid alone is not an alternative, given that there is little infrastructure in its place. Indigenous
medicine and curative practices, along with the use of indigenous health promoters, would go far
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towards dispelling some of the mistrust between practitioners of allopathic medicine and their
indigenous patients, but there is still need for allopathic medicine. Because many practitioners of
institutional medicine, however, are young and male, doing their year long residency
requirement in Chiapas, and because there are not enough indigenous health promoters to aid in
translation and trust-building, a change of policy is needed in allopathic medicine, as well. In
Chiapas, at the INI camp and at Acteal in 1997-99, the health system was in crisis as patients and
health practitioners routinely mistrusted the other, finding fault in the delivery of health services
and in patients’ belief systems, respectively.

Conclusion
EZLN and Las Abejas government aid rejection meant that government-provided health
delivery systems, such as doctors from the Clínica de Campo, the state hospital, were mistrusted
and their medicines suspect, as patients sometimes rejected allopathic medicine and turned to
traditional curative techniques and practitioners instead. Indigenous medicine was, thus, a
component of the EZLN’s autonomous municipalities in the late 1990s (and is part of the
caracoles in the present). Yet the IDPs more often accepted allopathic medical aid than rejected
it, even as it came from the Social Security hospital IMSS Clínica de Campo, a government
agency, and thus was forbidden by the EZLN. In this, CCESC played a coordination role, calling
in doctors to the INI camp as needed—and working with the nurse from the Clínica de Campo
who was present in the mornings at INI in 1998 and 1999. From CCESC’s perspective, there was
simply no alternative, as the IDPs needed medical oversight due to their structural poverty—
oversight which was largely lacking in their home communities due to clinics with few
medicines, staffed by mostly male, mestizo medical interns from the cities doing their one-year
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residency in Chiapas and moving on. Poverty was and is the most significant impediment to
good health in Chiapas, both in and out of the camps, although poverty’s deleterious effects were
in 1998 and 1999 often disregarded by practitioners of institutional medicine. The political
economy of illness and suffering includes unhygienic conditions, non-potable water, poor
sanitation, the lack of shoes, inadequate vaccinations, illiteracy, inadequate housing and absolute
poverty. At INI, unsanitary conditions during the rainy season meant that basic public health
measures were impossible to implement—fecal matter was spread by the rain as IDPs used the
fields rather than the two flooded and largely non-working bathrooms for defecation, and there
were no showers or tubs to heat the water for bathing in—but the IDPs living there were faulted
for the lack of such measures, and in the process, stripped of their agency—and, critical to this
study, their autonomy. The IDPs were angered by the constant public health lectures they
received from CCESC and from the nurse from the Clínica de Campo, and, as a consequence,
their prescribed measures remained only partially executed. The lectures were instructive—and
thus, not assistentialist—but there were no funds to fix the flooded bathrooms or to provide tubs
to heat the water for bathing, so the structural conditions that subtended the lectures remained
unchanged. Yet, some structural conditions were altered by the Chiapas conflict, and more
specifically, by the massacre at Acteal; for one, children and their mothers were vaccinated
together at Acteal by Médicos del Mundo in 1999.131 I argue that this medical oversight also
ensured that in the camps, the displaced came under the aegis of quasi-state—and state—
structures for the first time. However, they resisted this oversight, such as when they were
incensed by the impossible public health messages at INI, even as they accepted the medical aid
that came along with it.
131

I treat the subject of education at Acteal in the next chapter. There, the EZLN’s educational methods were and
are used, teaching children their history and the history of the Chiapas conflict (among other subjects) in both their
native language and in Spanish.
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By 1999, aid rejection had seriously affected the Acteal camp, as there was no
supplemental nutrition for the children, and Médicos del Mundo’s clinic at Acteal was only
sparsely staffed. Although there were promotores de salud, there was only one doctor and camp
inhabitants often waited on long lines in the summer rains to be seen for their countless ailments.
These ailments were many both at INI and at Acteal. Because of the resistance to DIF’s atolemaking development aid at INI, and the limited supply of food aid, both camps were in difficult
straights, and there was not altogether much difference between the two.
A skin-disease workshop held by Médicos del Mundo for indigenous health promoters
emphasized the political and sociological thrust of poverty as responsible for most diseases and
helped dispel some of the mistrust that the IDPs held for allopathic medicine. The workshop
presenters also held poverty responsible for the Chiapas conflict, as well as for the formation of
the EZLN, Las Abejas and the paramilitaries, only a year and a half after the massacre of Acteal.
This was a very different orientation than that of the institutional medical providers, who held a
subtle prejudice towards the indigenous IDPs—they feared that there was some truth to the joke
that the family of a sick boy should sell the antibiotics to buy a chicken, and they resisted telling
the IDPs that the boy, who had a bacterial infection and parasites, was contagious, fearing that
such a pronouncement would spread panic. Public health was a top-down program forced on an
unwilling populace, the IDPs in the camps. Most public health aid was assistentialist, or charityladen. Indigenous health promoters were the exception to this rule, as they assuaged fears and
offered a sociological vision of illness at Acteal. The next chapter deals with a
microdevelopment project which was likewise not assistentialist, making breastfeeding dolls for
sale. With this project, the female dollmakers would overturn the normative division of labor and
be able to support their families for the first time.
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Chapter Seven:
Development Aid: The Doll Project at INI
After analyzing in previous chapters the politics of aid rejection, which was seen as
increasing dependency on the Mexican government, and as a way of breaking down the EZLN’s
revolutionary struggle and its different consequences for the displaced and impoverished
populations affected by the Acteal massacre, this chapter details a microcredit development
project for those women at the INI camp who were skilled in sewing and embroidery, making
breastfeeding dolls for sale in foreign and distant markets. This project is one of the “success
stories” that Edelman and Haugerud (2005) note are in short supply in the anthropological
literature. The idea for it came from Dr. Marcos Arana of CCESC, now CCESC-DDS, Centro de
Capacitación, Educación y Salud para los Campesinos, Defensoría de Derechos de la Salud
(Training Center for Education and Health of Peasants, and Defender of Health Rights), a health
and education NGO which, as we saw earlier, monitored the health of the displaced at the INI
camp, as well as at the other camps in San Cristóbal de Las Casas and in the highlands. The
project was midway between a “gift” and a commodity, as it was a loan implemented by
FONAES, a government agency, Fondo de Apoyo para Empresas en Solidaridad (National Fund
of Support for Companies in Solidarity), the social development arm of INI, the National Indian
Institute. And because the families still in residence at the INI camp in June of 1999 had left Las
Abejas, they were free to accept a government project with impunity. Although the principals
noted that there had been a social transformation in indigenous communities in the previous
decade due to neoliberalism,132 the project was the best way out of the poverty and dependency
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For instance, rather than making their trajes (literally “suits,” denoting indigenous clothing, in this case, a
colorfully embroidered blouse and an embroidered blue skirt cinched with a pom pom belt, see photos below)
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so prevalent at the INI camp. It allowed the women to feed their families chicken on an
occasional Sunday, and to buy vegetables, things not included in the very basic shipments of
food by the ICRC, CARITAS and the Mexican Red Cross, and by the early summer of 1999,
when the project was finally implemented, such rations were meager indeed. The project gave
the women the ability to reject these assistentialist, charity-laden shipments of food to the INI
camp, or at least to supplement their rations. Thus, although the women from Chenalhó had no
experience selling their labor power on the market, like Zapatista women, they were overturning
prohibitions on women’s work and providing for their families when their men couldn’t. The
breastfeeding doll project is still in effect and its long duration proves it a successful project, as it
has now been in operation for twenty years as of this writing. And it has been copied by women
from nearby Chamula, although the copies lack the anatomical correctness of the originals. I use
ethnography to chart the course of the project, below. It is a project of which Dr. Arana remains
justifiably proud.133

July 13, 1998, 3:00 PM, INI displaced persons’ camp, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, Chiapas: Ana
María has brought a doll, which resembles a prototype of a doll designed in Brazil, to camp
today.

women bought them ready-made from women who specialized in their production and sale, while they worked on
their milpas and cafetales or tended sheep.
133
When I emailed Dr. Arana the paper that I presented in 2015 at the American Anthropological Association
meetings “The Breast is Best:’ Microcredit Development and the Sexual Division of Labor in Chiapas, Mexico” on
the breastfeeding doll project, he wrote back, stating that finally someone had written about the project, and offering
to publish with me in Spanish.
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Figure 7.1 The Sample Breastfeeding Doll

Gathered around Ana María, examining the doll's dress and baby attached by a snap to its
breast, the women laugh uproariously. Manuel asks how much they are going to sell for. "Treinta
pesos, muy barato, ¿no?" (very cheap, no?) The women chime in that the doll is bonita,
“pretty.” Catarina, Manuel’s wife, speaks some Spanish, and clarifies the exchange for the
women who don’t. Ana María says she will post a list for the women who want to sign up for
work on the project. Manuel agrees that he can weave a narrow band for the doll's skirt: "Yes, it
is very easy to weave. The work will be easy." Then he goes back into the open room with his
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loom, financed in part with proceeds from the government settlement for the victims of Acteal
and their families.134

Three weeks earlier:
June 20, 1998, INI/FONAES- Social development: The projected costs of the materials will be
3,355 pesos [$258 US] for materials or 320 pesos [$24.62 US] for each person at 13 pesos to the
dollar, which was the contemporaneous amount. At this point, there are very few women. They
will need to sell the dolls for $5.00 US, or 45 pesos, in France or Spain to break even. They
project making 1200 dolls in a year. Ana María says that in 6 days they can probably make
several dolls each. She refers to the blouses that the women made with the materials that a local
patron135 provided, and says that they finished them very rapidly. They cut them and
embroidered them. Ana María estimates that each doll will take 4 hours to do. She says that there
are 30 women. She is very concerned about the amount of time and the costs. Ana María says
that they can complete one doll in three afternoons. She estimates that each woman can make 10
dolls a month.
Ana María says that a two-year project, in which the dolls will be sold in foreign markets,
is the goal. This would guarantee the success of the project.

July 10, 1998, INI camp:

134

This is the settlement that the EZLN insisted that the victim’s families reject; the EZLN mandate, however, was
not always adhered to by impoverished families.
135

This is a patron in the English sense of the word, a woman who provided blouse-making materials for the
women, which they could then sell once completed.
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When Ana María stuck the baby onto the doll’s breast the women laughed again, some
doubled over in hysterics.136 I had never seen them so joyful. The doll fascinated them perhaps
because it was dressed like them—although not in the same traje—and perhaps because, unlike
the ubiquitous baby doll, this doll is a mother. Each of the doll's breasts has a snap-on clip in
place of a nipple, and the baby's mouth is created from the complementary snap piece. Ana
María handed the doll to Marcela, the women's representante, “show them.” Each woman tried it
and laughed. Some pulled the doll's skirt over its head, examining the pouch between its legs
(representing a vagina), then the legs themselves, then the back of the skirt and blouse (traje).
Ana María demonstrated the use of the shawl, which doubled as a sling to tie the baby on the
doll's back in highland Chiapas fashion or in front to hold the baby for breastfeeding. Marcela
added “they are not dressed as we are—we can dress them like us.”
A year later in July 1999, production of the breastfeeding dolls was in full swing. When
the INI contingent of Las Abejas returned to Acteal in February 1999, eight months after INI
camp residents and NGO leaders first began planning doll production, Manuel and his wife,
Catarina, returned with them but settled outside the main camp area, along the road to Pantelhó.
Manuel’s oldest son, also called Manuel, elected to stay behind at the INI camp in San Cristóbal
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The doll project was begun in conjunction with CCESC’s work on breastfeeding, which it promoted
through the Baby Friendly Hospital initiative, supported by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN)
and other allied organizations. The original idea came from “Amigas de Peito,” or “Friends of the Breast,” an NGO
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil that IBFAN formed to support breastfeeding. The Clínica de Campo hospital just outside of
the city of San Cristóbal de Las Casas, has been one of the participating hospitals. At the hospital, corridors and
individual rooms are adorned with large, colorful posters and murals that depict women breastfeeding newborns.
Some of the women appear to be indigenous, but to appeal to mestiza or ladino women other depictions are more
ambiguous. The overall message is that breastmilk is the best source of nutrients for babies. In hospitals such as this,
doctors and nurses convey this message to new mothers. During the 1970s and even the 1980s, Nestlé, Gerber, and
other companies sent free baby formula samples to rural hospitals and clinics to “hook” new customers, the new
mothers, who would then be unable to nurse because their milk had stopped flowing during the time that they bottlefed their infants. Then, when mothers ran out of free samples, the companies had a dependent customer.
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and work the loom there, where he had begun to develop a local customer base.137 Manuel, the
younger, used the loom to provide material for the dolls. Producing the fabric on site ensured ontime delivery, and because Manuel belonged to Las Abejas he found coordinating the process
relatively easy.
The women and children from the INI camp sat at a long wooden table assembling the
dolls. Oftentimes men from the camp watched and even pitched in by cutting cloth or gluing
fabric. The women had modified the original prototype so that the dolls wore an embroidered
traje similar to the one worn by the women of Chenalhó. They added metallic necklaces in gold,
blue and yellow and a belt tied with pom-poms that cinched the embroidered skirt. Velcro on
each hand allowed the mother doll to hold her infant in her arms. Borrowing from the Cabbage
Patch Kid doll marketing innovation of the early 1980s the women included with each doll a tag
stating that it was made by members of Las Abejas who had been displaced from Chenalhó,
Chiapas. And each doll received a name. It was the responsibility of the doll’s maker, but the
younger girls frequently offered their favorite names.

137

Indigenous people who lived or worked nearby, many of them originally from Chamula, came to him with their
yarn to be woven or with orders to be placed. The loom was housed in a shed and paid for with monies that his
youngest son received from the government for an injury he received when he was attacked at Acteal.
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Figure 7.2 The finished dolls
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Figure 7.3 Dolls dressed in the traje of Chenalhó

This project had taken a full year to get off the ground, slowed by a lengthy bureaucratic
application and proposal process; a three-month delay caused by FONAES moving offices to a
new location much farther from the INI camp —it had bordered the INI camp during the spring
of 1998; and by the long internal process of acceptance by the women at camp. Once the project
began, however, men and children, and even the women whose names did not appear on the list
of 22 principals, got involved in the process and took pride in the outcome. The doll project,
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staffed completely by those who rejected returning to Acteal, now “represented” the INI camp,
and, more importantly, helped unite it. It lifted people’s spirits, one of the project’s goals.
These goals were set out in early 1998, during the project’s first planning session at a San
Cristóbal café, when CCESC’s Dr. Marcos Arana explained that he hoped the project would
accomplish four things: 1) promote work for women and allow them to re-learn skills they hoped
would prove useful; 2) build confidence and restore their previous self-sufficiency; 3) promote
Spanish language skills and literacy through involvement with the teams from CCESC,
FONAES, and also suppliers; and 4) instill among the displaced a collective vision, which was
lacking and evident in the discord, jealousy, and disunity that was apparent at camp at the outset
of the project in 1998. For many these goals were accomplished.
Once begun, the doll project fostered unity and a collective vision of the displaced as
indigenous people from Chenalhó. Monolingual Tzotzil speakers learned basic Spanish—words
for cloth, dolls, and materials, among others. The women who worked on the project achieved a
level of self-sufficiency. They used money from early sales to purchase supplies anew but put
whatever remained into their bank accounts. And what was perhaps most significant, women
who had never before known how to sew or embroider learned from others. This last point was
especially true of the girls, who learned quickly, practicing embroidering on scraps of cloth, and
even, on their own trajes.138

Gendered Decision-making
At the INI camp twenty-two women had the ultimate decision over the project’s fate
when they decided to participate in the microcredit project. Given how decisions were generally
138

One of the girls from Canolal embroidered a “bee” (abeja) on her blouse once she had returned to Acteal. This
was a poignant case of learning politics and identity along with craft, although it was unrelated to the doll project.
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made at the camp and the state of gender relations at the time, it was telling that the women had
the last word in the decision-making process. Just as significant, despite initial skepticism and
some hostility, many men became involved in the project.
Around late March 1998, when the idea of the doll project was introduced to the INI
camp, Sebastián and Gerardo, former and present responsables, respectively, complained that
there was little food at the camp—only basic necessities, and not nearly enough to feed all the
families properly. This ultimately pushed the women to support the project, although they feared
the compromiso, the promise to pay back the loan. From the first, the women were excited about
the doll project, but the loan scared them. The men at first rejected the project, although it was
intended to be under the control of the women who would produce the dolls. When the men
rejected the project, they spoke on behalf of the twenty-two women who initiated the project.
During this time, nearly a month in March-April 1998, Gerardo, the 24-year old responsable at
the INI camp repeatedly told me that “the women aren’t going to want to do it; they’re not going
to WANT to.” The initial male rejection was in keeping with earlier findings from the area.
Women’s cooperatives threatened men, and the backlash included cases where some women
were murdered for their success because of the independence they asserted (Nash 1993; Eber and
Rosenbaum 1993).
During this period, the twenty-two women—and their husbands and fathers—and the
team from CCESC, including myself, held several critical meetings to discuss adopting the
project. The meetings were typical of the camp’s political process: collective decisions required a
consensus in an open forum. At the meeting with observers from Melel Xojobal and Alianza
Cívica described in Chapter Six, Padre Gonzalo Ituarte berated the IDPs at INI for its disunity
and inability to reach a consensus. That inability, he told them, was hindering their receipt of
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additional humanitarian aid. Padre Ituarte’s tone and message were harsh, sternly admonishing
the IDPs as though they were children. He told the camp, in no uncertain terms, that they had to
participate in the project and come together and make a decision as one. Perhaps his tone pushed
the women to go ahead with the doll project. Yet, they were, from the beginning interested in the
project, whereas the men’s objections were more ideological—FONAES/INI provided funding,
which came from government sources. Additionally, most of the men and even a few of the
women feared involvement in the project because it involved a loan that had to be paid back. It
was clear that the men, at least, were being strong-armed into accepting the project by the NGOs,
profiled in Chapter Six, who met with the IDPs at the INI camp during the summer of 1998. Now
the entire camp would forge ahead on this project, which was intended to alleviate some of their
economic stress. The project was not one on which they had truly reached a consensus; the
NGOs and Catholic priest had largely goaded them into it. The mood changed once the project
was underway, though.
The men’s participation sometimes leaned to taking over, especially at first—it was one
of the men who gave me information about the bank account that was opened under one of the
women’s names. Sebastián and Gerardo often spoke for the women, without consulting them,
especially in the early stages, saying things like “the women aren’t going to want to do this.” But
eventually, most of the men learned to ask the women their opinions about the project and to call
the women out when customers came by, as they sometimes did. This was difficult for the men
at first, but in time, it became apparent that they were proud that the women could have their
own economic niche. And they were proud of the output—the dolls.
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Commodification and Social Transformation
Escobar (1995, 1991) and others see the local and local ways of knowledge as a solution
to the problems of underdevelopment, although treating local communities as a panacea would
seem to succumb to the fallacy of romanticization of these same communities. In this case, the
assumed local knowledge behind the breastfeeding doll project was the women’s ability to sew
and embroider, but this knowledge was in the process of being lost as processes of
commodification took hold in the countryside. That is, highland indigenous women were no
longer learning how to sew and embroider, but bought their trajes ready-made from women who
could. When they were developing the breastfeeding doll development project, officials at
FONAES ignored that many women at the INI camp had either never learned to sew and
embroider or that their skills were rudimentary. FONAES/CCESC determined that the project
would involve sewing and embroidery, even though the principals knew that many women were
unskilled in these traditional crafts. As, I’ll discuss below, they ignored local conditions in part
because such changed realities did not match outsiders’ perceptions of indigenous people and
partly because this project appeared to be the best way that the displaced, former subsistence and
coffee farmers, could help themselves. The government agency, Fondo de Apoyo para Empresas
en Solidaridad, or FONAES (National Fund of Support for Companies in Solidarity), and the
NGO, CCESC, regarded the project as the best chance for a return to self-sufficiency. Because
the displaced had left everything behind in their communities, they needed a project that could
use transportable skills (Nash 1993; Verrillo and MacLean Earle 1993). Given more time and
better funding—that is, optimal conditions—it is certain that FONAES/CCESC would have been
better able to tailor the project to all of the women, but under the difficult circumstances of
displacement, this proved impossible.
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It was one summer morning in 1998, while putting together the specifications for the doll
project proposal at the FONAES offices, a long barracks-like structure near the offices of INI,
that Arturo Farrera, the FONAES agronomist who headed the doll project, admitted that the
project planners had overlooked a “social transformation” in highland indigenous communities.
Women were no longer learning traditional crafts as their mothers and grandmothers had. I was,
of course, shocked. Here we were, pushing the project through FONAES, the social development
arm of INI, and one of the two principals on the project conceded a fundamental flaw before the
funding was even obtained. The assumption that the women in the camp already possessed the
necessary skills was illustrative of the reality of many development projects. Project developers
assumed that what had proven successful elsewhere—in this case, Brazil139—would work just as
well in a new setting. The principals knew that there were obstacles, but regarded the project as
the only viable alternative. It had the potential of producing some economic gain and helping the
displaced to become more self-sufficient. This potential was realized both in and out of the camp
setting, as the displaced families who had elected not to return to Acteal in 1999, or to remain
with Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, relocated to more remote regions of Chiapas. Given these
constraints, CCESC was the link that kept the project viable and ultimately ensured its success.
The social transformation that had occurred in indigenous highland communities was
most obvious among women of the EZLN (Speed 2003, 2005; Castro Apreza 2003; Forbis 2003;
Nash 2001) although women outside of the EZLN saw this social transformation as well. In
particular, the technical advisor at FONAES acknowledged that many indigenous women had
not learned to sew during their childhoods and that a division of labor had developed in which
some women bought their trajes ready-made from other women who specialized in their
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The dolls made in Brazil were offered for sale through the IBFAN newsletter, 2002.
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production, that is, processes of commodification and craft specialization were at work. Women
worked on coffee cultivation, tended sheep, or sold food or handicrafts in the market but rarely
did all three. Even though it was a common perception that indigenous women are skilled in
many areas, this was becoming less true as specialization increased and took hold—here, as
elsewhere, it was cheaper to buy commodities ready-made than to make them yourself—forcing
women as well as men to concentrate their energies on one productive enterprise. In the camp at
INI, most of the teenage girls did not know how to sew or to embroider but learned these skills
from several of the older women who learned the skills while resident at camp. Julia and
Lorenza, both in their teens, did not know how to embroider nor could Susana, a woman in her
fifties, whose arm was injured three years before the doll project began, sew. Mercedes, a mother
of 11, told me that she never learned to sew because she had worked on her milpa and cultivated
coffee for much of her life. Others echoed this sentiment, at times with a sense of sadness, and
indicated that they felt excluded from the doll project because there was little room for women
without the requisite skills to work on the project. Unless they could learn from others, many
women’s options to work on handicrafts were severely restricted.
An initial survey of the women at camp would have revealed that the number lacking
embroidery and sewing skills was sizeable (nearly one-third), and that several other women had
lost their ability to sew due to repetitive-motion injury from sewing. Yet, no one asked—even
though the agronomist at FONAES was aware that things had changed in the past decade. And
this fits neatly into the assumption made by many NGOs—critiqued by anthropologists of
development—that you help indigenous people most when you foster local skills and knowledge.
But such an assumption of indigenous skill in effect essentializes indigenous women because it
takes as a given that indigenous women learn embroidery and sewing when growing up. The
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implication is that indigenous girls become indigenous women through social reproduction, by
learning to sew and embroider. In this view, the two—indigenous women and
sewing/embroidering—are inseparable. In fact, women are individuals, each with their own
stories and histories, and these traditional patterns are changing. Some women’s history
channeled them toward farming, tending animals, or cooking rather than to sewing.
In most of these cases, women who had never learned to sew bought their trajes readymade from other women who did. The mothers of these women had not stressed sewing or
embroidery when they were young often because of biting poverty or because a father who had
abandoned the family or drank to excess forced the children into other economic or caring
activity (Eber 1995). In all cases, as girls, the women were needed to tend to their younger
brothers and sisters because their mothers were overworked—and this pattern was repeating
itself, as the children at camp cared for their own brothers and sisters (and, prior to the doll
project, had not learned to sew or to embroider, either). As adults, these women’s labor was
valued in cultivating coffee and their milpa. When women had enough cash (from coffee or
livestock sales), they bought their trajes. And this, in a way, was revolutionary because women’s
ability to embroider had traditionally been intertwined with religion. In traditional Mayan
communities, the most highly skilled woman was chosen each year to embroider and weave the
saint's clothes for use in the church; this was the highest form in which a woman could serve the
Virgin (see Morris 1987; Eber and Rosenbaum 1993). Yet, the project at INI changed all this, at
least for the time being: young girls and women began to learn to embroider in the camp rather
than in their homes, and from women who were not their family but who already knew how.
These young women complied with the NGO's mandate to do handiwork because that is what the
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NGOs funded. Because there was suddenly a demand for traditional skills, these women were
learning them.
When development agencies fund artisan or embroidery projects based upon assumptions
of indigenous skill, they accomplish two unintended results: 1) they unwittingly exclude some of
the very women they intend to help; and 2) by fostering traditional forms of knowledge, they
reinforce this knowledge, making it difficult for women to move away from it into more
lucrative areas. Morris’ (1987) work with the indigenous cooperative, Sna Jolobil was unusual in
that he was able to command a market price for the women’s exquisite artisan work (Nash 1993;
2001). But unless such a feat can be accomplished on a much larger scale so that it gives most
women a fighting chance to survive through their traditional knowledge and skills, development
agencies’ shoehorning of indigenous women into traditional crafts only serves to keep them in
the “female ghetto” of traditional work, which serves to reinforce women’s overall
subordination. This is a point which has been debated by Marxists and neo-Marxists for a
generation (see della Costa 1977). Movements such as the successful “wages for housework”
campaign in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s (Birnbaum 1986) were an attempt to increase the value
of the most invisible of women’s work, housework. However, there were few alternatives in the
camp setting given the cultural, familial and economic constraints under which the women lived,
especially in the context of displacement. This fact overthrows many of the anthropological
critiques: there was virtually no other work available, and no other options for indigenous
women who had been overworked in their communities, but who were now living under the
constraints of displacement where, other than the daily grind of subsistence tasks, making
tortillas from masa (corn flour) and laundry, there were no cafetales (coffee plants) to cut, or
milpa to tend and the women had more free time than ever before in their lives. It was in this
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context that the project situated itself squarely within the gender and familial constraints that the
women were experiencing in the context of the camp.
Although Collier (1975), Collier and Quaratiello (1999) and others have noted that there
were newly emergent work specializations and an incipient class-structure in places such as
Chamula and Zinacantan among men, the example from INI (and from Chenalhó) suggests that
such specialization holds true for women as well. Nash (1993) has noted that one consequence of
this has been increased pressure on women when they formed craft cooperatives in pottery
production in Amatenango del Valle; her work illustrates that males often felt threatened by
female success at these endeavors, and various social controls were put in place to limit the
women’s autonomy and to prevent other women from following their example—even though
entire families depended on cash from the women’s pottery sales. But the example from the IDPs
who came to INI also indicates that there were fewer dramatic changes at work in some areas, as
women had worked alongside their husbands cultivating coffee or raising livestock on their own.
Becoming specialized did not necessarily put them at odds with their husbands. Indigenous
communities in the highlands have held special regard for women and men’s complementary
place in the sexual division of labor.
The idea for the breastfeeding doll project, the decision to accept it, and its
implementation all came from outside of Las Abejas, that is, from NGOs more powerful than
Las Abejas. During the course of the project social interaction changed. For example, men ceded
decision-making power to women, and Las Abejas became more critical of those who would
implement such projects for them. In so doing, they turned Padre Ituarte’s admonition against
their disunity, discussed earlier, on its head. This attitudinal and organizational volte-face took
place once the camp had split in two and half the residents returned to Acteal. The INIti were in
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agreement and capable of agitating on their behalf once those with whom they had had difficulty
had left the camp.

Women and Development and Women in Development
Many development projects in less developed countries in the 1960s and 1970s,
especially those self-consciously embracing modernization projects, ignored women’s role in
economic life. Their emphasis on male economic output agricultural and non-agricultural—and
their blindness to female economic contributions, both monetary and non-monetary—led to a
failure to produce significant achievements in country after country. The earliest work to take
women’s contribution to economic development into account was Esther Bøserup’s (1973)
landmark study, Women’s Role in Economic Development, which documented the many
subsistence tasks undertaken by women—even though development agencies at the time
customarily entrusted monies to men to carry out these same tasks (Buvinic and Yudelman 1989;
Bunch and Carrillo 1990; Rogers 1979). Rogers (1979), in particular, documented male
development agents’ blindness to women’s active contributions to development projects then
underway. Studies that focused on women’s contributions to economic life, that is, the sexual
division of labor and women’s work—as well as to reproduction—contributed to a re-thinking of
how the theory behind development addressed women’s inequality within economic and cultural
life (Edelman and Haugerud 2005; Bennholdt-Thomsen 1981; Beneria and Sen 1981; Nash and
Safa 1980; Leacock and Safa 1986).
In the years since the 1975 International Women’s Year Conference in Mexico City and
the United Nations Decade for Women (1975-85) the field of “women and development”
(WAD) and its corollary, “women in development” (WID), began to expand in the development
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field, and women’s points of view were increasingly taken into account to rectify earlier
oversights. The WID perspective traces its theoretical roots to feminist anthropology, the
generalized field of social and economic development, modernization theory of the 1950s, and
dependency theory of the 1960s and 1970s (Beneria and Sen 1981; Leacock and Safa 1986;
Bunch and Carrillo 1990; Hale 1988; Elliott 1977). After unsuccessful attempts within the field
of women and development, such as welfare, equity, and anti-poverty approaches, efficiency and
empowerment models stressing strategic gender needs grew out of the 1975 International
Women’s Year Conference and feminist theory and grassroots women’s organizations in the socalled Third World (Bunch and Carrillo 1990; Moser 1989).
Later approaches to development slowly came to realize that targeting women alone was
not enough; men were eventually drawn back into the mix, albeit with a separation of spheres
apparent (Cornwall 1997; Kabeer 1995). The expansion of the field to reinclude men led to the
creation of the gender and development perspective (GAD), which looks at male and female
roles in development, as well as in globalization, difference and “voice” (Parpart et al. 2000).
One current approach to eliminating discriminatory practices in development is gender
“mainstreaming,” that is, the integration of gender issues into all aspects of development
projects, and of men, i.e., “menstreaming” (UNICEF 2001; Chant and Gutmann 2001).
As for the doll-making project at INI, the above critiques about expert-guidance and
ignorance of local knowledge hold true, although a nuanced understanding of what resources the
INIti brought to the project and what constraints they faced puts into question the abstract nature
of many of the anthropological and modernization critiques. In targeting women, the project
addressed many of the earliest gender critiques head-on. Because of the dire poverty that the
IDPs faced at INI in 1998 and 1999, the doll project was their best option for a way out of
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immiseration and dependency. It was not “charity,” the way that shipments of humanitarian aid
were. “Gifts” of humanitarian aid shipments were assistentialist in nature, unlike a project which
aimed to change the underlying structural conditions of people’s lives, such as this project did.
Although the participants had little agency in the designing of the project, it gave them some
agency afterward—something that they never got with humanitarian aid shipments, although half
of the IDPs left the INI camp in an effort to secure agency, and although the aid received was
always contested. The IDPs insisted on replacing Sebastián with the younger, more pliable
Gerardo, who would not misuse aid shipments for his own family the way Sebastián did. And
they were critical of the ICRC, and the Mexican Red Cross before it, constantly complaining that
the rations were never enough for their large families. Their children were ill and losing weight,
and their poverty was profound. The donors had to keep on giving, as their “gifts” needed
constant replenishment. Yet, with this project, the INIti could begin to secure a better living for
themselves. The loan was not quite a “gift,” but rather closer to a commodity exchange. It
worked much better in the camp setting than did the “free gift” from the aid agencies.
The project relied upon a level of skill that some of the women possessed, and they began
teaching other women and girls how to sew and embroider in the camp setting, thus ensuring that
women who had never learned would have a fighting chance to make a living with their hands
the way they did.
We know from the literature that although the transportability of skills may make craft
projects the best option for internally displaced persons or refugees living in camps, their
implementation is “notoriously difficult to organize and sustain” and requires knowledge of
marketing techniques (Verillo and MacLean Earle 1993, 225). A craft-based project geared to
Guatemalan refugees housed in refugee camps in Chiapas continued for nine years, albeit with
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complications: there were production snafus due to difficulties communicating with the Mamspeaking refugees; the market was already flooded with Guatemalan handicrafts; and demand in
America, in the end, was limited to the “sympathy market”: churches and “alternative trading
organizations” (Verrillo and MacLean Earle 1993, 238). In addition, there were further political
and coordination complications: the Guatemalan refugee community in Mexico was treated by
the PRIista Mexican government as a population of “political undesirables,” threatening to local
political stability, and, hence, local authorities limited outsider access to the camps (Aguilar
Zinser 1983). Even NGOs involved in refugee relief had difficulties coordinating aid in the
recipients’ best interest (Verrillo and MacLean Earle 1993:231). Guatemalan refugees
responding to Rios Montt’s “scorched earth” policy began arriving in Chiapas in the early 1980s
malnourished and needing medical attention. And, unlike the Guatemalan refugee crafts projects,
CCESC successfully offered the dolls for sale in foreign markets, as it had an international reach.
So, although FONAES/CCESC spearheaded—some might say goaded—the women at the INI
camp to undertake the doll-making project, it was necessary and it was an excellent fit given the
lack of other alternatives. But, most critically, there was little other work available. And this was
the rationale for the project, which is a successful development project, as it continues today,
twenty-one years after the planning phase and twenty years after its implementation in 1999.
One July day in 1999, María approached me with a delighted smile on her lovely face. “Marí,
look at what we did!” she exclaimed. The dolls were, indeed, exquisite—and anatomically
correct. I would take a large plastic bagful with me to New York City to sell when my fieldwork
ended during the last days of August and return $375.00 U.S. to the women on my next visit, in
2001 through CCESC, which had kept in touch with the women, some of whom had relocated to
the selva. Selling the dolls was a joy. I sold them to friends and acquaintances for the most part,
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and I told the story of the project, the massacre and the camp to each buyer. The dolls proved to
be very popular in my circles, as I am sure that they were in European and Mexican markets, as
well, accounting for the project’s continued success.
Following the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994,
signs of intensive change appeared throughout Mexico. And these changes were not limited to
urban areas, where they were more apparent. Overall, women themselves—and whole
communities—have “modernized” in significant ways. Development projects fall seriously short
because “developers” don’t take into account local knowledge systems but impose their own.
Although the doll project undertaken by CCESC/FONAES did take into account local
knowledge, in small part the project required that the women “re-learn” skills which could work
to their advantage. The agronomist at FONAES and Dr. Marcos Arana at CCESC were unusual
in that they were aware of the processes of commodification at work in the countryside. Given
the dire condition of the displaced at INI, however, both believed that the doll project was the
best solution for those living there and the best way out of poverty and dependency. Given the
constraints of the camp setting, this was exactly the case. And it worked. The families who
remained behind at INI began to earn enough to contemplate leaving the dependency of the INI
camp to relocate to other regions of Chiapas where they could work the land, even if, like
Manuel, they remained without titles to the land they now occupied. The doll project, then, is one
of the elusive “success stories” that rarely get written about in the anthropological literature.

INI and Rural Development
To quell unrest among the poor, state regulatory or welfare systems in the United States
and Western Europe have long forced impoverished populations to give up privacy and
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autonomy in exchange for various benefits, sometimes quite meager (Piven and Cloward 1971,
1993). Although some sense of “accountability” is present in the Latin American and Mexican
contexts, and though a strong federal government was mandated by the 1917 constitution,
Mexico has historically provided little in the way of welfare or relief services, especially to its
ten million indigenous citizens. Only since the late 1970s and early 1980s has the Mexican
government begun reaching out to its disenfranchised, indigenous population in a meaningful
way. Mexican solidarity programs [concertación social] have tried to close the gap between the
rural poor and urban residents by providing rural development programs targeted to this
indigenous population. Using poor people’s movements as a springboard, reformers tried to
reform the state apparatus from above (Fox 1994, 183; 1993). Solidarity programs had their
genesis under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) and came into their own under Salinas de
Gortari (1988-94), especially after the 1982 economic crisis (Fox 1994, 182). The federal
government gave funds to INI, and then INI channeled monies to autonomous indigenous civil
society groups, provided they were not politically-motivated, single ethnic groups, or
autonomous political parties. FONAES, the funding arm of INI that oversees rural development
programs, and that was largely responsible for instituting the breastfeeding doll project at the INI
camp (along with the NGO, CCESC, which is part of the UNICEF network), is one such
Regional Development fund. The goal of such funds was to entrust decision-making to
indigenous organizations that would, in turn, staff autonomous regional councils (Fox 1994,
181). This was a change from the old way of doing business; ascendant technocrats were
challenging the PRI’s entrenched faction of “dinosaurs” and its nearly 70-year old patronage
system, which relied upon clientelism. Concertación social was the result of the “new bargaining
relationship” between technocrat-reformers and new social movements within society (Fox 1994,
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182). Mexico was beginning to change from within, paving the way for the political tidal wave
that would, by 2000, unseat the PRI from the presidency for a time.

Outcomes of the Doll Project
Traditional skills may be limiting in the new economy, but, as Nash (1993) argues, such
skills are niche-based and of small-scale. Such economies can work, but structures need to be set
up to take advantage of those niche-based skills. In 1999, NGOs had little success in making the
external connections to market the products made by the women—the structural prerequisites
were still in their nascent stages. The result was lots of dolls for sale to tourists in San Cristobal,
and sales in Mexico City and abroad. Although the project continues today, and thus, has proven
sustainable over the medium term, it remains small-scale. In a 2011 follow-up to the doll project,
Dr. Arana told me that the doll idea has been copied by women from Chamula and Chenalhó,
who have updated the colors of the doll’s traje to keep up with the change in fashion, from red to
blue. This replication, in itself, is evidence of a successful project; however, the copies have been
simplified and lack the anatomical detail of the originals. Although the project has continued,
once the women moved from INI they became isolated from one another, and this makes
coordination more difficult for CCESC. The leader of the project, María, continues making the
dolls from her new home, near Ocosingo, as do several of the other women from INI, who are
now scattered in various locations around Chiapas. The collective nature of the enterprise,
though, seems watered down as the participants are few and scattered in 2019.
Despite these limitations, the dolls themselves have been recently used in an interesting
way by Dr. Arana to teach the women who participate in the project their sexual rights as well as
basic anatomy. Using the anatomically-correct doll—and its male analog, which they have also
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begun to produce—the doctor teaches the women about concepts such as rape and sexual
harassment. The women themselves soon realized their common humanity with men via the dollmaking materials; that is, the stuffing and materials for making both the male and female dolls
were the same. In an exchange about equality in a workshop on sexual rights, the women told Dr.
Arana that men were more valuable than women. So he used the doll-making materials, the
stuffing and the cloth, to demonstrate that they are both the same, then showed them an
anatomical sketch of the inside of the body. The women learned that both men and women have
brains, hearts, lungs, the same organs, and that although sometimes men and women aren’t able
to do the same things, most of the time, this is culture, not anatomy. Because education in
indigenous communities is so limited in scope, and so few women attended schools, they were
learning these things for the first time. We all have the same abilities, Dr. Arana told the women,
and the women laughed a lot—just as they had done at the project’s outset. This was an
unexpected outcome of the project, which turned out to be useful in many senses, albeit different
from the original project’s conception.
Moreover, the project helped the INIti break the cycle of dependency that they lived
under at the INI camp in 1999. With the proceeds from the finished dolls, sold for $45 dollars in
the United States, and fetching similar prices in the European Union, the dollmakers were a huge
help to their families. At 2019 exchange rates of 19 pesos to the dollar, that is 855.00 pesos per
doll—that is enough to support a rural family for a month, even given the compromiso to pay
back the loan.
Once they left the INI camp, the women, scattered in various locations around Chiapas,
dug deeply into the work of subsistence, but the doll project remained a big part of their lives—
for those who remained in Mexico, that is. Some, as we will see in the epilogue, migrated to the
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United States. For those in Chiapas, some worked in the fields alongside their husbands, while
others, like María, could concentrate their energies on sewing. And the gender relations in their
households have shifted ever so imperceptibly as the women became the family breadwinners
during a time of scarcity. Their families depended upon them to eat while they awaited their
harvests, of both maize (and beans and squash) and coffee. This in itself was revolutionary. The
women had learned to handle money, to pay back their loans, and to reinvest some of their
profits into the project to keep it going. These women have found their own economic niche, and
it is one of which they are rightfully proud.

Conclusion
The doll project at INI is the rare success story in the anthropological literature on
development, and it is well poised to critique assistentialism, as it treats the causes and not
simply the symptoms, of poverty, much as Paulo Freire described in 1973. Although I have noted
that the principals at FONAES and CCESC were aware of the social transformations due to
neoliberalism in the countryside in the previous decade, that is, roughly from 1988 to 1998, but
pushed the project through anyway, they knew that supporting local knowledge is in fact one of
the few avenues out of poverty, short of migration. And in this, they echoed “postdevelopment”
anthropologists such as Arturo Escobar and Gustavo Esteva, who emphasized local ways of
knowing and local communities as a way forward. Although such a view may fall prey to the sin
of romanticization—and in its abandonment of the post-war development apparatus, to turning a
blind eye to inequality and impoverishment—the INI doll project proves that local, in this case,
indigenous, knowledge, is an untapped resource which allowed the women who worked on the
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project to break the invidious cycle of dependency imposed by the ICRC, CARITAS and the
Mexican Red Cross.
Berger (1990, 224) directs our attention to a second critical question faced by
development agencies: whether to design projects based on the traditional sexual division of
labor or to try to “break with tradition,” that is, to break out of the narrow confines of traditional
crafts projects and allow experimentation with other income-producing projects for women
unrelated to traditional gender roles. Projects modeled on the traditional gendered division of
labor reinforce women’s domestic role, and such projects may then tie them more firmly to those
tasks. Once such a project is initiated, women involved in it will have trouble accepting outside
work, even if it were to become available to them because, as Julia of Alianza Civica told me, the
tendency of the women to remain at camp at all times limited their opportunities for work; they
were not accustomed to working outside of their homes and could hardly imagine a world in
which they—in addition to or in place of men—would be called upon to do so. Yet, in the case
of the doll-making project at INI, a project which fit exactly into the schema of women’s lives at
camp, this project was, ironically, exactly what was needed and was what worked best—
although the idea came from the NGOs and not from the displaced themselves. Yet, in speaking
with the women, it was clear that they wanted to work, wanted to participate in the doll project,
and wanted to overturn some of the more onerous aspects of the gendered labor division under
which they lived.
In this, the women of INI echoed the more radical transformations undergone by
Zapatista women, who learned Spanish, learned their history as indígenas in post-colonial
Mexico, and learned how to shoot a rifle. Still, for the women from Chenalhó who until
February, 1999, had been members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, the act of selling handicrafts—
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and in philosophical terms, dolls which breastfeed, and are, thus, mimetic representations of
themselves, was no less revolutionary. It allowed them to take over the productive role, that of
selling their labor power, in the household, and to be the primary breadwinners for their families,
especially in the context of the camp. That they continued making the breastfeeding dolls once
they had moved away from INI—and that they could leave in the first place—was in no small
way testament to CCESC’s and FONAES’s faith in the women’s skilled handiwork and in the
eagerness to work that the women had shown from the project’s outset. If the project was a
success, they had made it so, and CCESC’s wide distribution network had helped.
This was and is an example of microcredit development at its best. Tailored towards only
the twenty-two women who had the requisite skills and knowledge at the INI camp, the
breastfeeding doll project helped to support an entire community of IDPs and helped to unite the
camp, one of the project’s initial goals. Although the development project was yet another
instance of Las Abejas at INI protesting the resistance—the EZLN mandate to reject government
aid—it was the best means for the INIti to move forward with their lives, and eventually to leave
the camp. And they had already agreed to accept a settlement from COCOPA via Emilio Rabasa
Gamboa in January of 1999, in the process leading the camp to split in two, and remaining
behind at INI. Thus, the project was a success in every other way—in cultural, familial, and
gendered terms, even as it overturned the dominant sexual division of labor under which the
women lived. The project allowed the families of the INI camp to reimagine their lives, not as
displaced persons, but as indígenas and campesinos struggling to make sense of the momentous
changes wrought in 1994, regardless of whether or not they broke the EZLN rules on aid
acceptance. Perhaps they had decided to leave Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, but they continued
living as they always had, except that now women as well as men had found an economic niche
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and now they could support their families, even if the men couldn’t. At the INI camp in 1998 and
1999, such changes could be seen on a microlevel, as the doll project and its outcome illustrates.
In an interesting turn, the large indigenous minority within Mexico was as prone to change as
any other sector of society, and this included women, as well as men. But what of the children?
Childhood in displacement is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Eight:
Childhood in Displacement
“At least half of all refugees and displaced people [in the world] are children.”
-Graça Machel, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict (1996)

After a summer and fall of heavy rains and dark skies, December 1998 is bright and
verdant at the INI camp. There are no clouds and the sky is a deep cornflower blue. Flowers
bloom in force, and everywhere the grass is green. The children and I are playing out back on a
1950s car which has rusted to a bright orange. Springs pop out of seats once covered in
naugahyde. There is a vestige of a steering wheel, although holes in the car’s bottom allow for a
view of grass underneath. Four children scramble to the roof, which is intact and manages to
hold their weight. Eight-year-old Anita takes the driver’s seat after a scuffle with Fernando, who
seems about to cry. Fernando, at six is much smaller and can’t push her out. After a few minutes,
he begins making imaginary honking sounds, echoed by five-year-old José Luis on the roof. I am
squeezed in on the passenger’s side. There is no glass, so Gaby squats on the hood, swatting at
our noses with a bunch of flowers and weeds laughing her uproarious, gummy laugh. José Luis
reaches down into the car, trying to unseat Anita, who makes noises in her throat, turning over
the engine. It occurs to me to ask Anita, who seems thoroughly in control, where we are headed.
Without a moment’s hesitation, she shouts “ta Chenalhó!” To Chenalhó, to home, away from
here. All the children take up the chorus, jumping up and down inside the car, on its roof and
hood. With all the movement, the car appears actually to move and for just a moment, the
children and I believe that it might be truly possible.
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Remembered aspects of the children’s lives before displacement appear again and again
in their drawings, as well: coffee bushes, chickens, goats, sheep, dogs, houses, as well as other,
still ubiquitous features of life such as mothers with babies on their backs, hammocks, and
flowers. Because the children were displaced and missed their homes, a theme of their play and
their drawings was often what they had lost or what they could remember about home. When I
talked with children individually, the things they had left behind popped up in conversation. Ana,
a girl of 8, missed washing her jícaras, or plates and jugs—that is, helping around the house. All
the children at INI missed their houses and animals, and the countryside. José Luis remembered
gathering raspberries, bougainvillea, and chayotes and climbing trees and picking lemons,
oranges, and plantains, which grow freely in the countryside. Instead of picking wildflowers, at
INI children caught tadpoles and fish and played at breeding them in the puddles on the INI
grounds near the commercial fishery located a quarter mile from the camp. At other times, they
wandered far behind the camp in search of flowers and on several occasions came home with
bunches for their parents. Most of all they missed having homes.
How had low-intensity war and had aid rejection affected Las Abejas and BAEZLN
children at INI and at Acteal? In the cases where aid was accepted, how had “gifts” of aid
acceptance been a factor in children’s overall well-being? How had their health, education, and
nutrition been affected during the period of displacement? What were the children learning when
they were unable to attend school? What effect did trauma (play and drawing) workshops have
on the children at INI and Acteal? How did their two-month stint at schooling change their
vision of the future? In short, how had social reproduction, the production and socialization of
human populations, been affected by a childhood spent in displacement? In this chapter, I
address play, drawings, PTSD, education, children’s futures away from the fields, based on the
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play and trauma workshops and the weeks I observed at the CONAFE school at INI and the Las
Abejas and EZLN schools at Acteal in 1999, as well as the question of what one can learn from
the different types of schools and their effects.
During the drawing workshops at INI and Acteal, the other volunteers and I sat down
with the children as they drew with markers, crayons, and paper.140 One child, “Guadalupe,”
drew page after page of suns with light rays, obsessively (Martínez González 2000, 29). An
alternate meaning of suns as helicopters became clear to me one afternoon at INI. It was a
particularly glorious afternoon in March 1998, and I sat outside to draw with the children out
back at INI on the concrete handball court, fresh weeds straining through the many cracks. Just
then an army helicopter circled directly overhead, flying low, kicking up a sea of dust and
paper… Fernando, at five years old, threw himself to the ground, covering his head with both
arms, and causing several of the other children to do the same. Chaos ensued. The helicopter
passed and things started to return to normal. I gathered up the drawing paper that had blown
away from the wind created by the helicopter and handed it out. After the usual ado of fighting
for the “best” colors, and threatening each other under their breath, the children finally settled
back down to work, beginning to trade magic markers in a peaceful fashion. Fernando
immediately drew seven orange suns in the middle of a page on which he had previously drawn
flowers and animals (Fieldnotes, March 22, 1998).
Children at Acteal, BAEZLN and Acteal Las Abejas were affected by war, much the
same way as children in other countries experience armed conflict. In 1994, Zlata’s Diary, a
child’s account of war-torn Sarajevo caused an international sensation because it told the story of
140

Some of the children’s drawings were eventually published in Rocio Martínez González’s book, Totik, Metik,
Kanal... a dos años de Acteal (2000), or Sun, Moon, Stars... Two Years after Acteal. Published by Rocío Martínez
González in San Cristóbal de las Casas, Centro de Información y Análisis de Chiapas, 2000. Totik, Metik, Kanal,
“Sun, Moon and Stars” in Tzotzil; it is the child’s game used to open the play sessions each afternoon. The book is
divided into several sections, four of which analyze children’s drawings.
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war from a child’s point of view (Filipovic 1994). War and displacement are very real to
children, who, living in constant fear and with little or no sense of safety, may experience them
more deeply than adults. A UNICEF report released in December 1999 estimated that 540
million children, that is, one in four of the world’s children, lived in violence or with the threat of
violence or displacement in 1999 (UNICEF 1999). Although the notion of childhood as a stable
period forming a “natural foundation for social life” (Stephens 1995, 11; Scheper-Hughes and
Sargent 1998) may in large part be myth, with little meaning for many of the world’s children,
the less idyllic mix of childhood with war or displacement seems especially volatile, likely to
produce trauma and serious psychological injury. Indeed, numerous studies have shown that
children are among the most-affected by war; political violence, ethnic strife, brutality and largescale terrorism can all be explicitly targeted at children, as at Acteal (Klingman 2006; Thabit and
Vostanis 2000; Garbarino, Kostelny & Dubrow 1991; Garbarino, Dubrow, Kostelny & Pardo
1992; Cairns 1987; Acker 1986; Rosenblatt 1983). A 1990 hearing before the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism that examined the effects of war and
dislocation on children reported that:

The tragedy and the truth of modern war is that children have become its main victims....
Of the estimated 15 million refugees worldwide, 80 percent are women and children. To
these add the so-called internally displaced, those who flee war and destruction but who
stay within a national border. Technically they don’t count as refugees because they
haven’t left their own countries. But relief officials figure that 180,000 such displaced
children died in 1988 alone because of the civil war in Sudan. Over and above the known
refugees there are about 150,000 internally displaced in El Salvador, over 1 million in
Mozambique and 2 million in Afghanistan (U.S. Senate Subcommittee, 1990, 2).
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The children I observed at INI and Acteal were hyperaware of the military presence
around which all negotiated their lives. In 1998-1999, one-third of the Mexican army, 70,000
troops, was stationed in Chiapas. With modern equipment and training from U.S. military
advisers, these troops opposed a largely unarmed rural populace and were ready for war. A 1996
UNICEF report by Graça Machel recounts that because internally displaced persons remain
within or close by the zone of conflict they are most likely to be displaced repeatedly and are
vulnerable to physical and psychological attack (Machel 1996). Says Machel:

At least half of all refugees and displaced people are children. At a crucial and vulnerable
time in their lives, they have been brutally uprooted and exposed to danger and
insecurity. In the course of displacement, millions of children have been separated from
their families, physically abused, exploited and abducted into military groups, or they
have perished from hunger and disease (1996, 17).
In Chiapas, due to large family sizes, the majority of the displaced were children under
the age of eighteen in Los Altos, the zone most affected by violence in 1997-1999. In 2002 there
were still 6,332 displaced persons, mostly children, from 1,173 families. In the Selva Norte zone,
the Selva zone, the Selva Fronteriza zone and Selva Centro there were 1,280 families but 6,048
persons, that is, an average family size of five (CDHFBC 2002, 15). At INI by March of 1998,
when the number dropped off from 230 persons, there were 26 families and 110 persons, typical
of this ratio. At the INI camp, children predominated, as they did at Acteal, typical of this ratio.
Because of the large military presence, the children were traumatized, and military overflights
disrupted their daily lives. Yet, they managed to play throughout, even if there weren’t many
toys to play with.
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Play as Imitation: INI and Acteal Camps, 1998-99
One of the first things an observer noticed at INI and Acteal in 1998 was the absence of
toys and play materials in the camps. There was the occasional beat-up doll, ball, or threewheeled truck, but, on the whole, children played with whatever was on hand: grass, rocks,
sticks, water and mud, and on one wet day at INI, something resembling tar, cut plastic Coke
bottles, painted Coke cans filled with sand (leftover from a project organized by Melel Xojobal)
used for throwing around, bent bicycle rims, wheels and tires, rubber car tires, empty cardboard
boxes and containers, cloth rags, plastic soldiers, and cartoon and movie characters long out of
date (a Rambo figurine). However, in their home communities, there weren’t many more toys
than this, typical of families living in absolute poverty. Children were accustomed to fashioning
their own toys, showing great creativity in the process.
I was a fixture at the INI camp, and the children often crowded around me, demanding
that we play wheelbarrow, or that I carry the younger children, and even some of the older ones,
on my back, as I did, daily, my “gift” to the children. When I would arrive at camp in the early
afternoon, after lunch, for the play and trauma workshops, or, on the weekends, in the morning,
the children would rush at me, tugging at my clothing or playing at braiding my hair. I enjoyed
myself as much as the children did, and I had many opportunities to observe their organic play,
which was entirely different from the organized play routines set up by the play workshops.
Along with parents and schooling, play is a primary agent of children’s socialization.
Through experimentation in play and role playing children rehearse for life. It is also one of the
universal joys of childhood. Sometimes play is just play—playing with puzzles or sleds or
helmets, things which are inherent to childhood. At other times, play is an imitation of the work
of adults, largely an imitation of adult activities in which work for men and women is gendered
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and structured. At Acteal and INI, however, children’s play also had elements of the conflict, as
children imitated helicopters and Humvees or drew them or drew soldiers at checkpoints. In their
drawings, there were guns and violence, evidence of trauma.
Through their drawings and behavior, children at Acteal still exhibited signs of PTSD
during the summer of 1999, a year and a half after the massacre, as 72.8% of children did in the
Gaza strip in 1999, after Israeli military activity against them. The Palestinian children had
witnessed a house demolished or a friend have bones broken or be beaten (Thabet and Vostanis
1999, 387). Thabet and Vostanis (1999, 387) report typical PTSD behaviors: restlessness,
irritability, worrying, bedwetting, and somatic responses such as headaches and asthma.
Although Thabet and Vostanis did not find a significant difference between girls and boys, a
study by Quota, Punamäki and El Sarraj (2004) found girls to be more vulnerable than boys; in
this study, 58% of Palestinian girls exhibited severe PTSD among children who had lost their
homes due to Israeli shelling, as opposed to 54% of children of both sexes (Quota, Punamäki and
El Sarraj 2004). Refugee children’s PTSD was predicted by the trauma of war that they
experienced directly, much as children at INI and at Acteal had directly experienced the Acteal
massacre,141 the loss of their homes, displacement, and the loss of cultural norms (Thabet, Abed
and Vostanis 2004).
At Acteal, children drew elements of the conflict, Humvees and tanks and guns, and they
recreated helicopters and tanks with cardboard and sticks (See Figure 1), evidence of residual
trauma a year and a half after the massacre. At the time, military convoys were passing the
entrance to the Acteal camp twice a day, and there was a checkpoint right at the entrance to the

141

In the case of Manuel’s son, Miguel, who was shot in the knee during the massacre, and in the cases of the
numerous children at Acteal who were likewise nearby on that day.
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camp. The boys pictured were playing only a few feet from where the convoys were passing by.
At the INI camp, overflights made the children throw themselves to the ground throughout 1998.

Figure 8.1 At Acteal, during June and July 1999, boys constructed Humvees out of cardboard and waste
materials, evidence of continued trauma. Military convoys passed the Acteal camp twice a day.

A Generational Shift
And because their lives had changed so much at INI due to their ongoing displacement,
compared to their communities, many younger children had fewer and fewer memories of their
parents’ traditional work and lives and had to construct new games and activities in the camp
setting. An agricultural orientation was evident among the IDPs—but not in their children’s play.
This generational change recalls the profound differences between parents and their children,
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much as has been seen in the generations coming of age in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
arguably the generations with the most ruptures between them. IDPs had been uprooted from the
soil—their livelihood—but their children were learning to be citizens of a city, in the Greek
sense of the word, where true citizenship, civitas, is tied to “civilization.” During a long
discussion one morning over strong shade-grown Arabica coffee in the far reaches of the Acteal
camp, Manuel had stated that “somos campesinos” (“we are peasants”), “we don’t know how we
are to live if we have no land.” “La tierra ES la vida” (land IS life). Their children’s responses
were altogether different. Aside from making tortillas from mud, few of the games and activities
resembled their parents’ activities—past or present. Their cultural norms had shifted and their
rural origins were in the process of being lost.
Another instance in which this generational shift was clearly noted was gender-specific.
In the IDP camps women and girls were given microcredit projects involving sewing and
embroidering, a traditional activity. This work, provided by a local patron, was accepted by the
IDPs—women made blouses which were sold at the Casa del Pan, a local restaurant popular with
foreigners and Mexicans alike—as well as participating in the doll-making project through
FONAES/CCESC, examined in the last chapter. As was noted there, embroidery and sewing
were skills which were being lost even in the campo or countryside as the division of labor
changed.142 Yet, generational differences aside, there were some commonalities, such as an
emphasis on finding things for the children to do with their time while they were not in school.
In this case, it would be the NGOs who would pick up the challenge.

142

One other interesting point is that the girls’ embroidering tended to mirror their political
involvements.142 One embroidered wall art piece read: “Día international de la Mujer. Vivan las mujeres indígenas.
Vivan las mujeres revolucionarias.” This was a Zapatista work, while girls who were members of Las Abejas tended
to embroider bees on their own huipiles (blouses).
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Formal (Trauma Workshops) and Informal Play, INI, 1998
Organized trauma (play and drawing) workshops broke the monotony of life for the
children at INI. NGOs such as Melel Xojobal, volunteers from the museum Na Balom, and other
local organizations became involved in finding things for children to do for fun—and to alleviate
trauma, our “gifts” to the community of IDPs. These workshops stressed movement and creative
play but began with dances and songs that were designed to lessen the children’s trauma and to
encourage children who had been severely affected by the tragedy of Acteal—who had had
relatives among the victims—to open up. This was the case for several of the children, one of
whom did not speak at all over the course of her displacement at INI due to severe Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Playing and drawing were activities designed to draw the children out
of trauma and to reengage them in the pursuits of childhood. One dance began with the words
“Totik, Metik, Kanal,” or “sun, moon, stars.” The children, forming a circle, first raised their
arms over their heads, bowing their arms to suggest a rounded sun, curved them to suggest a half
moon, and then lowered them slowly, wiggling their fingers, to suggest falling stars. These
movements were designed by Rocío Martínez González and a group of volunteers, of whom I
was a part. We called ourselves the “Colectivo de apoyo a niños desplazados de Chenalhó,” or,
“collective to support displaced children of Chenalhó.” The aim was to:
Conduct activities and mental health programs, and later on, educational programs,
through creative activities. The initial idea was to help the children leave behind the state
of anguish caused by physical aggression that some of the children seemed to have
experienced directly, or else that they had experienced through the act of having to
abandon their homes and habitual modes of life (Martínez González 2000, 15)
Translation by author.
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Although typical Mexican games were played as well, including “A Pares y Nones,” or
“Evens and Odds,” in which one child stands in the middle of a circle of children and the circle
turns first one way and then the other, “La Tienda de San Juan,” “San Juan’s Store,” in which
each child is accused of stealing bread, “La Tía Mónica,” “Aunt Mónica,” a clapping game,“Se
Quemó el Atole,” “You Burned the Atole,” in which a grandmother is accused of burning the
atole, and “A la Víbora de la Mar” “The Serpent of the Sea,” in which children line up and cross
below a bridge of enjoined hands, it was the new movements created especially for the children
in the camps which were the most noteworthy. The work began with several emphases:
The first month we succeeded in organizing in the city of San Cristóbal (at INI) intensive
work with the children, approximately four hours a day, with parental involvement. We
created games, rounds and songs, musical processions, collective dances and accounts
that contained physical movements, we made musical instruments with tin cans and other
residual (waste) materials which we recycled (Martínez González 2000, 15) Translation
by author.

Another game was called “Cebolla,” (“Onion”) in which the children lined up on the
ground, locking arms and legs, one in front of the other, and one or two of the children tried to
pull them apart by the legs or the arms as though they were peeling onions. This game seemed
entirely appropriate for children with such strong links to the soil—and seemed apt socialization
for future campesinos, although they now lived on the outskirts of a medium-sized city. Among
Maya living traditionally, it is through attending to one’s milpa, or corn patch, and by performing
cargos, or ceremonial obligations to the community, that one acquires one’s soul (Higgins 2004;
Eber 2003); hence, play at times focuses on agricultural products—flowers, soil, and mud, as
children imitated the former work of their parents.
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There were several results of the trauma workshops for the children at INI: after a few
months at INI, by the end of May, 1998, many of the older children now had a rudimentary grasp
of Spanish, where upon arrival, they had none at all. They were learning via the repetition of the
words of the games the volunteers chanted with them week after week, a form of language and
even cultural indoctrination. Because of official government discouragement of language
programs, the volunteers have filled this role and the children have been picking up a lot of it on
their own, as they are not in school. Adult women have no understanding of Spanish, or not
much at all, but children pick up things fast. They are becoming acculturated to city life at a
much faster pace than their parents.

Our work with the children as part of the collective to support the displaced children of
Chenalhó helped most of the children to open up and start to put the trauma behind them,
although they all showed signs of PTSD, especially at first. This trauma was still obvious in July
1998, as I recount in the next section. The child who did not speak during her displacement at
INI, Miguelina, spoke to me towards the end of her tenure at the INI camp (and she opened up
once at Acteal in 1999, laughing and climbing trees and speaking)—and most of the children
spoke to me as we played informally after the other volunteers had gone home.
The workshops were virtually the only sustained contact that the children at the INI camp
had with adults attempting to lessen their trauma. Because the workshops continued for an
extended period (from December, 1997 through December of 1998, and beyond), they were a
substantial presence in the children’s lives. As such, they achieved their intended objective,
which was to reintroduce the children to the cares of childhood, and to lessen their trauma, as
well as to alleviate stress, all symptoms of the children’s PTSD. Because Martinez González
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intended to publish the children’s drawing in book form, the children’s PTSD would be
highlighted for the public, as it was for us, and the children’s reduction in trauma would be
evident, as well. Upon the publication of her book, Martinez González received death threats
from members of the PRI government, an all too common occurrence in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Yet, this event attests to the importance of her work, and to the collective’s work with the
IDP children at the INI camp, and to the success of the collective’s work with the children.

Multidisciplinary International Arts Festival, San Cristóbal, July 1998
Along with the workshops, on a few occasions, special events were held for the children
at the INI camp. The best-organized was the Festival Internacional Artístico Multidisciplinario
[International Multidisciplinary Arts Festival], which, according to the festival program,
organized the event “for the urgent benefit of the displaced children who survive in Chiapas, and
who are currently dying of hunger, cold, illness and sadness.” The festival took place on July 15
and 16, 1998 at the Casa de Las Imágenes in San Cristóbal, with funding from a locally-staged
musical performance by the well-known Chilean rock group, Los Tres. Hosted by several NGOs
and civil society organizations, the children at INI, as well as children in the art programs at
Lisbon Max (an organization serving indigenous children in San Cristóbal that, among other
things provided art classes, and where I volunteered part-time for two months in the fall of
1998), eagerly attended the festival. Local NGOs donated paints, clay, paper, magic markers and
other art supplies, and poets, actors, dancers, bands, clowns and other performers volunteered for
the event. An international contingent of volunteers rounded out the event. I worked with eight
children at a time, showing them how to glue beans, rice, pasta, and other colorful dry grains
onto construction paper in designs of their choice. Some of the children’s work was excellent,
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and all of it showed great creativity. The event appealed to the children, and they in turn
responded energetically and noisily, moving among the tables in groups, trying their hand at clay
modeling, painting, pasting, and puppetry. The event’s planners anticipated the importance of
this occasion for children who otherwise had little to motivate them, stating, “It is urgent to start
to reaffirm their roots and provide emotional contact with their creativity and culture, so that
one day they may live better” (printed festival program, translation by author).
One ill-planned section of the event, however, traumatized the children. The section
started well, although because none of the program was in Tzotzil much of the content, if not the
style, of the show was lost on the intended audience. While there were theater pieces and clowns
for the children, many of the songs were about war, human rights and suffering—clearly more
appropriate for adults than children. Gustavo, a boy of 18 who was informally in charge of the
children when they exited the camp, decided to return the INI children to camp hours early after
a man whose skin was painted blue and yellow with smears of red ran hysterically through the
crowd, screaming as if he were angry, being pursued or attacking someone. The children became
extremely frightened and scattered in all directions. Small children covered their eyes. They took
refuge behind me.
Events like this highlighted the disconnect between the mestizo and international
community of San Cristóbal and the displaced children themselves. It was yet another example
of forgetting one’s intended audience, in this case, children. In this, the workshop violated the
central tenets of psychology, which aims to heal victims of trauma and PTSD and not exacerbate
its effects. Psychologists diagnosed the children with post-traumatic stress disorder, a result of
their forced displacement. However, aside from our collective’s trauma workshops every
weekday, there was little else in the way of trauma alleviation for the children at INI—or for the
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adults, for that matter. During the summer of 1999, a psychology professor from the University
of Alabama was an international peace observer along with me at Acteal and she conducted
drawing workshops with the children geared towards the lessening of trauma, just as we had
done at INI.143 In July 1998, it was clear that a screaming and painted man running through the
crowd was inappropriate for such children, who had been through so much already. It was a
miscalculation in the planning of the event, as with other projects intended for the displaced,
namely the Musicians for Peace, who bought rubber flip-flops instead of huaraches with the
proceeds of a cd they had recorded and sold for the benefit of the children. Although they
intended to keep with tradition and buy huaraches, flip-flops were cheaper.144
Breckenridge and Appadurai (1989, iii) have characterized social reproduction under
trying conditions as an “everyday miracle.” Ana, acting like many mothers in the INI camp, sent
her children into the market to search for discarded fruit and vegetables and to sell chicle, or
chewing gum. She would have preferred sending them to school, but child labor was a reality;
needed by families, it occurred regularly. Because of the insecure food supply and precarious
living situation at camp, Ana told me that she felt as though she had little control over the course
of her family’s life. With displacement, the family’s well-being—its social reproduction and very
survival—was entrusted to relief organizations. This proved the most frustrating aspect of
displacement to most families, the loss of control over their lives.

143

I, also, brought drawing supplies for the children at Acteal. And I participated in the trauma workshops there
during the summer of 1999.
144
Musicians for Peace, a mix of mestizo and foreign musicians, recorded a CD of songs about the Chiapas conflict
which they sold in order to raise money for huaraches, leather sandals, or the more ubiquitous tire-rubber version.
Yet, because costs were lower, they ended up buying plastic flip-flops. I never saw a child at INI wear a pair, and
was told by Alianza Cívica that they sold them in the market for items which they COULD use. As I recount in
Chapter Six, I was treated to a bowl of chicken soup one Sunday in May 1998 at the INI camp from the proceeds of
the sale of donated shoes from a hospital in Villahermosa.
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A CONAFE Education at INI, December 1998-February 1999
This brings us to a second aspect of social reproduction that was almost entirely lacking
at the INI camp for most of the IDPs’ tenure at INI: education. In this section, I describe
bilingual, bicultural, coeducational education which fell prey to Freire’s charge of the “banking
concept” of education, that is, one in which knowledge is stored in the mind of the student in a
passive way, and which was administered through a state agency and eventually accepted by the
IDPs housed at INI against the dictates of the Mesa Directiva at Acteal and the EZLN. Ironically,
many government officials also did not want the IDPs in school, although this was because it
would mean that they were settling in to life in the city, precluding an eventual return to their
communities, hence the government’s choice of CONAFE, an agency that educates the children
of agricultural migrants. Although it was a final instance of the IDPs protesting the resistance,
through it, they displayed their own autochthonous and homegrown push for autonomy.
In 1998, none of the displaced children in camps on the outskirts of the city—or in the
highlands—were in school—and their lack of education was a serious issue. As a consequence,
several NGOs began to organize voluntary schooling in the camps. They gave parents and
children the opportunity to decide whether to enroll. Such decision-making was customary in
indigenous communities, where children’s wishes were taken into account, and where school
attendance was low. In addition, because of their displacement, compulsory education had been
waived, and the story of the children’s re-enrollment in school was one of difficulty.
IDPs at the INI camp first rejected the CONAFE school because it was seen as a “gift”
of aid, but within a year it became a reality. In early-February 1998, shortly after the IDPs’
arrival, CONAFE, or Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo, a state education agency, sent
two teachers to the INI camp. CONAFE was one of two government agencies offering bilingual,
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bicultural education; the other was DGEI, the Intercultural Bilingual Schools. Both were
decentralized but regulated by the General Directorate for Indian Education within the
Secretariat of Education (Schmelkes 2000, 321). After several weeks, the displaced inhabitants at
INI realized the state government provided the teachers and decided to reject them. Awareness of
government-sourced aid was high immediately after the massacre. Yet, by the end of 1998, the
IDPs accepted the teachers from CONAFE because they came to believe that the children, who
had been idled for a year by then, would be better off going to school—even a state-run school. I
accompanied the children to school for a few weeks during January and early February of 1999.
This decision was not uncontroversial. Las Abejas at Acteal resisted the INI inhabitants’
decision. Manuel, the man profiled in Chapter Five discussing Acteal prior to the massacre,
relayed a message to INI’s Las Abejas members that the Mesa Directiva at Acteal would not
accept the CONAFE school. The Mesa noted that the children at INI hadn’t been in school for
more than a year and that the INI camp had accepted a government-run school. Manuel expected
that with a strong talking-to the INI Las Abejas members would reconsider their decision. But
Manuel also argued that the children had to learn and by doing so he challenged the policy of aid
rejection.
The state CONAFE school, as a “gift” to the students, featured instruction in Tzotzil,
although Spanish predominated. The use of Tzotzil in indigenous education in Mexico dates to
the 1940s, the “apogee of federal indigenismo” (Lewis 2005, 191); this time frame situates the
beginnings of an acculturationist educational model, emphasizing the continued existence of
ethnic identity, meant to replace the older assimilationist model, which was charged with making
indigenous people into modern Mexicans, or mestizos. The 1940s saw the founding of the new
federal Department of Indian Affairs (Departamento de Asuntos Indígenas), which, relying
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heavily on Indian boarding schools, combatted the prior incorporationist, assimilationist
measures. The new director of the Department of Indian Affairs was Luis Chávez Orozco, who
believed “Mexico’s indigenous people should be respected as autonomous nations within the
greater Mexican nation.” He believed that language and customs were foremost among those
items worth holding onto. Despite taking a stance opposed to President Cárdenas’ emphasis on
cultural homogeneity, Cárdenas allowed for the use of native language and customs in the
indigenous schools out of friendship with Chávez Orozco (Lewis 2005, 191). Bilingual,
bicultural education dates from a Regional Indigenous Congress held in San Cristóbal in May
1940. Representatives to the Congress made other entreaties—for “roads, land, credit, tools, and
special, separate-but-equal145 ‘Indian schools’ taught by bilingual, bicultural teachers who
resided in their communities” (Lewis 2005, 192). These claims foreshadowed the Zapatistas’
demands.
This was yet another case of Las Abejas at INI protesting the EZLN instead of the
Mexican state; the displaced had come to believe that bringing in teachers, of whatever
affiliation, was better than being without teachers. A majority of adults voted for the CONAFE
school in open voting. They were exercising their autonomy, albeit apart from Sociedad Civil
Las Abejas and the EZLN. INI was the first—and only camp—to have accepted CONAFE, and
as a result was the only displaced persons’ camp where children were getting an education.
Resistance to schooling came not only from the Mesa Directiva in Acteal. Obstacles to
education came from the state, parents worried about the dissolution of traditional gender roles,
and an inability to recruit culturally-equipped, committed teachers to serve the IDP population.146
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In the context of Mexico, separate but equal education has been seen as desirable as it protects customs and
tradition against change from the outside.
146
Moreover, the difficulties the displaced faced in 1998 was amplified by a lack of identity papers necessary for
school enrollment: It was as though the IDPs had no citizenship and were a forgotten people. In June, Alianza Cívica
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During 1998 schooling became part of the struggle between the displaced and the government—
which did not want displaced children in school. Ana María, the dentist at CCESC, became a gobetween. She was hardly neutral, though. She noted that the government discouraged literacy and
Spanish classes because they signaled that the IDPs were “digging in.” She bluntly added, in the
summer of 1998: “The government doesn’t want them in school.” Children at the Don Bosco
camp and Nueva Primavera, both also in San Cristóbal, were not in school, either.
Hunger was a constant problem for the INI children, and CONAFE provided breakfast or
a snack to entice children to school. This was an important incentive for families to send their
children to school, although it was less common for daughters to attend school than it was for
sons. Girls were required to help to care for younger siblings and also to help with cooking and
laundry. These were full-time jobs with family sizes upwards of eight.

Because CONAFE designed its educational model to provide services for migrant
workers new to an area, perhaps only for a season, it seemed an appropriate model for the
displaced who had been housed at INI. At the teacher training session, I learned that:

The educational model that CONAFE implemented was designed for agricultural migrant
workers. In Chiapas many campesinos work seasonally on the fincas, and instructors
have to adjust to students and their families. If a group moves, then the instructor has to
move with them. Teachers need to speak the language of the children, Tzotzil, Tzeltal,
Chol, Tojolabal or other indigenous language. This usually means that teachers come

sought to enroll INI camp children into a nearby school for September, but enrollment required birth certificates and
residency papers, none of which the IDPs had. They had left them behind or perhaps the documentation had never
existed. One option was to return to the municipal cabecera (town hall), but that would incur various fees, and with
paramilitaries in power the IDPs feared returning. CONAFE pointed to a solution. In December 1998, at a teacher
training session in San Cristóbal, I learned that alternative identification forms might be used: immunization records
or testimonial certificates [acta testimonial] affirmed by fathers or two stand-in witnesses.
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from the same communities or language group (Interview with Trainer, December 20,
1998).
Yet when half the camp moved back to Acteal, retaining teachers proved a problem for
CONAFE. There were few children left at INI, the borders of camp were porous and there was
no proper classroom, let alone a school building. Marcela was the third teacher at INI in two
months, and although she had worked for CONAFE for four years, her plan was to continue her
nursing education rather than make teaching a career.
An additional problem surfaced at INI. Some parents resisted educating their daughters.
By all indications, girls are more likely to drop out of school than boys in Mexico. The federal
government responded by targeting girls with Progresa, the Education, Health and Nutrition
Program (Muñiz 2000, 291), rejected by the EZLN and Las Abejas’ Mesa Directiva. For
indigenous populations in Mexico, girls’ non-attendance was much higher. In Chiapas, where
racism and discrimination have affected school attendance for both genders, but especially for
girls, attendance rates for girls were among the lowest of all states (Schmelkes 2000, 320). I
encountered a case at INI, in which a girl, then 15, had been pulled out of school by her mother
at the age of ten. I found it common for parents to pull their daughters out of school when they
reached their pre-teen years and would be in close contact with boys in a school setting. This
girl’s parents told me that they did not approve of boys and girls going to school together after a
certain age (Interview, March 9, 1998). Eber (1998, 6) makes the same point:
…another reason [for low attendance by girls] is parents’ concern that attending school
past sixth grade increases the chances that their children will get involved in
relationships with members of the opposite sex, or enter a path on which they may
abandon the connection to the land, their families and traditions. Parents have also
refused to let their daughters go further in school out of a legitimate fear that teachers

313

will verbally disrespect them or physically molest them. To most parents, indigenous
teachers represent agents of modernization and purveyors of mestizo gender ideology.

The main difference between the school at INI and the Las Abejas and BAEZLN schools
that I observed during the summer of 1999 at Acteal was that the children had little choice in the
school curriculum at the state-run CONAFE school. The school, though, did allow the children
three choices for the main theme, and they chose medicinal plants (the other options were nature
and society). The CONAFE school structured the day more tightly with no play or music
included. Both at the INI camp, during play workshops, and at Acteal’s play workshops school
planners included time for structured play. Freire’s (1970, 71) characterization of Western
education as “banking” found an exemplar in the CONAFE school. The “banking system” relies
on teachers to provide a “narrative” and students to be “patient, listening objects.” In such
systems, it is the teacher’s job to “‘fill’ the students with the contents of his narration”—which is
often alien to the student, rather than transforming her through the power of words (1993, 71). At
the CONAFE school at INI, such ideas were apparent in the imposition of a traditional, “alien”
pedagogy—math and reading—on the children who would profit by learning about their history
and the Chiapas conflict as the children did in the autonomous Zapatista schools. That is,
students would be better served by being included in the curriculum, and though the effort to
teach about medicinal plants went part-way towards solving this problem, it did not go far
enough. The lesson on medicinal plants would have been better presented in a garden where
students could have observed the plants in the ground, rather than simply drawing them. By
drawing the plants rather than tending them or examining them in situ, the students were
expected to “absorb” the teacher’s knowledge rather than exploring that knowledge in a handson way. The emphasis on Spanish words and counting in Spanish confirmed the charge of
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educational homogeneity; the purpose of the school was to teach children to live in Mexican
mestizo society—as generations of Indian boarding school students had learned both in Mexico
and the U.S. (Lewis 2005).
A similar issue arose with the reading and mathematics lessons at the CONAFE school.
Marcela incorporated a game into her lesson to include the students in the learning process, but it
was clear that the students were more interested in competing against one another than in
learning the concepts presented. Teaching the students their letters was problematic in an
analogous way; it was clear that they were laboriously copying out the date on the board, without
grasping the concept of letters or spelling. Chewing on their pencil erasers and playing with their
hair, the girls, especially, seemed to have difficulty with the concept of writing. Illiteracy in
Chiapas stands at 17 percent, the highest in the nation;147 illiteracy is a problem which
disproportionately affects women. This huge gender difference comes into play because girls
spend far less time in school than do their male counterparts. Beginning in 1997, the federal
government began to attack these gender disparities in a serious way through the creation of
Progresa, a government program that provided campesino and other poor families a subsidy for
each child who attended school regularly and had up-to-date vaccinations. (up until June, 2019,
Development Pathways 06/02/2019). I discussed this in Chapter One, but it is worth noting here
that these funds helped lift some families out of poverty (Molyneux 2007).148 Because Las
Abejas and the EZLN rejected government aid, they refused this program, except for the INIti
contingent remaining behind at INI in February, 1999. They were inscribed in the Oportunidades
program, as it provided more than the limited humanitarian aid aid on offer in 1999. Yet it was a
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From the 2010 Census (Noticias al Noticias, March 8, 2011).
Conservative critics charge that although the funds were given directly to mothers, fathers sometimes took the
lion’s share and used it to buy alcohol. But there is no way to prove this assertion. However, children still benefitted
by school attendance and check-ups, if this were to occur.
148
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“gift” that they ultimately would not keep, as many of the INIti would leave for the United States
and sue ex-President Zedillo in 2011.
Separate indigenous education became a reality through CONAFE schools, as well,
although state-run campesino and indigenous schools never equaled the education available in
the cities—or in the autonomous municipalities. In more recent years, the Zapatista caracoles
education has truly become part of the contested terrain and a test in an absolute sense of
autonomy in action. In May 2014, federal agents would ambush José Luis Solís López, with the
nom de guerre of Galeano, the teacher at La Realidad’s “escuelita,” killing him and destroying
both the school and the health clinic.149

Play and Drawing Workshop, July 1999, Las Abejas Acteal and BAEZLN Acteal
Solis López’s school reflected just one of the many different educational philosophies at
work in the neo-Zapatista movement in the late 1990s. Because this was a time of low-intensity
war and residual trauma after the massacre at Acteal, what was evident at Acteal bases de apoyo
and Las Abejas was consciousness creation, or concientización, the indoctrination of children
with the political beliefs of their parents, be it Las Abejas’ pacifism or the EZLN’s autonomous
thrust. Enrique, a mestizo from Mexico City, invited me to join him up on the ridge and around
the bend at Acteal and at the schoolhouse in the BAEZLN camp for the four weeks I was a peace
observer there in June-July, 1999. He used the schoolhouse as a site for play and drawing
workshops with the children in the Las Abejas and Acteal Zapatista base support camps and at
X’Oyep and Polhó. This was done with conscious opposition to the federal government agenda
of creating a mestizo identity among indigenous groups or assimilating them to a mestizo
149

The school and clinic would be rebuilt in 2014-15 by international donations and Subcomandante Marcos would
henceforth be known as Galeano.
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“modernity,” a process which had begun in the early part of the 20th century, the process that was
evident at the CONAFE school at INI. Although all the teachers were indigenous, all were
bilingual, and they were trained to follow agricultural workers when they migrated.
Enrique’s program was much better supplied than the CONAFE school at INI or the
collective, or Collectivo de apoyo a niños desplazados de Chenalhó, at INI, because it was paid
for with civil society inputs. There was a large shopping bag full of new, child-sized musical
instruments donated largely by Canadian and European solidarity groups. Other toys were bright
colored and attractive.
On June 19, 1999, Enrique and I are with the children at the Las Abejas Acteal
schoolhouse after breakfast. Enrique brings a guitar. Later he will bring out fine black magic
markers and good quality paper and tell me that he will publish a book in Tzotzil and Spanish of
songs and original drawings by the children, much as Martínez González (2000) had done at INI.
This workshop is far better funded than our collective at INI, which only had paper and crayons
and a tape recorder.150 As Enrique looks for more children, I lead the ones we have collected so
far up the hill to the schoolhouse to begin. As if on cue, all the children immediately run into the
wooden schoolroom and run to the bag containing the musical instruments. Most take at least
two and begin an impromptu staccato rhythm, 1-2-3, 1-2-3. This goes on for a while. Then
Enrique comes, and they put the instruments away. The first song is a bienvenidos song
(welcome), then they begin the game, a pares y nones (evens and odds) and I join in. After
playing with the instruments and the hula hoops we move inside, and Enrique plays the guitar,
singing several songs in Tzotzil that the children, singing along, all seem to know. The “Cumbia
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Although Enrique is doing this at Don Bosco, too, he says that families have been leaving there to come here,
and that there are only about 25 children left at Don Bosco and only 13 left at Nueva Primavera. The time in San
Cristóbal was only a temporary stay for most families. The people themselves saw it that way, although many
observers in San Cristóbal held the view that they would be there permanently, or at least for a much longer time.
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Las Abejas” comes next and everyone sings. The children are now being socialized in the ways
of Las Abejas here at Acteal—and this did not happen at INI.
At INI, the only socialization the children received came from their parents, with the
exception of the few children who attended the two month long CONAFE school, which deemphasized the children’s indigenous and social movement identity. Here identity as Abeja or
Zapatista was emphasized, as I would soon see at the Acteal BAEZLN camp where the himno
Zapatista was played—with all the children (and me) joining in. Many children at the BAEZLN
camp chose not to take part in the activities, with their parents’ blessings. The BAEZLN children
were more guarded, and several of the older children declined to take part in the activities,
remaining silent or, conversely, acting more aggressive. Las Abejas children were more open.
Right after the Acteal massacre, the children in both camps were traumatized, but by the summer
of 1999 that trauma had lessened to the point where the children were not as perturbed, although
military overflights still made them throw themselves to the ground.
The children’s drawings were reminiscent of daily life. Boys’ drawings were a little more
violent than girls’—people who seemed threatened, a tank, which could just as easily be a
humvee, which habitually passed both camps twice a day in 1999, a screaming mouth. At the
BAEZLN camp, boys drew rifles and helicopters and grenades. Girls drew chickens and sheep,
things which they had lost upon becoming displaced from their communities. Boys begin
giggling wildly, imitating belches and farts. They run to the edge of the cliff to watch more army
trucks and humvees roll by.
At Acteal, while there were differences between the two groups of students and their
respective schools, there were similarities as well: the content of the day was conducted in
Tzotzil rather than Spanish, and socialization activities were stressed for both groups of children.
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Yet the differences were important; the Las Abejas Acteal camp contained all the elements of
non-violence espoused by the organization Las Abejas, while the base camp stressed the armed
and then mostly disarmed EZLN’s primary search for dignity and the idea, explored in the next
section, that “another world is possible”—and necessary.

Education for a Better World
An important component of the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas has been autonomous
education, proposed and instituted first in the autonomous municipalities and later in the
caracoles or MAREZ, the Autonomous Zapatista municipalities, after 2003. As a result of the
uprising, the EZLN has redefined Indian education to adapt to the needs of the indigenous
population; this includes meeting their needs, demands, linguistic and cultural conditions, type of
settlements, social organization and type of production and work—as well as engaging in the
struggle against racism and discrimination (Schmelkes 2000, 321). Autonomous education in the
caracoles, however, has encountered problems: “(i) how to fund the system, which is highly
dependent on international solidarity; (ii) lack of official recognition of Zapatista education, and
subsequent discrimination” (Dinerstein 2009, 7). Some of the funding for new autonomous
schools has come from the NGO Schools for Chiapas, which set up an Institute for Mayan
Languages and only charges students three days of the minimum wage in their country of origin
for five days of language instruction. Tzotzil or Tzeltal lessons cost more than Spanish, reflecting
the premium placed on indigenous identity in the MAREZ (after 2003, caracoles) (Schools for
Chiapas 2001). Other funding has come from international donations. Many of these donations
have come directly from the governments of the EU countries and others from solidarity groups,
like the Irish Mexico Group, which, as of this writing still has a very active fundraising agenda,
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the Italian group, Ya Basta, and Scotland’s Edinburgh Chiapas Solidarity Group. Spain, though,
is perhaps the most active country, and Basques especially, the most rebellious part of Spain, the
most involved in solidarity efforts.
As with everything else among the EZLN and Las Abejas, education has been a work in
progress. Although traditional education in Chiapas, especially in indigenous communities, has
had a long and contested history and an assimilationist thrust (Lewis 2005; Modiano 1973),
autonomous education was something entirely different and innovative and had roots in both the
Catholicism of liberation theology, which opened the way for the acceptance of the EZLN, and
the EZLN’s secular ideology, which opposed neoliberalism. In this way, the emphasis on justice,
which is a feature of liberation theology, spilled over into the autonomous schools, although
interpreted in a much more secular way. Schools at Moisés Gandhi, Tierra y Libertad, Las Rosas,
and other communities were built by volunteers, mostly from outside of Chiapas and from
abroad. Second, there has been a push towards providing outlets for play and psychological
support and counseling to those directly affected by trauma. This has occurred through organized
play workshops, such as those profiled in this chapter.
With the creation of autonomous communities in 1995, entire communities became more
radicalized and addressed the need for education in fundamentally innovative ways. In the
highlands, government-sponsored primary education had long been insufficient to meet the needs
of children, with state-trained and educated teachers sent to communities on a rotating basis.
CONAFE ran primary schools throughout the highlands, the zona norte, the Soconusco river
region, and the coastal region—but the Zapatistas have rejected CONAFE in territories under
their control. Organizations such as Schools for Chiapas and countries such as Spain and Italy
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rushed in to try to fill in the gap left by the state agencies that previously operated schools in
areas that were to become caracoles.
What struck me about the two schools at Acteal was that the course content was largely
in Tzotzil, as were the hand-lettered and photocopied books that the students were reading, and
this differed greatly from the CONAFE model. It was clear that students were participants in
their future in Acteal in a way that they were not at the CONAFE school—for one, they were
much more interested in their lessons than at the CONAFE school at INI. Lastly, because the
school was located in a physical building, students remained seated at the appropriate times and
adults did not disrupt them.
In Morelia and Oventik, schools have operated since 1995 when the idea of autonomy
was seized on by the EZLN comandancia. According to Muñoz Ramirez (2004) here children
don’t only learn literacy but, according to the EZLN’s goals, “they learn to struggle, to defend
their surroundings, to look after nature, and be proud of their culture.” They study subjects like
“agricultural production, politics, art, culture, reading and writing, health, sports, math, history,”
and both Spanish and their mother tongues. Interestingly, primary schools were built without
external supports, that is, from community resources rather than with the resources of civil
society. Typical building materials are blocks, cement and wooden planks. The structures are
simple, but as promoters say, “the school is not the building.”151
The education is oriented towards the collective, rather than individually-based.
“Education, without a doubt, motivates us to fight and strengthens the autonomy of our pueblos”
(Muñoz Ramírez, La Jornada, 2004). The main thrust of the EZLN’s educational system, then, is
to teach not simply content, but philosophy, or concientización, that is, consciousness-raising.
151

Muñoz Ramírez (2004) reports on education in Caracol number four, Morelia, and in Oventik and gives a more
comprehensive account of its structure.
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The goals to be achieved are the eleven demands set out in the First Declaration of the Selva
Lacandona, on January 2, 1994: for work, land, housing, food, health care, education,
independence, freedom, democracy, justice, and peace (Schools for Chiapas 2011). Schooling is
critical for the achievement of these goals in the next generation and is a real attempt to provide a
balanced, separate-but-equal education for Zapatista caracoles and, before 2003, displaced
persons camps. As with displaced members of Las Abejas, children form the majority of caracol
inhabitants, and the future of both organizations hinges upon their access to a good education,
now being provided by Zapatistas and Las Abejas themselves. Resistance to the state is, in part,
dependent upon the socialization of the next generation—and is a critical component of the
autonomous schools in Zapatista zones of Chiapas. Children are learning to resist, which is
crucial to the reimagined future that the EZLN and Las Abejas have put into practice in their
autonomous schools.

Conclusion
It was clear in 1998 that the displaced children at INI wanted to return to their
communities in Chenalhó, and their drawings and organic, unstructured play reflected this fact, as
did their play that they were driving back to Chenalhó in a rusted car one glorious day in
December, 1998. At INI they were dealing with the aftereffects of war, trauma and PTSD, and
these facets came out in their drawings and their play. The trauma workshops that the Collective to
Support Displaced Children of Chenalhó provided the IDP children went part way towards
alleviating this trauma, but it was exacerbated at an international festival held for the children in
San Cristóbal de Las Casas in July, 1998, when a screaming, painted man ran through the crowd
and the children hid behind me, terrified. Clearly they were still suffering from PTSD, and the
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Collective’s play and trauma workshops were one of the few supports given the children to help
them to recover from trauma.
In 1998-99, Las Abejas children were not attending school, and the two-month stint at
schooling at INI was an attempt to rectify this. However, it was provided by the state government,
via CONAFE, and the very opposite of the autonomy sought by the EZLN. As such, it was
rejected in the autonomous municipalities and camps, except for INI. The IDPs at INI were
protesting the resistance, the EZLN, and the acceptance of a government school was the clearest
indication of this fact, although they defied the Zapatista comandancia and the Mesa Directiva at
Acteal on many other occasions, as well. Their disunity, their overwhelming poverty and their own
brand of autonomy were to blame. Too poor to blindly follow Subcomandante Marcos’s hard line
on government aid rejection, they most often succeeded in accepting rather than rejecting aid
which came from the government. And some left Las Abejas rather than give up their hard-won
autonomy.
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Conclusion: “The Gifts of Enemies are No Gifts and Bring No Good”152
“Let Night and Hades keep it underground!" he bellowed, "For ever since I took into my hand
this gift from Hector, my greatest enemy, I have gotten no good from the Greeks. Yes, men's
proverb is true: the gifts of enemies are no gifts and bring no good." (Sophocles, Ajax)

The massacre at Acteal was an attempt to “kill the seed”—to kill unborn children in the
womb, to kill their mothers, and to kill the children allied with the EZLN. Sociedad Civil Las
Abejas, a pacifist, religious group, was unarmed and an easy target for paramilitary hyped up on
Rambo movies and adrenaline. While the material authors of the crime—the paramilitary—
served 8-11 years in jail, the intellectual authors—the federal government—remained free. In
1998, Chiapas was a hotbed of activism. Bobby Rush, former Black Panther and Representative
from Illinois to the U.S. Congress, came to Chiapas in June 1998, along with many other
activists, religious organizations and international solidarity groups. Mary Robinson, then the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, visited Chiapas in July 1998. In Vatican City, Acteal
was included in Pope John Paul II’s Christmas Eve homily, as the massacre took place in a
church. The 45 massacred Tzotziles became known as the “martyrs” of Acteal.153 Images of
barefoot women and crying children, now internally displaced persons, dominated the national
news every day during early 1998.154
The massacre was an attack on both the EZLN and the Catholic diocese of San Cristóbal
de Las Casas; Sociedad Civil Las Abejas, an unarmed community of believers, fasted and prayed
for peace in the chapel where the paramilitary band, Máscara Roja butchered them, slicing open
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Sophocles, Ajax, line 665. Sir Richard Jebb (1893) translation.
A “Pillar of Shame” was erected at the entrance to the Acteal, Las Abejas camp in 1999 by Danish artist Jens
Galshiot. It is identical to the one erected in Hong Kong in 1997 to memorialize the protests at Tiananmen Square in
Beijing in 1989.
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Especially the left-learning newspaper La Jornada, but also local papers such as Quarto Poder.
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pregnant women’s wombs and killing unborn children. While the army stood by, forty-five died
at Acteal during an attack that raged from 10:30 in the morning until late afternoon.
Because of the signing of the San Andrés Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture
between the EZLN and the government in 1996, the army was forced into a cease-fire with the
EZLN and used paramilitaries to attack Las Abejas instead—most observers agree that the
massacre was part of the low-intensity war that has been simmering since 1994. Yet, it was a
costly mistake; the PRI would lose the presidency in the next election, and Mexico would be
under scrutiny from the United Nations and human rights organizations from 1997 onwards. On
Friday, September 16, 2011, former President Ernesto Zedillo was sued for crimes against
humanity by ten survivors of the massacre in New Haven, CT, where he was in 2011 a Yale
University Professor. The damages sought were greater than $10 million US dollars (Navarro,
2011).155 Significantly, Sociedad Civil Las Abejas was not responsible for the lawsuit, and stated
that “our demand does not center on obtaining money, but on the demand for justice and for an
end to impunity" (Sociedad Civil Las Abejas official website, accessed March 1, 2013).
This story is ultimately one of protest; however, during 1997-1999, much of the defiance
demonstrated by my research participants was directed against the EZLN rather than the
Mexican state. In this regard, although they remained with the organization until 2008, they
proved themselves to be social agents with a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 2005) or habitus156
more than members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas. As a pacifist, religious organization, Sociedad
Civil Las Abejas demanded a commitment that my informants could not sustain. Life was just
too hard and their poverty too overwhelming. As I have documented in this study, the decision to
leave the organization was foreshadowed in numerous ways over the course of their
155

The suit was dismissed in 2013. Heads of state are granted immunity, according to U.S. law.
That is, ingrained habits, skills and dispositions, ranging from how a person holds his or her body to how he or
she perceives the world and acts and reacts to it (Bourdieu 1977).
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displacement, as one-time members of the organization accepted a government school,
government healthcare, and humanitarian aid, which sometimes came from DIF, CONAFE, the
IMSS Clínica de Campo hospital, FONAES and INI—as well, for some of them, from COCOPA
member, Emilio Rabasa Gamboa in January 1999. Resistance to the state requires fortitude and
organization; the group of IDPs housed at INI proved that they had limited quantities of both,
although more than half left INI and returned to Acteal rather than accept aid from Rabasa. The
disunity and jealousy so evident during the period of my fieldwork, from 1997 to 1999, meant
that the conditions of life were even more precarious than in the other camps, which were more
united and organized. When food is insecure and resources in short supply, anarchy sometimes
becomes the order of the day, and this proved to be the case for the IDPs, whose desperation
shone through at every turn.
In this study, I have examined the ways this desperation and underlying structural—and
absolute—poverty forced the IDPs at the INI camp to defy the CCRI-CG of the EZLN and Las
Abejas’ Mesa Directiva by accepting forbidden government aid and development programs.
Indigenous people invoked their history as the original peoples of Chiapas to justify nonpayment of electricity and taxes, control of natural resources, and rejection of government aid.
Yet, my research participants more often accepted government aid than rejected it. Such a move
was an effort to assert their autochthonous autonomy in the context of the camp, although it
overstepped the EZLN policy of government aid rejection. By accepting government aid, they
entered into an exchange relationship with the Mexican state. The reciprocity centered on their
new alliance with the PRI—and they were dropped from Sociedad Civil Las Abejas due to the
directive of the CCRI-CG that all government aid be rejected.
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I showed how governmental humanitarian aid was not in any sense a “pure gift” as it
bound the recipient in a reciprocal relationship based on political loyalties and a debt owed the
government. In doing so, I challenge David Graeber’s statement that debt can only exist between
equals, as the Mexican government offered a monetary “gift” to Las Abejas at INI—and nearly
half of them accepted it, thus demonstrating that unequal partners to an exchange may participate
in gift giving and accumulate debt. Yet, this alliance with the PRI ultimately was a “gift” that did
them “no good.” They received a symbolic amount of $43.00 Mexican Pesos in 2008 (U.S. $4.00
in 2008 exchange rates) from the government—and cash transfers of around 300 pesos every two
months for their children’s school attendance, health and household hygiene and regular medical
checkups—and unwanted advice on family planning, all of which was an effort to “control” the
impoverished families who received this benefit (Mora 2017). And for many of them, over time,
this would not be enough. Those in their home communities in Chenalhó township were ineligible
to participate in Progrea/Oportunidades/Prospera, as there were no health clinics in most
communities, a requirement for subscription in the government program, thus negating the effects
of the one successful program that the government devised to lift the poor out of absolute poverty
in the most marginalized regions of the country, and in Chiapas, in particular. This amount was a
drop in the bucket for families of eight or ten persons, hardly enough to live on, although initially
the cash transfers represented more than the limited humanitarian aid on offer. However, along
with plots of land (in areas with health clinics), the cash transfers could be a viable survival
strategy, but for indigent, landless IDPs, they just weren’t sufficient. To survive, they “took back”
their identity as “Las Abejas” instead, something that they had lost when they accepted the
monetary aid from the PRI (that is to say, the government) in 1999, forming two splinter factions
of the social movement: Las Abejas Asociación Civil in 2008—and invading Las Abejas’s land in

327

Nuevo Yibeljoj—and Unión de Pueblos Indígenas Las Abejas de los Altos de Chiapas, in 2012.
By so doing, they were diversifying their survival strategies by staying in “the game,” economic
actions that, as Pierre Bourdieu (2005) showed us, individual choices must be examined for their
objective structures and their transformation. My research participants varied their individual
strategies: some of them became campesino farmers again, albeit on invaded land, while others
relocated to the selva Lacandona, where there was “available” (recuperated) land (Harvey 1998;
Leyva Solano 2001; Nash 2001; Barmeyer 2009; Mora 2017); others moved to San Cristóbal, or
left for the United States (see, for example, Eber 2012). But first they left Las Abejas. As I
showed in this study, this factionalism began in 1999 at the INI camp, co-dating or predating
other studies of members leaving the EZLN (for example, Barmeyer 2009; Eber 2012).
Las Abejas at INI, as an arm of a civil society group, occupied an ambiguous position that
allowed for protest of the EZLN as well as resistance to the Mexican state. At a human rights
workshop held at Acteal in 1999 by the human rights center, Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray
Bartolomé de Las Casas, I showed how the attendees, victims of the massacre, jeered, laughed
and booed at two paramilitary soldiers, members of Máscara Roja, who were ambling by—they
were responsible for their relatives’ deaths, and Las Abejas were responding in a non-violent way
to those with violent intentions. In this, they were applying classic social sanctions to the
paramilitary, who carried AK 47s, illustrating the “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1976). At the
time, paramilitaries were wandering freely in Chenalhó, a daily threat to the workshop’s
attendees, their families, their livelihoods, their communities, and their future. In this, they
resisted the state in a predictable manner—a nonviolent one, as they were members of Las
Abejas. Yet most instances of protest were directed to the EZLN and Las Abejas.
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One of the underlying themes of the dissertation is the critique of humanitarian reason
and assistentialism. When the IDP women at INI griped that making atole on the outdoor stove
was more trouble than it was worth because the women couldn’t get along (older women became
jealous of younger women who had children under five who were eligible to participate in the
program from DIF, a government source), they weren’t grateful, they were critical—both of the
other IDPs and of the social service agency, DIF. And the men who were stealing the eggs meant
for the atole, only added an additional layer of dissatisfaction to the project, which was virtually
abandoned by the late spring of 1998. The women were critical of the”gifts” of aid received from
DIF, the Desarollo Integral de la Familia, and its government source was less important,
although initially they had all accepted this forbidden government aid, against the dictates of the
EZLN and Sociedad Civil Las Abejas. There was no gratefulness in evidence. And it worked both
ways, as Fassin (2012, 139) puts it when describing a comparable situation, “For the staff [of
Sangatte, a migrant waystation in northern France on the way to the U.K.] any initial illusions that
refugees are docile and grateful recipients of assistance gave way to compassion fatigue”—this
would affect the INI IDPs after the landfall of Hurricane Mitch in September, 1998, when
donations fell off sharply precisely because of (donor) fatigue. Gratefulness was never in evidence
at INI—nor was docility. The IDPs’ humanity shone through constantly, as did their foibles.
They asked for help from everyone who came to camp and complained incessantly about the
inadequate aid that they received. And because the aid was never enough, the situation reached
crisis proportions by the summer of 1998, when a meeting of NGOs had to be convened at the INI
camp to discuss the seriousness of the lack of aid and the dissension among the (very human)
IDPs.
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The IDPs at first garnered a great deal of media attention,157 although this would change
over time; with the severe damage done to Mexico and Guatemala by Hurricane Mitch in
September, 1998, which devastated Guatemala especially, causing hundreds of mudslides and
copious flooding, the displaced would become a forgotten people, although the NGOs would
continue to work on their behalf. But public attention had waned. A weariness of war and
homicide was edging in among the continued news reports of death threats, displacement and
civil war. The small population at INI, in particular, suffered from neglect, illness and hunger,
which only worsened over time.
Similarly, the “gifts” of many medical consultations at the INI camp during 1998 were
accepted but griped about. This aid was assistentialist (treating the symptoms rather than the
underlying causes) because the nurse and doctors from the IMSS hospital Clínica de Campo
repeatedly told the IDPs to bathe when bathing was impossible at camp. There were no tubs, nor
showers—nor hoses (as at Acteal)—and the IDPs resorted to the polluted stream which ran past
the camp, even though Ana Maria repeatedly warned that it was contaminated and thus,
unhygienic for bathing in. The teams from CCESC (including myself) infuriated the population
at INI with our emphasis on hygiene, when good hygiene was unfeasible at camp. Exhorting the
IDPs to improve their hygiene and overall state of cleanliness infantilized them. There was a lack
of potable water and extreme overcrowding. These structural conditions created conflicts—there
were no funds to end them, and people objected constantly, illustrating Fassin’s (2012) critique.
Because important health decisions were made outside of the autonomous body of Las
Abejas and the EZLN, and came from the NGOs, I argue that such NGO attention, whether
medical or hygienic, detracts from Las Abejas’—and the Zapatistas’—project of autonomy. The
157

I was even interviewed for a news segment by Televisa, the Mexican media giant, while working at the INI
camp in the summer of 1998.
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MAREZ, and after 2003, the caracoles, provided inhabitants autonomous health clinics using
both allopathic and indigenous medicine; in 1998, the NGOs took on this role. This degree of
medical attention was, I argue, new to most of the displaced in Chiapas, who came under quasistate health structures for the first time.
In 1998 and 1999, the “gifts” of food aid from the Mexican Red Cross and later the ICRC
were basic—and insufficient—and the IDPs were incessantly critical of this aid but forced to
accept it or starve. As it was, they were hungry and reminisced about the foods they had eaten in
the countryside. Besides illustrating the critique of humanitarian reason, the food aid was
assistentialist, or charity-laden, contributing to both literatures.
I also presented a successful development project, a rare success story in the development
literature, as Edelman and Haugerud (2005) remind us that such stories are few and far between.
The project was not assistentialist. It was instituted by CCESC and FONAES (a government
source), making breastfeeding dolls for sale and undertaken by those who left Sociedad Civil Las
Abejas in 1999, and thus, were free agents, as it took a year to be implemented. The project, a
loan, midway between gift and commodity, is still in operation after twenty years, and was so
successful that it reversed the normative labor division and made the 22 dollmakers their family
breadwinners in the camp and beyond. Like Zapatista women, they were overturning
prohibitions on women’s work and providing for their families when their men couldn’t. Taken
together these theoretical contributions show that, from the outside, this project appears to be the
classic neocolonial example of aid groups proposing assistance without understanding the people
they were assisting, many of whom did not know how to sew—except that the project’s
principals were well aware of the social transformations in the countryside but pushed the project
through anyway, thus negating this interpretation. Thus, the project was, as proposed, the best
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chance for the IDP women to change the underlying structural conditions under which they
lived—and to work their way out of poverty. And it worked.
The narrative began with the massacre at Acteal, which affected my research participants
intimately. Among them were survivors of the massacre. Their testimony, as well as the rest of
the displaced’s testimony, tells the story of the mounting fear in 1997 in Chenalhó township.
Many of them fled their home communities to Acteal or other highland Las Abejas and Zapatista
camps because of a flurry of paramilitary activity in the countryside. Immediately after the Acteal
massacre, my research participants fled to San Cristóbal. Their struggle to survive in the INI camp
is the subject of this dissertation. Because of differing political views, with Zapatista base
supporters and families of PRI affiliation among the INI population, in the camps, they were
strange bedfellows, who had internal rifts and bitter internecine conflicts.
In Chapter One, I discussed the multiple dimensions of indigenous poverty and traced the
genesis of government aid rejection to 1996, when the CCRI-CG made aid rejection a
cornerstone of their resistance to the Mexican state as it turned from the “Fire” to the “Word.”
Although it seemed that Subcomandante Marcos made a critical error in judgement, losing many
base supporters over this policy, the CCRI-CG’s, the comandancia’s, gamble paid off in the very
long term, as the policy of la Resistencia became EZLN doctrine. The EZLN would begin to do
better than its PRI neighbors beginning in 2016—22 years after the rebellion. In August 2019, it
would add seven new caracoles and four new autonomous municipalities to its territory, creating
the CRAREZ. In the meantime, IDPs dependent upon others for their every need made a political
statement through their selective acceptance of aid, conferring social capital upon humanitarian
aid providers and civil society organs. Civil society—the ICRC, the Mexican Red Cross, Doctors
Without Borders, Médicos del Mundo, CCESC, CARITAS and the Fideicomiso para la Salud de
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los Niños Indigenas, among 900 other NGOs and INGOs, provided “gifts” of food, medicine, dry
latrines, medical consultations, development aid and other necessary items to the IDPs in all of
the highland camps from 1997 to 2003.
Much of this aid was assistentialist. Paulo Freire (1973) traced the roots of assistentialism
to policies of financial or social “assistance” which treat the symptoms rather than the root
causes of poverty. The IDPs at INI accepted this assistentialist aid—shipments of used shoes and
donated flip flops, both of which they sold for foodstuffs which they really needed, and food aid,
which they were forced to accept, although they were critical that the aid did not stretch far
enough—and of the fact that there were no vegetables in the aid shipments of corn flour and
beans. One of the sticking points during the first half of 1998 was that all families, regardless of
size, received the same amount of food aid. The ICRC would later change this policy and give
“gifts” of aid based on family size, but it caused contention in 1998 as the IDPs at INI replaced
the representante Sebastián with Gerardo because he was accused of taking extra rations for his
very large family, something that Didier Fassin (2012, 139) touches on in the critique of
humanitarian reason, by relating that refugees are neither grateful nor docile. Medical aid was
largely assistentialist because it did not treat the causes of the IDPs’ absolute poverty but merely
placed a band-aid on that poverty. The “gift” of aid of which the IDPs were the least critical was
non-assistentialist development aid, a loan from FONAES, a government agency, to make
breastfeeding dolls for sale.
When the EZLN CCRI-CG refused all government aid in 1996, the Mexican government
increased supports to needy citizens, intending this aid to divide rebel communities.
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera is the most successful government program for indigent
families in Latin America, begun in 1997, and it reaches many indigenous people in Chiapas.
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Because it is a cash transfer program based on mandatory health clinic visits, nutrition, and
school attendance—as well as unwanted family planning advice, it is not assistentialist, and it
has achieved its indended result, attracting many former adherents of the neo-Zapatista
movement to the PRI—including, after 2008, all of my research participants who left Sociedad
Civil Las Abejas to join a splinter faction. Although I have voiced criticisms of the program,
Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera may be one of the most important long term results of the
Zapatista rebellion for the Mexican nation as it put indigenous poverty on the table, forcing
subsequent presidents to address the roots of rebellion and armed insurgency in a structural, nonassistentialist manner.
In Chapter Two, I showed how the idea of the gift, from Marcel Mauss, and the gift
economy, from Bronislaw Malinowski, animated this study, with its emphasis on gift-giving
among social actors from the PRI and indigent IDPs, among other humanitarian aid givers.
Challenging David Graeber’s notion of debt of debt as something transacted among social
equals, I showed how debt was accumulated among vastly unequal categories of people creating
a debt of loyalty and political support in a clientelistic mechanism which amounted to a gift
economy, and I showed how gift-giving occurred between people in a hierarchical relationship
and how these gifts were reciprocated whenever possible so as not to be construed as “charity.”
To take but one example, I had social capital and the IDPs at the INI camp were “the beholden of
the world” (Fassin 2012, 233); we were not on equal footing, yet we exchanged gifts: caldo de
pollo (chicken soup) for photographs of themselves, and the things they taught me—the “gifts”
they gave of themselves: how to make tortillas, how to make a fire, how to make pozol, how to
catch a chicken, and the world’s most delicious coffee. I contend that humanitarian aid was a
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“free gift,” that is, a gift given with no intention of reciprocation or counter-gift, and that the
IDPs were mostly critical of this assistentialist aid.
Inspired by Didier Fassin’s (2012) critique of humanitarian reason, I ask, why do some
people embrace (government sourced) humanitarianism in a context in which it is rejected
politically by powerful local actors, such as the EZLN? Fassin shows us how refugees were
ungrateful and not at all docile, and I showed how IDPs were critical of the aid they received,
considering it not good enough. When and how do aid recipients become critical of the aid they
are forced to receive? What is the result? How did this play out at the INI camp?
In response to the Zapatista uprising, the Mexican government instituted the successful
cash transfer program, Progresa/Oportunidades/Prospera in 1997. The program required state
oversight for participants and was extremely intrusive. In their to-some-extent-successful
attempts to buy off adherents of the neo-Zapatista social movement and gain their loyalty, these
conditional “gifts” illustrated the Maussian binary between gifts and war. Mauss (1990, 105)
tells us that “it is by opposing reason to feeling, by pitting the will to peace against sudden
outbursts of insanity… that peoples succeed in substituting alliance, gifts, and trade for war,
isolation and stagnation,” with the unrest in the short term in the Chiapas case. This is likewise a
Marxist reading of “history from below” (Fassin 2012, 79). Mexico had done exactly this in
1997 with Progresa; it was an attempt to forestall further violence and entice supporters of the
EZLN to leave for the PRI. The PRI government, to gain supporters, had to buy them in an ageold clientelistic pattern, in Latin America with the use and manipulation of resources, and the
both hidden and open mechanisms and dynamics of exercising power, while the neo-Zapatistas
set out to win hearts and minds.
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Social reproduction needs were provided for, yet contested, by “gifts” of problematic
humanitarian aid. The atole-making project was a failure for cultural reasons, and because the
women couldn’t get along to cooperate on the project, but it was also unacceptable in the
affective-cognitive, psychological and community senses, although it provided assistance with
social reproduction needs. The humanitarian aid shipments from the Mexican Red Cross and
later the ICRC were tolerated but never really “accepted” in the physical sense, although the
IDPs were forced to accept them for lack of other alternatives. Top-down public health
infrastructures threatened the IDPs’ fragile autonomy, but they were coerced into accepting
them. The CONAFE school was accepted after nearly a year, as it met community needs for
education. The loan from FONAES was accepted after some coercion on the part of the NGOs,
but the women were excited about the project from its inception. As for the decision whether or
not to accept the governmental aid of COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa Gamboa in January of
1999, political decisions were sometimes made on the personal and familial level as IDPs proved
themselves to be social agents with “a feel for the game” (Bourdieu 2005) in accepting political
patronage. Humanitarian aid is ostensibly a free gift, yet there may be strings attached, as there
certainly is with the gift economy of clientelism. The gift model is a perfect corollary to a field
that is, first and foremost, based on giving.
In Chapter Four I discussed paramilitarization and civil war, and the events that
produced the displacement of 20,000 people in the highlands alone in 1997. NAFTA caused a
deepening of poverty, already abject, and immiseration, and in this context, marginalized and
landless young men were recruited by military-commanded paramilitary bands in 1997.
Paramilitarization was part of a counterinsurgency strategy by the Mexican government due to
the 1996 cease-fire as a result of the rebellion. One-third of the Mexican army was stationed in
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Chiapas by the fall of 1997. In this chapter, I showed how fear and threats by paramilitaries
intensified in the fall of 1997 in Chenalhó, leading to massive displacements in the lead up to the
Acteal massacre of December 22nd of the same year. I here presented testimonio, which I
collected in 1998, that proves the Chiapas conflict had turned into a civil war by 1997.
Like others I argued that land grabs by landless paramilitaries and the militarization of
the highlands were a result of structural poverty and the loss of ejido, or communal, lands in the
late 1990s following President Salinas de Gotari’s “reform” of Article 27 of the Constitution, in
place since the Mexican Revolution. The situation became dire as ejidos could now be bought
and sold on the market. In the period following the Zapatista rebellion, ejidatarios took back
their lands, or “recuperated” them, and others, who had no title to ejido—or private—lands,
joined the paramilitaries. By this time in Chiapas, displacements were part of the low-intensity
war against the EZLN; paramilitaries threatened families who would not—or could not—pay the
“cooperación” the paramilitaries demanded to pay for arms in the fall of 1997, just prior to the
Acteal massacre.158 Although the federal government’s report on Acteal, the Libro Blanco Sobre
Acteal, or White Paper on Acteal, blamed inter-ethnic and inter-community feuds for the
violence in the highlands, paramilitary activity in the countryside was responsible for the unrest.
The fabric of social life in Chenalhó was torn apart, revealing that the violence had both material
and ideological ramifications. Paramilitary activity also meant that there were no safe conditions
of return—and, although a few families returned to the communities of Canolal and Quextic in
2001 (and were hyped in the media), the majority were permanently dispossessed. The
paramilitary saw the conflict as an opportunity to take over vacated property.

158

This amount ranged from 100 to 300 pesos per family, or ten to thirty U.S. dollars, a substantial sum for
campesinos, or peasant farmers.
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In Chapter Four, I showed the light sentencing that the material authors of the crime of
Acteal received and I argue that this, as well as the Attorney General’s report, the White Paper
on Acteal (1998) whitewashed the massacre and protected the intellectual authors of Acteal. The
massacre exemplified the precepts of low-intensity war, the use of the army to surround the
conflict zone and the use of paramilitaries to carry out violent acts. The Mexican military was
within earshot of the high caliber gunshots during the massacre. The intellectual authors remain
free, and only 82 of 88 paramilitaries served time—less than half of their 25-40 year sentences—
and all were freed by 2014. The massacre was first and foremost a human rights violation, and I
here profile a law workshop facilitated by the human rights center CDHFBC in the summer of
1999 at Acteal, a year and a half after the massacre. The workshop was attended by
representantes from the communities of Chenalhó and survivors of the massacre. It illustrates
how the concept of rights had to be explained to representatives of the communities and
survivors, who were learning about their rights for the first time. The workshop stressed that
proof—documents, local and expert witnesses, testimonies and confessions and the direct,
material evidence of death, the bullets and high-caliber rifle wounds—was critical to making a
legal case.
In Chapter Five, I discussed the politics of humanitarian and development aid, which
became a crisis by the summer of 1998. The IDPs at the INI camp were living in dismal
conditions during 1998 and 1999—they were malnourished and losing weight and dependent
upon aid organizations for their very survival, and that aid did not stretch far enough.
Additionally, there was a struggle between the ICRC, backed by the European Union, and the
Mexican Red Cross for control of the aid-giving process. I showed the involvement of several
NGOs and the diocese of San Cristóbal in forging—and forcing—consensus among the disparate
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actors at the INI camp, base Zapatista supporters, Evangelicals and a sprinkling of PRI
supporters among them. I argue that displaced members of Las Abejas were forced to adhere to
an agenda that they didn’t create, giving up both agency and sought-for autonomy in the process
and through their criticisms and ungratefulness at camp, how they illustrate the critique of
humanitarian reason (Fassin 2011; 2012). I also demonstrated how NGO and INGO
humanitarian aid was a “pure gift” to the IDPs but how governmental humanitarian aid
demanded reciprocity in the form of adherence to the PRI in a gift economy. I also demonstrated
the role of humanitarian aid acceptance for the split at the INI camp, with half returning to Acteal
in February 1999 rather than accept state aid, offered by COCOPA member Emilio Rabasa
Gamboa. IDPs in Chiapas—of whom there are still 27,000 today—continue to struggle for
autonomy in the context of limited humanitarian aid.
There were 21 IDP camps in the highlands alone in 1998, and eight more in the zona
norte and the selva. The relief effort was plagued with problems and logistical difficulties. Pohló
and X’Oyep, the largest and arguably the most political of the camps, were clear in banning the
Mexican Red Cross from making donations to EZLN autonomous camps; Las Abejas followed
suit. Because the Mexican Red Cross sent outdated medications to the highland camps, the
EZLN refused all aid until the Mexican Red Cross promised not to do so again. The IDPs at INI
rejected the first shipment of food from the Mexican Red Cross, believing that it came from
PRIistas, whereas aid was accepted at Acteal right after the massacre. After much internal
debate, Las Abejas at INI decided that the Mexican Red Cross was a “neutral” organization, and
that it would be allowed to provide humanitarian aid. But the EZLN rejected “gifts” of
humanitarian aid from Juan Ramón de la Fuente, then Minister of Health in the Zedillo
administration, who visited several IDP camps by helicopter in late December 1997 and early
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January 1998. Las Abejas likewise rejected the medicine, food, blankets and housing proffered.
The ICRC, UNICEF, Medecins sans Frontières, and local agencies like CCESC, the Fideicomiso
por los Niños Indigenas and Melel Xojobal quickly stepped in to provide the needed aid.
At a meeting of several NGOs, the diocese of San Cristóbal, and the IDPs at INI in July
1998, the question arose of how to end assistentialist aid in favor of having “a little borrowed
land” to work. The doll project was proposed at the meeting, as well; however, the INI group
voted with their feet and split into two rather than resolve their internal disputes. At INI, the IDPs
were never able to achieve a consensus or to act collectively. The IDPs ultimately rejected the
NGOs’ attempts to control every aspect of their lives. To achieve both unity and autonomy, the
group of Las Abejas at the INI camp had to split apart, leading to Sociedad Civil Las Abejas’ first
fracture.
It is the political anthropologist’s goal, as Joan Vincent (2004, 2) notes, “to understand,
interpret, and transmit the ideologies and circumstances of political structure, political
organization, and political action. These relate to each other as choreography does to dance, and
as dance does to performance.” Because of this emphasis on political action, there has been a
misreading of the fact that people often leave social movements when they do not continue to
meet their needs. In the context of the Chiapas conflict, some left the EZLN and Las Abejas
because they could not afford to refuse material aid from the Mexican state. This is a material
inducement, which proved, for at least a few, to be too tempting to resist, and is central to this
study. Because of these conflicts, I suggest, after Amartya Sen (1983) and James Ferguson
(2010), that food aid would be better replaced with monetary aid in humanitarian situations.
In Chapter Six, I examined the delivery of health services at INI and at Acteal; structural
violence and structural poverty affected the administration of health services in the camp at INI
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and at Acteal—and because of INGOs such as Médicos del Mundo at Acteal and NGOs such as
CCESC and the nurse and doctors from the IMSS Social Security hospital, Clínica de Campo at
INI, “gifts” of medical attention increased for populations that experienced little of it prior to
armed conflict. Public health was the stratagem of the NGOs, the ICRC and Mexican
governmental health providers in 1998-99 in Chiapas. Patients were not seen as individuals, but
rather, as members of a community who could spread panic and fear over contagious illnesses
such as cholera, bacterial infections or parasites, as I illustrated in this chapter.
The rainy season presented its own set of challenges: cholera, diarrhea, typhoid, intestinal
parasites, respiratory infections and dysentery. Because fecal matter is carried by the torrential
rains during May to November, even the water turns lethal. Diarrhea spreads from person to
person through physical contact with the water and the mud or soil below it. Because of the
flooded bathrooms at INI, coupled with the custom of bodily elimination in the open fields, the
water spread parasites and disease, and cholera is always a distinct possibility. The water trucked
in by the Mexican Red Cross continually ran out before its two-week replenishment, and the
IDPs began using the stream to bathe and to wash clothes in, even though they knew it was
polluted by human and animal waste and thus, unhygienic. Because there were no tubs to heat
the limited potable water or to bathe in and there was no shower, expecting the IDPs to bathe
was unrealistic, and divested them of their agency—and their autonomy.
I demonstrated how through encounters between IDPs and public health professionals,
public health reminders and lectures remained incompletely implemented. The constant overt
messages pressed upon the IDPs by public health teams angered the INI population; because
conditions at the camp were unsanitary in the extreme, it was impossible to implement basic
public health measures. Yet, the IDPs were blamed for their perceived shortcomings. They had
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no agency, as it was stripped away by the NGOs; autonomy was practically non-existent. The
use of indigenous health promoters in the camps was a special “gift,” such as in the
administration of vaccinations at Acteal in 1999, and was one way of reasserting autonomy, but
was limited in scope. Most public health aid was assistentialist, but indigenous health promoters
were the exception to this rule, as they assuaged fears and offered a sociological vision of illness
at Acteal. At a workshop on skin diseases for indigenous health promoters facilitated by Médicos
del Mundo in July, 1999, the political and sociological orientation differed from allopathic
medicine, accentuating poverty as the main cause of the Chiapas conflict, responsible for the
creation of paramilitaries, the EZLN and Las Abejas—and it was entirely different than the
medical oversight that I observed in 1998-99 at INI.
By June 1999, aid rejection had severely affected the Acteal camp. There were few
medications, and the clinic run by Médicos del Mundo was sporadically staffed. This camp and
others like it were worse off than INI because they refused any government support. There was
no atole in the stores and no supplemental nutritional foods for the children. However, at INI,
people protested the “gift” of the atole making development project instituted by DIF by not
participating, and the food rations from the Mexican Red Cross and later, the ICRC, were
inadequate, so ultimately there was not a great deal of difference.
In Chapter Seven I profiled a successful microcredit development project which is still in
operation after 20 years. The project, a loan, midway between gift and commodity exchange, was
supported by the government agency, FONAES, the social development arm of INI, and came to
fruition in the summer of 1999 after a year of planning. Although I worked on the project’s
proposal in the spring of 1998, the funds became available only in June of 1999. Several things
were—and are—interesting about the project. For one, the principals noted that there had been a
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social transformation in indigenous communities in which commodification had taken hold. That
is, some women’s histories channeled them towards working in the fields or tending sheep rather
than towards sewing or embroidering, as neoliberalism transformed the countryside. Such
women bought their trajes from women who specialized in their production. By the summer of
1999, food rations from the ICRC were basic, corn flour and beans, and even beans were in short
supply, due in part to the many victims of Hurricane Mitch which made landfall in Chiapas and
Guatemala in September of 1998, and the project allowed the women to overturn the purely
assistentialist and charity-laden shipments of food to the INI camp. And because of the
popularity of the dolls, the dolls themselves have been copied by women from Chamula, a
township near Chenalhó, although they lack the anatomical correctness of the originals. Dr.
Marcos Arana of CCESC, whose brainchild the project was, uses the finished dolls to teach the
women about their sexual rights. The project also helped lift the “INItis’” spirits, one of the
project’s early goals.
In 1998, during an early planning session at a San Cristóbal café, CCESC’s Dr. Marcos
Arana explained that the project would accomplish four goals: 1) promote work for women and
allow them to re-learn skills they hoped would work to their advantage; 2) build confidence and
restore their previous self-sufficiency; 3) promote Spanish language skills and literacy through
involvement with the teams from CCESC, FONAES, and with suppliers; and 4) instill among the
displaced a collective vision, which was lacking, and evident in the discord, jealousy, and
disunity that was apparent at the INI camp at the project’s outset in 1998. Once begun, the doll
project fostered unity and a collective vision of the displaced as indigenous people from
Chenalhó. Monolingual Tzotzil speakers learned basic Spanish—words for cloth, dolls, and
materials, among others. The women who worked on the project achieved a level of self-
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sufficiency. They used money from early sales to purchase supplies anew but put whatever
remained into their bank account. And perhaps most significant, women who had never before
known how to sew or embroider learned from others who did. This last point was especially true
of the girls, who learned quickly, practicing embroidering on scraps of cloth, and even on their
own trajes.
The dolls sell for $45.00 dollars in the United States, and for similar prices in the
European Union. At 2019 exchange rates of 19 pesos to the dollar, that is 855.00 pesos per
doll—enough to support a rural family for a month, even given the compromiso to pay back the
loan. And the project allowed the women who worked on the project to break the invidious cycle
of dependency imposed by the ICRC, CARITAS and the Mexican Red Cross. And, like the
revolution affecting Zapatista women, for the dollmakers, the act of selling handicrafts was no
less revolutionary. That they continued making the breastfeeding dolls—mimetic representations
of themselves—once they had moved away from INI, and the fact that they could leave in the
first place was in no small way testament to CCESC’s and FONAES’s faith in the women’s
skilled handiwork and in the eagerness to work that the women had shown from the project’s
beginning. Although the development project was yet another instance of Las Abejas at INI
protesting the resistance—the EZLN mandate to reject aid—it was the best means for the INIti to
move forward with their lives, in which the women played an enormous role.
Chapter Eight detailed social reproduction under trying circumstances, something which
Breckenridge and Appadurai (1999, iii) have called “an everyday miracle.” I examined
children’s lives in displacement, at INI and at Acteal through involvement in trauma (play and
drawing) workshops with the “Colectivo de apoyo a niños desplazados de Chenalhó,” or,
“collective to support displaced children of Chenalhó,” by accompanying the children to the
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CONAFE (Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo) school at INI during January and February
of 1999, and by accompanying Las Abejas and BAEZLN children at Acteal to the Las Abejas
and BAEZLN schools and play and drawing workshops there during the summer of 1999. Lowintensity war and aid rejection—and even its acceptance—had affected the children. At the INI
camp, they had lost weight, had many illnesses, and were malnourished, and they were out of
school for most of their tenure at INI, for the first year, from December 1997 to December 1998.
They experienced PTSD, and the trauma (play and drawing) workshops were their only sustained
contact with adults attempting to lessen their trauma.
Numerous studies have shown that children are among those most affected by war, with
political violence, ethnic strife, brutality and large-scale terrorism explicitly targeting children, as
at Acteal. Eighty percent of refugees worldwide are women and children. In Chiapas, the
majority of the displaced were children under the age of 18 in Los Altos, the zone most affected
by violence in 1997-99. Children I observed at INI and at Acteal were hyperaware of the large
military presence around which all negotiated their lives. Through their drawings and behavior,
children at Acteal still exhibited signs of PTSD a year and a half after the massacre. Military
overflights made the children throw themselves to the ground both at INI and at Acteal; at INI
and later at Acteal, Miguelina did not speak for nearly a year and a half after the massacre; the
children’s play echoed the military presence, as they constructed Humvees, tanks and helicopters
out of cardboard and waste materials, as well as sticks. The boys, especially, both constructed
and drew tanks, Humvees, helicopters, grenades and rifles, evidence of the conflict and of
residual trauma. The children were restless and easily startled, and during the summer of 1998,
the INI children’s PTSD was showcased while they attended the Festival Internacional Artístico
Multidisciplinario (International Multidisciplinary Arts Festival) held at the Casa de las
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Imágenes in San Cristóbal. Gustavo, a boy of 18 who was informally in charge of the children
when they exited the INI camp, decided to return the children to camp hours early after a man
whose skin was painted blue and yellow with smears of red ran hysterically through the crowd,
screaming as if he were angry, being pursued or attacking someone. The children, violently
frightened, scattered in all directions, covered their eyes, and took refuge behind me. This was a
miscalculation in planning the event, as it exacerbated the effects of the children’s PTSD.
The “gift” of the CONAFE school was accepted against the dictates of the Mesa
Directiva at Acteal and the EZLN. Although it was a final instance of the IDPs protesting the
resistance, through it they displayed their own push for autonomy. CONAFE sent two teachers to
the INI camp in early February, 1998. After several weeks, the IDPs realized that the state
provided the teachers and decided to reject them. Awareness of government-sourced aid was
high soon after the massacre. Yet, by the end of 1998, the IDPs accepted the teachers from
CONAFE because they came to believe that the children, who had been idled for a year by then,
would be better off going to a school—even a state-run school. The two schools at Acteal, the
Las Abejas school and the BAEZLN school, socialized the children into the political orientations
of their parents. The Las Abejas school stressed pacifism and dignity, as well as a religious
identity, and the BAEZLN school taught resistance to the Mexican state, ethnic and cultural
identity, and the Chiapas conflict. Both schools continue to this day, and continue to teach these
subjects, largely in the children’s mother tongues. An entire generation has come of age since the
conflict started, and these children not only know that “another world is possible,” as members
of the neo-Zapatista movement, both Sociedad Civil Las Abejas and EZLN, they live it every
day.
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Discussion
In exchange for the gift of “fragments of their life” (Fassin 2012, 81) the IDPs at the INI
camp, like the poor and the refugees studied by Didier Fassin received “the counter gift of a
means of survival.” Fassin might have been talking about the INI camp, so similar—and
unequal—was the exchange system. At INI, human rights workers and anthropologists collected
“fragments of their life,” while humanitarian aid providers (from NGOs and INGOs) gave the
“gift” of aid. I showed how much of this aid was contested throughout this study.
Gifts of humanitarian aid, health care provisioning and public health, atole-making
ingredients and supplies, schooling, a loan from a government source, and government aid all
contributed to shoring up social reproduction at the INI camp during 1998 and 1999. And social
reproduction was something that was not a given as the health of both children and adults was
fragile, illnesess were common, weight loss was endemic, and parasites rampant. There was a
risk of cholera. Public health was a concern, but it threatened the IDPs’ tenuous autonomy.
Schooling lasted for a mere two months at camp—and it meant accepting a state-run school,
counter to the neo-Zapatista and CCRI-CG rule on rejecting government aid. Social reproduction
itself, thus, was a gift that was fundamentally necessitated at the INI camp, and it was one that
was accepted by the majority in the face of dire need.
In an exception to the self-rule laid out in the Sexta,159 the restriction on acceptance of
“gifts” of government aid came from the CCRI-CG, or Zapatista comandancia (leadership). But
many people, among them my research participants, braced at these restrictions, choosing instead
to make their own decisions, which were likewise autonomous, albeit on a personal and familial
level. These decisions came from the base, rather than the top of their organization, Las Abejas.

159

The Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Rainforest, or Sexta for short.
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They showed agency in acts of defiance against their social movement’s strictures. As a result, a
struggle ensued over humanitarian aid, with IDPs rejecting, but more often accepting,
governmental aid. But underlying this was a blistering poverty whose roots were structural, deep,
and enduring—a systemic poverty which had finally begun to lessen twenty-two years after the
Zapatista uprising because of self-sufficiency in merchandising boots, blouses and other
Zapatista items, Zapatista coffee cooperatives, classes in Tzotzil and Spanish at Oventik, one of
the caracoles, and international connections—which affected the entire EZLN and Las Abejas
right along with them. Many could not hang on until conditions improved and Zapatismo’s and
Las Abejas’s autonomous communities could ameliorate the material conditions of life.
Leaving Las Abejas, thus, was a critical survival strategy, a hope for a way out of poverty,
as well as a stepping stone to a viable life, as was relocating back to Acteal. Those who chose the
former path accepted “gifts” of government aid that made their loyalty to the PRI obligatory in a
gift economy, while the others relied on international donations from both NGOs and national
governments, largely European Union member states. These strategies were polar opposites but
still similar in their desperation and emotive expression. But these events happened fourteen
months after the Acteal massacre. By then the levels of fear among the small population at INI
had decreased to manageable size; at Acteal in July 1999, Las Abejas succeeded in jeering and
booing at the paramilitary who were walking by.
Yet, this story is ultimately one of hope, as this group of Las Abejas continues to
reimagine their identity. Life for the IDPs has been one of continual struggle, and that has not
abated since the summer of 1997 as the seeds of discord were sown in Chenalhó and
displacement in Los Altos begun. This study demonstrates how, even within the Zapatista project
of autonomy, autonomous decisions were being made daily on the microlevel. Most notably,
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children’s needs for schooling and proper nutrition were placed before Las Abejas’ commitment
to resistance at INI. At the INI camp, a different sort of resistance was evident: foot-dragging
directed against the EZLN and the organization Sociedad Civil Las Abejas rather than against the
Mexican state. As such, this story is ultimately a human story of mixed emotions and a staunch
unwillingness to act in ways that counter common sense and habitus. The struggle to survive is
paramount to this subset of survivors of the Acteal massacre. This struggle continues today, even
within those who had been part of the movement, noted, on February 5, 2016, by Comandante
Moisès:
“Zapatista settlements were ‘better than 22 years ago’, but also better than those in nonautonomous communities, which have been supported by government programs. But
some observers say government money has already caused the movement to splinter. The
offers can be enticing for the inhabitants of impoverished communities as government
officials and political parties hand out everything from sheep to bicycles to bags of
fertilizer-–especially at election time” (Agren, 2016).
And so it goes. La lucha sigue, the struggle continues. And, as the continued examples of
patronage illustrate, the struggles continue.
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Epilogue: Leaving Las Abejas

“Somos pobres,” “we are poor” began the Zapatista at the wheel of the combi I took to
Chenalhó in Chiapas on Christmas Eve, 2014, or Nochebuena in Mexico. “We are poor and that
is why we want to live in the United States. I want to go to New York. Everyone does.” Fidencio
lived in the community of Tzabalhó, a community with both Zapatistas and PRIistas in the
municipality of Chenalhó. I asked if I could interview him at the end of his shift. It turned out
that, besides the communal van, he also drove a taxi and so we made plans for the next day. I
was eager to hear what he had to say about his community and equally eager to find my research
participants, members of Sociedad Civil Las Abejas who had splintered off to form a new faction
of Las Abejas (Las Abejas Associación Civil) in 2008 and some of whom had formed yet another
faction, Unión de Pueblos Indígenas Las Abejas de los Altos de Chiapas, in 2012.
I was told by the human rights center, Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de
Las Casas, during a visit in April 2011, that Las Abejas had had a bitter split. I had also read
about it on the Sociedad Civil Las Abejas website in 2011. The new community was called
Nuevo Yibeljoj, which in 1997 was a Las Abejas and EZLN community. The problem was that
the new group of Las Abejas (Associación Civil) had invaded the land, which was bought by
Sociedad Civil Las Abejas that year. The new group of Las Abejas took down Sociedad Civil
Las Abejas’ fencing and roofing and began to till the soil. Many lands continued to be, and are
still, as a matter of course, invaded.
As Fidencio, the Zapatista “chofer,” and I drove cautiously over unpaved roads on
Christmas morning to the new community of Nuevo Yibeljoj to search for my two old friends—
Sebastián Gómez Pérez and Manuel López Pérez, whom the Mesa Directiva had told me on
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December 22 (the day of the annual mass at Acteal for the 45 victims of the 1997 Acteal
massacre) both lived in Nuevo Yibeljoj—I was hopeful. I had been unable to find them on prior
visits in 2009, 2010 or 2011, when no one—either at Frayba or at Acteal—would confirm their
whereabouts; however, this time would be different. It had been 15 years since I had last seen
them, Manuel at Acteal during my stay there in the summer of 1999, and Sebastián that summer
at INI.
We found Nuevo Yibeljoj at the top of a rocky hill, after driving over loose gravel and
dust at five mph. The entire community was gathered because it was Christmas Day. Fidencio
spoke to the responsible, Antonio, in Tzotzil. Neither Sebastián nor Manuel were there—nor
lived there, Antonio told us. I was unsure whom to believe. However, Fidencio’s Tzotzil and
Zapatista status worked a kind of magic. I thought we had given up when we approached
Chenalhó, the cabecera or municipal seat, but Fidencio had other ideas. He stopped abruptly in
the center of town. Both Sebastián and Manuel were there, he told me quietly. I jumped out of
the taxi. As our boots crunched on the gravel underfoot, we walked down a driveway out back to
a brand new unfurnished white cement building which had American style paneled doors and
plastic outdoor stackable chairs such as you would see in a cantina in rural Mexico. It was the
seat of the PRI government in Chenalhó, the Casa de Gobierno PRI. I could not have been more
shocked.
Standing at the entrance was none other than Sebastián, looking not much older. He wore
an unwrinkled light blue button-down dress shirt and dress pants; his eyes bore slightly more
lines, but otherwise he was unchanged. He rushed to hug me, showing much the same bravado as
he had while still the responsable at the INI camp, before the election of Gerardo in his stead. In
a thrilled tone of voice this former campesino told me that he “worked with his fingers now,”
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wiggling his fingers and smiling ecstatically. A second shock awaited me. This former “Word of
God” Catholic was now a minister with the religious organization Consejo Mundial de la Iglesia,
or World Council of Churches. At this news, I nearly sunk down in my chair. My former Las
Abejas leader had abruptly switched sides. Sebastián admitted to leaving Las Abejas for the
greater resources of this ecumenical non-governmental organization.160 In 1992 he had joined
Sociedad Civil Las Abejas. In 1994, he joined the EZLN.161 He explained that Derechos
Humanos, as most Mexicans call Frayba, Pueblo Creyente, the EZLN, the Catholic Church and
Las Abejas all took on the philosophy of 1994, that is, the EZLN’s First Declaration of the Selva
Lacondona. He told me that he had left Las Abejas because of the inadequacy of humanitarian
aid in 1999. Then he went to the United States under the aegis of the World Council of Churches
and began proselytizing. In Florida, he worked with indigenous immigrants who worked in
agriculture under inhumane conditions.
Manuel was not there on Christmas Day. But a further shock awaited: Sebastián
confirmed—at my query about the 2011 U.S. lawsuit against Zedillo by the 10 survivors of the
Acteal massacre in New Haven, Connecticut—that it was he along with nine others who had
brought the lawsuit in against the Mexican president whom many called the “intellectual author”
of the massacre. He was proud at spearheading the lawsuit. He told me that “Las Abejas divided
in two….” His faction was called Unión de Pueblos Indígenas Las Abejas de los Altos de
Chiapas, formed in 2012. The faction that split apart from Sociedad Civil Las Abejas in 2008
was Las Abejas, Asociación Civil, the group in Nuevo Yibeljoj. We exchanged contact

160

Founded in 1948 at the First Assembly in Amsterdam ecumenical conference, this NGO has an agenda of human
rights protections, protections for immigrants and a commitment to the poor.
161
Collier and Quaratiello (1994) show how indigenous Chiapanecos’ identities are often shifting and fluid, much
like Sebastián’s multiple, serial identities throughout his life.
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information. I promised to come back and we left Sebastián standing in the municipal cabecera
in Chenalhó.
The struggle to subsist is paramount to this subset of survivors of the Acteal massacre,
and, as a result, they have abandoned participation in the struggle against the Mexican
government—and against the EZLN—and have forged an alternate reality. Yet, as the examples
of Sebastián and Manuel demonstrate, they have not given up hope for a better future.
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